Philosophy of Law, Miscellaneous

Residence of unauthorized immigrants is a stable feature of the Global North’s liberal democracies. This article asks how liberal-democratic policymakers should respond to this phenomenon, assuming both that states have incontrovertible rights and interests to assert control over immigration and that unauthorized residence is nevertheless an entrenched fact. It argues that a set of liberal-democratic commitments gives policymakers strong reason to implement both so-called ‘firewall’ and ‘regularization’ policies, thereby protecting unauthorized immigrants’ basic needs and interests and officially incorporating many of (...) them in society. It then explains that the background imperative of immigration control creates a dilemmatic tension between these policies, as regularization is envisaged alongside the removal of the ineligible, which is in turn hindered by the implementation of firewalls. This creates a dilemma between the pursuit of two policy goals that are both underwritten by the same value commitments. Though it cannot be entirely dissolved, I argue that the best way to mitigate this dilemma is to design regularization policy in a way that leaves only a small number of unauthorized immigrants subject to removal. (shrink)

The ideas that law is (or can be regarded as) a legal system, and that law evolves over time in adaptation to its context, are two of the most widely shared and presupposed ideas in contemporary legal theory. However, even if much interest has been dedicated in legal theory and legal dogmatics to the evolution of specific legal concepts or institutions, as well as legal norms in particular, not so much attention has been dedicated to the evolution of legal systems (...) in themselves. In this chapter, I will try to offer an overview of the evolution of the concept of legal system and critically analyse whether an evolutionary theory of legal systems - i.e., a theory about the evolution of legal systems - can be reconstructed and laid down for the analysis both of the past, the present, and the future of legal systems. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that there is no discrepancy between Kant's Doctrine of Right (The Metaphysics of Morals) (1797), which legally permits lies that do not deprive someone of their rights or property, and his On a Supposed Right to Lie from Love of Humanity (1797), which argues that it would be a crime to lie to a murderer about the whereabouts of the innocent person he is pursuing.

This paper explores Kant's account of marriage and its relevance to contemporary debates over same-sex marriage. Kant's defense of marriage is read against debates unfolding in Prussia in the 1790s, when the question of whether marriage was a "universal estate" was a central point of debate surrounding the Prussian Legal Code of 1794. By reading Kant's arguments in light of this historical context, and in comparison with those offered by his contemporaries, Fichte and von Hippel, this article shows both that (...) the debates about marriage in the 1790s mirror contemporary tensions, and that Kant took a "middle path" that innovatively defended marriage as a basic feature of the state. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of the phrase ‘acting on behalf of another.’ To do this, acting on behalf is first distinguished from ‘acting for the sake of another,’ the latter being a matter of other-directed motivation, the former of what we call ‘normative other-directedness’—i.e., acting on the claims and duties of the other. Second, we provide a distinction between two kinds of acting on behalf of another: representation as other-directedness plus normative replacement, and normative support as other-directedness without normative (...) replacement. Third, the paper offers conditions of appropriateness for both types of acting on behalf. (shrink)

In questo breve commento a El concepto de «poder constituyente» di Jorge Baquerizo, formulerò tre osservazioni su alcune tematiche e alcuni aspetti della (o connessi alla) sua definizione di ‘soggetto costituente’ (§2). Le prime due osservazioni riguardano alcuni aspetti problematici del rapporto di ‘soggetto costituente’ con ‘autorità de facto’ e ‘potere di fatto’, in particolare la non completa considerazione dell’ambiguità di tali nozioni e delle conseguenze di tale ambiguità (§3). La terza riguarda la possibilità che la definizione in analisi sia (...) insufficiente, e la proposta di superare i limiti di tale definizione per mezzo di una definizione dell’‘identità costituente’ basata sull’analisi della «triade costituente», e della considerazione del contesto internazionale (§4). (shrink)

Hunger strikes are commonly repressed in prison and seen as disruptive, coercive, and violent. Hunger strikers and their advocates insist that incarcerated persons have a right to hunger strike, which protects them against repression and force-feeding. Physicians and medical ethicists generally ground this right in the right to refuse medical treatment; lawyers and legal scholars derive it from incarcerated persons’ free speech rights. Neither account adequately grounds the right to hunger strike because both misrepresent the hunger strike as noncoercive and (...) nonviolent. I articulate an alternative, dual account of the right to hunger strike. On the remedial argument, the right to hunger strike should be legally protected as a right to petition for redress, in light of incarcerated people’s structural vulnerability to abuse and given inadequate grievance mechanisms. The constructive argument derives the right to hunger strike from the right to resist oppression and stresses the normative permissibility of the use of coercive tactics to defend one’s liberty interests in the face of carceral oppression. -/- . (shrink)

The status of indirect discrimination is ambiguous in the current literature. This paper addresses two contemporary and related debates. First, for some, indirect discrimination is not truly a distinct kind of discrimination, but it is simply a legal construct designed to address distributive inequalities between groups. Second, even if one accepts that indirect discrimination is a distinct type of discrimination, the connection between the two kinds of discrimination, direct and indirect, is debated. For some, they are distinct act-types, while for (...) others, indirect discrimination should be conceived as a side effect of prior cases of direct discrimination. In this paper, I argue that indirect discrimination is a distinct act-type that can take place without being connected to prior instances of direct discrimination. (shrink)

Most people will not be familiar with the term ‘jurisprudence of sport’ (JOS). The idea is that looking at sport through the eyes of a legal scholar might illuminate our understanding of certain problems in sport (and vice versa). The term was first introduced in 2011, in the title of a paper by Mitchell N. Berman, who is also a contributor to this book. In the present volume we have contributions from around the world: Italy, Spain, Germany, Australia, Great Britain, (...) the US and the Netherlands, by authors of various nationalities. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo sostenemos que la teoría de la competencia que Rodríguez postula en su Teoría Analítica del Derecho (TAD) adolece de algunos problemas. El primero de ellos consiste en ser un enfoque reduccionista de la competencia (similar al de Bulygin y el de Ferrer), en el cual la competencia queda reducida a reglas determinativas que determinan potestades. Es dudoso que la competencia pueda reducirse a un único tipo de norma y el mismo Rodríguez parece albergar dudas a este (...) respecto. El segundo problema consiste en el rechazo que Rodríguez hace de la idea misma de regla constitutiva. Dicho rechazo a su vez se basa en un rechazo más general: el de las tesis de Searle sobre las reglas constitutivas. Sostenemos que rechazar las tesis de Searle no implica el tener que rechazar el concepto de regla constitutiva, que el problema de la competencia puede explicarse de una manera más completa acudiendo a la noción (ligeramente reformulada) de regla eidético-constitutiva de Amedeo Conte y que esto permite construir un sistema de normas que constituya de manera completa la competencia de los agentes jurídicos. A este tipo de sistemas lo llamamos “sistema constitutivo” y creemos que su implementación permite considerar un enfoque de la competencia más completo que el ofrecido en TAD, resolver la ambivalencia que Rodríguez parece tener frente a su propio enfoque y rescatar la idea de regla constitutiva de la condena que Rodríguez le aplica. (shrink)

El presente trabajo propone hacer un análisis de la noción de autoridad en el marco de la teoría del derecho de Bulygin, particularmente en conexión con sus nociones de derecho y de interpretación. La intención es doble: por un lado, intentar articular sistemáticamente el pensamiento de Bulygin en relación con estas tres nociones, reconstruyendo un posible modo en el cual éstas se relacionan entre sí en el marco de su teoría del derecho (sección 2). Por el otro, proponer algunas perplejidades (...) que pueden surgir al momento de analizar detenidamente estas relaciones, y cómo pueden representar tensiones en la teoría del derecho bulyginiana (sección 3). Finalmente, ofreceré unas breves consideraciones finales (sección 4). (shrink)

En este trabajo, propongo realizar un breve análisis de dos visiones teóricas acerca del razonamiento jurídico en contextos judiciales que, a primera vista, resultan radicalmente diferentes: la visión de Paolo Comanducci (en adelante, “modelo comanducciano”), y la visión de Damiano Canale y Giovanni Tuzet (en adelante, “modelo inferencialista”). Primero realizaré una reconstrucción sumaria, pero global, de ambos modelos (secciones II y III), para luego establecer algunas notas comparativas entre ellos (sección IV). Allí, intentaré mostrar propondré entender que la visión de (...) Comanducci es mejor entendida como analizando al razonamiento jurídico desde un punto de vista estático, momentáneo e individual, mientras que la visión de Canale y Tuzet es mejor entendida como analizando el razonamiento desde un punto de vista dinámico, concatenado e intersubjetivo. En este sentido, el objetivo principal en este trabajo es evaluar cómo, y en qué medida, estas dos posturas ambas pueden ser consideradas más bien complementarias en lugar de excluyentes a los fines de describir y/o explicar el razonamiento jurídico en contextos judiciales (sección V). (shrink)

En este trabajo, propongo realizar un análisis crítico de la concepción de la “autoridad como servicio” defendida por Joseph Raz, concentrando la atención en la condición de justificación normal. En la sección 2, realizaré una reconstrucción articulada de esta concepción la autoridad como servicio, desagregando las tesis que la componen y mostrando cómo se articulan entre ellas (2.1, 2.2, 2.3), y propondré una versión del contenido del “test de legitimidad” que surge de la postura de Raz para determinar la legitimidad (...) una autoridad (2.4). En la sección 3, plantearé algunos interrogantes acerca de la justificación de la autoridad (política) con base en la condición de justificación normal, relacionados con la oscuridad ínsita a la evaluación de la condición de justificación normal (3.1), la (in)existencia de un modo seguro para verificar la condición de justificación normal (3.2), y una evaluación sobre la (no) necesidad de la condición de justificación normal para las autoridades prácticas políticas (3.3). Finalmente, en la sección 4, ofreceré unas breves palabras conclusivas. (shrink)

If it were followed by “I’m a president,” Richard Nixon’s televised denial (“I am not a crook”) would be tantamount to Jimmy McGill’s self-portrayal in Better Call Saul. Out of the crooked timber of humanity, an honest president or an ethical lawyer rarely emerges. They’re like needles in a haystack. Nevertheless, it’s worthwhile to search for these rare artifacts and, in the process, ask, “Why do so many lawyers (and presidents) fall from grace, transforming into morally bad or corrupt actors?” (...) The ability to be a good or ethical person can deteriorate over time. In their personal and professional lives, people can make consistently poor choices in their capacity as moral agents. In turn, they cultivate flawed habits or what are often referred to as vices. Jimmy McGill’s trajectory is, without a doubt, a harrowing story of moral decline. In some ways, his transformation into Saul Goodman resembles a trite story about how a profession, lawyering, corrupts its practitioners. On a deeper level, McGill’s journey involves a fundamental change in how he habitually interacts with his environment, a change of motivation and disposition that is, almost entirely, a change for the worse. To know the content of Jimmy’s character is to be familiar with his story, a story of moral decline and ethical failure. (shrink)

En «What Makes a Transnational Rule of Law? Understanding the Logos and Values of Human Action in Transnational Law», Verónica Rodríguez-Blanco explora la posibilidad –y oportunidad– de la existencia de un Rule of Law (en adelante, ROL) a nivel transnacional. El objetivo de este trabajo es discutir brevemente algunos puntos relativos a diferentes facetas de la propuesta de Rodríguez-Blanco: la pregunta correcta acerca del ROL y su visión particular acerca de la acción humana (sección 2); el tipo de explicación acerca (...) de las reglas, estándares, reglamentos y principios (sección 3); las definiciones de ROL, coerción, y libertad (sección 4); las partes de la relación relevante y la noción de derecho transnacional (sección 5), y la estructura de las relaciones relevantes en contextos nacionales y transnacionales (sección 6). Intentaré, por una parte, mostrar cómo estos puntos pueden presentarse como relativamente problemáticos y por tanto debilitar la integridad de la propuesta de Rodriguez-Blanco; y, por otra parte, ofrecer algunas alternativas acerca de cómo estos problemas podrían ser resueltos para fortalecerla. A través de esos comentarios intentaré también mostrar cuáles serían, en mi opinión, los puntos importantes a considerar para cualquier discurso o propuesta sólida relacionada con éstos. Finalmente, concluiré con algunos comentarios finales (sección 7). (shrink)

In “What Makes a Transnational Rule of Law? Understanding the Logos and Values of Human Action in Transnational Law”, Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco explores the possibility—and opportunity—of the existence of a Rule of Law (from now on, RoL) on a transnational level. The aim of this paper is to briefly discuss some points related to various facets of Rodriguez-Blanco’s proposal: the correct question about the RoL and her particular view of human action (section 2); the type of explanation about rules, standards, regulations (...) and principles (section 3); the definitions of RoL, coercion, and freedom (section 4); the parties of the relevant relationship and the notion of transnational law (section 5); and the structure of relevant relationships in national and transnational contexts (section 6). I will try, on the one hand, to show how these points could appear quite problematic and thus seem to undermine the integrity of Rodriguez-Blanco’s proposal, and on the other hand, to offer some suggestions as to how these problems could be solved to strengthen her proposal. With these comments, I will also try to indicate what I think are the most important points that should be considered in any sound discourse or proposal on these subjects. I will then conclude with some final remarks (section 7). (shrink)

This paper presents a new challenge for libertarianism. The problem, in a nutshell, is that libertarianism appears to self-destruct in cases where conjoined twins—who share body parts—disagree over what to do with them. The problem is explored, and some solutions are proposed. The verdict is that accepting any of them will make libertarianism harder to defend.

The counter majoritarian difficulty is one of the main objections against the judicial review. In this paper, this objection is analyzed from the standpoint of the norm formulation/norm distinction. By stressing the distinc- tion between norm formulations and norms, I claim that when judicial review prevents the application of a norm to an individual case the counter majoritarian difficulty objection does not hold.

In the field of Evidence Law the relation between truth and law has been a somewhat non- debated topic in the past years. It is a given that such a connection exists and, it is understood as the notion of the ascertainment of the truth of disputed questions of fact through legal evidence. The thesis that I have reconstructed in this paper has been presented by Prof. Jordi Ferrer who grounds the connection between truth and law in the role of (...) the legal system as a tool for guiding the behavior of the governed. I call this thesis the theory of the structural clause of truth. In this paper I shall present a possible reconstruction of this theory, I shall raise two objections against it and I shall present five possible interpretations of the relation between truth and law. (shrink)

O objetivo do trabalho é auxiliar o jurista desocupado responsável pelo ensino da cadeira de filosofia do direito. A situação mais frequente nas faculdades de direito são as aulas de filosofia e de outras cadeiras do eixo fundamental serem tapeadas por qualquer bacharel sem nada melhor para fazer. Ocorre que tais ociosos juristas muitas vezes se veem receosos quando instituídos nos seus cargos, isso porque não possuem qualquer conhecimento na matéria em que lecionam, ao mesmo tempo em que são lançados (...) em sala de aula expostos às dúvidas e críticas dos alunos. Nesse sentido apresento a esses professores, juristas desocupados, uma técnica pedagógica resumida e de fácil compreensão para ministrarem sem maiores sobressaltos a cadeira de filosofia do direito. Seguindo os passos propostos, o jurista desocupado não terá riscos de ser questionado pelos alunos ou pela instituição, mantendo seu complemento de renda garantido. (shrink)

This article argues that certain interpretive trajectories within Jewish tradition – both halakhic (nomos) and aggadic (narrative) – can be illuminated vis-a-vis classical American pragmatism (CAP). Contrary to a prevalent belief, Peirce, James, and Dewey were neither anti-metaphysical nor anti-traditional. They contended, in different ways, that the ‘pragmatic maxim’ (PM) – “truth is what works” in James’s phrasing – is not a narrowly instrumentalist truth test. The PM rather implies that ideas and beliefs (philosophical and religious alike) should be examined (...) against their worldly consequences. After a clarification of this relational idea in its pragmatist philosophical context, and an introductory sketch of the appearances of the PM in Jewish tradition, the article examines the PM within the thought of Rabbi Ḥayyim Hirschensohn (RḤH; 1857-1935). The article runs as follows: Section 1 presents CAP and clarifies what the PM is. Section 2 offers a bird’s eye mapping of the application of the PM within Jewish tradition. Section 3 briefs RḤH’s intellectual biography and elaborates on his pragmatist premises and his application of the PM. Rather than conceiving divine commandments as an arbitrary dictate, RḤH viewed them as purposive, relational, and as constituted and reaffirmed by individual and collective human agreements. Finally, the article reflects on the theological-intellectual prerequisites for the application of the PM. (shrink)

On the basis of the problem of the possible compulsory nature of vaccines against Covid-19, this paper considers the sources that allow us to justify the imposition of collective measures. The social contract theory provides a rational basis for the universality of ethical and natural law obligations, including conditional respect for a protected domain of individual physical and moral integrity. However, the practical application of the covenant is subject to the uncertainty of what effective consequences the policies have. Ethical principles (...) show the problem of application in the environment of epistemological uncertainty. Only in a free society, with free scrutiny and deliberation, can justified knowledge be achieved that allows social measures to be agreed upon. The characteristics of the case that is the subject of this article lead to the conclusion that Covid-19 vaccines are not ethically obligatory, universally, but they can generate reasoned health measures, promotion, and limitations, based on proven positive effects, as a technical matter. (shrink)

The very idea of promulgation has been given little to no treatment in the philosophy of law. In this exploratory essay, I introduce three possible theories of promulgation: the ‘no-theory theory’ (which treats promulgation as a matter of particular contexts), the ‘conveyance theory’ (which treats promulgation as a function of intellectual good faith interpreters), and ‘agonistic theory’ (which treats promulgation as indistinguishable from propaganda). I suggest that (at least) three kinds of models are consistent with the theories, and can potentially (...) help us understand when law is successfully promulgated in particular legal contexts: the spread model, the chain model, and the memetic model. I end the paper by comparing the two theories with respect to a case study. Throughout I will show that the conveyance and agonistic theories have a serious advantage over the no-theory theory, in that they allow us to comparatively examine the epistemic weaknesses of diverse theories about the grounding of law on the basis of their contents. (shrink)

Summary Background Self-binding directives instruct clinicians to overrule treatment refusal during future severe episodes of illness. These directives are promoted as having potential to increase autonomy for individuals with severe episodic mental illness. Although lived experience is central to their creation, service users’ views on self-binding directives have not been investigated substantially. This study aimed to explore whether reasons for endorsement, ambivalence, or rejection given by service users with bipolar disorder can address concerns regarding self-binding directives, decision-making capacity, and human (...) rights. Methods This study used qualitative data from an internet-based survey distributed to the mailing list of the UK charity Bipolar UK, which contained multiple closed and open questions on advance decision-making in bipolar disorder. Quantitative analysis of a closed question about self-binding directives had already demonstrated endorsement amongst a very high proportion of participants with bipolar disorder who completed the survey. We conducted thematic analysis of responses from those participants who answered a subsequent open question about reasons for their view. Research was co-produced within a multi-disciplinary team, with clinical, legal, and ethical expertise, and lived experience of bipolar disorder. Ideas and methodologies associated with all these areas of expertise were used in the analysis of these reasons and to gain insight into the thoughts of individuals with bipolar disorder about self-binding directives and associated issues. Findings Between Oct 23 and Dec 5, 2017, 932 individuals with a self-reported clinical diagnosis of bipolar disorder completed the internet survey, with 565 (154 men; 400 women; 11 transgender or other) providing free text answers to the open question. A large majority of respondents endorsed self-binding directives, nearly all describing a determinate shift to types of distorted thinking and decision-making when unwell as their key justification. Responses indicating ambivalence were dominated by logistical concerns about the drafting and implementation of self-binding directives, while those who rejected self-binding directives also cited logistical concerns, validity of their thinking when unwell, and potential contravention of human rights. Interpretation This study is, to our knowledge, the first large study of reasons why mental health service users might endorse or reject the use of self-binding directives. The findings provide empirical support for introducing self-binding directives into mental health advance decision-making practice and policy and may help to address enduring ethical concerns surrounding possible implementation of the directive while a person retains decision-making capacity. The opinions expressed here in responses given by multiple service users with bipolar disorder challenge a prominent view within international disability rights debates that involuntary treatment and recognition of impaired mental capacity constitute inherent human rights violations. Funding The Wellcome Trust . (shrink)

Il settantesimo anniversario della Dichiarazione universale dei diritti umani è, senza dubbio, un’importante occasione per riflettere sui diritti umani. In questo breve intervento, propongo una riflessione sul problema concettuale relativo alle disposizioni normative che vengono utilizzate per riconoscere e/o stabilire diritti umani. La domanda può essere posta in questi termini: che tipo di norme esprimono queste disposizioni? Regole, principi, oppure entrambe, a seconda delle circostanze? La risposta a questa domanda implica la soluzione di due distinti problemi. Da un lato, un (...) problema concettuale: che tipo di teoria o di approccio può meglio render conto delle norme sui diritti umani? Quale teoria o approccio meglio si attaglia alla loro struttura, alle loro condizioni, ecc.? Da un altro, un problema assiologico: come dovremmo considerare le norme sui diritti umani, alla luce di una data dottrina o ideologia ritenuta migliore o corretta? In considerazione di ciò, la struttura di questo saggio segue il seguente andamento. Nella sezione 2, vengono effettuate in via preliminare alcune distinzioni concettuali, pregiudiziali rispetto alla tematica affrontata. La sezione 3 offre risposta alla domanda di cui sopra, sia sotto il profilo concettuale sia sotto il profilo assiologico. La sezione 4 è dedicata al possibile modo di risolvere le tensioni identificate nella sezione precedente. Infine, l’ultima sezione contiene una breve conclusione sulle riflessioni precedenti. (shrink)

This essay analyses those statements that mention legal norms in negative terms. Specifically, it analyses those statements that define a legal system by mentioning how legal protection does not work and where legal protection ends, and those statements that identify what rights‐holders do not have to with their legally protected free capacities. This essay argues that these statements address a systemic question. It calls such a dynamic as negative governmentality. The argument proceeds in four steps. It introduces the concept of (...) negative governmentality by arguing that the idea of freedom requires both the positive affirmation of moral agency and the constraining of moral agency (Section 2). It then explores how rights constitute freedom by limiting rights or making exceptions to them (Section 3). Later, it analyses how rights‐based norms prevent abuse of rights by holders of rights (Section 4). Finally, it sees how rights‐based norms constrain the legal guarantor of rights, i.e., a state (Section 5). The essay concludes by mentioning the importance of negative governmentality (Section 6). (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a tension between the Law in the novel The Island of Doctor Moreau, by H. G. Wells, and Kant's reciprocity thesis. The Law is a series of prohibitions that Moreau has his beasts recite. Moreau devotes his time to transforming animals through a painful surgery into beings that resemble humans, but the humanized beasts are constantly slipping back into animalistic habits, and so Moreau promulgates the Law to maintain decorum. Kant's reciprocity thesis states that free (...) will is the necessary and sufficient condition of moral practical laws. That is, in order for a moral practical law to be applicable, there must be free will, and, if free will is present, then there will be a moral practical law that sets a standard for the free will. However, in Wells's novel, the humanized beasts seem to lack free will. So, how can a law be applicable to them? By delving deeper into the mystery of Moreau's strange island, I will shed light on the otherwise cumbersome concepts of free will, natural impulses, and practical laws, as well as their interrelationships. The upshot will be a deeper understanding of personhood through an exploration of the instinctual nature of animals, moral law, and free will. (shrink)

Is justice (merely) an expression of particular values or is it to be understood as a (universal) cross-cultural standard of validity? Following the ideas of Jacques Derrida, this book provides a new answer to this question: Justice is to be explained as a process of deconstruction. To arrive at this conclusion, I proceed from a critical discussion of Martin Heidegger's approach to social philosophy in Being and Time which I connect with a detailed analysis of the implications of Derrida's writings (...) on practical philosophy aspiring to provide a variety of insights, both critical and constructive, into the cultural and normative foundations of democracy. Thematically, the book bridges the frontiers between the philosophy of law, cultural and social philosophy, ethics and political theory, focusing on fundamental questions of the constitution of normativity, responsibility and justification. In this way, my reading of Heidegger and Derrida aims to shed light on the nature of the political problems that concern our societies today. The file contains the table of contents and the first two (introductory) chapters, the introductions of the remaining chapters, as well as the concluding remarks (in German). (shrink)

In this chapter I seek to provide a theoretical defense of workplace democracy that is independent from and outside the lineage of Marxist and communist theory. Common to the council movements, anarcho- syndicalism and many other forms of libertarian socialism was the idea “that workers’ self- management was central.” Yet the idea of workers’ control has not been subject to the same theoretical development as Marx’s theory, not to mention capitalist economic theory. This chapter aims to contribute at a theoretical (...) level by providing a justification and defense of self- managed workplaces that is independent of the particular historical tradition of the council movements. There is a clear and definitive case for workplace democracy based on first principles that descends to modern times through the Reformation and Enlightenment in the abolitionist, democratic and feminist movements. By the twentieth century, the arguments had been scattered and lost – like the bones of some ancient beast scattered in a desert – partly due to misconceptions, mental blocks and misinterpretations embodied in Marxism, liberalism and economic theory. When one has worked through some of these intellectual roadblocks, then one may be better able to reassemble the case for workplace democracy from well- known first principles developed in the abolitionist, democratic and feminist movements. (shrink)

The question of how to arrive at a consensus on human rights norm in a diverse, pluralistic, and interconnected global environment is critical. This volume is a contribution to an intercultural understanding of human rights in the context of India and its relationship to the West. The legitimacy of the global legal, economic, and political order is increasingly premised on the discourse of international human rights. Yet the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights developed with little or no consultation from (...) non-Western nations such as India. In response, there has developed an extensive literature and cross-cultural analysis of human rights in the areas of African, East-Asian, and Islamic studies, yet there is a comparative dearth of conceptual research relating to India. As problematically, there is an lacuna in the previous literature; it simply stops short at analyzing how Western understandings of human rights may be supported from within various non-Western cultural self-understandings; yet, surely, there is more to this issue. The chapters in this collection pioneer a distinct approach that takes such deliberation to a further level by examining what it is that the West itself may have to learn from various Indian articulations of human rights as well. (shrink)

Modern neurotechnologies are rapidly infringing on conventional notions of human dignity and they are challenging what it means to be human. This article is a survey analysis of the future of the digital age, reflecting primarily on the effects of neurotechnology that violate universal human rights to dignity, self-determination, and privacy. In particular, this article focuses on neuromarketing to critically assess potentially negative social ramifications of under-regulated neurotechnological application. Possible solutions are critically evaluated, including the human rights claim to the (...) ‘right to mental privacy’ and the suggestion of a new human right based on spiritual jurisdiction, where the human psyche is a legal space in a substantive legal setting. (shrink)

Among the most persuasive arguments against hate speech bans was made by Ronald Dworkin, who warned of the threat to political legitimacy posed by laws that deny those subject to them adequ...

Проблема раціональності соціальних регуляторів таких як мораль і право завжди цікавила філософів. Розвиток уявлень про раціональність можна вважати певним соціально–культурним, історичним процесом зміни уявлень про неї, він є загальносвітовий розумний процес. Філософію і науку можна розглядати як різні прояви цього процесу, що по–різному реалізують як раціональність так і розумність. Ці важливі питання піднімає у своїй філософській системі відомий представник німецької класичної філософії Г. Гегель. Звернення до філософської системи Г. Гегеля щодо проблеми нормативності не є випадковим. Критерії її раціональності достатньо важко (...) виділити в тому сенсі, що вони дуже щільно вплетені в канву загальної культури якоїсь історичної епохи розвитку людини і суспільства. Ця раціональність сприймається як така, що відповідає історичному розвитку і усвідомлюється актуальною сучасними їй вченими і філософами. Відповідно раціональність нормативності повинна бути критичною щодо себе самої, щоб не втратити розумність, що цілком відповідає суті філософії. Метою даного дослідження є визначення загальної логіки втілення раціональності у нормативності моралі і права в філософській системі Г. Гегеля. Основними методами дослідження є діалектичний метод, метод співставлення історичного та логічного, метод аналізу і синтезу та ін. Дослідження філософії Г. Гегеля розкриває нормативність як соціальну сферу реалізації свободи і розумності і дозволяє показати внутрішню єдність особистої і загальної волі. (shrink)

Legal-Philosophical Propositions. It is possible to write a Kelsenian ‘Legal-Philosophical Tractate’ - based on Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law - after the example of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The following main and first sub-propositions analogous to the main and first sub-propositions of the Tractatus are a proof thereof and give an initial impetus to it: “May others come and do it better”. Unlike Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, that ends with the famous main proposition 7 that one should be silent about what cannot be (...) spoken, a Kelsenian Tractate would not end with an analogous main proposition 7, but with two sub-propositions that show the value of both ‘the speaking’ and ‘the silence’ of positive law. (shrink)

This essay discusses various representations of Eichmann's mind that were fashioned on the occasion of his trial in Jerusalem in 1961. Gideon Hausner the prosecutor presented the defendant as demonic. Hannah Arendt, the German-born American Jewish philosopher portrayed him as banal or thoughtless. Limiting themselves to the issue of mens rea in their judgment, the Israeli Supreme Court justices described Eichmann's mind as controlled by criminal intent. While these views have been widely discussed in the literature, much of this essay (...) focuses on a hitherto little noted perspective on Eichmann's mind that was formulated by the mental health experts who examined Eichmann for the prosecution. As compared to the inclusionist, confictual, and complex picture these experts presented of Eichmann's mind, Arendt's and Hausner's views appear similar in their reductionism, rather than diametrically opposed, while the approach of the Supreme Court justices to Eichmann's mind can be regarded as restrictive. Methodological problems involved in all these different perspectives are discussed, and it is argued that even though the psychological outlook declares itself to be non-judgmental, it does, in fact, entail a dimension of moral judgment. Finally, Eichmann 's recently declassified memoirs are adduced and interpreted as lending some support to the psychological, inclusionist perspective on Eichmann's mind. (shrink)

It is a truism that there are erroneous convictions in criminal trials. Recent legal findings show that 3.3% to 5%of all convictions in capital rape-murder cases in the U.S. in the 1980s were erroneous convictions. Given this fact, what normative conclusions can be drawn? First, the article argues that a moderately revised version of Scanlon’ s contractualism offers an attractive moral vision that is different from utilitarianism or other consequentialist theories, or from purely deontological theories. It then brings this version (...) of Scanlonian contractualism to bear on the question of whether the death penalty, life imprisonment, long sentences, or shorter sentences can be justified, given that there is a non-negligible rate of erroneous conviction. Contractualism holds that a permissible act must be justifiable to everyone affected by it. Yet, given the non-negligible rate of erroneous conviction, it is unjustifiable to mete out the death penalty, because such a punishment is not justifiable to innocent murder convicts. It is further argued that life imprisonment will probably not be justified (unless lowering the sentence to a long sentence will drastically increase the murder rate). However, whether this line of argument could be further extended would depend on the impact of lowering sentences on communal security. (shrink)

This study brings light to the concepts of State and Government in the thought of Marsilio de Padua pointing out to profoundly modern institutions present in the reflection of this medieval philosopher. We attempt to show that Marsilio de Padua reflects based on Aristotle´s categories, but proposes a State and Government conception different from that common place of medieval politics as he insists on the need of the popular consent as a criterion of political legitimacy. -/- O estudo explicita os (...) conceitos de Estado e de Governo no pensamento de Marsílio de Pádua apontando as intuições profundamente modernas presentes na reflexão desse filósofo medieval. Procuramos mostrar que Marsílio reflete com categorias aristotélicas, mas propõe uma concepção de Estado e de Governo que se distancia do lugar comum da reflexão política medieval ao insistir na necessidade do consentimento dos súditos como critério de legitimidade política. (shrink)

The relationship between power, law and consent is a key feature of the Western debate on criminal law. On the one side, defining the legitimate ways of exercising the punitive power has been a critical question since the Enlightenment thought onwards and especially as to the rule of law doctrine. On the other side, the role played by public punishment in shaping consent and its communicative potential have been crucial questions for critical, as well as non-critical approaches to criminal law (...) in contemporary thought. These questions gain in strength and radicalism when it comes to international criminal law (ICL). In this case the filter of the state is not present anymore to mediate between power, law and consent, and the power to punish individuals is directly exercised by international institutions. This means, on the one hand, that traditional justifications of the power to punish and which are elaborated on in the domestic sphere are not useful anymore in legitimating international punishment. International criminal norms are not framed by an international democratically elected parliament, and their exercise is not controlled by the complex system of checks and balances typical of the rule of law. On the other hand, having not being created by a sovereign, international criminal law cannot be conceived as an instrument to build or consolidate consent around the sovereign. A double-sided dilemma therefore arises: traditional explanations are no longer apt to answer the question whether ICL is legitimate, while ICL itself can no longer be considered an instrument to build consent around the traditional power exercising it, namely the state. Although I consider both sides of the dilemma equally interesting and stimulating, I will focus here only on one side of the coin: the ability to build consent of the ICL institutions, and in particular the International Criminal Court (ICC). In other words, instead of asking whether the consent around the ICC is broad enough for the Court to be considered legitimate, I shall ask whether the ICC is able to build consent around the world order it embodies. (shrink)

One of the Machiavelli's most famous and innovative thesis states that good laws arise from social conflicts, according to the Roman Empire example of the opposition between plebs and nobles. Conflicts are able to bring about order in virtue of the characteristic constrictive force of necessity, which prevents the ambition to prevail. Nonetheless, law does not neutralize the conflict; just give it a regulation. So, law is subjected to history, to the continuous change, which means that it is potentially corruptible. (...) On this account, Machiavelli says that a State can only maintain its authority through a continuous return to the originary moment, viz. to the revival of the experiences of "fear", "terror" and "punishment" lived in the originary event of the foundation. For that reason, in the origin of law is also the violence, whose combined function is to provide legitimacy to its exercise by the State apparatus as the only form to preserve political life from ruin.Uma das mais famosas e inovadoras teses de Maquiavel é a afirmação de que as boas leis nascem dos conflitos sociais, segundo o exemplo romano das oposições entre plebe e nobres. Os conflitos são capazes de produzir ordem por conter a força constritiva própria da necessidade, que impede a ambição de reinar. Contudo, a lei não neutraliza o conflito, mas apenas lhe dá uma ordenação. A lei está, pois, exposta à história, à contínua mudança, o que significa dizer que é potencialmente corruptível. Por causa desta possibilidade, Maquiavel afirma que um Estado somente mantém sua autoridade por meio de um retorno contínuo ao momento da origem, isto é, à revivência da experiência do "medo", do "terror" e da "punição" do acontecimento originário da fundação. Assim, na origem da lei está a violência, cuja função é proporcionar a legitimação de seu exercício pelo aparato estatal como única forma de preservar da ruína a vida política. (shrink)

The authors outline the way in which documents as social objects have evolved from their earliest forms to the electronic documents of the present day. They note that while certain features have remained consistent, processes regarding document authentication are seriously complicated by the easy reproducibility of digital entities. The authors argue that electronic documents also raise significant questions concerning the theory of ‘documentality’ advanced by Maurizio Ferraris, especially given the fact that interactive documents seem to blur the distinctions between the (...) static documents (or ‘inscriptions’) which form Ferraris’s starting point, and dynamic software processes. The authors argue further that the Ferraris view as applied to legal documents is flawed because of the fact that courts may treat contractual obligations as enduring even in spite of a complete absence of enduring inscriptions. Finally, the authors note that traces in brains, another important family of inscriptions (as Ferraris conceives them), differ significantly from genuinely documentary inscriptions by their lack of public inspectability. (shrink)

In this paper a theoretical definition that helps to explain how the logical structure of legal presumptions is constructed by applying the Carneades model of argumentation developed in artificial intelligence. Using this model, it is shown how presumptions work as devices used in evidentiary reasoning in law in the event of a lack of evidence to assist a chain of reasoning to move forward to prove or disprove a claim. It is shown how presumptions work as practical devices that may (...) be useful in cases in which there is insufficient evidence to prove the claim to an appropriate standard of proof. (shrink)

The article argues that the famous debate on natural and positive law between Lon Fuller and HLA Hart rests on a dispute about whether or not that something is a law provides on its own a prima facie reason for doing something.

This paper is in part an introduction to Plato's late political philosophy. In the central sections, I look at Plato's Laws and Statesman and ask the question of how law can produce authentic virtue. If law is merely coercive or habituating, but virtue requires rational understanding, there will be a gap between what law can do and what it is supposed to do. I examine the solution to this difficulty proposed in the Laws, the persuasive preludes attached to the laws, (...) and suggest that they produce an inferior, passive mode of rational order that falls short of full virtue. (shrink)

This chapter discusses major theories of domestic justice in the context of South African Constitutional, statutory and case law. It begins by considering when it is permissible for legislators to restrict civil liberty. South Africa's Parliament has criminalised prostitution, liquor sales on Sundays and marijuana use, actions that few liberals would say should be illegal. However, South African law permits abortion, gambling and homosexual relationships, which many conservatives would criminalise. Is there any deep inconsistency here? Should South Africa become more (...) liberal or less? Then, this essay takes up the issue of the way the law ought to govern the distribution of personal property such as houses, TVs and money. Is it permissible for the state to force those who have acquired wealth without using force or fraud to give some of it to those with less? Libertarians say that it is not permissible, while redistributivists say that it is. If the latter are correct, are wealthy South Africans giving their fair share, and is the South African state redistributing it in the right way? Next, the discussion considers whether the law should protect private property, something that capitalists affirm and socialists deny. Despite its socialist disposition before the end of apartheid, the ANC has decisively promoted private ownership of the means of production. Has this been appropriate? Is there a 'third way' between the communism of the East and the capitalism of the West that South Africa should pursue? The chapter concludes by providing a brief summary of the use of legal coercion in the new South Africa along with readings for further consideration. (shrink)

Civil liberty and privacy advocates have criticized the USA PATRIOT Act (Act) on numerous grounds since it was passed in the wake of the World Trade Center attacks in 2001. Two of the primary targets of those criticisms are the Act’s sneak-and-peek search provision, which allows law enforcement agents to conduct searches without informing the search’s subjects, and the business records provision, which allows agents to secretly subpoena a variety of information – most notoriously, library borrowing records. Without attending to (...) all of the ways that critics claim the Act burdens privacy, I examine whether those two controversial parts of the Act, the section 213 sneak-and-peak search and the section 215 business records gag-rule provisions, burden privacy as critics charge. I begin by describing the two provisions. Next, I explain why those provisions don’t burden privacy on standard philosophical accounts. Moreover, I argue that they need not conflict with the justifications for people’s claims to privacy, nor do they undermine the value of privacy on the standard accounts. However, rather than simply concluding that the sections don’t burden privacy, I argue that those provisions are problematic on the grounds that they undermine the value of whatever rights to privacy people have. Specifically, I argue that it is important to distinguish rights themselves from the value that those rights have to the rights-holders, and that an essential element of privacy rights having value is that privacy right-holders be able to tell the extent to which they actually have privacy. This element, which is justified by the right-holders’ autonomy interests, is harmed by the two provisions. (shrink)

“Excited Delirium Syndrome” (ExDS) is a controversial diagnosis. The supposed syndrome is sometimes considered to be a potential cause of death. However, it has been argued that its sole purpose is to cover up excessive police violence because it is mainly used to explain deaths of individuals in custody. In this paper, we examine the epistemic conditions giving rise to the controversial diagnosis by discussing the relation between causal hypotheses, evidence, and data in forensic medicine. We argue that the practitioners’ (...) social context affects causal inquiry through background assumptions that enter inquiry at multiple stages. This analysis serves to better understand the wide usage of the controversial diagnosis of ExDS. (shrink)

Recently, there has been an increased interest in employing model-based definitions of actual causation in legal inquiry. The formal precision of such approaches promises to be an improvement over more traditional approaches. Yet model-based approaches are viable only if suitable models of legal cases can be provided, and providing such models is sometimes difficult. I argue that causal-model-based definitions benefit legal inquiry in an indirect way. They make explicit the causal assumptions that need to be made plausible to defend a (...) particular claim of actual causation. My argument concerns the analysis of legal cases involving a combination of double prevention and causal redundancy. I show that discussions among legal theorists about such cases sometimes suffer from ambiguous assumptions about the causal structure. My account illustrates that causal models can act as a heuristic tool for clarifying such assumptions, and that causal models provide a framework for more accurate analyses of legal cases involving complex causal structure. (shrink)