View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

187 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
1 — 50 / 187
  1. On Non-Inferential Structure of Perceptual Judgment.Milos Bogdanovic - manuscript
    This paper deals with Peirce’s understanding of perceptual judgment, relating it to the conditions for the use of language defined by Michael Dummett. Namely, drawing on Dummett’s requirement for harmony between descriptive and evaluative aspects of our linguistic practice, we will try to give an interpretation of Peirce’s view of perception that implies rejecting the idea that the formation of a perceptual judgment has an inferential structure. On the other hand, since it is, in Peirce’s opinion, the structure of abductive (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. A New Objection to Representationalist Direct Realism.Paul H. Griffiths - manuscript
    Representationalism (aka intentionalism) has been the most significant weapon in the late twentieth century defence of direct realism. However, although the representationalist objection to the Phenomenal Principle might provide an effective response to the arguments from illusion and hallucination, plausible representationalist theories of perception are, when fleshed-out, incompatible with metaphysical direct realism’s directness-claim. Indeed within cognitive science, direct perception is the avowedly-radical anti-representationalist heterodoxy. Drawing on both the philosophy and cognitive science, we develop a robust argument against representationalist direct realism (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. The Case Against Direct Realism.Paul H. Griffiths - manuscript
    Analytic philosophy took a wrong turn when it rehabilitated direct realism. From the perspective of cognitive science, it seems that we can have the directness-claim or the realism-claim but not both together. Up until the mid-1900s the vast majority of philosophers dismissed direct realism as hopelessly naïve, but by the close of the century it had become the orthodoxy within analytic philosophy. In contrast, mainstream cognitive science has remained constant in its opposition to the directness-claim, and when the directness-claim is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Comments on Susanna Siegel's The Contents of Visual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - manuscript
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Cognitive Penetration and Implicit Cognition.Lucas Battich & Ophelia Deroy - forthcoming - In J. Robert Thompson (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. Routledge.
    Cognitive states, such as beliefs, desires and intentions, may influence how we perceive people and objects. If this is the case, are those influences worse when they occur implicitly rather than explicitly? Here we show that cognitive penetration in perception generally involves an implicit component. First, the process of influence is implicit, making us unaware that our perception is misrepresenting the world. This lack of awareness is the source of the epistemic threat raised by cognitive penetration. Second, the influencing state (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. O disjuntivismo ecológico e o argumento causal.Eros Carvalho - forthcoming - Trans/Form/Ação.
    In this paper I argue that the ecological approach to perception provides resources to overcome the causal argument against disjunctivism. According to the causal argument, since the brain states that proximally cause the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory one can be of the same type, there would be no good reason to reject that the perceptual experience and the corresponding hallucinatory experience have fundamentally the same nature. Disjunctivism in respect to the nature of the experience would then be false. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. High-Level Perception and Multimodal Perception.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - forthcoming - In Heather Logue & Louise Richardson (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    What is the correct procedure for determining the contents of perception? Philosophers tackling this question increasingly rely on empirically-oriented procedures in order to reach an answer. I argue that this constitutes an improvement over the armchair methodology constitutive of phenomenal contrast cases, but that there is a crucial respect in which current empirical procedures remain limited: they are unimodal in nature, wrongly treating the senses as isolatable faculties. I thus have two aims: first, to motivate a reorientation of the admissible (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. Sensory Substitution and Perceptual Learning.Kevin Connolly - forthcoming - In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Oxford University Press.
    When a user integrates a sensory substitution device into her life, the process involves perceptual learning, that is, ‘relatively long-lasting changes to an organism’s perceptual system that improve its ability to respond to its environment’ (Goldstone 1998: 585). In this paper, I explore ways in which the extensive literature on perceptual learning can be applied to help improve sensory substitution devices. I then use these findings to answer a philosophical question. Much of the philosophical debate surrounding sensory substitution devices concerns (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9. A Puzzle About the Experience of Left and Right.Brian Cutter - forthcoming - Noûs.
    Imagine your mirror-inverted counterpart on Mirror Earth, a perfect mirror image of Earth. Would her experiences be the same as yours, or would they be phenomenally mirror-inverted? I argue, first, that her experiences would be phenomenally the same as yours. I then show that this conclusion gives rise to a puzzle, one that I believe pushes us toward some surprising and philosophically significant conclusions about the nature of perception. When you have a typical visual experience as of something to your (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Not So Phenomenal!Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - The Philosophical Review.
    Our main aims in this paper is to discuss and criticise the core thesis of a position that has become known as phenomenal conservatism. According to this thesis, its seeming to one that p provides enough justification for a belief in p to be prima facie justified (a thesis we label Standard Phenomenal Conservatism). This thesis captures the special kind of epistemic import that seemings are claimed to have. To get clearer on this thesis, we embed it, first, in a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. The Perception of Virtue.Jennifer J. Matey - forthcoming - In Berit Brogaard & D. Gratzia (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, I put forward an argument for the view that emotional responses of esteem to perceived demonstrations of good character represent the perceived character traits as valuable, and hence, as virtues. These esteeming experiences are analogous to perceptual representations in other modalities in their epistemic role as causing, providing content for and justifying beliefs regarding the value of the traits they represent. I also discuss the role that the perceiver’s own character plays in their ability to recognize and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Perceiving Properties Versus Perceiving Objects.Boyd Millar - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    The fact that you see some particular object seems to be due to the causal relation between your visual experience and that object, rather than to your experiences’ phenomenal character. On the one hand, whenever some phenomenal element of your experience stands in the right sort of causal relation to some object, your experience presents that object (your experience’s phenomenology doesn’t need to match that object). On the other hand, you can’t have a perceptual experience that presents some object unless (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  13. Misperceiving Properties.Boyd Millar - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that property illusions—cases in which we perceive a property, but that property is not the property it seems to us to be in virtue of our perceptual experience—and veridical illusions—cases in which we veridically perceive an object’s properties, but our experience of some specific property is nonetheless unsuccessful or illusory—can occur. I defend the contrary view. First, I maintain that there are compelling reasons to conclude that property illusions and veridical illusions can’t occur; (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Against Hearing Phonemes - A Note on O’Callaghan.Naomi Osorio-Kupferblum - forthcoming - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft.
    Casey O’Callaghan has argued that rather than hearing meanings, we hear phonemes. In this note I argue that valuable though they are in an account of speech perception – depending on how we define ‘hearing’ – phonemes either don’t explain enough or they go too far. So, they are not the right tool for his criticism of the semantic perceptual account (SPA).
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Perceptual Attribution and Perceptual Reference.Jake Quilty-Dunn & E. J. Green - forthcoming - Wiley-Online-Library: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Perceptual representations pick out individuals and attribute properties to them. This paper considers the role of perceptual attribution in determining or guiding perceptual reference to objects. We consider three extant models of the relation between perceptual attribution and perceptual reference–all attribution guides reference, no attribution guides reference, or a privileged subset of attributions guides reference–and argue that empirical evidence undermines all three. We then defend a flexible-attributives model, on which the range of perceptual attributives used to guide reference shifts adaptively (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Filled/Non-Filled Pairs: An Empirical Challenge to the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness.Amber R. Hopkins & Kelvin J. McQueen - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 97:103245.
    Perceptual filling-in for vision is the insertion of visual properties (e.g., color, contour, luminance, or motion) into one’s visual field, when those properties have no corresponding retinal input. This paper introduces and provides preliminary empirical support for filled/non-filled pairs, pairs of images that appear identical, yet differ by amount of filling-in. It is argued that such image pairs are important to the experimental testing of theories of consciousness. We review recent experimental research and conclude that filling-in involves brain activity with (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Against the Senses.Spyridon Kakos - 2022 - Harmonia Philosophica.
    The validity of the senses we use to experience the cosmos is something we take for granted. The majority of the people view the senses as the most effective and potentially the only tool they have to reach reality. But as Shestov rightfully questioned, when was the last time the majority decided correctly on an important philosophical problem? The role of science and philosophy is to question the obvious and this is what we should do if we are to uncover (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Acquaintance, Knowledge, and Value.Emad H. Atiq - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14035-14062.
    Taking perceptual experience to consist in a relation of acquaintance with the sensible qualities, I argue that the state of being acquainted with a sensible quality is intrinsically a form of knowledge, and not merely a means to more familiar kinds of knowledge, such as propositional or dispositional knowledge. We should accept the epistemic claim for its explanatory power and theoretical usefulness. That acquaintance is knowledge best explains the intuitive epistemic appeal of ‘Edenic’ counterfactuals involving unmediated perceptual contact with reality (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Unknowable Colour Facts.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):909-941.
    It is common for an object to present different colour appearances to different perceivers, even when the perceivers and viewing conditions are normal. For example, a Munsell chip might look unique green to you and yellowish green to me in normal viewing conditions. In such cases, there are three possibilities. Ecumenism: both experiences are veridical. Nihilism: both experiences are non-veridical. Inegalitarianism: one experience is veridical and the other is non-veridical. Perhaps the most important objection to inegalitarianism is the ignorance objection, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. An Ecological Approach to Disjunctivism.Eros Moreira de Carvalho - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Radical Views on Cognition):285–306.
    In this paper I claim that perceptual discriminatory skills rely on a suitable type of environment as an enabling condition for their exercise. This is because of the constitutive connection between environment and perceptual discriminatory skills, inasmuch as such connection is construed from an ecological approach. The exercise of a discriminatory skill yields knowledge of affordances of objects, properties, or events in the surrounding environment. This is practical knowledge in the first-person perspective. An organism learns to perceive an object by (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. On Experiencing Moral Properties.Indrek Reiland - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):315-325.
    Do we perceptually experience moral properties like rightness and wrongness? For example, as in Gilbert Harman’s classic case, when we see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat and ignite it, can we, in the same robust sense, see the action’s wrongness?. Many philosophers have recently discussed this question, argued for a positive answer and/or discussed its epistemological implications. This paper presents a new case for a negative answer by, first, getting much clearer on how such experience (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22. Thinking and Perceiving: On the Malleability of the Mind.Dustin Stokes - 2021 - London: Routledge.
    [File is the introduction to the forthcoming monograph] -/- Abstract to monograph -/- How and whether thinking affects perceiving is a deeply important question. Of course it is of scientific interest: to understand the human mind is to understand how we best distinguish its processes, how those processes interact, and what this implies for how and what we may know about the world. And so in the philosopher’s terms, this book is one on both mental architecture and the epistemology of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23. On Perceptual Expertise.Dustin Stokes - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (2):241-263.
    Expertise is a cognitive achievement that clearly involves experience and learning, and often requires explicit, time-consuming training specific to the relevant domain. It is also intuitive that this kind of achievement is, in a rich sense, genuinely perceptual. Many experts—be they radiologists, bird watchers, or fingerprint examiners—are better perceivers in the domain(s) of their expertise. The goal of this paper is to motivate three related claims, by substantial appeal to recent empirical research on perceptual expertise: Perceptual expertise is genuinely perceptual (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  24. Phenomenology as Radical Reflection.Dave Ward - 2021 - In Heather Logue & Louise Richardson (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception. pp. 234-257.
    What does it mean to adopt a phenomenological approach when doing philosophy of perception? And what form should such an approach take? I address these questions by first distinguishing three different ways of drawing philosophical conclusions based on phenomenological reflection: 'Humean' phenomenology, which attempts to discern the structure of perceptual experience via reflection on its surface properties; 'Kantian' phenomenology, which aims to provide a priori arguments about the structure perceptual experience must have if it is to possess universally agreed upon (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Multisensory Perception.Keith A. Wilson - 2021 - In Sabah Ülkesi. Cologne: IGMG. pp. 76-79.
    The idea that there are five senses dates back to Aristotle, who was one of the first philosophers to examine them systematically. Though it has become conventional wisdom, many scientists and philosophers would argue that this idea is outdated and inaccurate. Indeed, they have given many different answers to this question, ranging from just three (the number of different kinds of physical energy we can detect) to 33 or more senses. Perhaps surprisingly, the issue remains controversial, partly because it is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Social Affordance.Eros Carvalho - 2020 - Encyclopedia of Animal Cognition and Behavior.
    A short entry on social affordance. Social affordances are possibilities for social interaction or possibilities for action that are shaped by social practices and norms.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27. Sintonizando com o mundo: uma abordagem ecológica das habilidades sensoriomotoras.Eros Carvalho - 2020 - In Giovanni Rolla & Gerson Araújo Neto (eds.), Ciência e Conhecimento. Teresina: pp. 81-108.
    In this chapter, I put forward and sustain an articulation of the notion of bodily skill based on ecological psychology, and I show how it is relevant for the debate between Dreyfus and McDowell about skillful coping and also for the debate about whether know-how is reducible or not to propositional knowledge. The right metaphor to understand bodily skills is not the computer metaphor but the radio metaphor. These skills result from a process of organism attunement to its environment.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28. Mental Structures.Kevin J. Lande - 2020 - Noûs.
    An ongoing philosophical discussion concerns how various types of mental states fall within broad representational genera—for example, whether perceptual states are “iconic” or “sentential,” “analog” or “digital,” and so on. Here, I examine the grounds for making much more specific claims about how mental states are structured from constituent parts. For example, the state I am in when I perceive the shape of a mountain ridge may have as constituent parts my representations of the shapes of each peak and saddle (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. Unconscious Inference Theories of Cognitive Acheivement.Kirk Ludwig & Wade Munroe - 2020 - In Anders Nes & Timothy Chan (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. New York: Routledge. pp. 15-39.
    This chapter argues that the only tenable unconscious inferences theories of cognitive achievement are ones that employ a theory internal technical notion of representation, but that once we give cash-value definitions of the relevant notions of representation and inference, there is little left of the ordinary notion of representation. We suggest that the real value of talk of unconscious inferences lies in (a) their heuristic utility in helping us to make fruitful predictions, such as about illusions, and (b) their providing (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Sustained Representation of Perspectival Shape.Jorge Morales, Axel Bax & Chaz Firestone - 2020 - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 117 (26):14873–14882.
    Arguably the most foundational principle in perception research is that our experience of the world goes beyond the retinal image; we perceive the distal environment itself, not the proximal stimulation it causes. Shape may be the paradigm case of such “unconscious inference”: When a coin is rotated in depth, we infer the circular object it truly is, discarding the perspectival ellipse projected on our eyes. But is this really the fate of such perspectival shapes? Or does a tilted coin retain (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  31. Science, substance and spatial appearances.Thomas Raleigh - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2097-2114.
    According to a certain kind of naïve or folk understanding of physical matter, everyday ‘solid’ objects are composed of a homogeneous, gap-less substance, with sharply defined boundaries, which wholly fills the space they occupy. A further claim is that our perceptual experience of the environment represents or indicates that the objects around us conform to this sort of conception of physical matter. Were this further claim correct, it would mean that the way that the world appears to us in experience (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32. The Many Faces of Attention: Why Precision Optimization is Not Attention.Madeleine Ransom & Sina Fazelpour - 2020 - In Dina Mendonça, José Manuel Robalo Curado & Steven Gouveia (eds.), The Philosophy and Science of Predictive Processing. London, UK: pp. 119-139.
    The predictive coding (PC) theory of attention identifies attention with the optimization of the precision weighting of prediction error. Here we provide some challenges for this identification. On the one hand, the precision weighting of prediction error is too broad a phenomenon to be identified with attention because such weighting plays a central role in multimodal integration. Cases of crossmodal illusions such as the rubber hand illusion and the McGurk effect involve the differential precision weighting of prediction error, yet attention (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Talking About Appearances: The Roles of Evaluation and Experience in Disagreement.Rachel Etta Rudolph - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):197-217.
    Faultless disagreement and faultless retraction have been taken to motivate relativism for predicates of personal taste, like ‘tasty’. Less attention has been devoted to the question of what aspect of their meaning underlies this relativist behavior. This paper illustrates these same phenomena with a new category of expressions: appearance predicates, like ‘tastes vegan’ and ‘looks blue’. Appearance predicates and predicates of personal taste both fall into the broader category of experiential predicates. Approaching predicates of personal taste from this angle suggests (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  34. Skill and Expertise in Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2020 - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Skill and Expertise, 2020. Routledge. pp. 306-313.
    Entry in Routledge handbook of skill and expertise. Discusses social perception, perceptual expertise, knowing what things look like, and a bit about about aesthetics at the end.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. 我们的自动无意识行为揭示了我们真实的自我和隐藏的宇宙真相吗?-- 大卫·霍金斯的《权力与力量——人类行为的隐藏决定因素——作者的官方权威版》412p(2012年)(原版1995年)(2019年修订版) (Do our automated unconscious behaviors reveal our real selves and hidden truths about the universe? -- A review of David Hawkins ‘Power vs Force--the hidden determinants of human behavior –author’s official authoritative edition’ 412p(2012)(original edition 1995)).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In 欢迎来到地球上的地狱: 婴儿,气候变化,比特币,卡特尔,中国,民主,多样性,养成基因,平等,黑客,人权,伊斯兰教,自由主义,繁荣,网络,混乱。饥饿,疾病,暴力,人工智能,战争. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 225-228.
    我已经习惯了奇怪的书和特殊的人,但霍金斯脱颖而出,因为他使用一个简单的技术来测试肌肉张力作为关键,任何种类的陈述的"真相"-即,不只是被测试的人是否相信它,但它是否真的是真的!众所 周知,人们会表现出自动的、无意识的生理和心理反应,就像他们接触到的任何东西——图像、声音、触觉、气味、想法、人。所以,肌肉阅读,找出他们的真实感受是一点也不激进,不像用它作为一个沉思的棍子(更多的肌肉 阅读)做"超自然科学"。 霍金斯描述了在认知负荷增加时使用降低手臂肌肉的张力,从而导致手臂在手指持续压力下下降。他似乎没有意识到,在社会心理学方面,有一个长期而庞大的持续研究,被诸如"隐性认知"、" ;自动性"等短语所指,而他使用"运动学"只是一小部分。除了肌肉张力(不常使用)外,社会心理学家还测量脑电图、电光皮肤反应,以及最常见的言语反应、句子、图像或情况,有时从刺 激后几秒钟到几个月不等。许多,如巴格和韦格纳,认为结果意味着我们是自动机,学习和行动在很大程度上没有意识通过S1(自动化系统1)和许多其他,如基尔斯特罗姆和尚克斯说,这些研究是有缺陷的,我们是S2的生 物(审议系统2)。虽然霍金斯似乎并不知道,就像在高阶思维的描述性心理学的其他领域一样,"自动性"的情况仍然像维特根斯坦描述心理学无菌和贫瘠的原因时一样混乱。在30年代。然而,这本书 是一个容易阅读,一些治疗师和精神教师可能会发现它使用。 那些希望从现代两个系统的观点来看为人类行为建立一个全面的最新框架的人,可以查阅我的书《路德维希的哲学、心理学、Min d和语言的逻辑结构》维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔的《第二部》(2019年)。那些对我更多的作品感兴趣的人可能会看到《会说话的猴子——一个末日星球上的哲学、心理学、科学、宗教和政治——文章和评论2006-20 19年第3次(2019年)和自杀乌托邦幻想21篇世纪4日 (2019) .
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Revisão de 'Seeing Things as They Are: a Theory of Perception' (Vendo as Coisas como são: uma Teoria da Percepção) (2015) (revisão revisada 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política, Economia, História e Literatura - Artigos e Avaliações 2006-2019. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 56-92.
    Como tantas vezes na filosofia, o título não só estabelece a linha de batalha, mas expõe os preconceitos e erros do autor, pois se podemos ou não entender o jogo de linguagem 'Ver as coisas como elas são' e se é possível ter uma "teoria filosófica" de percepção" (que é Pode ser sobre como a linguagem da percepção funciona), ao contrário de uma científica, que é uma teoria sobre como o cérebro funciona, são exatamente os problemas. Este é o Searle (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Perceptual Skills.Dustin Stokes & Bence Nanay - 2020 - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Skill and Expertise. London: Routledge.
    This chapter has four parts. I distinguishes some types of perceptual skills and highlights their importance in everyday perception. II identifies a well-studied class of perceptual skills: cases of perceptual expertise. III discusses a less studied possible instance of perceptual skill: picture perception. Finally, IV outlines some important mechanisms underlying perceptual skills, with special emphasis on attention and mental imagery.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Do We See Facts?Alfredo Vernazzani - 2020 - Mind and Language.
    Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  39. Other Minds Are Neither Seen nor Inferred.Mason Westfall - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11977-11997.
    How do we know about other minds on the basis of perception? The two most common answers to this question are that we literally perceive others’ mental states, or that we infer their mental states on the basis of perceiving something else. In this paper, I argue for a different answer. On my view, we don’t perceive mental states, and yet perceptual experiences often immediately justify mental state attributions. In a slogan: other minds are neither seen nor inferred. I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  40. Smell's Puzzling Discrepancy: Gifted Discrimination, yet Pitiful Identification.Benjamin D. Young - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (1):90-114.
    Mind &Language, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 90-114, February 2020.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  41. The Obscure Content of Hallucination.Marco Aurélio Sousa Alves - 2019 - Sofia 8 (1):30-53.
    Michael Tye proposed a way of understanding the content of hallucinatory experiences. Somewhat independently, Mark Johnston provided us with elements to think about the content of hallucination. In this paper, their views are compared and evaluated. Both their theories present intricate combinations of conjunctivist and disjunctivist strategies to account for perceptual content. An alternative view, which develops a radically disjunctivist account, is considered and rejected. Finally, the paper raises some metaphysical difficulties that seem to threaten any conjunctivist theory and to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Is the Experience of Pain Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities.Murat Aydede - 2019 - Synthese 196 (2):677-708.
    I distinguish between two claims of transparency of experiences. One claim is weaker and supported by phenomenological evidence. This I call the transparency datum. Introspection of standard perceptual experiences as well as bodily sensations is consistent with, indeed supported by, the transparency datum. I formulate a stronger transparency thesis that is entailed by representationalism about experiential phenomenology. I point out some empirical consequences of strong transparency in the context of representationalism. I argue that pain experiences, as well as some other (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  43. Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl.Matt E. M. Bower - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (2):211-243.
    Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44. A New Perceptual Adverbialism.Justin D'Ambrosio - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (8):413-446.
    In this paper, I develop and defend a new adverbial theory of perception. I first present a semantics for direct-object perceptual reports that treats their object positions as supplying adverbial modifiers, and I show how this semantics definitively solves the many-property problem for adverbialism. My solution is distinctive in that it articulates adverbialism from within a well-established formal semantic framework and ties adverbialism to a plausible semantics for perceptual reports in English. I then go on to present adverbialism as a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  45. Bilateral Symmetry Strengthens the Perceptual Salience of Figure Against Ground.Birgitta Dresp-Langley - 2019 - Symmetry 2 (11):225-250.
    Although symmetry has been discussed in terms of a major law of perceptual organization since the early conceptual efforts of the Gestalt school (Wertheimer, Metzger, Koffka and others), the first quantitative measurements testing for effects of symmetry on processes of Gestalt formation have seen the day only recently. In this study, a psychophysical rating study and a “foreground”-“background” choice response time experiment were run with human observers to test for effects of bilateral symmetry on the perceived strength of figure-ground in (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  46. Affording Illusions? Natural Information and the Problem of Misperception.Hajo Greif - 2019 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 10 (3):1-21.
    There are two related points at which J.J. Gibson’s ecological theory of visual perception remains remarkably underspecified: Firstly, the notion of information for perception is not explicated in much detail beyond the claim that it “specifies” the environment for perception, and, thus being an objective affair, enables an organism to perceive action possibilities or “affordances.” Secondly, misperceptions of affordances and perceptual illusions are not clearly distinguished from each other. Although the first claim seems to suggest that any perceptual illusion amounts (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Book Review of Evaluative Perception Eds. Bergqvist and Cowan. [REVIEW]Jennifer J. Matey - 2019 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (6).
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Mirrors and Misleading Appearances.Vivian Mizrahi - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):354-367.
    ABSTRACTAlthough philosophers have often insisted that specular perception is illusory or erroneous in nature, few have stressed the reliability and indispensability of mirrors as optical instrumen...
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  49. Early and Late Time Perception: On the Narrow Scope of the Whorfian Hypothesis.Carlos Montemayor - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (1):133-154.
    The Whorfian hypothesis has received support from recent findings in psychology, linguistics, and anthropology. This evidence has been interpreted as supporting the view that language modulates all stages of perception and cognition, in accordance with Whorf’s original proposal. In light of a much broader body of evidence on time perception, I propose to evaluate these findings with respect to their scope. When assessed collectively, the entire body of evidence on time perception shows that the Whorfian hypothesis has a limited scope (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  50. Naïve Realism, Hallucination, and Causation: A New Response to the Screening Off Problem.Alex Moran - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (2):368-382.
    This paper sets out a novel response to the ‘screening off problem’ for naïve realism. The aim is to resist the claim (which many naïve realists accept) that the kind of experience involved in hallucinating also occurs during perception, by arguing that there are causal constraints that must be met if an hallucinatory experience is to occur that are never met in perceptual cases. Notably, given this response, it turns out that, contra current orthodoxy, naïve realists need not adopt any (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
1 — 50 / 187