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  1. added 2018-07-30
    The Argument From Reason, and Mental Causal Drainage: A Reply to van Inwagen.Brandon Rickabaugh & Todd Buras - 2017 - Philosophia Christi 19 (2):381-399.
    According to Peter van Inwagen, C. S. Lewis failed in his attempt to undermine naturalism with his Argument from Reason. According to van Inwagen, Lewis provides no justification for his central premise, that naturalism is inconsistent with holding beliefs for reasons. What is worse, van Inwagen argues that the main premise in Lewis's argument from reason is false. We argue that it is not false. The defender of Lewis's argument can make use of the problem of mental causal drainage, a (...)
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  2. added 2018-07-24
    Empirismus, naturalismus a ideje.Tomas Hribek - 2017 - Filosoficky Casopis 2 (65):297-315.
    [Empiricism, Naturalism, and Ideas] The author analyses the modern reception of key themes in Hume’s philosophy during the past century. The first part presents Hume’s version of three such themes – empi­ricism, naturalism and the theory of ideas. The following three parts give an exposition of modern forms of each of these themes, with the choice of modern reception being directed to those contemporary authors who not only developed Hume’s motifs in the most original way, but who also explicitly traced (...)
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  3. added 2018-07-24
    Z evolučního hlediska: Pojem evoluce v současné filosofii.Tomas Hribek & Vladimír Havlík - 2011 - Praha, Česko: Filosofia.
    [From an Evolutionary Point of View: The Concept of Evolution in Contemporary Philosophy].
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  4. added 2018-04-17
    Anthropologischer und ethischer Naturalismus.Geert Keil - 2004 - In Bernd Goebel, Anna Maria Hauk & Gerhard Kruip (eds.), Probleme des Naturalismus. Philosophische Beiträge. Mentis. pp. 65-100.
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  5. added 2018-04-12
    Homunkulismus in den Kognitionswissenschaften.Geert Keil - 2003 - In Wolfgang R. Köhler & Hans-Dieter Mutschler (eds.), Ist der Geist berechenbar? Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. pp. 77-112.
    1. Was ist ein Homunkulus-Fehlschluß? 2. Analyse des Mentalen und Naturalisierung der Intentionalität 3. Homunkulismus in Theorien der visuellen Wahrnehmung 4. Homunkulismus und Repräsentationalismus 5. Der homunkulare Funktionalismus 6. Philosophische Sinnkritik und empirische Wissenschaft Literatur .
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  6. added 2018-01-02
    The Determinable–Determinate Relation Can’T Save Adverbialism.Alex Grzankowski - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):45-52.
    Adverbialist theories of thought such as those advanced by Hare and Sellars promise an ontologically sleek understanding of a variety of intentional states, but such theories have been largely abandoned due to the ‘many-property problem’. In an attempt to revitalize this otherwise attractive theory, in a series of papers as well as his recent book, Uriah Kriegel has offered a novel reply to the ‘many-property problem’ and on its basis he argues that ‘adverbialism about intentionality is alive and well’. If (...)
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  7. added 2017-08-28
    The Role of Valence in Intentionality.David Leech Anderson - 2017 - Mind and Matter 15 (1):71-90.
    Functional intentionality is the dominant theory about how mental states come to have the content that they do. Phenomenal intentionality is an increasingly popular alternative to that orthodoxy, claiming that intentionality cannot be functionalized and that nothing is a mental state with intentional content unless it is phenomenally conscious. There is a consensus among defenders of phenomenal intentionality that the kind of phenomenology that is both necessary and sufficient for having a belief that "there is a tree in the quad" (...)
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  8. added 2017-03-13
    Naturalismus und Biologie.Geert Keil - 2007 - In Ludger Honnefelder & Matthias C. Schmidt (eds.), Naturalismus als Paradigma. Berlin University Press. pp. 76-85.
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  9. added 2016-11-13
    Biologische Funktionen und das Teleologieproblem.Geert Keil - 2007 - In Ludger Honnefelder & Matthias C. Schmidt (eds.), Naturalismus als Paradigma. Berlin University Press. pp. 76-85.
    Die im Beitrag behandelte Frage, ob sich die organische Natur des Menschen sowie seine Gesundheits- und Krankheitszustände naturalistisch auffassen lassen, erscheint zunächst irritierend. Ist nicht der Mensch als Säugetier ein natürliches Phänomen par excellence? Wie alle anderen Tiere kann der Mensch gesund oder krank sein, weil er einen Körper hat, dessen vielfältige biologische Funktionen störungsanfällig sind. Was sollte es hier noch zu naturalisieren geben? Integrieren sich Organismus, Gesundheit und Krankheit nicht gleichsam von selbst in ein naturwissenschaftliches Weltbild? Die zu klärende (...)
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  10. added 2016-11-03
    A Theory of Practical Meaning.Carlotta Pavese - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (2):65-96.
    This essay is divided into two parts. In the first part (§2), I introduce the idea of practical meaning by looking at a certain kind of procedural systems — the motor system — that play a central role in computational explanations of motor behavior. I argue that in order to give a satisfactory account of the content of the representations computed by motor systems (motor commands), we need to appeal to a distinctively practical kind of meaning. Defending the explanatory relevance (...)
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  11. added 2016-10-21
    Review of I Am A Strange Loop by Douglas Hofstadter (2007).Michael Starks - 2017 - Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks 3rd Ed. (2017).
    Latest Sermon from the Church of Fundamentalist Naturalism by Pastor Hofstadter. Like his much more famous work Godel, Escher, Bach, it has a superficial plausibility but if one understands that this is rampant scientism which mixes real scientific issues with philosophical ones (i.e., the only real issues are what language games we ought to play) then almost all its interest disappears. I provide a framework for analysis based in evolutionary psychology and the work of Wittgenstein (since updated in my more (...)
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  12. added 2016-09-26
    The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in the Writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle.Michael R. Starks - manuscript
    I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and Searle on the logical structure of intentionality (mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic (...)
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  13. added 2016-07-12
    In Defense of Representation.Arthur B. Markman & Eric Dietrich - 2000 - Cognitive Psychology 40 (2):138--171.
    The computational paradigm, which has dominated psychology and artificial intelligence since the cognitive revolution, has been a source of intense debate. Recently, several cognitive scientists have argued against this paradigm, not by objecting to computation, but rather by objecting to the notion of representation. Our analysis of these objections reveals that it is not the notion of representation per se that is causing the problem, but rather specific properties of representations as they are used in various psychological theories. Our analysis (...)
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  14. added 2016-07-06
    Meaning Generation for Constraint Satisfaction. An Evolutionary Thread for Biosemiotics.Christophe Menant - 2016 - Dissertation, Prague Charles University. Gatherings in Biosemiotics 2016
    One of the mains challenges of biosemiotics is ‘to attempt to naturalize biological meaning’ [Sharov & all 2015]. That challenge brings to look at a possible evolutionary thread for biosemiotics based on meaning generation for internal constraint satisfaction, starting with a pre-biotic entity emerging from a material universe. Such perspective complements and extends previous works that used a model of meaning generation for internal constraint satisfaction (the Meaning Generator System) [Menant 2003a, b; 2011]. We propose to look at such an (...)
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  15. added 2016-02-25
    Mind in Life. [REVIEW]Tobias Schlicht - 2009 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 63 (4):615-619.
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  16. added 2016-02-25
    Orthogonality of Phenomenality and Content.Gottfried Vosgerau, Tobias Schlicht & Albert Newen - 2008 - American Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4):309 - 328.
    This paper presents arguments from empirical research and from philosophical considerations to the effect that phenomenality and content are two distinct and independent features of mental representations, which are both relational. Thus, it is argued, classical arguments that infer phenomenality from content have to be rejected. Likewise, theories that try to explain the phenomenal character of experiences by appeal to specific types of content cannot succeed. Instead, a dynamic view of consciousness has to be adopted that seeks to explain consciousness (...)
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  17. added 2016-02-25
    Action in Perception. [REVIEW]Tobias Schlicht & Ulrike Pompe - 2007 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 61 (2):250-254.
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  18. added 2016-02-14
    Biosemiotics, Aboutness, Meaning and Bio-Intentionality. Proposal for an Evolutionary Approach (2015).Christophe Menant - 2015 - Dissertation, Biosemiotics Gatherings 2015. Aalborg University Copenhagen
    The management of meaningful information by biological entities is at the core of biosemiotics [Hoffmeyer 2010]. Intentionality, the ‘aboutness’ of mental states, is a key driver in philosophy of mind. Philosophers have been reluctant to use intentionality for non human animals. Some biologists have been in favor of it. J. Hoffmeyer has been using evolutionary intentionality and Peircean semiotics to discuss a biosemiotic approach to the problem of intentionality [Hoffmeyer 1996, 2012]. Also, recent philosophical studies are bringing new openings on (...)
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  19. added 2015-10-25
    Merleau-Ponty and Embodied Cognitive Science.Christopher Pollard - 2014 - Discipline Filosofiche 24 (2):67-90.
    What would the Merleau-Ponty of Phenomenology of Perception have thought of the use of his phenomenology in the cognitive sciences? This question raises the issue of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the relationship between the sciences and philosophy, and of what he took the philosophical significance of his phenomenology to be. In this article I suggest an answer to this question through a discussion of certain claims made in connection to the “post-cognitivist” approach to cognitive science by Hubert Dreyfus, Shaun Gallagher and (...)
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  20. added 2015-08-26
    Naturalismus.Geert Keil & Herbert Schnädelbach (eds.) - 2000 - Suhrkamp.
    Mit Beiträgen von Gerhard Vollmer, Dirk Koppelberg, Stephen Stich, W. v. O. Quine, Ansgar Beckermann, Dirk Hartmann und Rainer Lange, Mircea Flonta, Geert Keil, Peter Simons, Andreas Kemmerling, Lynne R. Baker, Holm Tetens und Peter Janich.
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  21. added 2015-07-25
    Naturalism.Geert Keil - 2008 - In Dermot Moran (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Twentieth-Century Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 254-307.
    1. Introduction 2. Naturalism in the First Half of the Century 3. Three Eminent Figures 3.1 Husserl 3.2 Wittgenstein 3.3 Quine 4. The Nature of Naturalism 5. A Classification of Naturalisms 5.1 Metaphysical Naturalism 5.2 Methodological, or Scientific, Naturalism 5.2.1 Naturalism with a Leading Science: Physicalism and Biologism 5.2.2 Naturalism without a Leading Science 5.3. Analytic, or Semantic, Naturalism 6. Three Fields of Naturalisation 6.1 Naturalising Epistemology 6.2 Naturalising Intentionality 6.3 Naturalising Normativity 7. Naturalism and Human Nature 8. Scientific naturalism (...)
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  22. added 2015-07-25
    Naturalismus und Intentionalität.Geert Keil - 2000 - In Geert Keil & Herbert Schnädelbach (eds.), Naturalismus. Suhrkamp. pp. 187-204.
    Naturalism in theoretical philosophy comes in three kinds: metaphysical, scientific and semantical. Metaphysical naturalism holds that only natural things exist, scientific (or methodological) naturalism holds that the methods of natural science provide the only avenue to truth, semantic (or analytic) naturalism tries to provide sufficient nonintentional conditions for intentional phenomena. The paper argues that analytic naturalism does not render metaphysical or scientific naturalism obsolete, but can be understood as a further step in elaborating upon these programmes. The intentional idiom of (...)
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  23. added 2015-07-25
    Naturalismus.Geert Keil & Herbert Schnädelbach - 2000 - In Geert Keil & Herbert Schnädelbach (eds.), Naturalismus. Suhrkamp. pp. 7-45.
    Survey article which introduces a collection of essays on philosophical naturalism, mainly dealing with the question what “naturalism” means in contemporary philosophy. Structure of the article: 1. History of Ideas/History of the Problems, 2. Man as a Part of Nature, 3. The Explanatory Primacy of the Natural Sciences, 4. Naturalism and Unity of Science, 5. The Consideration of Empirical Knowledge, 6. Naturalism, Science and Common Sense.
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  24. added 2014-11-09
    Three Myths of Intentionality Versus Some Medieval Philosophers.Gyula Klima - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):359-376.
    This paper argues that three characteristic modern positions concerning intentionality – namely, (1) that intentionality is ‘the mark of the mental’; (2) that intentionality concerns a specific type of objects having intentional inexistence; and (3) that intentionality somehow defies logic – are just three ‘modern myths’ that medieval philosophers, from whom the modern notion supposedly originated, would definitely reject.
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  25. added 2013-12-03
    Debunking Enactivism: A Critical Notice of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism. [REVIEW]Mohan Matthen - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (1):118-128.
    In this review of Hutto and Myin's Radicalizing Enactivism, I question the adequacy of a non-representational theory of mind. I argue first that such a theory cannot differentiate cognition from other bodily engagements such as wrestling with an opponent. Second, I question whether the simple robots constructed by Rodney Brooks are adequate as models of multimodal organisms. Last, I argue that Hutto and Myin pay very little attention to how semantically interacting representations are needed to give an account of choice (...)
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  26. added 2013-05-15
    Filozofia jako inżynieria odwrotna: rzecz o naturalizmie Daniela C. Dennetta.Marcin Miłkowski - 2004 - Przeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 50 (2):75-89.
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  27. added 2013-04-17
    Bodily Intentionality and Social Affordances in Context.Erik Rietveld - 2012 - In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction. !e role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins.
    There are important structural similarities in the way that animals and humans engage in unreflective activities, including unreflective social interactions in the case of higher animals. Firstly, it is a form of unreflective embodied intelligence that is ‘motivated’ by the situation. Secondly, both humans and non-human animals are responsive to ‘affordances’ (Gibson 1979); to possibilities for action offered by an environment. Thirdly, both humans and animals are selectively responsive to one affordance rather than another. Social affordances are a subcategory of (...)
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  28. added 2013-01-31
    Mind, Matter, Meaning and Information.Robin Faichney - 2013 - TripleC - Cognition, Communication, Co-Operation 11 (1):36-45.
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  29. added 2011-04-27
    L’irréductibilité de la connaissance et l’intentionnalité en contexte de découverte abductive.Philippe Gagnon - 2011 - Laval Théologique et Philosophique 67 (2):227-258.
    Knowledge is still an enigma, with its ability to inductively bring out a pattern without restricting itself to an empirical count of situations experienced. Instead of seeing the concept as a weakened object representing an external reality, it is suggested to view knowledge as the bridging of a distance with an ability for the knower to stay connected with outward reality. Attempts at defining an external and quantitative criterion of truth are questioned, as many human performances are not likely to (...)
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  30. added 2009-09-29
    Nietzsche, Naturalism, and the Tenacity of the Intentional.Mark Alfano - 2013 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 44 (3):457-464.
    In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche demands that “psychology shall be<br>recognized again as the queen of the sciences.” While one might cast a dubious glance at the “again,” many of Nietzsche’s insights were indeed psychological, and many of his arguments invoke psychological premises. In Genealogy, he criticizes the “English psychologists” for the “inherent psychological absurdity” of their theory of the origin of good and bad, pointing out the implausibility of the claim that the utility of unegoistic<br>actions would be forgotten. Tabling (...)
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  31. added 2008-12-31
    Materialism and the Logical Structure of Intentionality.George Bealer - 1996 - In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
    After a brief history of Brentano's thesis of intentionality, it is argued that intentionality presents a serious problem for materialism. First, it is shown that, if no general materialist analysis (or reduction) of intentionality is possible, then intentional phenomena would have in common at least one nonphysical property, namely, their intentionality. A general analysis of intentionality is then suggested. Finally, it is argued that any satisfactory general analysis of intentionality must share with this analysis a feature which entails the existence (...)
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