Rights and Religion

Since Jürgen Habermas' speech for the Peace Price of the German Book Trade in October 2001, secular reason – personified by one of its main protagonists – has been able to debate with religion anew. For the purpose of an unbiased encounter between philosophy and religion, Habermas introduced the term “postsecular” back then in order to emphasize that this dialogue was inevitably necessary, all the more in the face of religiously motivated terrorism. Nonetheless, this willingness to debate was accompanied by (...) the conviction that secular reason itself, as a matter of fact, would be “ideologically neutral”. However, taking the necessity of accomplishing the confrontation with “world” (Weltbewältigung) seriously, the reflection on world view as a whole unveils its implied tasks of granting metaphysical and existential certainty (metaphysische Sicherheit), therefore resulting in the statement that there cannot be a neutral world view at all. Only dialogue as exchange of beliefs generates the general framework within which the discursive issues of world views are separated from their existential aspects, thus enabling a reasonably conducted debate without endangering the existential certainty of its participants. As a consequence, the neutrality of world views exclusively rests in dialogue and is no unique feature of secular reason at all. Eventually, this leads to the reconsideration of the conditions that must be given for an argument to be called “rational”. The article tries to point out that an argument in political contexts, whether given by a religious or a secular person, should only be acknowledged rational if it takes at least all living people – regardless of their group affiliations – into account. (shrink)

Catholic integralism is a tradition of thought which insists upon the ideal nature of political arrangements on which the Church can mandate the State to advance the supernatural good of the baptized. Thomas Pink, one of the foremost defenders, has proposed controversially that these arrangements are ideal because the Church possesses rights to civil coercive authority. But I argue this fact would not entail – by itself – the ideal nature of those arrangements. To the contrary, I argue that integralism (...) is unjust, even assuming Pink’s claims are true. The integralist ideal necessarily involves violating moral duties toward unbaptized citizens. Integralism does so in imposing differential civic burdens upon baptized/unbaptized citizens and in implying that non-Catholics might be rightly excluded from power merely on account of religious beliefs, both without just cause. I conclude by showing that readings of the relevant Catholic teaching can be given which are non-integralist. (shrink)

This research examines the most important historical, political, economic, social, cultural, and religious factors before, during, and after the reign of Communism in Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 2021 and their effect on the extreme increase in atheism and decrease in Christianity, particularly Roman Catholicism, in the present-day Czech Republic. It devotes special attention to the role of the Clandestine Catholic Church (Ecclesia Silentii) and the changing policies of the Holy See vis-à-vis this Church, examining these policies' impact on the continuing (...) decline of Roman Catholicism in the Czech Republic after the collapse of Communism. The article also deals with Pope Pius XII's Secret Mandates of 1948-1950, the Second Vatican Council, and the Holy See's Ostpolitik. Scholars, who previously relied only on the views of the Czechs, blame the unprecedented drop in Christianity, the near-total destruction of the Catholic Church, and the rise in atheism on the Czechoslovak communist government's four decades of totalitarianism. Although the increase in atheism and decrease in Christianity were substantial during the era of Communism from 1948 to 1989, our data indicate that the decline in Christianity, particularly the historically predominating Roman Catholicism, did not commence with the 1948 communist coup d’état but traces its origins to the breakdown of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the conclusion of WWI and the establishment of Czechoslovakia on October 28, 1918. What's more, this research shows that the most significant and unprecedented steep deterioration of the Christian Faith, namely Roman Catholicism, did not occur during the era of Communism but only after the Czechoslovak communist government collapsed in 1989. This massive decay did not happen even during the most extraordinary communist persecution of the Catholic Church during the era of Stalinism in Czechoslovakia. This research further finds that the Holy See's ill-advised policies and systematic, sustained, and prevalent failures in leadership, guidance, and teachings are responsible for the near destruction of the Roman Catholic Church and especially the end destruction of the Clandestine Catholic Church (Ecclesia Silentii), in the Czech and Slovak Republics after the fall of Communism. These failures furthermore contributed to the Czech Republic, the historical lands of Bohemia and Moravia that once were in the center of Christendom, degenerating into the most atheist country in Europe and the world today. (shrink)

Religious discourse is one of the instruments that are often used by the dominant class (the majority, who are in power) to carry out a symbolic violence mechanism against the dominated class (the minority, who are ruled). For example, through religious discourses that seem plural and open, the power and domination of the dominant class are continuously perpetuated. This study aims to analyze the symbolic violence that occurs in religious discourse in Indonesia, especially in the study of religion, by reviewing (...) the discourse of “agama vs. kepercayaan” and “moderasi beragama”. The symbolic violence referred to here is, according to Pierre Bourdieu's theory, violence that does not appear asviolence and is latent. Victims of this type of violence do not feel that they are victims ofviolence as if what happened was natural and it should have been. This study also argues that symbolic violence in religious discourse in Indonesia is widely produced in educational institutions, especially through the hands of academics, because through educational institutions, discourses of “agama vs. kepercayaan” and “moderasi beragama” are formulated and then implemented in government policies, as if the discourse has accommodated all religions and beliefs, but only perpetuates the way of thinking and tastes of the dominant class. In short, this study argues that religious discourses such as “agama vs. kepercayaan” and “moderasi beragama” are produced by the dominant class through educational institutions and so on and produce symbolic violence. (shrink)

Public reason liberalism is defined by the idea that laws and policies should be justifiable to each person who is subject to them. But what does it mean for reasons to be public or, in other words, suitable for this process of justification? In response to this question, Kevin Vallier has recently developed the traditional distinction between consensus and convergence public reason into a classification distinguishing three main approaches: shareability, accessibility and intelligibility. The goal of this paper is to defend (...) the accessibility approach by demonstrating its ability to strike an appealing middle course in terms of inclusivity between shareability and intelligibility. We first argue against Vallier that accessibility can exclude religious reasons from public justification. Second, we use scientific reasons as a case study to show that accessibility excludes considerably fewer reasons than shareability. Throughout the paper, we connect our discussion of accessibility to John Rawls’s model of public reason, so as to give substance to the accessibility approach and to further our understanding of Rawls’s influential model. (shrink)

Should religious reasons be used in political discourse? Habermas argues that religious reasons can enter the public sphere so long as they undergo a translation that meets the standards of public reason. I argue that such a translation may be either unnecessary or impossible. Habermas does not sufficiently consider the possibility that religious reasons are already publicly accessible such that no translation is required. Moreover, Habermas entirely fails to consider the possibility that, if he is right about religious reasons not (...) being publicly accessible, these reasons may be of a kind such that they cannot be translated into a publicly accessible idiom as he supposes they can be. (shrink)

Cet article vise à enrichir l’approche désagrégative proposée par Cécile Laborde dans Liberalism’s Religion [HUP, 2017] à l’aide de certaines intuitions rawlsiennes provenant de notre ouvrage La nation pluraliste [PUM, 2018]. En partant de la notion d’« accommodement raisonnable » telle que comprise dans le contexte légal du Québec et du Canada, nous parvenons à une interprétation des fondements normatifs de la distinction entre droits fondamentaux et accommodements qui repose sur la raison publique. La perspective que nous défendons permet ultimement (...) d’admettre des droits fondamentaux à la fois pour les personnes et pour les groupes. (shrink)

One central objection to philosophical defences of liberal neutrality is that many neutrally justified laws and policies are nonetheless discriminatory as they unilaterally impose costs or confer unearned privileges on the bearers of a particular conception of the good. Call this the false neutrality objection. While liberal neutralists seldom consider this objection to be a serious allegation, and often claim that it rests on a misunderstanding, I argue that it is a serious challenge for proponents of justificatory neutrality. Indeed, a (...) careful examination of recent French and Canadian laws which impede the members of cultural minorities from freely practising their religion reveals that the state can hide its discriminatory aims by cloaking the policies it enacts in neutral language. In order to avoid the problem of false neutrality, I contend, liberal neutralists should defend a combination of neutrality of justification and neutrality of aim and operationalize neutrality of aim through a practical test that has been a defining feature of American jurisprudence on religious freedom in the last thirty years: the general applicability requirement. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz beschäftigt sich am Beispiel des deutschen "Kopftuchstreits" mit der rechtlich-politischen Auseinandersetzung um subjektive Rechte innerhalb des liberalen Rechtsstaats. Wie Christoph Menke in seiner Deutung der für den politischen Liberalismus wesentlichen politischen Konflikte gezeigt hat, bezieht sich diese Auseinandersetzung vorrangig auf zwei Fragen: Wer sollte Anspruch darauf genießen, ein politisches Subjekt zu sein, das heißt, als Gleiche oder Gleicher berücksichtigt zu werden? Welche Ansprüche politischer Subjekte könneen als schützenswerte Verwirklichung subjektiver Rechte gelten? Der vorliegende Beitrag beschäftigt sich vorwiegend mit (...) der Frage, wie die politischen Konflikte des letztgenannten Typs auf die rechtliche Auseinandersetzung um Grundrechte abfärben. Damit wende ich mich gegen ein Verständnis der Grundrechte, das diese als Garant der ethischen Neutralität eines liberalen Gemeinwesens ansieht. Ich möchte zeigen, dass der Sinn subjektiver Rechte in der liberalen Demokratie zwar unter anderem genau darin besteht, dass sie partikulare ethische Wertvorstellungen neutralisieren und die Bürgerinnen und Bürger innerhalb eines vernünftigen Rahmens vor Unterdrückung schützen. Wie eine Analyse der Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (BVerfG) zum "Kopftuchstreit" zeigt, wird diese Funktion aber stets zugleich durch die partikulare Interpretation gleicher Rechte unterminiert. Dies bezeichne ich als die Dekonstruktion der Neutralität, die sich im Recht vollzieht. (shrink)

The paper attempts to develop an immanent conception of natural law and natural rights of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi.

According to Corey Brettschneider, we can protect freedom of religion and promote equality, by distinguishing religious groups’ claims to freedom of expression and association from their claims to financial and verbal support from the state. I am very sympathetic to this position, which fits well with my own views of democratic rights and duties, and with the importance of recognizing the scope for political choice which democratic politics offers to governments and to citizens. This room for political choice, I believe, (...) is necessary if people are to have any chance of reconciling the conflicting moral and political obligations they are likely to face, however idealized our conception of democracy or morality. Granted that no amount of personal and political choice will ever guarantee that we do not encounter tragic choices, and painfully conflicting moral demands, it is an important feature of democracy – or so I believe – that its rights reflect the importance of mitigating these conflicts so that people are able, as a rule, to act as they ought, so that they do not experience their moral sentiments, beliefs and capacities simply as grounds for recrimination, alienation and despair. I therefore believe that democracies have good reason not to force the consciences of the undemocratic and the intolerant, where it is possible to accommodate such people without threatening the rights of others. However, the fact that I share many of Brettschneider’s intuitions and beliefs does not mean that I share them all. In particular, I find his conception of democracy unduly narrow, and unduly based on a rather idealized conception of the American constitution which is unlikely to appeal to those whose conceptions of democracy are more republican, more socialist, more pragmatic and more international than his. I have explained these worries elsewhere and drawn out some of their implications for his arguments about privacy and judicial review. There is no need to repeat them here. I will also set to one side my worries about his uninflected, overly abstract and rather reified characterization of the State, in the hope that others will discuss this and that, in the end, a more nuanced conception of the State and a more lively appreciation of the conflicting people, institutions, histories and norms which make up most states, will prove consistent with his arguments. Finally, I do not propose to enter into a detailed discussion of the difficulties of Brettschneider’s overly abstract and reified conception of State ‘speech’ and ‘expression’ which, while motivated by the language of American constitutionalism, appears to cover pretty much anything a government might do, from raising and spending taxes, to accepting judicial interpretations of contested constitutional provisions, or to affirmatively pronouncing on the goals that will animate its legislative agenda and its aspirations for citizen’s lives. Again, while I would have wished for a more nuanced and analytical discussion of so central a concept as ‘expression’ and, in particular, expression by ‘the State’, I am uncertain that anything fundamental in Brettschneider’s account of citizen rights and duties would be altered in the process. Instead, then, I want to focus on points in Brettschneider’s argument that intrigue, and sometimes puzzle, me the most and where issues of nuance and clarification might make a substantial difference to our views of equality and religious freedom. (shrink)

Is the institutionalization of religious freedom through human rights jurisprudence simply a means by which the modern nation-state manufactures and regulates “religion”? Is the discourse of religious freedom principally a technology of state governance? These questions challenge the ways that scholars conceptualize the relation between states, nationalism, human rights, and religious freedom. This article forwards an approach to human rights and methodological nationalism that both counters and explores alternatives to the prevailing conceptions of human rights, nationalism, and state sovereignty in (...) the discourse on the putative impossibility—and, by some accounts, insidiousness—of religious freedom. I first explicate the interpretive and contestatory dimensions of human rights discourse concerning religious freedom. I then explore cross-cutting ambivalences within the nationalisms that states need and cultivate in effort to transmute their monopoly upon coercive force (i.e. power) into legitimated authority. I argue that these provide two dimensions in and through which state sovereignty may be opposed, criticized, held accountable, and subject to change. (shrink)

Responding to an article in a previous issue from Matthew B. O’Brien on the impermissibility of same-sex marriage, this reply corrects a misinterpretation of Rawls’s understanding of political liberalism and a misdirected complaint against the jurisprudence of the U.S. federal courts on civil marriage and other matters. In correcting these interpretations, I seek to demonstrate that a publicly reasonable case for same-sex civil marriage is conceivable in line with political liberalism. I conclude the article by arguing that, although the same-sex (...) civil marriage issue is likely to be a matter of controversy for some time in western societies, a proper understanding of the theoretical issues at stake may contribute to a partial de-escalation of the ‘culture wars’ currently surrounding the issue. (shrink)

Religious freedom is often thought to protect, not only religious practices, but also the underlying religious beliefs of citizens. But what should be said about religious beliefs that oppose religious freedom itself or that deny the concept of equal citizenship? The author argues here that such beliefs, while protected against coercive sanction, are rightly subject to attempts at transformation by the state in its expressive capacities. Transformation is entailed by a commitment to publicizing the reasons and principles that justify the (...) basic rights of citizens. (shrink)

A collection of articles on the the principles of social justice from an Australian Catholic perspective. Contents: Forward (Archbishop Philip Wilson), Introduction (James Franklin), The right to life (James Franklin), The right to serve and worship God in public and private (John Sharpe), The right to religious formation (Richard Rymarz), The right to personal liberty under just law (Michael Casey), The right to equal protection of just law regardless of sex, nationality, colour or creed (Sam Gregg), The right to freedom (...) of expression (Damian Grace), The right to choose and freely maintain a state of life, married or single, lay or religious (Marita Winters), The right to education (Anthony Cleary), The right to petition government for the redress of grievances (Paul Russell), The right to a nationality (Andrew Hamilton), The right to have access to the means of livelihood, by migration when necessary (Brenda Hubber), The right of association and peaceful assembly (Michael Hogan), The right to work and choose one's occupation (Ian Blandthorn), The right to personal ownership, use and disposal of property subject to the right of others (Brian Coman), The right to a living wage (Garrick Small), The right to collective bargaining (Keith Harvey), The right to associate by industries and professions to obtain economic justice (Henrik Jurisevic), The right to assistance from society, if necessary from the State, in distress of persons and family (Catherine Althaus), Afterword (James Franklin). (shrink)

On 25 December 1991 Alaa Hamed must for his literary work to the "Emergency Court for National Security" in Cairo. The judge read out the verdict: 2,300 egyptian pounds fine and eight years in prison for violating of state security and social peace. - A shock not only for egyptian intellectuals! The Arabic Department of BBC London placed the sentence in second place in the news, immediately after the notification of the resignation of Michail Gorbachev. Even in Germany the message (...) arrived in the media (FAZ, 30 December 1991). The egyptian journalist Jusif El Kaid spoke of the "most dangerous convicted of the 20 century" (Almussawar. No. 3508, 3 January 1992). The human rights organization of Egypt criticized the verdict as a violation of the right to freedom of expression and artistic innovation. It was the first time in modern history (after the 1952 revolution), that an author should because of his literary work in prison. (shrink)