Properties

Edited by Gabriele Contessa (Carleton University)
View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

501 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
1 — 50 / 501
Material to categorize
  1. (April 2019) UNBELIEVABLE Similarities Between Some Articles From a Book Edited by Bliss and Priest (2018) and My Ideas (2002-208). [REVIEW]Gabriel Vacariu - manuscript
    (April 2019) UNBELIEVABLE similarities between some articles from a book edited by Bliss and Priest (2018) and my ideas (2002-208) -/- (2018) Reality and its Structure - Essays in Fundamentality, Ricki Bliss and Graham Priest (eds.), Oxford Univ Press -/- The content of this paper is about the following articles from the above book: -/- Gabriel Oak Rabin (2018) Grounding Orthodoxy and the Layered Conception Daniel Nolan (2018) Cosmic Loops Naomi Thompson (2018) Metaphysical Interdependence, Epistemic Coherentism, and Tuomas E. Tahko (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. From Aristotle’s Oppositions to Aristotelian Oppositions.Fabien Schang - 2017 - In Valery V. Petroff (ed.), The Legacies of Aristotle as Constitutive Element of European Rationality: Proceedings of the Moscow International Conference on Aristotle. Moscou, Russie:
    Aristotle’s philosophy is considered with respect to one central concept of his philosophy, viz. opposition. Far from being a mere side-effect of syllogistic, it is argued in the present paper that opposition helps to articulate ontology and logic through an account of what can be or cannot be in a systematic and structural way. The paper is divided into three main parts. In Section I, the notion of Being is scrutinized through Aristotle’s theory of categories. In Section II, the notion (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. The Identity Theory of Powers Revised.Joaquim Giannotti - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.
    Dispositionality and qualitativity are key notions to describe the world that we inhabit. Dispositionality is a matter of what a thing is disposed to do in certain circumstances. Qualitativity is a matter of how a thing is like. According to the Identity Theory of powers, every fundamental property is at once dispositional and qualitative, or a powerful quality. Canonically, the Identity Theory holds a contentious identity claim between a property’s dispositionality and its qualitativity. In the literature, this view faces a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Nagi substrat i teoria jednostkowienia.Karol Lenart - 2017 - In Natalia Anna Michna (ed.), Kierunki badawcze w filozofii 2017 "Nowe Horyzonty wiedzy". Łódź, Polska: pp. 67-76.
    W artykule rozważana jest koncepcja nagiego substratu w kontekście problemu indywiduacji. Głównym celem tekstu jest obrona teorii nagiego substratu (TNS) przed klasycznymi oraz współczesnymi zarzutami. Tok rozważań jest następujący: Autor we wstępie definiuje problem jednostkowienia i systematyzuje obecną dyskusję nad tym zagadnieniem. Następnie skupia się na porównaniu teorii wiązki i teorii nagiego substratu, ujętych jako alternatywne wyjaśnienia jednostkowości przedmiotów. Celem porównania dwóch teorii jest przedstawienie motywacji stojących za przyjęciem TNS. Głównym elementem tekstu jest punkt 2, w którym analizuje podstawowe założenia (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Regressões ao Infinito em Metafísica.João Branquinho & Guido Imaguire - 2014 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    Este ensaio consiste num exame crítico da estrutura e do valor de um conjunto diverso de argumentos por regressão ao infinito que têm sido objecto de discussão recorrente na metafísica contemporânea. O seminal livro de David Armstrong Nominalism and Realism (Armstrong 1978) contém uma das mais compreensivas discussões de argumentos regressivos em metafísica, os quais variam entre argumentos que foram de facto avançados ao longo da história da disciplina (como o Argumento do Terceiro Homem, de Platão) e argumentos construídos de (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Existência.João Branquinho - 2015 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    Neste ensaio, discutem-se cinco questões acerca da existência: 1. É a existência representável em termos de quantificação? 2. É a existência um predicado" real", de primeira ordem? 3. É existir o mesmo que ser? 4. Existe tudo? 5. Qual é a forma lógica de afirmações de existência? São introduzidas e examinadas algumas das mais salientes posições acerca destas questões, em especial a concepção Frege-Russell da existência e diversas concepções recentes neo-Meinongianas. Defendemos as seguintes três teses acerca daquilo que deve ser (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. On the Genealogy of Universals: The Metaphysical Origins of Analytic Philosophy.Fraser MacBride - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The concepts of particular and universal have grown so familiar that their significance has become difficult to discern, like coins that have been passed back and forth too many times, worn smooth so their values can no longer be read. On the Genealogy of Universals seeks to overcome our sense of over-familiarity with these concepts by providing a case study of their evolution during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, a study that shows how the history of these (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. Essentiality Without Necessity.Petter Sandstad - 2016 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):61-78.
    It is widely accepted that if a property is essential then it is necessary. Against this I present numerous counterexamples from biology and chemistry, which fall into two groups: (I) A property is essential to a genus or species, yet some instances of this genus or species do not have this essential property. (II) A property is essential to a genus, yet some species of this genus do not have this essential property. I discuss and reject four minor objections. Then (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Theories of Properties and Ontological Theory-Choice: An Essay in Metaontology.Christopher Gibilisco - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska-Lincoln
    This dissertation argues that we have no good reason to accept any one theory of properties as correct. To show this, I present three possible bases for theory-choice in the properties debate: coherence, explanatory adequacy, and explanatory value. Then I argue that none of these bases resolve the underdetermination of our choice between theories of properties. First, I argue considerations about coherence cannot resolve the underdetermination, because no traditional theory of properties is obviously incoherent. Second, I argue considerations of explanatory (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Über die deskriptive Unerschöpflichkeit der Einzeldinge.Geert Keil - 2006 - In Geert Keil & Udo Tietz (eds.), Phänomenologie und Sprachanalyse. Mentis. pp. 83-125.
    Der Topos von der Unerschöpflichkeit des Gegenstands wird mit der Phänomenologie assoziiert. Den ihm verwandten Topos von der Unaussprechlichkeit des Individuellen haben Goethe und die deutschen Romantiker in die Welt getragen. Der Diktion der analytischen Philosophie sind die Ausdrücke „unerschöpflich“ und „unaussprechlich“ fremd. Dieser Umstand sollte analytische Philosophen nicht davon abhalten, sich den sprachphilosophischen und ontologischen Problemen zuzuwenden, die sich hinter den besagten Formeln verbergen. Husserls Wort für Unerschöpflichkeit ist „Fülle“. Die „Fülle des Gegenstandes“ erläutert Husserl als den „Inbegriff der (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Natural Individuals and Intrinsic Properties.Godehard Brüntrup - 2009 - In Ludger Honnefelder, Edmund Runggaldier & Benedikt Schick (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 237-252.
    In the world there are concrete particulars that exhibit the kind of substantial unity that allows them to be called substances or “natural individuals”, as opposed to artifacts or mere conglomerates. Persons, animals, and possibly the most fundamental physical simples are all natural individuals. What gives these entities the ontological status of a substantial unity? Arguments from the philosophy of mind and arguments from general metaphysics show that physical properties alone cannot account for substantial unity. The ultimate intrinsic properties of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  12. Partitions and Objective Indefiniteness.David Ellerman - manuscript
    Classical physics and quantum physics suggest two meta-physical types of reality: the classical notion of a objectively definite reality with properties "all the way down," and the quantum notion of an objectively indefinite type of reality. The problem of interpreting quantum mechanics (QM) is essentially the problem of making sense out of an objectively indefinite reality. These two types of reality can be respectively associated with the two mathematical concepts of subsets and quotient sets (or partitions) which are category-theoretically dual (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Kripke y las descripciones rígidas.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1993 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 19 (1):109-113.
    In this paper I discuss a passage from *Naming and Necessity* where Kripke assumes that the essential properties by means of which a definite description designates are a sufficient condition of its rigidity. I put forward two examples that show the falsity of this assumption. Then I examine the non-rigid character of definite descriptions that designate by means of properties that are sufficient conditions of identity of the objects designated by those descriptions. I conclude that the properties by means of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Comments on Patrick McGivern's “Parts of Properties: Realization as Decomposition”.Peter Alward - unknown
    My main reaction to MCGivern’s paper was one of dialectical puzzlement. Block argues that, Macro Non-Reduction: [all] macro properties are irreducible to the micro properties on which they supervene..
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. COMMENTARY: “Second-Order Predication and the Metaphysics of Properties” by Andrew Egan.Peter Alward - unknown
    Egan argues against Lewis’s view that properties are sets of actual and possible individuals and in favour of the view that they are functions from worlds to extensions (sets of individuals). Egan argues that Lewis’s view implies that 2nd order properties are never possessed contingently by their (1st order) bearers, an implication to which there are numerous counter-examples. And Egan argues that his account of properties is more commensurable with the role they play as the semantic values of predicates than (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
Determinates and Determinables
  1. Maimon’s ‘Law of Determinability’ and the Impossibility of Shared Attributes.Yitzhak Melamed - forthcoming - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale.
    Apart from his critique of Kant, Maimon’s significance for the history of philosophy lies in his crucial role in the rediscovery of Spinoza by the German Idealists. Specifically, Maimon initiated a change from the common eighteenth-century view of Spinoza as the great ‘atheist’ to the view of Spinoza as an ‘acosmist’, i.e., a thinker who propounded a deep, though unorthodox, religious view denying the reality of the world and taking God to be the only real being. I have discussed this (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Ditching Dependence and Determination: Or, How to Wear the Crazy Trousers.Michael J. Duncan, Kristie Miller & James Norton - forthcoming - Synthese.
    This paper defends Flatland—the view that there exist neither determination nor dependence relations, and that everything is therefore fundamental—from the objection from explanatory inefficacy. According to that objection, Flatland is unattractive because it is unable to explain either the appearance as of there being determination relations, or the appearance as of there being dependence relations. We show how the Flatlander can meet the first challenge by offering four strategies—reducing, eliminating, untangling and omnizing—which, jointly, explain the appearance as of there being (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Trooppiteoriat ja relaatiossa olemisen analyysi.Markku Keinänen - 2018 - Ajatus 75:121-150.
    Trope theories aim to eschew the primitive dichotomy between characterising (properties, relations) and characterized entities (objects). This article (in Finnish) presents a new trope theoretical analysis of relational inherence as the best way out of the impasse created by the alleged necessity to choose between an eliminativist and a primitivist ("relata-specific") view about relations in trope theory.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. The Determinable–Determinate Relation Can’T Save Adverbialism.Alex Grzankowski - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):45-52.
    Adverbialist theories of thought such as those advanced by Hare and Sellars promise an ontologically sleek understanding of a variety of intentional states, but such theories have been largely abandoned due to the ‘many-property problem’. In an attempt to revitalize this otherwise attractive theory, in a series of papers as well as his recent book, Uriah Kriegel has offered a novel reply to the ‘many-property problem’ and on its basis he argues that ‘adverbialism about intentionality is alive and well’. If (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5. Quantity Tropes and Internal Relations.Markku Keinänen, Antti Keskinen & Jani Hakkarainen - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):519-534.
    In this article, we present a new conception of internal relations between quantity tropes falling under determinates and determinables. We begin by providing a novel characterization of the necessary relations between these tropes as basic internal relations. The core ideas here are that the existence of the relata is sufficient for their being internally related, and that their being related does not require the existence of any specific entities distinct from the relata. We argue that quantity tropes are, as determinate (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  6. Against Quantum Indeterminacy.David Glick - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):204-213.
    A growing literature is premised on the claim that quantum mechanics provides evidence for metaphysical indeterminacy. But does it? None of the currently fashionable realist interpretations involve fundamental indeterminacy and the ‘standard interpretation’, to the extent that it can be made out, doesn't require indeterminacy either.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  7. Uninstantiated Properties and Semi-Platonist Aristotelianism.James Franklin - 2015 - Review of Metaphysics 69 (1):25-45.
    Once the reality of properties is admitted, there are two fundamentally different realist theories of properties. Platonist or transcendent realism holds that properties are abstract objects in the classical sense, of being nonmental, nonspatial, and causally inefficacious. By contrast, Aristotelian or moderate realism takes properties to be literally instantiated in things. An apple’s color and shape are as real and physical as the apple itself. The most direct reason for taking an Aristotelian realist view of properties is that we perceive (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Two Problems for Proportionality About Omissions.Sara Bernstein - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (3):429-441.
    Theories of causation grounded in counterfactual dependence face the problem of profligate omissions: numerous irrelevant omissions count as causes of an outcome. A recent purported solution to this problem is proportionality, which selects one omission among many candidates as the cause of an outcome. This paper argues that proportionality cannot solve the problem of profligate omissions for two reasons. First: the determinate/determinable relationship that holds between properties like aqua and blue does not hold between negative properties like not aqua and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  9. Determinables and Brute Similarities.Olivier Massin - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag.
    Ingvar Johansson has argued that there are not only determinate universals, but also determinable ones. I here argue that this view is misguided by reviving a line of argument to the following effect: what makes determinates falling under a same determinable similar cannot be distinct from what makes them different. If true, some similarities — imperfect similarities between simple determinate properties — are not grounded in any kind of property-sharing. I suggest that determinables are better understood as maximal disjunctions of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10. Can Determinable Properties Earn Their Keep?Robert Schroer - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):229-247.
    Sydney Shoemaker's "Subset Account" offers a new take on determinable properties and the realization relation as well as a defense of non-reductive physicalism from the problem of mental causation. At the heart of this account are the claims that (1) mental properties are determinable properties and (2) the causal powers that individuate a determinable property are a proper subset of the causal powers that individuate the determinates of that property. The second claim, however, has led to the accusation that the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Causation and Determinable Properties : On the Efficacy of Colour, Shape, and Size.Tim Crane - 2008 - In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 176-195.
    This paper presents a puzzle or antinomy about the role of properties in causation. In theories of properties, a distinction is often made between determinable properties, like red, and their determinates, like scarlet (see Armstrong 1978, volume II). Sometimes determinable properties are cited in causal explanations, as when we say that someone stopped at the traffic light because it was red. If we accept that properties can be among the relata of causation, then it can be argued that there are (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  12. A Tale of Two Simples.Joshua Spencer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (2):167 - 181.
    A material simple is a material object that has no proper parts. Some philosophers have argued for the possibility of extended simples. Some have even argued for the possibility of heterogeneous simples or simples that have intrinsic variations across their surfaces. There is a puzzle, though, that is meant to show that extended, heterogeneous simples are impossible. Although several plausible responses have been given to this puzzle, I wish to reopen the case against extended, heterogeneous simples. In this paper, I (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties
  1. Intrinsic Properties and Relations.Jan Plate - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (8):783-853.
    This paper provides an analysis of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, as applied both to properties and to relations. In contrast to other accounts, the approach taken here locates the source of a property’s intrinsicality or extrinsicality in the manner in which that property is ‘logically constituted’, and thus – plausibly – in its nature or essence, rather than in e.g. its modal profile. Another respect in which the present proposal differs from many extant analyses lies in the fact that it does (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Against Extrinsic Dispositions.Seungbae Park - 2017 - Review of Contemporary Philosophy 16:92-103.
    McKitrick (2003) proposes that an object has a disposition if and only if there are a manifestation, the circumstances of the manifestation, a counterfactual true of the object, and an overtly dispositional locution referring to the disposition. A disposition is extrinsic if and only if an object has it, but a perfect duplicate of the object might not have it. I present an alternative definition that an object has a disposition if and only if a counterfactual is true of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3. Natural Individuals and Intrinsic Properties.Godehard Brüntrup - 2009 - In Ludger Honnefelder, Edmund Runggaldier & Benedikt Schick (eds.), Unity and Time in Metaphysics. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 237-252.
    In the world there are concrete particulars that exhibit the kind of substantial unity that allows them to be called substances or “natural individuals”, as opposed to artifacts or mere conglomerates. Persons, animals, and possibly the most fundamental physical simples are all natural individuals. What gives these entities the ontological status of a substantial unity? Arguments from the philosophy of mind and arguments from general metaphysics show that physical properties alone cannot account for substantial unity. The ultimate intrinsic properties of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  4. Essence and Intrinsicality.David A. Denby - 2014 - In Robert Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter. pp. 87-109.
    In the first half of this paper, I argue that essential properties are intrinsic and that this permits a modal analysis of essence that is immune the sort of objections raised by Fine. In the second half, I argue that intrinsic properties collectively have a certain structure and that this accounts for some observations about essences: that things are essentially determinate; that things often have properties within a certain range essentially; and that the essential properties of things are their core (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  5. Intrinsic Explanations and Numerical Representations.M. Eddon - 2014 - In Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter. pp. 271-290.
    In Science Without Numbers (1980), Hartry Field defends a theory of quantity that, he claims, is able to provide both i) an intrinsic explanation of the structure of space, spacetime, and other quantitative properties, and ii) an intrinsic explanation of why certain numerical representations of quantities (distances, lengths, mass, temperature, etc.) are appropriate or acceptable while others are not. But several philosophers have argued otherwise. In this paper I focus on arguments from Ellis and Milne to the effect that one (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Intrinsic/Extrinsic: A Relational Account Defended.Robert Francescotti - 2014 - In Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter. pp. 175-198.
    In "How to Define Intrinsic Properties" I offered a relational account of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction. The basic idea is that F is an intrinsic property of an item x just in case x’s having F consists entirely in x’s having certain internal properties, where an internal property is one whose instantiation does not consist in one’s relation to any distinct items (items other than oneself and one’s proper parts). I still think that this relational analysis is largely correct, and here (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  7. An Insubstantial Externalism.Axel Arturo Barcelo Aspeitia - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (10):576-582.
    Alvin I. Goldman has argued that since one must count epistemic rules among the factors that help to fix the justificational status of agents (generally called J-factors), not all J-factors are internalist, that is, intrinsic to the agent whose justificational status they help to fix. After all, for an epistemic rule to count as a genuine J-factor, it must be objectively correct and, therefore, “independent of any and all minds.” Consequently, it cannot be intrinsic to any particular epistemic agent. In (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8. What's the Use of an Intrinsic Property?Carrie Figdor - 2014 - In Robert Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter. pp. 139-156.
    Work on the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction is often motivated by its use in other areas, such as intrinsic value, real vs. Cambridge change, supervenience and other topics. With the exception of Figdor 2008, philosophers have sought to articulate a global distinction -- a distinction between kinds of properties, rather than ways in which individuals have properties. I argue that global I/E distinctions are unable to do the work that allegedly motivates them, focusing on the case of intrinsic value.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9. Primitivism About Intrinsicality.Alexander Skiles - 2014 - In Robert Francescotti (ed.), Companion to Intrinsic Properties. De Gruyter. pp. 221-252.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  10. Part‐Intrinsicality.J. Robert G. Williams - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):431-452.
    In some sense, survival seems to be an intrinsic matter. Whether or not you survive some event seems to depend on what goes on with you yourself —what happens in the environment shouldn’t make a difference. Likewise, being a person at a time seems intrinsic. The principle that survival seems intrinsic is one factor which makes personal fission puzzles so awkward. Fission scenarios present cases where if survival is an intrinsic matter, it appears that an individual could survive twice over. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  11. Analyses of Intrinsicality in Terms of Naturalness.Daniel Graham Marshall - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (8):531-542.
    Over the last thirty years there have been a number of attempts to analyse the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties in terms of the facts about naturalness. This article discusses the three most influential of these attempts, each of which involve David Lewis. These are Lewis's 1983 analysis, his 1986 analysis, and his joint 1998 analysis with Rae Langton.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  12. Mere Cambridge Properties.Robert Francescotti - 1999 - American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):295-308.
    The predicates 'is outgrown by Theaetetus,' 'is 300 miles west of a lemur,' and 'is such that 9 is odd' denote properties, but there is a sense in which these properties are not genuine features of the objects that have them. The fact that we find these mere-Cambridge properties odd has something to do with their relational character. But relationality in itself is not an adequate criterion for property-genuineness for there are many relational properties that do not qualify as mere-Cambridge. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  13. Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality.M. Eddon - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):314-336.
    The standard counterexamples to David Lewis’s account of intrinsicality involve two sorts of properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents of the account have attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of ways. This paper argues that none of these moves are legitimate. Furthermore, this paper argues that no account along the lines of Lewis’s can succeed, for an adequate account of intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional distinctions among properties.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  14. Intrinsicality for Monists (and Pluralists).Kelly Trogdon - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):555-558.
    Response to Skiles (2009) on Trogdon (2009) on intrinsic properties and fundamentality.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15. Intrinsically/Extrinsically.Carrie Figdor - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (11):691-718.
    I separate two intrinsic/extrinsic distinctions that are often conflated: one between properties (the intrinsic/extrinsic, or I/E, distinction) and one between the ways in which properties are had by individuals (the intrinsically/extrinsically, or I-ly/E-ly, distinction). I propose an analysis of the I-ly/E-ly distinction and its relation to the I/E distinction that explains, inter alia, the puzzle of cross-classification: how it can be, for example, that the property of being square can be classified as an intrinsic property and yet individuals can be (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  16. How to Define Intrinsic Properties.Robert Francescotti - 1999 - Noûs 33 (4):590-609.
    An intrinsic property, according to one important account, is a property that is had by all of one's duplicates. Instead, one might choose to characterize intrinsic properties as those that can be had in the absence of all distinct individuals. After reviewing the problems with these earlier accounts, the author presents a less problematic analysis. The goal is to clarify the rough idea that an intrinsic property is a special sort of non-relational property; having the property does not consist in (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   34 citations  
  17. Intrinsic Value and Intrinsic Properties.Josh Parsons - unknown
    It’s now commonplace — since Korsgaard (1996) — in ethical theory to distinguish between two distinctions: on the one hand, the distinction between value an object has in virtue of its intrinsic properties vs. the value it has in virtue of all its properties, intrinsic or extrinsic; and on the other hand, the distinction between the value has an object as an end, vs. the value it has as a means to something else. I’ll call the former distinction the distinction (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. Monism and Intrinsicality.Kelly Trogdon - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):127 – 148.
    Amendment of the Witmer, Butchard, and Trogdon (2005) account of intrinsic properties with the aim of neutrality between competing theories of what is fundamental.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  19. The Asymmetric Magnets Problem.Brian Weatherson - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):479–492.
    There are many controversial theses about intrinsicness and duplication. The first aim of this paper is to introduce a puzzle that shows that two of the uncontroversial sounding ones can’t both be true. The second aim is to suggest that the best way out of the puzzle requires sharpening some distinctions that are too frequently blurred, and adopting a fairly radical reconception of the ways things are.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  20. Intrinsicality Without Naturalness.D. Gene Witmer, William Butchard & Kelly Trogdon - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):326–350.
    Defense of an account of intrinsic properties in terms of (what is now called) grounding rather than naturalness.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
Natural Properties
  1. Conceptual Evaluation: Epistemic.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - forthcoming - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Ethics and Conceptual Engineering. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    On a view implicitly endorsed by many, a concept is epistemically better than another if and because it does a better job at ‘carving at the joints', or if the property corresponding to it is ‘more natural' than the one corresponding to another. This chapter offers an argument against this seemingly plausible thought, starting from three key observations about the way we use and evaluate concepts from en epistemic perspective: that we look for concepts that play a role in explanations (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. The Special Composition Question and Natural Fusion.Renato Rocha - 2019 - Proceedings of the 3rd Filomena Workshop.
    Philosophical problems about the part-whole relation have been discussed throughout the history of philosophy, at least since Plato and Aristotle. In contemporary philosophy, the understanding of these issues has benefited from the formal tools of Classical Extensional Mereology. This paper aims is to defend mereological restrictivism against some constraints imposed by the vagueness argument. To achieve this, the paper is divided into three parts. In the first, I introduce the special composition question (hereafter SCQ) as formulated by [Van Inwagen, 1990] (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Lasst uns den Weg einer neuen Ontologie einschlagen! (2. Teil).Gianluigi Segalerba - 2018 - Analele Universitǎţii Din Craiova, Seria: Filosofie 42 (2):5-48.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 501