Perception

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto at Scarborough)
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  1. The Varieties of Instantiation.Umrao Sethi - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (3):417-437.
    Working with the assumption that properties depend for their instantiation on substances, I argue against a unitary analysis of instantiation. On the standard view, a property is instantiated just in case there is a substance that serves as the bearer of the property. But this view cannot make sense of how properties that are mind-dependent depend for their instantiation on minds. I consider two classes of properties that philosophers often take to be mind-dependent: sensible qualities like color and bodily sensations (...)
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  2. Why Interdisciplinary Research in AI is so Important, According to Jurassic Park.Marie Oldfield - 2020 - The Tech Magazine 1 (1):1.
    Why interdisciplinary research in AI is so important, according to Jurassic Park. -/- “Your scientists were so preoccupied with whether or not they could, they didn’t stop to think if they should.” -/- I think this quote resonates with us now more than ever, especially in the world of technological development. The writers of Jurassic Park were years ahead of their time with this powerful quote. -/- As we build new technology, and we push on to see what can actually (...)
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  3. Will AI Take Away Your Job? [REVIEW]Marie Oldfield - 2020 - Tech Magazine.
    Will AI take away your job? The answer is probably not. AI systems can be good predictive systems and be very good at pattern recognition. AI systems have a very repetitive approach to sets of data, which can be useful in certain circumstances. However, AI does make obvious mistakes. This is because AI does not have a sense of context. As Humans we have years of experience in the real world. We have vast amounts of contextual data stored in our (...)
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  4. Relationship between Being and Consciousness in Husserl’s Logical Investigation.Seyed Mohammad Hosseini - 2021 - فلسفه 49 (1):64-83.
    This article tries to examine Husserl's theory of signification and reference, while presenting a content-oriented view of theory of intentionality and proposing the theory of the ideality of meaning, and thus explores the relation between Being and consciousness under the category of "objectivity" in logical investigation; Because the relationship between Being and consciousness must be sought at the intersection of theory of intentionality and objectivity. This intersection can be proposed in the truth condition of the objectivity of meaning, which acts (...)
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  5. A Critique of Representationalism In Heidegger and Sellars.Ekin Erkan - 2021 - Cosmos and History 17 (1):365-404.
    In this paper, we compare Heidegger and Sellars’ respective responses to Kant’s Schematism section of the Transcendental Analytic, taking heed of how both philosophers motivate a criticism of representationalism in their respective renderings while also prodding their Kantian insights towards a holist conception of normativity. We begin with an overview and analysis of Heidegger and Sellars’ holism, comparing both thinkers’ systematic thought. We then turn to how both appraise Kant' Schematism section, first working through Heidegger’s analysis of Kant’s understanding and (...)
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  6. Béatrice Longuenesse and Ned Block Vide Kant.Ekin Erkan - 2021 - Cosmos and History 17 (1):405-452.
    Understanding, for Kant, does not intuit, and intuition—which involves empirical information, i.e., sense-data—does not entail thinking. What is crucial to Kant’s famous claim that intuitions without concepts are blind and concepts without intuitions are empty is the idea that we have no knowledge unless we combine concepts with intuition. Although concepts and intuition are radically separated mental powers, without a way of bringing them together (i.e., synthesis) there is no knowledge for Kant. Thus Kant’s metaphysical-scientific dualism: (scientific) knowledge is limited (...)
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  7. Transcendental Conditions, Schematism, and Naturalizing Kant’s “I Think”.Ekin Erkan - 2021 - Estudos Kantianos 9 (1):121-162.
    Considering how Kant’s synthetic unity of apperception could be “naturalized,” this paper seeks to liberate the Kantian theory of experience from any foundationalist renderings that blur the lines between the empirical and transcendental, without compromising Kant’s attempt to investigate how the invariant structures of experience condition and supply rules for our knowledge of the world. This paper begins with an overview of the Transcendental Deduction’s apperceptive “I think.” We then consider Sellars’ Myth of Jones and Sellars’ notion of noumenal reality (...)
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  8. The Fundamental Unity Of Voluntary And Involuntary Actions.Aadarsh Singh - manuscript
    Social structure of our society decides the actions that are allowed by any individual human being. All the actions of an individual are characterized into voluntary or involuntary actions, which decides the behaviour of society towards that individual for that action. In this paper it has been shown that the characterization of action into these two categories is fundamentally flawed.
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  9. The Tractability of the Debate on Relationalism.Roberta Locatelli - 2021 - In Heather Logue & Louise Richardson (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 85-106.
    The debate between relationalism and representationalism in the philosophy of perception seems to have come to a standstill where opponents radically disagree on methodological principles or fundamental assumptions. According to Fish (this volume) this is because, not unlike Kuhnian scientific paradigms, the debate displays some elements of incommensurability. This diagnosis makes advancing the debate impossible. I argue that what is hindering progress is not a clash of research programmes, but a series of misunderstandings that can be avoided by disentangling the (...)
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  10. Mirrors, Windows and Paintings.Calabi Clotilde, Huemer Wolfgang & Santambrogio Marco - forthcoming - Estetika.
    What do we see in a mirror? There is an ongoing debate whether mirrors present us with images of objects or whether we see, through the mirror, the objects themselves. Roberto Casati has recently argued that there is a categorical difference between images and mirror-reflections. His argument depends on the observation that mirrors, but not paintings, are sensitive to changes in the observer’s prospective. In our paper we scrutinize Casati’s argument and present a modal argument that shows that it cannot (...)
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  11. Word vector embeddings hold social ontological relations capable of reflecting meaningful fairness assessments.Ahmed Izzidien - 2021 - AI and Society (March 2021):1-20.
    Programming artificial intelligence to make fairness assessments of texts through top-down rules, bottom-up training, or hybrid approaches, has presented the challenge of defining cross-cultural fairness. In this paper a simple method is presented which uses vectors to discover if a verb is unfair or fair. It uses already existing relational social ontologies inherent in Word Embeddings and thus requires no training. The plausibility of the approach rests on two premises. That individuals consider fair acts those that they would be willing (...)
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  12. Can Hierarchical Predictive Coding Explain Binocular Rivalry?Julia Haas - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (3):424-444.
    Hohwy et al.’s (2008) model of binocular rivalry (BR) is taken as a classic illustration of predictive coding’s explanatory power. I revisit the account and show that it cannot explain the role of reward in BR. I then consider a more recent version of Bayesian model averaging, which recasts the role of reward in (BR) in terms of optimism bias. If we accept this account, however, then we must reconsider our conception of perception. On this latter view, I argue, organisms (...)
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  13. Unconscious Perception and Central Coordinating Agency.Joshua Shepherd & Myrto Mylopoulos - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-25.
    One necessary condition on any adequate account of perception is clarity regarding whether unconscious perception exists. The issue is complicated, and the debate is growing in both philosophy and science. In this paper we consider the case for unconscious perception, offering three primary achievements. First, we offer a discussion of the underspecified notion of central coordinating agency, a notion that is critical for arguments that purportedly perceptual states are not attributable to the individual, and thus not genuinely perceptual. We develop (...)
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  14. Seeing Seeing.Ben Phillips - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):24-43.
    I argue that we can visually perceive others as seeing agents. I start by characterizing perceptual processes as those that are causally controlled by proximal stimuli. I then distinguish between various forms of visual perspective-taking, before presenting evidence that most of them come in perceptual varieties. In doing so, I clarify and defend the view that some forms of visual perspective-taking are “automatic”—a view that has been marshalled in support of dual-process accounts of mindreading.
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  15. Conservation of a Circle Explains (the Human) Mind.Ilexa Yardley - 2021 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory.
    Conservation of a circle explains (the human) mind.
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  16. The Cognitive Impenetrability of Early Vision: What’s the Claim?Jack Lyons - 2020 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 11 (3):372-384.
    Raftopoulos’s most recent book argues, among other things, for the cognitive impenetrability of early vision. Before we can assess any such claims, we need to know what’s meant by “early vision” and by “cognitive penetration”. In this contribution to this book symposium, I explore several different things that one might mean – indeed, that Raftopoulos might mean – by these terms. I argue that whatever criterion we choose for delineating early vision, we need a single criterion, not a mishmash of (...)
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  17. Percezione.Huemer Wolfgang - 2020 - In C. Cantillo & S. Achella (eds.), Le parole e i numeri della filosofia. Roma: pp. 172-7.
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  18. Concepts and Predication From Perception to Cognition.Jake Quilty-Dunn - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):273-292.
    Philosophical Issues, Volume 30, Issue 1, Page 273-292, October 2020.
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  19. Performance Vs. Competence in Human–Machine Comparisons.Chaz Firestone - 2020 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 41.
    Does the human mind resemble the machines that can behave like it? Biologically inspired machine-learning systems approach “human-level” accuracy in an astounding variety of domains, and even predict human brain activity—raising the exciting possibility that such systems represent the world like we do. However, even seemingly intelligent machines fail in strange and “unhumanlike” ways, threatening their status as models of our minds. How can we know when human–machine behavioral differences reflect deep disparities in their underlying capacities, vs. when such failures (...)
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  20. Structure of Perceptual Objects: Introduction to the Synthese Topical Collection.Alfredo Vernazzani, Błażej Skrzypulec & Tobias Schlicht - forthcoming - Synthese:1-12.
    Introduction to the topical collection "The Structure of Perceptual Objects"—with contributions by Mohan Matthen, EJ Green, Alisa Mandrigin, Blazej Skrzypulec, and Anna Drożdżowicz.
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  21. Conscious Experience and Designing User Experiences.Venkata Rayudu Posina - manuscript
    Neuroscientific discourse on consciousness often resorts to "collection of elements", notwithstanding the Gestalt demonstrations against representing conscious experience as a collection of sensory elements. Here I show that defining conscious experience as an object of the category of conscious experiences, instead of as cohesion-less set of structure-less elements, provides the conceptual repertoire—basic shapes, figures, and incidence relations—needed to reason about the essence of conscious experiences and the essence-preserving transformations of conscious experiences. Viewed in light of the category of conscious experiences, (...)
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  22. Concept and Memory.Justin Fuoco - manuscript
    This article tries to pinpoint the mechanism behind concept formation, which is grounded in the conductivity of a cell.
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  23. Mind-Dependence in Berkeley and the Problem of Perception.Umrao Sethi - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    On the traditional picture, accidents must inhere in substances in order to exist. Berkeley famously argues that a particular class of accidents—the sensible qualities—are mere ideas; entities that depend for their existence on minds. To defend this view, Berkeley provides us with an elegant alternative to the traditional framework: sensible qualities depend on a mind, not in virtue of inhering in it, but in virtue of being perceived by it. This metaphysical insight, once correctly understood, gives us the resources to (...)
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  24. The Normative/Agentive Correspondence.Ryan Simonelli - forthcoming - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy.
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  25. Compassionate Moral Realism, Written by Colin Marshall. [REVIEW]Joshua Blanchard - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
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  26. Cartesian Clarity.Elliot Samuel Paul - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (19):1-28.
    Clear and distinct perception is the centrepiece of Descartes’s philosophy — it is the source of all certainty — but what does he mean by ‘clear’ and ‘distinct’? According to the prevailing approach, what it means for a perception to be clear is that its content has a certain objective property, like truth. I argue instead that clarity is at least partly a subjective, phenomenal quality whereby a content is presented as true to the perceiving subject. Clarity comes in degrees. (...)
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  27. 'William James on Percepts, Concepts, and the Function of Cognition'.James O'Shea - 2019 - In Alexander Klein (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of William James.
    ABSTRACT: Central to both James’s earlier psychology and his later philosophical views was a recurring distinction between percepts and concepts. The distinction evolved and remained fundamental to his thinking throughout his career as he sought to come to grips with its fundamental nature and significance. In this chapter, I focus initially on James’s early attempt to articulate the distinction in his 1885 article “The Function of Cognition.” This will highlight a key problem to which James continued to return throughout his (...)
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  28. Psychoneural Isomorphism: From Metaphysics to Robustness.Alfredo Vernazzani - 2020 - In Marco Viola & Fabrizio Calzavarini (eds.), Neural Mechanisms: New Challenges in the Philosophy of Neuroscience. Springer.
    At the beginning of the 20th century, Gestalt psychologists put forward the concept of psychoneural isomorphism, which was meant to replace Fechner’s obscure notion of psychophysical parallelism and provide a heuristics that may facilitate the search for the neural correlates of the mind. However, the concept has generated much confusion in the debate, and today its role is still unclear. In this contribution, I will attempt a little conceptual spadework in clarifying the concept of psychoneural isomorphism, focusing exclusively on conscious (...)
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  29. Hume’s “Projectivism” Explained.Miren Boehm - 2020 - Synthese: Humeanisms.
    Hume appeals to a mysterious mental process to explain how to world appears to possess features that are not present in sense perceptions, namely causal, moral, and aesthetic properties. He famously writes that the mind spreads itself onto the external world, and that we stain or gild natural objects with our sentiments. Projectivism is founded on these texts but it assumes a reading of Hume’s language as merely metaphorical. This assumption, however, conflicts sharply with the important explanatory role that “spreading” (...)
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  30. No Time to Move: Motion, Painting and Temporal Experience.Jack Shardlow - 2020 - Philosophy 95 (3):239 - 260.
    This paper is concerned with the senses in which paintings do and do not depict various temporal phenomena, such as motion, stasis and duration. I begin by explaining the popular – though not uncontroversial – assumption that depiction, as a pictorial form of representation, is a matter of an experiential resemblance between the pictorial representation and that which it is a depiction of. Given this assumption, I illustrate a tension between two plausible claims: that paintings do not depict motion in (...)
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  31. Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist Account.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):505-523.
    This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and it surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as (...)
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  32. Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling. [REVIEW]Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling.
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  33. The Function of Pain.Laurenz C. Casser - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):364-378.
    Various prominent theories of pain assume that it is pain’s biological function to inform organisms about damage to their bodies. I argue that this is a mistake. First, there is no biological evidence to support the notion that pain was originally selected for its informative capacities, nor that it currently contributes to the fitness of organisms in this specific capacity. Second, neurological evidence indicates that modulating mechanisms in the nociceptive system systematically prevent pain from serving a primarily informative role. These (...)
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  34. Metafisica e Percezione. Una teoria contemporanea.Andrea Bucci - 2020 - Chieti: Tabula Fati.
    Il libro prende in esame la percezione come il modo in cui gli oggetti del mondo esterno entrano a far parte della nostra esperienza cosciente. Il corpo, da un lato, gli oggetti del mondo che ci circonda, dall'altro, verranno messi nel loro posto di argomento rispetto alla metafisica della nostra esperienza percettiva.
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  35. A Processive View of Perceptual Experience.Sebastián Sanhueza Rodríguez - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (1):130-151.
    The goal of this piece is to put some pressure on Brian O’Shaughnessy’s claim that perceptual experiences are necessarily mental processes. The author targets two motivations behind the development of that view. First, O’Shaughnessy resorts to pure conceptual analysis to argue that perceptual experiences are processes. The author argues that this line of reasoning is inconclusive. Secondly, he repeatedly invokes a thought experiment concerning the total freeze of a subject’s experiential life. Even if this case is coherent, however, it does (...)
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  36. After-Effects and the Reach of Perceptual Content.Joulia Smortchkova - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7871-7890.
    In this paper, I discuss the use of after-effects as a criterion for showing that we can perceive high-level properties. According to this criterion, if a high-level property is susceptible to after-effects, this suggests that the property can be perceived, rather than cognized. The defenders of the criterion claim that, since after-effects are also present for low-level, uncontroversially perceptual properties, we can safely infer that high-level after-effects are perceptual as well. The critics of the criterion, on the other hand, assimilate (...)
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  37. Üniversite öğrencilerinde suçluluk kavramı üzerine metaforik bir inceleme [A metaphorical investigation on the concept of guilt among college students].Duygu Dincer - 2019 - Electronic Journal of Social Sciences 18 (71):1222-1238.
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  38. Üniversite öğrencilerinin utanç kavramlarının incelenmesi [A metaphorical investigation on the concept of shame among college students].Duygu Dincer - 2014 - Journal of International Social Research 29 (7):295-311.
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  39. Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?François Kammerer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):649-667.
    Many philosophers have tried to defend physicalism concerning phenomenal consciousness, by explaining dualist intuitions within a purely physicalist framework. One of the most common strategies to do so consists in interpreting the alleged “explanatory gap” between phenomenal states and physical states as resulting from a fallacy, or a cognitive illusion. In this paper, I argue that the explanatory gap does not rest on a fallacy or a cognitive illusion. This does not imply the falsity of physicalism, but it has consequences (...)
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  40. On Scepticism about Unconscious Perception.J. Berger & M. Mylopoulos - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (11-12):8-32.
    While there seems to be much evidence that perceptual states can occur without being conscious, some theorists recently express scepticism about unconscious perception. We explore here two kinds of such scepticism: Megan Peters and Hakwan Lau's experimental work regarding the well-known problem of the criterion -- which seems to show that many purported instances of unconscious perception go unreported but are weakly conscious -- and Ian Phillips' theoretical consideration, which he calls the 'problem of attribution' -- the worry that many (...)
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  41. Precis of Perceiving Reality: Consciousness, Intentionality, and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy.Christian Coseru - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):9-24.
    The point of departure for Perceiving Reality is the idea that per- ception is an embodied structural feature of consciousness whose function is determined by phenomenal experiences in a corresponding domain (of visible, tangibles, etc.). In Perceiving Reality, I try to develop a way of conceiving of our most basic mode of being in the world that resists attempts to cleave reality into an inner and outer, a mental and a physical domain. The central argument of the book is that (...)
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  42. Межсегментные связи: индивидуация и недовольство языком.Vitalii Shymko - 2019 - Pro|Stranstvo.
    Публикация (#8) из научно-популярного цикла: "Структурная онтология познания с доктором Шимко".
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  43. Идентификация сегментов матрицы: рефлексия, культура, цивилизация.Vitalii Shymko - 2019 - Pro|Stranstvo.
    Публикация (#7) из научно-популярного цикла: "Структурная онтология познания с доктором Шимко".
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  44. Идентификация сегментов матрицы: два плана рефлексии.Vitalii Shymko - 2019 - Pro|Stranstvo.
    Публикация (#6) из научно-популярного цикла: "Структурная онтология познания с доктором Шимко".
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  45. Структурно-онтологическая матрица: приступаем к идентификации сегментов.Vitalii Shymko - 2019 - Pro|Stranstvo.
    Публикация (#5) из научно-популярного цикла: "Структурная онтология познания с доктором Шимко".
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  46. Структурно-онтологическая матрица: дихотомическая логика осей.Vitalii Shymko - 2019 - Pro|Stranstvo.
    Публикация (#4) из научно-популярного цикла: "Структурная онтология познания с доктором Шимко".
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  47. A Closer Look at the Perceptual Source in Copy Raising Constructions.Rachel Etta Rudolph - 2019 - Proceedings of Sinn Und Bedeutung 23 2:287-304.
    Simple claims with the verb ‘seem’, as well as the specific sensory verbs, ‘look’, ‘sound’, etc., require the speaker to have some relevant kind of perceptual acquaintance (Pearson, 2013; Ninan, 2014). But different forms of these reports differ in their perceptual requirements. For example, the copy raising (CR) report, ‘Tom seems like he’s cooking’ requires the speaker to have seen Tom, while its expletive subject (ES) variant, ‘It seems like Tom is cooking’, does not (Rogers, 1972; Asudeh and Toivonen, 2012). (...)
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  48. Perception Is Not Always and Everywhere Inferential.Inês Hipólito - 2018 - Australasian Philosophical Review 2 (2):184-188.
    This paper argues that it is possible to embrace the predictive processing framework without reducing affordances to inferential perception. The cognitivist account of PP contends that it can capture relational perception, such as affordances. The rationale for this claim is that over time, sensory data becomes highly-weighted. This paper, however, will show the inconsistency of this claim in the face of the cognitivist premise that ‘encapsulated’ models can throw away ‘the body, the world, or other people’ [Hohwy 2016: 265]. It (...)
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  49. Cognition as Embodied Morphological Computation.Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic - 2018 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence 2017. Springer.
    Cognitive science is considered to be the study of mind (consciousness and thought) and intelligence in humans. Under such definition variety of unsolved/unsolvable problems appear. This article argues for a broad understanding of cognition based on empirical results from i.a. natural sciences, self-organization, artificial intelligence and artificial life, network science and neuroscience, that apart from the high level mental activities in humans, includes sub-symbolic and sub-conscious processes, such as emotions, recognizes cognition in other living beings as well as extended and (...)
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  50. Accounting for the Specious Present: A Defense of Enactivism.Kaplan Hasanoglu - 2018 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 39 (3):181-204.
    I argue that conscious visual experience is essentially a non-representational demonstration of a skill. The explication and defense of this position depends on both phenomenological and empirical considerations. The central phenomenological claim is this: as a matter of human psychology, it is impossible to produce a conscious visual experience of a mind-independent object that is sufficiently like typical cases, without including concomitant proprioceptive sensations of the sort of extra-neural behavior that allows us to there and then competently detect such objects. (...)
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1 — 50 / 3144