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  1. Quantification, Negation, and Focus: Challenges at the Conceptual-Intentional Semantic Interface.Tista Bagchi - manuscript
    Quantification, Negation, and Focus: Challenges at the Conceptual-Intentional Semantic Interface Tista Bagchi National Institute of Science, Technology, and Development Studies (NISTADS) and the University of Delhi Since the proposal of Logical Form (LF) was put forward by Robert May in his 1977 MIT doctoral dissertation and was subsequently adopted into the overall architecture of language as conceived under Government-Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981), there has been a steady research effort to determine the nature of LF in language in light of structurally (...)
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  2. A Contextualist Defence of the Material Account of Indicative Conditionals.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    The material account of indicative conditionals faces a legion of counterexamples that are the bread and butter in any entry about the subject. For this reason, the material account is widely unpopular among conditional experts. I will argue that this consensus was not built on solid foundations, since these counterexamples are contextual fallacies. They ignore a basic tenet of semantics according to which when evaluating arguments for validity we need to maintain the context constant, otherwise any argumentative form can be (...)
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  3. Conditional Sentences as Implication Statements: A New Approach.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    It is usually accepted that conditional sentences are sui generis and enigmatic. In this paper I try to make them more accessible by interpreting them as claims to relations of implication restricted to a parameter world. This interpretation revives an old idea that fell into disuse, but in its improved version leads to refreshing solutions to known problems in conditional theory. The many benefits of this approach are evidenced by its insightful explanation of some apparent counter-examples to classical argumentative forms (...)
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  4. Keep All Your Textbooks.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    Akman (2017) argued that our logic textbooks should be burned, since they present a propositional analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions that leads to a contradiction. According to Akman, we should instead adopt a first-order analysis where conditions are interpreted as one-place predicates. I will argue that (1) Akman’s argument fails to show that the propositional analysis of conditions leads to a contradiction, since the negation of a conjunction is not a conjunction with negated conjuncts, but rather a disjunction with (...)
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  5. Making Conditional Speech Acts in the Material Way.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    The conventional wisdom about conditionals claims that (1) conditionals that have non-assertive acts in their consequents, such as commands and promises, are not plausibly interpreted as material implications; (2) the most promising hypothesis about these sentences is conditional-assertion theory, which explains a conditional as a conditional speech act, i.e., a performance of a speech act given the assumption of the antecedent. This hypothesis has far-reaching and revisionist consequences, because conditional speech acts are not synonymous with a proposition with truth conditions. (...)
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  6. The Material Account of Conditionals and the Clash Between Intensional and Extensional Evidence.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    Intensional evidence is any reason to accept a proposition that is not the truth values of the proposition accepted or, if it is a complex proposition, its propositional contents. Extensional evidence is non-intensional evidence. Someone can accept a complex proposition, but deny its logical consequences in two circumstances: (1) when her acceptance is based on intensional evidence, while the logical consequences of the proposition presuppose the acceptance of extensional evidence, e.g., she can refuse the logical consequence of a proposition she (...)
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  7. If Counterfactuals Were Neg-Raisers, Conditional Excluded Middle Wouldn’T Be Valid.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - manuscript
    The principle of Conditional Excluded Middle has been a matter of longstanding controversy in both semantics and metaphysics. According to this principle, we are, inter alia, committed to claims like the following: If the coin had been flipped, it would have landed heads, or if the coin had been flipped, it would not have landed heads. In favour of the principle, theorists have appealed, primarily, to linguistic data such as that we tend to hear ¬(A > B) as equivalent to (...)
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  8. Inferential Expressivism and the Negation Problem.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 16.
    We develop a novel solution to the negation version of the Frege-Geach problem by taking up recent insights from the bilateral programme in logic. Bilateralists derive the meaning of negation from a primitive *B-type* inconsistency involving the attitudes of assent and dissent. Some may demand an explanation of this inconsistency in simpler terms, but we argue that bilateralism’s assumptions are no less explanatory than those of *A-type* semantics that only require a single primitive attitude, but must stipulate inconsistency elsewhere. Based (...)
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  9. Assertion and Rejection.Julian J. Schlöder - forthcoming - In Daniel Altshuler (ed.), Linguistics Meets Philosophy. Cambridge University Press.
    I argue that rejection is a speech act that cannot be reduced to assertion. Adapting an argument by Huw Price, I conclude that rejection is best conceived of as the speech act that is used to register that some other speech act is (or would be) violating a rule of the conversation game. This can be naturally understood as registering *norm violations* where speech acts are characterised by their essential norms. However, I argue that rejection itself is not to be (...)
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  10. A Peculiar and Perpetual Tendency: An Asymmetry in Knowledge Attributions for Affirmations and Negations.John Turri - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-14.
    From antiquity through the twentieth century, philosophers have hypothesized that, intuitively, it is harder to know negations than to know affirmations. This paper provides direct evidence for that hypothesis. In a series of studies, I found that people naturally view negations as harder to know than affirmations. Participants read simple scenarios and made judgments about truth, probability, belief, and knowledge. Participants were more likely to attribute knowledge of an outcome when framed affirmatively than when framed negatively. Participants did this even (...)
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  11. The Importance of Being Erroneous.Nils Kürbis - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (3):155-166.
    This is a commentary on MM McCabe's "First Chop your logos... Socrates and the sophists on language, logic, and development". In her paper MM analyses Plato's Euthydemos, in which Plato tackles the problem of falsity in a way that takes into account the speaker and complements the Sophist's discussion of what is said. The dialogue looks as if it is merely a demonstration of the silly consequences of eristic combat. And so it is. But a main point of MM's paper (...)
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  12. A General Semantics for Logics of Affirmation and Negation.Fabien Schang - 2021 - Journal of Applied Logics - IfCoLoG Journal of Logics and Their Applications 8 (2):593-609.
    A general framework for translating various logical systems is presented, including a set of partial unary operators of affirmation and negation. Despite its usual reading, affirmation is not redundant in any domain of values and whenever it does not behave like a full mapping. After depicting the process of partial functions, a number of logics are translated through a variety of affirmations and a unique pair of negations. This relies upon two preconditions: a deconstruction of truth-values as ordered and structured (...)
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  13. Negation, Expressivism, and Intentionality.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (279):246-267.
    Many think that expressivists have a special problem with negation. I disagree. For if there is a problem with negation, I argue, it is a problem shared by those who accept some plausible claims about the nature of intentionality. Whether there is any special problem for expressivists turns, I will argue, on whether facts about what truth-conditions beliefs have can explain facts about basic inferential relations among those beliefs. And I will suggest that the answer to this last question is, (...)
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  14. A Direction Effect on Taste Predicates.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (27):1-22.
    The recent literature abounds with accounts of the semantics and pragmatics of so-called predicates of personal taste, i.e. predicates whose application is, in some sense or other, a subjective matter. Relativism and contextualism are the major types of theories. One crucial difference between these theories concerns how we should assess previous taste claims. Relativism predicts that we should assess them in the light of the taste standard governing the context of assessment. Contextualism predicts that we should assess them in the (...)
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  15. The Problem of Future Contingents: Scoping Out a Solution.Patrick Todd - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5051-5072.
    Various philosophers have long since been attracted to the doctrine that future contingent propositions systematically fail to be true—what is sometimes called the doctrine of the open future. However, open futurists have always struggled to articulate how their view interacts with standard principles of classical logic—most notably, with the Law of Excluded Middle. For consider the following two claims: Trump will be impeached tomorrow; Trump will not be impeached tomorrow. According to the kind of open futurist at issue, both of (...)
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  16. Negation on the Australian Plan.Francesco Berto & Greg Restall - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (6):1119-1144.
    We present and defend the Australian Plan semantics for negation. This is a comprehensive account, suitable for a variety of different logics. It is based on two ideas. The first is that negation is an exclusion-expressing device: we utter negations to express incompatibilities. The second is that, because incompatibility is modal, negation is a modal operator as well. It can, then, be modelled as a quantifier over points in frames, restricted by accessibility relations representing compatibilities and incompatibilities between such points. (...)
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  17. Categoricity and Negation. A Note on Kripke’s Affirmativism.Constantin C. Brîncuș & Iulian D. Toader - 2019 - In The Logica Yearbook 2018. London: College Publications. pp. 57-66.
    We argue that, if taken seriously, Kripke's view that a language for science can dispense with a negation operator is to be rejected. Part of the argument is a proof that positive logic, i.e., classical propositional logic without negation, is not categorical.
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  18. A Survey of Logical Realism.Tuomas E. Tahko - 2019 - Synthese.
    Logical realism is a view about the metaphysical status of logic. Common to most if not all the views captured by the label ‘logical realism’ is that logical facts are mind- and language-independent. But that does not tell us anything about the nature of logical facts or about our epistemic access to them. The goal of this paper is to outline and systematize the different ways that logical realism could be entertained and to examine some of the challenges that these (...)
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  19. Weak Assertion.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):741-770.
    We present an inferentialist account of the epistemic modal operator might. Our starting point is the bilateralist programme. A bilateralist explains the operator not in terms of the speech act of rejection ; we explain the operator might in terms of weak assertion, a speech act whose existence we argue for on the basis of linguistic evidence. We show that our account of might provides a solution to certain well-known puzzles about the semantics of modal vocabulary whilst retaining classical logic. (...)
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  20. An Argument for Minimal Logic.Nils Kürbis - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):31-63.
    The problem of negative truth is the problem of how, if everything in the world is positive, we can speak truly about the world using negative propositions. A prominent solution is to explain negation in terms of a primitive notion of metaphysical incompatibility. I argue that if this account is correct, then minimal logic is the correct logic. The negation of a proposition A is characterised as the minimal incompatible of A composed of it and the logical constant ¬. A (...)
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  21. Is Incompatibilism Compatible with Fregeanism?Nils Kürbis - 2018 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 14 (2):27-46.
    This paper considers whether incompatibilism, the view that negation is to be explained in terms of a primitive notion of incompatibility, and Fregeanism, the view that arithmetical truths are analytic according to Frege’s definition of that term in §3 of Foundations of Arithmetic, can both be upheld simultaneously. Both views are attractive on their own right, in particular for a certain empiricist mind-set. They promise to account for two philosophical puzzling phenomena: the problem of negative truth and the problem of (...)
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  22. Molnar on Truthmakers for Negative Truths.Nils Kürbis - 2018 - Metaphysica 19 (2):251-257.
    Molnar argues that the problem of truthmakers for negative truths arises because we tend to accept four metaphysical principles that entail that all negative truths have positive truthmakers. This conclusion, however, already follows from only three of Molnar´s metaphysical principles. One purpose of this note is to set the record straight. I provide an alternative reading of two of Molnar´s principles on which they are all needed to derive the desired conclusion. Furthermore, according to Molnar, the four principles may be (...)
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  23. Bilateralism, Independence and Coordination.Gonçalo Santos - 2018 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):23-27.
    Bilateralism is a theory of meaning according to which assertion and denial are independent speech acts. Bilateralism also proposes two coordination principles for assertion and denial. I argue that if assertion and denial are independent speech acts, they cannot be coordinated by the bilateralist principles.
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  24. Weak Rejection.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):741-760.
    ABSTRACTLinguistic evidence supports the claim that certain, weak rejections are less specific than assertions. On the basis of this evidence, it has been argued that rejected sentences cannot be premisses and conclusions in inferences. We give examples of inferences with weakly rejected sentences as premisses and conclusions. We then propose a logic of weak rejection which accounts for the relevant phenomena and is motivated by principles of coherence in dialogue. We give a semantics for which this logic is sound and (...)
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  25. Bilateralist Detours: From Intuitionist to Classical Logic and Back.Nils Kürbis - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 60 (239):301-316.
    There is widespread agreement that while on a Dummettian theory of meaning the justified logic is intuitionist, as its constants are governed by harmonious rules of inference, the situation is reversed on Huw Price's bilateralist account, where meanings are specified in terms of primitive speech acts assertion and denial. In bilateral logics, the rules for classical negation are in harmony. However, as it is possible to construct an intuitionist bilateral logic with harmonious rules, there is no formal argument against intuitionism (...)
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  26. Bilateralism: Negations, Implications and Some Observations and Problems About Hypotheses.Nils Kürbis - 2017 - In Thomas Piecha & Jean Fichot (eds.), Beyond Logic. Proceedings of the Conference held in Cerisy-la-Salle, 22-27 May 2017. Tübingen, Germany:
    This short paper has two loosely connected parts. In the first part, I discuss the difference between classical and intuitionist logic in relation to different the role of hypotheses play in each logic. Harmony is normally understood as a relation between two ways of manipulating formulas in systems of natural deduction: their introduction and elimination. I argue, however, that there is at least a third way of manipulating formulas, namely the discharge of assumption, and that the difference between classical and (...)
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  27. Some Comments on Ian Rumfitt’s Bilateralism.Nils Kürbis - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 45 (6):623-644.
    Ian Rumfitt has proposed systems of bilateral logic for primitive speech acts of assertion and denial, with the purpose of ‘exploring the possibility of specifying the classically intended senses for the connectives in terms of their deductive use’ : 810f). Rumfitt formalises two systems of bilateral logic and gives two arguments for their classical nature. I assess both arguments and conclude that only one system satisfies the meaning-theoretical requirements Rumfitt imposes in his arguments. I then formalise an intuitionist system of (...)
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  28. Expressing Permission.William B. Starr - 2016 - Semantics and Linguistic Theory 26:325-349.
    This paper proposes a semantics for free choice permission that explains both the non-classical behavior of modals and disjunction in sentences used to grant permission, and their classical behavior under negation. It also explains why permissions can expire when new information comes in and why free choice arises even when modals scope under disjunction. On the proposed approach, deontic modals update preference orderings, and connectives operate on these updates rather than propositions. The success of this approach stems from its capacity (...)
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  29. Aserción, expresión y acción. Una lectura de J.L. Austin.Tomás Barrero - 2015 - Dianoia 60 (74):81-107.
    This paper offers a new interpretation of John Austin’s views both on assertion and on adverbs, as result of which an expressivist thesis concerning the semantics for action sentences is advanced. First, Austin’s analysis of assertion based on various, specific assertive forces and his remarks on adverbs are systematically connected in order to obtain assertive schemata for action sentences. Finally, those schemata are put to work as the expression of inferential commitments implicit in argumentative practices of different sorts (exculpatory, justificatory (...)
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  30. A Modality Called ‘Negation’.Francesco Berto - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):761-793.
    I propose a comprehensive account of negation as a modal operator, vindicating a moderate logical pluralism. Negation is taken as a quantifier on worlds, restricted by an accessibility relation encoding the basic concept of compatibility. This latter captures the core meaning of the operator. While some candidate negations are then ruled out as violating plausible constraints on compatibility, different specifications of the notion of world support different logical conducts for negations. The approach unifies in a philosophically motivated picture the following (...)
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  31. Proof-Theoretic Semantics, a Problem with Negation and Prospects for Modality.Nils Kürbis - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):713-727.
    This paper discusses proof-theoretic semantics, the project of specifying the meanings of the logical constants in terms of rules of inference governing them. I concentrate on Michael Dummett’s and Dag Prawitz’ philosophical motivations and give precise characterisations of the crucial notions of harmony and stability, placed in the context of proving normalisation results in systems of natural deduction. I point out a problem for defining the meaning of negation in this framework and prospects for an account of the meanings of (...)
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  32. What is Wrong with Classical Negation?Nils Kurbis - 2015 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 92 (1):51-86.
    The focus of this paper are Dummett's meaning-theoretical arguments against classical logic based on consideration about the meaning of negation. Using Dummettian principles, I shall outline three such arguments, of increasing strength, and show that they are unsuccessful by giving responses to each argument on behalf of the classical logician. What is crucial is that in responding to these arguments a classicist need not challenge any of the basic assumptions of Dummett's outlook on the theory of meaning. In particular, I (...)
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  33. Embedding Denial.David Ripley - 2015 - In Colin Caret & Ole Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford University Press. pp. 289-309.
    Suppose Alice asserts p, and the Caterpillar wants to disagree. If the Caterpillar accepts classical logic, he has an easy way to indicate this disagreement: he can simply assert ¬p. Sometimes, though, things are not so easy. For example, suppose the Cheshire Cat is a paracompletist who thinks that p ∨ ¬p fails (in familiar (if possibly misleading) language, the Cheshire Cat thinks p is a gap). Then he surely disagrees with Alice's assertion of p, but should himself be unwilling (...)
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  34. Thinking is Believing.Eric Mandelbaum - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):55-96.
    Inquiry, Volume 57, Issue 1, Page 55-96, February 2014.
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  35. Logic in Opposition.Fabien Schang - 2013 - Studia Humana 2 (3):31-45.
    It is claimed hereby that, against a current view of logic as a theory of consequence, opposition is a basic logical concept that can be used to define consequence itself. This requires some substantial changes in the underlying framework, including: a non-Fregean semantics of questions and answers, instead of the usual truth-conditional semantics; an extension of opposition as a relation between any structured objects; a definition of oppositions in terms of basic negation. Objections to this claim will be reviewed.
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  36. Oppositions and Opposites.Fabien Schang - 2012 - In J.-Y. Beziau & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition. Bâle, Suisse: Birkhäuser. pp. 147--173.
    A formal theory of oppositions and opposites is proposed on the basis of a non- Fregean semantics, where opposites are negation-forming operators that shed some new light on the connection between opposition and negation. The paper proceeds as follows. After recalling the historical background, oppositions and opposites are compared from a mathematical perspective: the first occurs as a relation, the second as a function. Then the main point of the paper appears with a calculus of oppositions, by means of a (...)
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  37. Questions and Answers About Oppositions.Fabien Schang - 2011 - In Jean-Yves Beziau & Gillman Payette (eds.), The Square of Opposition: A General Framework for Cognition. Berne, Suisse: pp. 289-319.
    A general characterization of logical opposition is given in the present paper, where oppositions are defined by specific answers in an algebraic question-answer game. It is shown that opposition is essentially a semantic relation of truth values between syntactic opposites, before generalizing the theory of opposition from the initial Apuleian square to a variety of alter- native geometrical representations. In the light of this generalization, the famous problem of existential import is traced back to an ambiguous interpretation of assertoric sentences (...)
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  38. Moral Expressivism and Sentential Negation.Neil Sinclair - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):385-411.
    This paper advances three necessary conditions on a successful account of sentential negation. First, the ability to explain the constancy of sentential meaning across negated and unnegated contexts (the Fregean Condition). Second, the ability to explain why sentences and their negations are inconsistent, and inconsistent in virtue of the meaning of negation (the Semantic Condition). Third, the ability of the account to generalize regardless of the topic of the negated sentence (the Generality Condition). The paper discusses three accounts of negation (...)
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  39. Truth and The Ambiguity of Negation.Teresa Marques - 2010 - In Erich Rast & Luiz Carlos Baptista (eds.), Meaning and Context. Peter Lang. pp. 2--235.
    This article has one aim, to reject the claim that negation is semantically ambiguous. The first section presents the putative incompatibility between truth-value gaps and the truth-schema; the second section presents the motivation for the ambiguity thesis; the third section summarizes arguments against the claim that natural language negation is semantically ambiguous; and the fourth section indicates the problems of an introduction of two distinct negation operators in natural language.
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  40. Depicting Negation in Diagrammatic Logic: Legacy and Prospects.Fabien Schang & Amirouche Moktefi - 2008 - Diagrammatic Representation and Inference: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference Diagrams 2008 5223:236-241.
    Here are considered the conditions under which the method of diagrams is liable to include non-classical logics, among which the spatial representation of non-bivalent negation. This will be done with two intended purposes, namely: a review of the main concepts involved in the definition of logical negation; an explanation of the epistemological obstacles against the introduction of non-classical negations within diagrammatic logic.
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  41. Negative Findings in Electronic Health Records and Biomedical Ontologies: A Realist Approach.Werner Ceusters, Peter Elkin & Barry Smith - 2007 - International Journal of Medical Informatics 76 (3):S326-S333.
    PURPOSE—A substantial fraction of the observations made by clinicians and entered into patient records are expressed by means of negation or by using terms which contain negative qualifiers (as in “absence of pulse” or “surgical procedure not performed”). This seems at first sight to present problems for ontologies, terminologies and data repositories that adhere to a realist view and thus reject any reference to putative non-existing entities. Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) and Referent Tracking (RT) are examples of such paradigms. The (...)
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  42. Pluralism and the Logical Basis of Metaphysics.N. Kurbis - 2007 - In Logica Yearbook.
    I argue for a kind of logical pluralism on the basis of a difficulty with defining the meaning of negation in the framework of Dummett's and Prawitz' proof-theoretic semantics.
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  43. Nāgārjuna’s Catuṣkoṭi.Jan Westerhoff - 2005 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 34 (4):367-395.
    The catuṣkoṭi or tetralemma is an argumentative figure familiar to any reader of Buddhist philosophical literature. Roughly speaking it consists of the enumeration of four alternatives: that some propositions holds, that it fails to hold, that it both holds and fails to hold, that it neither holds nor fails to hold. The tetralemma also constitutes one of the more puzzling features of Buddhist philosophy as the use to which it is put in arguments is not immediately obvious and certainly not (...)
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  44. Conjunction Meets Negation: A Study in Cross‐Linguistic Variation.Anna Szabolcsi & Bill Haddican - 2004 - Journal of Semantics 21 (3):219-249.
    The central topic of this inquiry is a cross-linguistic contrast in the interaction of conjunction and negation. In Hungarian (Russian, Serbian, Italian, Japanese), in contrast to English (German), negated definite conjunctions are naturally and exclusively interpreted as `neither’. It is proposed that Hungarian-type languages conjunctions simply replicate the behavior of plurals, their closest semantic relatives. More puzzling is why English-type languages present a different range of interpretations. By teasing out finer distinctions in focus on connectives, syntactic structure, and context, the (...)
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  45. Hungarian Disjunctions and Positive Polarity.Anna Szabolcsi - 2002 - In Istvan Kenesei & Peter Siptar (eds.), Approaches to Hungarian, Vol. 8. Univ. of Szeged.
    The de Morgan laws characterize how negation, conjunction, and disjunction interact with each other. They are fundamental in any semantics that bases itself on the propositional calculus/Boolean algebra. This paper is primarily concerned with the second law. In English, its validity is easy to demonstrate using linguistic examples. Consider the following: (3) Why is it so cold in here? We didn’t close the door or the window. The second sentence is ambiguous. It may mean that I suppose we did not (...)
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  46. True and False: An Exchange.Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi - 2000 - In André Chapuis & Anil Gupta (eds.), Circularity, Definition, and Truth. Indian Council of Philosophical Research. pp. 365-370.
    Classically, truth and falsehood are opposite, and so are logical truth and logical falsehood. In this paper we imagine a situation in which the opposition is so pervasive in the language we use as to threaten the very possibility of telling truth from falsehood. The example exploits a suggestion of Ramsey’s to the effect that negation can be expressed simply by writing the negated sentence upside down. The difference between ‘p’ and ‘~~p’ disappears, the principle of double negation becomes trivial, (...)
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  47. Überlegungen zur Vielfalt der "Nichts-Rede".Erwin Sonderegger - 1997 - Prima Philosophia 10 (3):341–257.
    The variety and ambiguity of our use of negation has often been classified according to the classes of negated terms. But if we take into account, first, the negations of possibility and necessity, and second, the negations of questions and wishes, it seems that not only negated expressions change, but the way to negate as well. If we consider that up to here every negation has only been a relative one, we may ask if it is possible to say „nothing“ (...)
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  48. Weak Islands and an Algebraic Semantics for Scope Taking.Anna Szabolcsi & Frans Zwarts - 1997 - In Ways of Scope Taking. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
    Modifying the descriptive and theoretical generalizations of Relativized Minimality, we argue that a significant subset of weak island violations arise when an extracted phrase should scope over some intervener but is unable to. Harmless interveners seem harmless because they can support an alternative reading. This paper focuses on why certain wh-phrases are poor wide scope takers, and offers an algebraic perspective on scope interaction. Each scopal element SE is associated with certain operations (e.g., not with complements). When a wh-phrase scopes (...)
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  49. Introduction to Adolf Reinach, ‘On the Theory of the Negative Judgment’.Barry Smith - 1982 - In Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. pp. 289-313.
    Reinach’s essay of 1911 establishes an ontological theory of logic, based on the notion of Sachverhalt or state of affairs. He draws on the theory of meaning and reference advanced in Husserl’s Logical Investigations and at the same time anticipates both Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and later speech act theorists’ ideas on performative utterances. The theory is used by Reinach to draw a distinction between two kinds of negative judgment: the simple negative judgment, which is made true by a negative state of (...)
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  50. Can We Test Inconsistent Empirical Theories?Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    This paper discusses the logical possibility of testing an inconsistent empirical theory. The main challenge for answering this affirmatively is to avoiding that the inconsistent consequences of a theory are both potential corroborators and falsifiers of the same theory. I answer affirmatively by showing that we can define a class of empirical sentences whose truth would force us to abandon such inconsistent theory: the class of its potential refuters. In spite of this, I show that the contradictions implied by a (...)
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