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  1. added 2020-09-12
    Strategic Reliabilism: A Naturalistic Approach to Epistemology.Michael A. Bishop & J. D. Trout - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):1049-1065.
    Strategic Reliabilism is a framework that yields relative epistemic evaluations of belief-producing cognitive processes. It is a theory of cognitive excellence, or more colloquially, a theory of reasoning excellence (where 'reasoning' is understood very broadly as any sort of cognitive process for coming to judgments or beliefs). First introduced in our book, Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment (henceforth EPHJ), the basic idea behind SR is that epistemically excellent reasoning is efficient reasoning that leads in a robustly reliable fashion (...)
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  2. added 2020-09-12
    Fast and Frugal Heuristics.Michael A. Bishop - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (2):201–223.
    A heuristic is a rule of thumb. In psychology, heuristics are relatively simple rules for making judgments. A fast heuristic is easy to use and allows one to make judgments quickly. A frugal heuristic relies on a small fraction of the available evidence in making judgments. Typically, fast and frugal heuristics (FFHs) have, or are claimed to have, a further property: They are very reliable, yielding judgments that are about as accurate in the long run as ideal non-fast, non-frugal rules. (...)
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  3. added 2020-09-12
    The Autonomy of Social Epistemology.Michael A. Bishop - 2005 - Episteme 2 (1):65-78.
    Social epistemology is autonomous: When applied to the same evidential situations, the principles of social rationality and the principles of individual rationality sometimes recommend inconsistent beliefs. If we stipulate that reasoning rationally from justified beliefs to a true belief is normally sufficient for knowledge, the autonomy thesis implies that some knowledge is essentially social. When the principles of social and individual rationality are applied to justified evidence and recommend inconsistent beliefs and the belief endorsed by social rationality is true, then (...)
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  4. added 2020-09-11
    The Role of Error in Computer Science.Gary Jason - 1989 - Philosophia 19 (4):403-416.
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  5. added 2020-07-28
    The Neural and Cognitive Mechanisms of Knowledge Attribution: An EEG Study.Adam Michael Bricker - 2020 - Cognition 203:104412.
    Despite the ubiquity of knowledge attribution in human social cognition, its associated neural and cognitive mechanisms are poorly documented. A wealth of converging evidence in cognitive neuroscience has identified independent perspective-taking and inhibitory processes for belief attribution, but the extent to which these processes are shared by knowledge attribution isn't presently understood. Here, we present the findings of an EEG study designed to directly address this shortcoming. These findings suggest that belief attribution is not a component process in knowledge attribution, (...)
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  6. added 2020-05-21
    Skepticism, Fallibilism, and Rational Evaluation.Michael Hannon - forthcoming - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered.
    This paper outlines a new type of skepticism that is both compatible with fallibilism and supported by work in psychology. In particular, I will argue that we often cannot properly trust our ability to rationally evaluate reasons, arguments, and evidence (a fundamental knowledge-seeking faculty). We humans are just too cognitively impaired to achieve even fallible knowledge, at least for many beliefs.
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  7. added 2020-03-14
    Epistemic Value in the Subpersonal Vale.J. Adam Carter & Robert D. Rupert - 2020 - Synthese:1-30.
    A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology – one with origins in Plato’s Meno – concerns the value of knowledge, and in particular, whether and how the value of knowledge exceeds the value of mere (unknown) true opinion. The recent literature is deeply divided on the matter of how best to address the problem. One point, however, remains unquestioned: that if a solution is to be found, it will be at the personal level, the level at which states of subjects or (...)
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  8. added 2019-12-29
    Some Epistemic Roles for Curiosity.Dennis Whitcomb - 2018 - In Ilhan Inan, Lani Watson, Dennis Whitcomb & Safiye Yigit (eds.), The Moral Psychology of Curiosity. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. pp. 217-238.
    I start with a critical discussion of some attempts to ground epistemic normativity in curiosity. Then I develop three positive proposals. The first of these proposals is more or less purely philosophical; the second two reside at the interdisciplinary borderline between philosophy and psychology. The proposals are independent and rooted in different literatures. Readers uninterested in the first proposal (and the critical discussion preceding it) may nonetheless be interested in the second two proposals, and vice versa. -/- The proposals are (...)
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  9. added 2019-12-09
    Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy.Christian Coseru - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
    What turns the continuous flow of experience into perceptually distinct objects? Can our verbal descriptions unambiguously capture what it is like to see, hear, or feel? How might we reason about the testimony that perception alone discloses? Christian Coseru proposes a rigorous and highly original way to answer these questions by developing a framework for understanding perception as a mode of apprehension that is intentionally constituted, pragmatically oriented, and causally effective. By engaging with recent discussions in phenomenology and analytic philosophy (...)
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  10. added 2019-10-29
    A Cognitive Perspective on Scientific Realism.Michael Vlerick - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (8):1157-1178.
    The debate about scientific realism is concerned with the relation between our scientific theories and the world. Scientific realists argue that our best theories or components of those theories correspond to the world. Anti-realists deny such a correspondence. Traditionally, this central issue in the philosophy of science has been approached by focusing on the theories themselves (e.g., by looking at theory change or the underlying experimental context). I propose a relatively unexplored way to approach this old debate. In addition to (...)
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  11. added 2019-10-27
    Karma, Rebirth, and Mental Causation.Christian Coseru - 2007 - In Charles Prebish, Damien Kewon & Dale Wright (eds.), Revisioning Karma. Journal of Buddhist Ethics Online Books. pp. 133-154.
    Attempts to provide a thoroughly naturalized reading of the doctrine of karma have raised important issues regarding its role in the overall economy of the Buddhist soteriological project. This paper identifies some of the most problematic aspects of a naturalized interpretation of karma: (1) the strained relationship between retributive action and personal identity, and (2) the debate concerning mental causation in modern reductionist accounts of persons. The paper explores the benefits of a phenomenological approach in which reductionist accounts of karma (...)
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  12. added 2019-10-20
    Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction.Stefanie Rocknak - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An overview of Quine's understanding of the analytic/synthetic distinction, especially as it is conveyed in his paper, "The Two Dogmas of Empiricism.".
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  13. added 2019-03-17
    Our Incorrigible Ontological Relations and Categories of Being.Julian M. Galvez Bunge (ed.) - 2017 - USA: Amazon.
    The purpose of this book is to address the controversial issues of whether we have a fixed set of ontological categories and if they have some epistemic value at all. Which are our ontological categories? What determines them? Do they play a role in cognition? If so, which? What do they force to presuppose regarding our world-view? If they constitute a limit to possible knowledge, up to what point is science possible? Does their study make of philosophy a science? Departing (...)
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  14. added 2019-03-07
    Evolution and Epistemic Justification.Michael Vlerick & Alex Broadbent - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (2):185-203.
    According to the evolutionary sceptic, the fact that our cognitive faculties evolved radically undermines their reliability. A number of evolutionary epistemologists have sought to refute this kind of scepticism. This paper accepts the success of these attempts, yet argues that refuting the evolutionary sceptic is not enough to put any particular domain of beliefs – notably scientific beliefs, which include belief in Darwinian evolution – on a firm footing. The paper thus sets out to contribute to this positive justificatory project, (...)
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  15. added 2019-03-07
    Natural Selection Does Care About Truth.Maarten Boudry & Michael Vlerick - 2014 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 28 (1):65-77.
    True beliefs are better guides to the world than false ones. This is the common-sense assumption that undergirds theorizing in evolutionary epistemology. According to Alvin Plantinga, however, evolution by natural selection does not care about truth: it cares only about fitness. If our cognitive faculties are the products of blind evolution, we have no reason to trust them, anytime or anywhere. Evolutionary naturalism, consequently, is a self-defeating position. Following up on earlier objections, we uncover three additional flaws in Plantinga's latest (...)
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  16. added 2019-03-07
    The Epistemology of “Epistemology Naturalized”.Paul Roth - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (2):87-110.
    Quine's “Epistemology Naturalized” has become part of the canon in epistemology and excited a widespread revival of interest in naturalism. Yet the status accorded the essay is ironic, since both friends and foes of philosophical naturalism deny that Quine makes a plausible case that the methods of naturalism can accommodate the problems of epistemology.
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  17. added 2019-02-09
    Kvajnov naturalistički empirizam protiv epistemološkog nihilizma.Jelena Mijic - 2015 - Theoria: Beograd 58 (4):77-95.
    Cilj ovog rada je da razmotrimo zašto, i na koji način se Kvajn pozicionira između logičkih pozitivista i epistemoloških nihilista u pogledu shvatanja empirijskog svedočanstva. Naime, on će na nov način formulisati kriterijume opservacionalnosti s namerom da prevaziđe probleme koji su za logički pozitivizam bili nepremostivi, a da time ne žrtvuje objektivnost nauke poljuljanu krahom tradicionalnog pristupa epistemološkim pitanjima. Privučeni provokativnošću Kvajnovog istovremenog ispoljavanja radikalnih, ali i konzervativnih tendencija, odnosno namere da održi balans između stanovišta tradicionalne filozofije i epistemološkog nihilizma, (...)
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  18. added 2019-01-30
    Intellectualism and the Argument From Cognitive Science.Arieh Schwartz & Zoe Drayson - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (5):662-692.
    Intellectualism is the claim that practical knowledge or ‘know-how’ is a kind of propositional knowledge. The debate over Intellectualism has appealed to two different kinds of evidence, semantic and scientific. This paper concerns the relationship between Intellectualist arguments based on truth-conditional semantics of practical knowledge ascriptions, and anti-Intellectualist arguments based on cognitive science and propositional representation. The first half of the paper argues that the anti-Intellectualist argument from cognitive science rests on a naturalistic approach to metaphysics: its proponents assume that (...)
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  19. added 2018-07-22
    Amodal Completion and Knowledge.Grace Helton & Bence Nanay - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):415-423.
    Amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of perceived objects. We argue for the following three claims: First, at least some amodal completion-involved experiences can ground knowledge about the occluded portions of perceived objects. Second, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge are not sensitive, that is, it is not the case that in the nearest worlds in which the relevant claim is false, that claim is not believed true. Third, at least some instances of amodal completion-grounded knowledge (...)
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  20. added 2017-07-10
    Quine's ‘Needlessly Strong’ Holism.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 61:11-20.
    Quine is routinely perceived as having changed his mind about the scope of the Duhem-Quine thesis, shifting from what has been called an 'extreme holism' to a more moderate view. Where the Quine of 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' argues that “the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science” (1951, 42), the later Quine seems to back away from this “needlessly strong statement of holism” (1991, 393). In this paper, I show that the received view is incorrect. I distinguish (...)
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  21. added 2017-07-10
    Boarding Neurath's Boat: The Early Development of Quine's Naturalism.Sander Verhaegh - 2017 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 55 (2):317-342.
    W. V. Quine is arguably the intellectual father of contemporary naturalism, the idea that there is no distinctively philosophical perspective on reality. Yet, even though Quine has always been a science-minded philosopher, he did not adopt a fully naturalistic perspective until the early 1950s. In this paper, I reconstruct the genesis of Quine’s ideas on the relation between science and philosophy. Scrutinizing his unpublished papers and notebooks, I examine Quine’s development in the first decades of his career. After identifying three (...)
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  22. added 2017-03-31
    Two Paradigms for Religious Representation: The Physicist and the Playground.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2017 - Cognition 164:206-211.
    In an earlier issue, I argue (2014) that psychology and epistemology should distinguish religious credence from factual belief. These are distinct cognitive attitudes. Levy (2017) rejects this distinction, arguing that both religious and factual “beliefs” are subject to “shifting” on the basis of fluency and “intuitiveness.” Levy’s theory, however, (1) is out of keeping with much research in cognitive science of religion and (2) misrepresents the notion of factual belief employed in my theory. So his claims don’t undermine my distinction. (...)
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  23. added 2016-12-08
    The Epistemology of Geometry I: The Problem of Exactness.Anne Newstead & Franklin James - 2010 - Proceedings of the Australasian Society for Cognitive Science 2009.
    We show how an epistemology informed by cognitive science promises to shed light on an ancient problem in the philosophy of mathematics: the problem of exactness. The problem of exactness arises because geometrical knowledge is thought to concern perfect geometrical forms, whereas the embodiment of such forms in the natural world may be imperfect. There thus arises an apparent mismatch between mathematical concepts and physical reality. We propose that the problem can be solved by emphasizing the ways in which the (...)
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  24. added 2016-05-06
    Teleologies and the Methodology of Epistemology.Georgi Gardiner - 2015 - In David Henderson & John Greco (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 31-45.
    The teleological approach to an epistemic concept investigates it by asking questions such as ‘what is the purpose of the concept?’, ‘What role has it played in the past?’, or ‘If we imagine a society without the concept, why would they feel the need to invent it?’ The idea behind the teleological approach is that examining the function of the concept illuminates the contours of the concept itself. This approach is a relatively new development in epistemology, and as yet there (...)
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  25. added 2015-08-25
    Are Evolutionary Debunking Arguments Really Self-Defeating?Fabio Sterpetti - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):877-889.
    Evolutionary Debunking Arguments are defined as arguments that appeal to the evolutionary genealogy of our beliefs to undermine their justification. Recently, Helen De Cruz and her co-authors supported the view that EDAs are self-defeating: if EDAs claim that human arguments are not justified, because the evolutionary origin of the beliefs which figure in such arguments undermines those beliefs, and EDAs themselves are human arguments, then EDAs are not justified, and we should not accept their conclusions about the fact that human (...)
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  26. added 2015-05-16
    Phenomenal Evidence and Factive Evidence Defended: Replies to McGrath, Pautz, and Neta.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):929-946.
    This paper defends and develops the capacity view against insightful critiques from Matt McGrath, Adam Pautz, and Ram Neta. In response to Matt McGrath, I show why capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue moreover, that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in the good and the bad case is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by the employment of such capacities. In response to Adam Pautz, I (...)
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  27. added 2015-03-20
    The Role of Philosophy in a Naturalized World.Jan Faye - 2012 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 8 (1):60-76.
    This paper discusses the late Michael Dummett’s characterization of the estrangement between physics and philosophy. It argues against those physicists who hold that modern physics, rather than philosophy, can answer traditional metaphysical questions such as why there is something rather than nothing. The claim is that physics cannot solve metaphysical problems since metaphysical issues are in principle empirically underdetermined. The paper closes with a critical discussion of the assumption of some cosmologists that the Universe was created out of nothing: In (...)
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  28. added 2015-02-07
    Quine and the A Priori.Lars Bergström - 2014 - In Gilbert Harman & Ernie Lepore (eds.), A Companion to W. V. O. Quine. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 38–53.
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  29. added 2014-11-08
    Quine's Argument From Despair.Sander Verhaegh - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (1):150-173.
    Quine's argument for a naturalized epistemology is routinely perceived as an argument from despair: traditional epistemology must be abandoned because all attempts to deduce our scientific theories from sense experience have failed. In this paper, I will show that this picture is historically inaccurate and that Quine's argument against first philosophy is considerably stronger and subtler than the standard conception suggests. For Quine, the first philosopher's quest for foundations is inherently incoherent; the very idea of a self-sufficient sense datum language (...)
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  30. added 2014-08-26
    Lockhart’s Problem.Adam Morton - 2014 - The Philosophers' Magazine 25 (30):25-30.
    If we had more powerful minds would we be puzzled by less - because we could make better theories - or by more - because we could ask more difficult questions? This paper focuses on clarifying the question, with an emphasis on comparisons between actual and possible species of thinker. A pre-publication version of the paper is available on my website at http://www.fernieroad.ca/a/PAPERS/papers.html .
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  31. added 2014-03-28
    Prudential Arguments, Naturalized Epistemology, and the Will to Believe.Henry Jackman - 1999 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 35 (1):1 - 37.
    This paper argues that treating James' "The Will to Believe" as a defense of prudential reasoning about belief seriously misrepresents it. Rather than being a precursor to current defenses of prudential arguments, James paper has, if anything, more affinities to certain prominent strains in contemporary naturalized epistemology.
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  32. added 2014-03-16
    Reflections on Cognitive and Epistemic Diversity: Can a Stich in Time Save Quine?Michael Bishop - 2009 - In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    In “Epistemology Naturalized” Quine famously suggests that epistemology, properly understood, “simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science” (1969, 82). Since the appearance of Quine’s seminal article, virtually every epistemologist, including the later Quine (1986, 664), has repudiated the idea that a normative discipline like epistemology could be reduced to a purely descriptive discipline like psychology. Working epistemologists no longer take Quine’s vision in “Epistemology Naturalized” seriously. In this paper, I will explain why I (...)
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  33. added 2014-03-06
    Quine's Relativism.Lars Bergström - 2006 - Theoria 72 (4):286-298.
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  34. added 2014-03-06
    Epistemology as Engineering?Chase B. Wrenn - 2006 - Theoria 72 (1):60-79.
    According to a common objection to epistemological naturalism, no empirical, scientific theory of knowledge can be normative in the way epistemological theories need to be. In response, such naturalists as W.V. Quine have claimed naturalized epistemology can be normative by emulating engineering disciplines and addressing the relations of causal efficacy between our cognitive means and ends. This paper evaluates that "engineering reply" and finds it a mixed success. Based on consideration of what it might mean to call a theory "normative," (...)
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  35. added 2013-11-13
    Davidson's Holism: Epistemology in the Mirror of Meaning.Jeff Malpas - unknown
    Foreword to the new edition Acknowledgements Introduction: radically interpreting Davidson I. From translation to interpretation 1. The Quinean background 1.1 Radical translation and naturalized epistemology 1.2 Meaning and indeterminacy 1.3 Analytical hypotheses and charity 2. The Davidsonian project 2.1 The development of a theory of meaning 2.2 The project of radical interpretation 2.3 From charity to triangulation..
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  36. added 2013-06-01
    De dierlijke rede, of: kennen om te overleven.Pouwel Slurink - 1992 - Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte.
    Evolutionary epistemology explains knowledge as an adaptation (or series of adaptations) which enables animals to behave adaptively in their environment. The aim of knowledge, then, is to act. Our knowledge-apparatus was never designed to understand the nature of the universe.
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  37. added 2013-04-24
    Argumente für die naturaliste Erkenntnistheorie.Joshua Shepherd & Michael Bishop - 2015 - In Stefan Tolksdorf & Dirk Koppleberg (eds.), Erkenntnistheorie: Wie und Wozu? Mentis Publishers. pp. 245-274.
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  38. added 2013-02-18
    Naturalism, Fallibilism, and the a Priori.Lisa Warenski - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426.
    This paper argues that a priori justification is, in principle, compatible with naturalism—if the a priori is understood in a way that is free of the inessential properties that, historically, have been associated with the concept. I argue that empirical indefeasibility is essential to the primary notion of the a priori ; however, the indefeasibility requirement should be interpreted in such a way that we can be fallibilist about apriori-justified claims. This fallibilist notion of the a priori accords with the (...)
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  39. added 2012-10-15
    The Proper Role of Intuitions in Epistemology.A. Feltz & M. Bishop - 2010 - In M. Milkowski & K. Talmont-Kaminski (eds.), Beyond Description: Normativity in Naturalized Philosophy. College Publication.
    Intuitions play an important role in contemporary philosophy. It is common for theories in epistemology, morality, semantics and metaphysics to be rejected because they are inconsistent with a widely and firmly held intuition. Our goal in this paper is to explore the role of epistemic intuitions in epistemology from a naturalistic perspective. Here is the question we take to be central: (Q) Ought we to trust our epistemic intuitions as evidence in support of our epistemological theories? We will understand this (...)
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  40. added 2012-07-10
    Aquinas and Naturalism.Paul O'Grady - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 3 (2):369 - 385.
    Aquinas’s actual response to a naturalistic challenge at ST I.2.3 is one which most naturalists would find unimpressive. However, I shall argue that there is a stronger response latent in his philosophical system. I take Quine as an example of a methodological naturalist, examine the roots of his position and look at two critical responses to his views (those of BonJour and Boghossian). If one adjusts some of the problematical aspects of their responses and establishes a hybrid position on the (...)
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  41. added 2011-12-23
    La Naturalizzazione Dell'epistemologia. Contro Una Soluzione Quineana.Nicla Vassallo - 1997 - Franco Angeli.
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  42. added 2011-08-08
    Understanding Quine in Terms of the Aufbau: Another Look at Naturalized Epistemology.Stefanie Rocknak - 2010 - In Marcin Milkowski Konrad Talmud-Kaminski (ed.), Beyond Description: Naturalism and Normativity. College Publications.
    I argue that Quine’s rejection of Carnap’s “radical” (FLPV; TDE 39) and “phenomenalistic” (FSS 15-16) reductionism—as it is manifest in the Aufbau—may be understood in terms of a broader historical context. In particular, it may be understood as a rejection of a contemporary variant of the second horn of Meno’s Paradox. As a result, Quine’s motivation to adopt naturalism may be understood independently of his pragmatic concerns. According to Quine, it was simply unreasonable (i.e. paradoxical) to adopt a Carnapian phenomenalistic/mentalistic (...)
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  43. added 2011-01-22
    The Constitutive A Priori and Epistemic Justification.Michael J. Shaffer - 2011 - In Michael J. Shaffer & Michael Veber (eds.), What Place for the A Priori? Open Court. pp. 193.
    In this paper I argue that Michael Friedman's conception of the contitutive a priori faces two serious problems. These two problems show that the view collapses into a form of conventionalism.
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  44. added 2010-11-29
    Realism, Naturalism, and Pragmatism: A Closer Look at the Views of Quine and Devitt.Gregg Caruso - 2007 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):64-83.
    Michael Devitt’s views on realism and naturalism have a lot in common with those of W.V. Quine. Both appear to be realists; both accept naturalized epistemology and abandon the old goal of first philosophy; both view philosophy as continuous with the empirical procedures of science and hence view metaphysics as similarly empirical; and both seem to view realism as following from naturalism. Although Quine and Devitt share quite a bit ideologically, I think there is a deeper, more fundamental dissimilarity between (...)
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  45. added 2010-09-28
    Making Naturalised Epistemology (Slightly) Normative.Marcin Miłkowski - 2010 - In Konrad Talmont-Kaminski & Marcin Miłkowski (eds.), Beyond Description. Naturalism and Normativity.
    The standard objection against naturalised epistemology is that it cannot account for normativity in epistemology (Putnam 1982; Kim 1988). There are different ways to deal with it. One of the obvious ways is to say that the objection misses the point: It is not a bug; it is a feature, as there is nothing interesting in normative principles in epistemology. Normative epistemology deals with norms but they are of no use in prac-tice. They are far too general to be guiding (...)
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  46. added 2010-08-23
    The Pathologies of Standard Analytic Epistemology.Michael Bishop & J. D. Trout - 2005 - Noûs 39 (4):696-714.
    Standard Analytic Epistemology (SAE) names a contingently clustered class of methods and theses that have dominated English-speaking epistemology for about the past half-century. The major contemporary theories of SAE include versions of foundationalism, coherentism, reliabilism, and contextualism. While proponents of SAE don’t agree about how to define naturalized epistemology, most agree that a thoroughgoing naturalism in epistemology can’t work. For the purposes of this paper, we will suppose that a naturalistic theory of epistemology takes as its core, as its starting-point, (...)
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  47. added 2010-03-06
    Generalizing and Normalizing Quine's Epistemology.Cheng-Hung Tsai - 2002 - Philosophical Writings 19:3-21.
    The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to generalize Quine's epistemology, to show that what Quine refutes for traditional epistemology is not only Cartesian foundationalism and Carnapian reductionism, but also any epistemological program if it takes atomic verificationist semantics or supernaturalism, which are rooted in the linguistic/factual distinction of individual sentences, as its underlying system. Thus, we will see that the range of naturalization in the Quinean sense is not as narrow as his critics think. Second, to normalize Quine's (...)
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  48. added 2009-11-22
    Underdetermination of Physical Theory.Lars Bergström - 2004 - In Roger F. Gibson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Quine. Cambridge University Press. pp. 91--114.
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  49. added 2009-05-26
    Methodological Pluralism, Normative Naturalism and the Realist Aim of Science.Howard Sankey - 2000 - In Howard Sankey & Robert Nola (eds.), After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 211-229.
    There are two chief tasks which confront the philosophy of scientific method. The first task is to specify the methodology which serves as the objective ground for scientific theory appraisal and acceptance. The second task is to explain how application of this methodology leads to advance toward the aim(s) of science. In other words, the goal of the theory of method is to provide an integrated explanation of both rational scientific theory choice and scientific progress.
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