View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

327 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
1 — 50 / 327
Material to categorize
  1. Intention and Self Knowledge: Wittgenstein's Bequeathal A First Draft.Les Jones - manuscript
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Introspection of Emotions.Bertille De Vlieger & Anna Giustina - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this paper, we argue that knowledge of emotions essentially depends on introspecting the phenomenology of emotional experiences, and that introspection of emotional experiences is a process by stages, where the most fundamental stage is a non-classificatory introspective state, i.e., one that does not depend on the subject’s classifying the introspected emotion as an instance of any experience type. We call such a non-classificatory kind of introspection primitive introspection. Our main goal is to show that, although not sufficient, primitive introspection (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Extending Introspection.Lukas Schwengerer - 2021 - In Robert William Clowes, Klaus Gärtner & Inês Hipólito (eds.), The Mind-Technology Problem - Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artifacts. Springer. pp. 231-251.
    Clark and Chalmers propose that the mind extends further than skin and skull. If they are right, then we should expect this to have some effect on our way of knowing our own mental states. If the content of my notebook can be part of my belief system, then looking at the notebook seems to be a way to get to know my own beliefs. However, it is at least not obvious whether self-ascribing a belief by looking at my notebook (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Fernández on Transparency: Is the Bypass Procedure Compatible with Changes in Belief-Formation?Martin Francisco Fricke - 2020 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):25-40.
    According to Fernández, we self-attribute beliefs on the basis of their grounds, “bypassing” the beliefs to be attributed. My paper argues that this procedure runs into normative and metaphysical problems if certain changes in the subject’s ways of forming beliefs occur. If the change is accidental, the problem is normative: self-attributing the resulting belief by way of Bypass cannot be justified. The metaphysical problem is that it is unclear how the procedure can reflect any change in belief-formation at all, given (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. ¿BEL o Bypass? Dos teorías de la transparencia del autoconocimiento.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2020 - Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía 59:11-50.
    Alex Byrne and Jordi Fernández propose two different versions of a transparency theory of self-knowledge. According to Byrne, we self-attribute beliefs by an inference from what we take to be facts about the world (following a rule he calls BEL). According to Fernández, we self-attribute the belief that p on the basis of a prior mental state, a state which constitutes our grounds for the belief that p (thereby realizing a procedure he calls Bypass). In this paper, I present the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. The Value of Privileged Access.Jared Peterson - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):365-378.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Teaching Drunk: Work, the Online Economy, and Uncertainty in Action.Max F. Kramer - 2021 - Philosophy 96 (3):387-408.
    (Runner-up, Royal Institute of Philosophy 2020 Philosophy Essay Prize) Technological developments have led to the digitization of certain sectors of the economy, and this has many authors looking ahead to the prospects of a post-work society. While it is valuable to theorize about this possibility, it is also important to take note of the present state of work. For better or worse, it is what we are currently stuck with, and as the COVID-19 pandemic has ensured, much of that work (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Alienation or regress: on the non-inferential character of agential knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1757-1768.
    A central debate in philosophy of action concerns whether agential knowledge, the knowledge agents characteristically have of their own actions, is inferential. While inferentialists like Sarah Paul hold that it is inferential, others like Lucy O’Brien and Kieran Setiya argue that it is not. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for the view that agential knowledge is non-inferential, by posing a dilemma for inferentialists: on the first horn, inferentialism is committed to holding that agents have only alienated knowledge (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Self, Sense and Autonomy.Matthew Ian Harding - manuscript
    This study advances a refutation of Physicalism. It demonstrates that it cannot, coherently, be maintained. An alternative approach based on Husserl’s ‘transcendental ego’ is developed. This is an account where the physical world is constituted by a freely acting self from a phenomenology that is ontologically neutral. By doing so, the, so-called, ‘hard problem’ of consciousness is dissolved. It will be shown that the self is compelled to attribute moral and aesthetic value to the world that it has constituted. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. The Self, Self-Knowledge, and a Flattened Path to Self-Improvement.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    This essay explores the connection between theories of the self and theories of self-knowledge, arguing (a) that empirical results strongly support a certain negative thesis about the self, a thesis about what the self isn’t, and (b) that a more promising account of the self makes available unorthodox – but likely apt – ways of characterizing self-knowledge. Regarding (a), I argue that the human self does not appear at a personal level the autonomous (or quasi-autonomous) status of which might provide (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.
    In this paper I aim to illuminate the significance of thought insertion for debates about the first-person concept. My starting point is the often-voiced contention that thought insertion might challenge the thesis that introspection-based self-ascriptions of psychological properties are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person concept. In the first part of the paper I explain what a thought insertion-based counterexample to this immunity thesis should be like. I then argue that various thought insertion-involving scenarios do not give (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12. Personal Identity and Self-Interpretation & Natural Right and Natural Emotions.Gabor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Toth (eds.) - 2020 - Budapest: Eötvös University Press.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Skill and Sensitivity to Reasons.Joshua Shepherd - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):669-681.
    In this paper I explore the relationship between skill and sensitivity to reasons for action. I want to know to what degree we can explain the fact that the skilled agent is very good at performing a cluster of actions within some domain in terms of the fact that the skilled agent has a refined sensitivity to the reasons for action common to the cluster. The picture is a little bit complex. While skill can be partially explained by sensitivity to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. The "Ten-Percent Brain Myth" Guided with the Fundamentals of Jaina's Theory of Knowledge.Megha Arora - 2020 - International Journal of Psychosocial Rehabilitation 24 (08):5977-5982.
    Great religions to pragmatic capacities sporadically abound in the stories of supernatural phenomena which subsumes telepathy, clairvoyance and precognition. However, unfortunately treated as the topics of spiritualism, witchcraft and edification, not the materials of Scientific Enquiry. Whatsoever, have been deciphered about these queer speculations, the most prevalent sole concept is : namely, that there can be senseexperiences from the realm which is not accessible to human brain and sense organs. Possessor of these senses which are not currently accessible to average (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Warum ich weiß, dass ich kein Zombie bin.Thomas Grundmann - 2005 - In Albert Newen & Gottfried Vosgerau (eds.), Den eigenen Geist kennen. Paderborn: mentis. pp. 135-149.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Self-Referential Memory and Mental Time Travel.Jordi Fernández - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):283-300.
    Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology. One way to capture what is distinctive about it is by using the notion of mental time travel: When we remember some fact episodically, we mentally travel to the moment at which we experienced it in the past. This way of distinguishing episodic memory from semantic memory calls for an explanation of what the experience of mental time travel is. In this paper, I suggest that a certain view about the content of memories can (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17. Skeptical Doubting and Mindful Self-Reflection.Guido Melchior - 2013 - In Mind, Language and Action. Papers of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 274-276.
    The skeptic argues that we cannot have any external world knowledge because we cannot know that we are not brains in a vat. The intuitive appeal of this skeptical argument is essentially based on the comprehensibility of the process of skeptical doubting, where we focus our attention on our experiences and experience-based beliefs and raise questions about the sources of these experiences. I propose that skeptical doubting is an instance of a mental attitude that contemporary psychology characterizes as mindfulness. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. The Narrative Coherence Standard and Child Patients' Capacity to Consent.Gah-Kai Leung - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 11 (1):40-42.
    Aryeh Goldberg compellingly argues for a Narrative Coherence Standard (NCS) to bolster existing methods of assessing patients' mental capacity. But his account fails to distinguish between the cognitive abilities of children and adults; consequently, worries may be raised about the scope of the NCS, in particular when we consider child patients. In this article, I argue the NCS cannot plausibly apply to children. Since children's self-conception does not arrive fully formed — but rather is a product of both incomplete cognitive (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Observer Memory and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Jordi Fernández - forthcoming - Synthese (1):641-660.
    Are those judgments that we make on the basis of our memories immune to error through misidentification? In this paper, I discuss a phenomenon which seems to suggest that they are not; the phenomenon of observer memory. I argue that observer memories fail to show that memory judgments are not IEM. However, the discussion of observer memories will reveal an interesting fact about the perspectivity of memory; a fact that puts us on the right path towards explaining why memory judgments (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  20. Memory: A Self-Referential Account.Jordi Fernández - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    This book offers a philosophical account of memory. Memory is remarkably interesting from a philosophical point of view. Our memories interact with mental states of other types in a characteristic way. They also have some associated feelings that other mental states lack. Our memories are special in terms of their representational capacity too, since we can have memories of objective events, and we can have memories of our own past experiences. Finally, our memories are epistemically special, in that beliefs formed (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  21. The Functional Character of Memory.Jordi Fernandez - 2018 - In Dorothea Debus Kourken Michaelian (ed.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. London: pp. 52-72.
    The purpose of this chapter is to determine what is to remember something, as opposed to imagining it, perceiving it, or introspecting it. What does it take for a mental state to qualify as remembering, or having a memory of, something? The main issue to be addressed is therefore a metaphysical one. It is the issue of determining which features those mental states which qualify as memories typically enjoy, and those states which do not qualify as such typically lack. In (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  22. Intentional Objects of Memory.Jordi Fernandez - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. London, UK: pp. 88-100.
    Memories are mental states with a number of interesting features. One of those features seems to be their having an intentional object. After all, we commonly say that memories are about things, and that a subject represents the world in a certain way by virtue of remembering something. It is unclear, however, what sorts of entities constitute the intentional objects of memory. In particular, it is not clear whether those are mind-independent entities in the world or whether they are mental (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  23. Self-Knowledge and the possible moral consequences.Robson Barcelos - 2019 - Pólemos 8 (15):274-291.
    We are subject with consciousness. For this we have to have self-consciousness so that consciousness can exist. In this way, there is the possibility of self-knowledge of one's own mental states. Thus, the article aims at investigating the possibility of self-knowledge of one's own mental states, their applicability and consequences in relation to Kantian moral theory. Therefore, it reflects on how self-knowledge of one's own mental states and the characteristics of Kantian moral theory occur. Finally, there is the possibility of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. The Agential Point of View.Ben Sorgiovanni - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):549-572.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25. The Self Shows Up in Experience.Matt Duncan - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):299-318.
    I can be aware of myself, and thereby come to know things about myself, in a variety of different ways. But is there some special way in which I—and only I—can learn about myself? Can I become aware of myself by introspecting? Do I somehow show up in my own conscious experiences? David Hume and most contemporary philosophers say no. They deny that the self shows up in experience. However, in this paper I appeal to research on schizophrenia—on thought insertion, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  26. Russell on Introspection and Self-Knowledge.Donovan Wishon - 2018 - In Russell Wahl (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Bertrand Russell. New York, NY, USA: pp. 256-285.
    This chapter examines Bertrand Russell's developing views--roughly from 1911 to 1918--on the nature of introspective knowledge and subjects' most basic knowledge of themselves as themselves. It argues that Russell's theory of introspection distinguishes between direct awareness of individual psychological objects and features, the presentation of psychological complexes involving those objects and features, and introspective judgments which aim to correspond with them. It also explores his transition from believing that subjects enjoy introspective self-acquaintance, to believing that they only know themselves by (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. Graph of Socratic Elenchos.John Bova - manuscript
    From my ongoing "Metalogical Plato" project. The aim of the diagram is to make reasonably intuitive how the Socratic elenchos (the logic of refutation applied to candidate formulations of virtues or ruling knowledges) looks and works as a whole structure. This is my starting point in the project, in part because of its great familiarity and arguable claim to being the inauguration of western philosophy; getting this point less wrong would have broad and deep consequences, including for philosophy’s self-understanding. -/- (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Are There Degreess of Self-Consciousness?R. Milliere - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (3-4):252-282.
    It is widely assumed that ordinary conscious experience involves some form of sense of self or consciousness of oneself. Moreover, this claim is often restricted to a 'thin' or 'minimal' notion of self-consciousness, or even 'the simplest form of self-consciousness', as opposed to more sophisticated forms of self-consciousness which are not deemed ubiquitous in ordinary experience. These formulations suggest that self-consciousness comes in degrees, and that individual subjects may differ with respect to the degree of self-consciousness they exhibit at a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  29. Kant on de Se.Luca Forgione - 2018 - In Violetta Waibel, Margit Ruffing & David Wagner (eds.), Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Berlino, Germania: De Gruyter. pp. 3779-3786.
    Since the classic works by Castañeda, Perry and Lewis, de se thoughts have been described as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. In recent years, various theoretical perspectives have gained ground, and even if the transcendental system does not seem to contemplate an explicit articulation of de se thoughts, apparently a few features of transcendental apperception and I think do anticipate a few points in Perry and Recanati’s claims on the so-called implicit de se thoughts in the specific terms of Transcendentalism.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  30. Radical Enactivism and Self-Knowledge.Giovanni Rolla - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (141):723-743.
    ABSTRACT I propose a middle-ground between a perceptual model of self-knowledge, according to which the objects of self-awareness are accessed through some kind of causal mechanism, and a rationalist model, according to which self-knowledge is constituted by one's rational agency. Through an analogy with the role of the exercises of sensorimotor abilities in rationally grounded perceptual knowledge, self-knowledge is construed as an exercise of action-oriented and action-orienting abilities. This view satisfies the privileged access condition usually associated with self-knowledge without entailing (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. In Search of Enlightenment by Reading Samuel Beckett’s Waiting for Godot.Syed Ismyl Mahmood Rizvi - 2015 - Literaria: An International Journal of New Literature Across the World 5 (1-2):37-55.
    Beckett’s philosophical indebtedness has long been recognised – especially in conjunction with Dante, Descartes and Geulincx. In this article, I examine Beckettian universal values of Enlightenment, which will be exposed as self-serving mystifications that rationalize and instrumentalize the meaning of life. In this context, the awareness of the Enlightenment nature of Beckett’s writing in Waiting for Godot will be analysed along with the freedom appeal of his reader as he strives to attain the enlightenment.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Minimal Sartre: Diagonalization and Pure Reflection.John Bova - 2018 - Open Philosophy 1:360-379.
    These remarks take up the reflexive problematics of Being and Nothingness and related texts from a metalogical perspective. A mutually illuminating translation is posited between, on the one hand, Sartre’s theory of pure reflection, the linchpin of the works of Sartre’s early period and the site of their greatest difficulties, and, on the other hand, the quasi-formalism of diagonalization, the engine of the classical theorems of Cantor, Godel, Tarski, Turing, etc. Surprisingly, the dialectic of mathematical logic from its inception through (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Memory, Imagery, and Self-Knowledge.Dustin Stokes - 2019 - Avant: Special Issue-Thinking with Images 10 (2).
    One distinct interest in self-knowledge concerns whether one can know about one’s own mental states and processes, how much, and by what methods. One broad distinction is between accounts that centrally claim that we look inward for self-knowledge (introspective methods) and those that claim that we look outward for self-knowledge (transparency methods). It is here argued that neither method is sufficient, and that we see this as soon as we move beyond questions about knowledge of one’s beliefs, focusing instead on (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Descartes and Hume on I-Thoughts.Luca Forgione - 2018 - Thémata: Revista de Filosofía 57:211-228.
    Self-consciousness can be understood as the ability to think I-thou-ghts which can be described as thoughts about oneself ‘as oneself’. Self-consciousness possesses two specific correlated features: the first regards the fact that it is grounded on a first-person perspective, whereas the second concerns the fact that it should be considered a consciousness of the self as subject rather than a consciousness of the self as object. The aim of this paper is to analyse a few considerations about Descartes and Hume’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Regret, Resilience, and the Nature of Grief.Michael Cholbi - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (4):486-508.
    Should we regret the fact that we are often more emotionally resilient in response to the deaths of our loved ones than we might expect -- that the suffering associated with grief often dissipates more quickly and more fully than we anticipate? Dan Moller ("Love and Death") argues that we should, because this resilience epistemically severs us from our loved ones and thereby "deprives us of insight into our own condition." I argue that Moller's conclusion is correct despite resting on (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  36. What Is Truth?: On the Need for an Old Paradigm.Richard Oxenberg - 2018 - Political Animal Magazine.
    In this essay I argue for the need to restore our recognition of the importance of philosophical truth in our endeavor to understand our world and our selves. In particular, I note that the physical sciences have no way of examining the axiological dimension of being - i.e., that dimension from which values spring - whereas an appreciation for, and understanding of, our values is crucial to the conduct of our personal, interpersonal, and political lives.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Two Russellian Arguments for Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):461-474.
    Bertrand Russell [1912] argued that we are acquainted with our experiences. Although this conclusion has generated a lot of discussion, very little has been said about Russell's actual arguments for it. This paper aims to remedy that. I start by spelling out two Russellian arguments for acquaintance. Then I show that these arguments cannot both succeed. For if one is sound, the other isn't. Finally, I weigh our options with respect to these arguments, and defend one option in particular. I (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38. Identity and Self-Knowledge.John Perry - 2017 - Philosophy, Theory, and Practice in Biology 9 (5).
    Self, person, and identity are among the concepts most central to the way humans think about themselves and others. It is often natural in biology to use such concepts; it seems sensible to say, for example, that the job of the immune system is to attack the non-self, but sometimes it attacks the self. But does it make sense to borrow these concepts? Don’t they only pertain to persons, beings with sophisticated minds, and perhaps even souls? I argue that if (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Hegel and Aquinas on Self-Knowledge and Historicity.Michael Baur - 1994 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 68:125.
    The Hegelian and the Thomistic accounts of self-knowledge are solidly Aristotelian in their origins and motivations. In their conclusions and consequences, however, the two accounts exhibit significant differences. Hegel argues that genuine self-knowledge is necessarily social and historical, while Aquinas says nothing about history or society in his account of self-knowledge. The aim of this paper is not to decide the issue concerning historicity in favor of either Hegel or Aquinas. The aim here is rather to address a prior question: (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Moran on Self-Knowledge, Agency and Responsibility.Carlos J. Moya - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):3-20.
    In this paper I deal with Richard Moran's account of self-knowledge in his book Authority and Estrangement. After presenting the main lines of his account, I contend that, in spite of its novelty and interest, it may have some shortcomings. Concerning beliefs formed through deliberation, the account would seem to face problems of circularity or regress. And it looks also wanting concerning beliefs not formed in this way. I go on to suggest a diagnosis of these problems, according to which (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  41. A Consciência Entre o Formalismo E a Psicologia, Em Sartre.Marcio Miotto - 2008 - AdVerbum 3 (2):144-155.
    O presente artigo pretende problematizar, nos três primeiros livros filosóficos de Sartre, a noção de consciência, em torno de um duplo horizonte de interlocução: o legado “formalista” kantiano, e os diversos projetos de “ciência psicológica” existentes nos séculos XIX e XX. Para isso, recompõem-se esses dois horizontes a partir do panorama feito por Sartre desde o momento cartesiano, discutindo as diferentes filosofias da subjetividade e culminando na noção de “intencionalidade”, formulada por Husserl. A noção de consciência intencional serviria como referência (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Autonomy, Character, and Self-Understanding.Paul Katsafanas - 2016 - In Iskra Fileva (ed.), Questions of Character. Oxford University Press.
    Autonomy, traditionally conceived, is the capacity to direct one’s actions in light of self-given principles or values. Character, traditionally conceived, is the set of unchosen, relatively rigid traits and proclivities that influence, constrain, or determine one’s actions. It’s natural to think that autonomy and character will be in tension with one another. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: while character influences and constrains choice, this poses no problem for autonomy. However, in particular cases character can affect (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. How We Get Along.J. David Velleman - 2009 - Cambridge University Press.
    In How We Get Along, philosopher David Velleman compares our social interactions to the interactions among improvisational actors on stage. He argues that we play ourselves - not artificially but authentically, by doing what would make sense coming from us as we really are. And, like improvisational actors, we deal with one another in dual capacities: both as characters within the social drama and as players contributing to the shared performance. In this conception of social intercourse, Velleman finds rational grounds (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  44. Some Thoughts About Aquinas's Conception of Truth as Adequation.Liran Shia Gordon - 2016 - Heythrop Journal 57 (2):325-336.
    While Aquinas’s primary notion of truth as adequation is applied to God and man in somewhat different ways, it is apparent that it is not applicable to the angels, at least not in the same way. However, since truth is a transcendental, and as transcendentals are convertible, one may claim that the transcendental systems that apply to various beings differ. In order to consolidate the universality of the transcendental system, the study aims to show the manner truth as adequation can (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  45. Knowledge of Life. [REVIEW]Daniel J. Nicholson - 2014 - Annals of Science 71 (3):434-437.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Der Nullpunkt der Orientierung.Geert Keil - 2002 - In Audun Øfsti, Peter Ulrich & Truls Wyller (eds.), Indexicality and Idealism: The Self in Philosophical Perspective. Mentis. pp. 9-29.
    The indexical sentence “I am here now” can be used any time and anywhere by anyone to say something true. Rather than yielding a special kind of infallible knowledge, this fact indicates that every speaker or thinker has a zero of an egocentric coordinate system at his disposal. Many idealist philosophers assume that this egocentric zero can be further reduced. The ability to make a de se-reference with the first person pronoun, they claim, need not involve spatiotemporal self-localization. The paper (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Why Transparency Undermines Economy.Derek Clayton Baker - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):3037-3050.
    Byrne offers a novel interpretation of the idea that the mind is transparent to its possessor, and that one knows one’s own mind by looking out at the world. This paper argues that his attempts to extend this picture of self-knowledge force him to sacrifice the theoretical parsimony he presents as the primary virtue of his account. The paper concludes by discussing two general problems transparency accounts of self-knowledge must address.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  48. Die Transparenz des Geistes.Wolfgang Barz - 2012 - Suhrkamp.
    The key message of this book is that we come to know our own mental states, not by peering inward, but by focusing on the aspects of the external world to which we are intentionally related in virtue of having the mental states in question. Though many philosophers think that the idea of transparency, as it is called, may apply to self-knowledge of some mental states, it is often regarded as hopeless to widen its scope to self-knowledge of mental states (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49. Contrastive Self-Knowledge and the McKinsey Paradox.Sarah Sawyer - 2015 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays. Cambridge, UK: pp. 75-93.
    In this paper I argue first, that a contrastive account of self-knowledge and the propositional attitudes entails an anti-individualist account of propositional attitude concepts, second, that the final account provides a solution to the McKinsey paradox, and third, that the account has the resources to explain why certain anti-skeptical arguments fail.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  50. Introduction: What is Confabulation?William Hirstein - 2009 - In Confabulation: Views From Neuroscience, Psychiatry, Psychology and Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
1 — 50 / 327