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  1. The Concept of 'I' in Kant's First Critique.Adriano Kurle - 2023 - In Agemir Bavaresco, Evandro Pontel & Jair Tauchen (eds.), Setenário. Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil: Editora Fundação Fênix. pp. 41-56.
    I seek to show in this paper how, in addressing the concept of “I” and the question of self-knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason, one encounters a paradox, which is essentially a consequence of the doctrine of transcendental idealism. I point to Kant's concept of “I” and its three co-constitutive perspectives. The importance of the concept of subject and its intertwining with the concept of reason is pointed out, as also how these two concepts appear in the text of (...)
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  2. Connaissance de soi et réflexion pratique: critique des réappropriations analytiques de Sartre.Samuel Webb - 2022 - Paris: Editions Mimésis.
    Comment se connaît-on soi-même ? Concernant nos états d’esprit, il peut sembler que la connaissance de soi jouisse d’un privilège : je sais ce que je pense parce que j’ai un accès immédiat à mon esprit. S’inspirant de Sartre, deux philosophes américains, Richard Moran et Charles Larmore, ont soutenu que cette idée ne rend pas compte de notre rapport singulier à notre propre esprit. En plus de se connaître par une réflexion théorique, on est aussi capable d’une réflexion pratique. On (...)
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  3. Byrne on transparent introspection. [REVIEW]Michael Roche - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    This is a review of Transparency and Self-Knowledge, by Alex Byrne, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2018, xi+227 pp., £46.61 (Hardback), ISBN 9780198821618.
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  4. Hot-Cold Empathy Gaps and the Grounds of Authenticity.Grace Helton & Christopher Register - forthcoming - Synthese.
    Hot-cold empathy gaps are a pervasive phenomena wherein one’s predictions about others tend to skew ‘in the direction’ of one’s own current visceral states. For instance, when one predicts how hungry someone else is, one’s prediction will tend to reflect one’s own current hunger state. These gaps also obtain intrapersonally, when one attempts to predict what one oneself would do at a different time. In this paper, we do three things: We draw on empirical evidence to argue that so-called hot-cold (...)
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  5. Questions of Reference and the Reflexivity of First-Person Thought.Michele Palmira - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (11):628-640.
    Tradition has it that first-person thought is somehow special. It is also commonplace to maintain that the first-person concept obeys a rule of reference to the effect that any token first-person thought is about the thinker of that thought. Following Annalisa Coliva and, more recently, Santiago Echeverri, I take the specialness claim to be the claim that thinking a first-person thought comes with a certain guarantee of its pattern of reference. Echeverri maintains that such a guarantee is explained by a (...)
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  6. Intention, Judgement-Dependence and Self-Deception.Ali Hossein Khani - forthcoming - Res Philosophica.
    Wright’s judgement-dependent account of intention is an attempt to show that truths about a subject’s intentions can be viewed as constituted by the subject’s own best judgements about those intentions. The judgements are considered to be best if they are formed under certain cognitively optimal conditions, which mainly include the subject’s conceptual competence, attentiveness to the questions about what the intentions are, and lack of any material self-deception. Offering a substantive, non-trivial specification of the no-self-deception condition is one of the (...)
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  7. Collective vice and collective self-knowledge.Lukas Schwengerer - 2023 - Synthese 201 (1):1-18.
    Groups can be epistemically vicious just like individuals. And just like individuals, groups sometimes want to do something about their vices. They want to change. However, intentionally combating one’s own vices seems impossible without detecting those vices first. Self-knowledge seems to provide a first step towards changing one’s own epistemic vices. I argue that groups can acquire self-knowledge about their epistemic vices and I propose an account of such collective self-knowledge. I suggest that collective self-knowledge of vices is partially based (...)
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  8. Groups that fly blind.Jared Peterson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-24.
    A long-standing debate in group ontology and group epistemology concerns whether some groups possess mental states and/or epistemic states such as knowledge that do not reduce to the mental states and/or epistemic states of the individuals who comprise such groups (and are also states not possessed by any of the members). Call those who think there are such states inflationists. There has recently been a defense in the literature of a specific type of inflationary knowledge—viz., knowledge of facts about group (...)
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  9. Observer memory and immunity to error through misidentification.Jordi Fernández - 2021 - Synthese (1):641-660.
    Are those judgments that we make on the basis of our memories immune to error through misidentification? In this paper, I discuss a phenomenon which seems to suggest that they are not; the phenomenon of observer memory. I argue that observer memories fail to show that memory judgments are not IEM. However, the discussion of observer memories will reveal an interesting fact about the perspectivity of memory; a fact that puts us on the right path towards explaining why memory judgments (...)
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  10. Introspection of Emotions.Bertille De Vlieger & Anna Giustina - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (3):551-580.
    In this paper, we argue that knowledge of emotions essentially depends on introspecting the phenomenology of emotional experiences, and that introspection of emotional experiences is a process by stages, where the most fundamental stage is a non-classificatory introspective state, i.e., one that does not depend on the subject’s classifying the introspected emotion as an instance of any experience type. We call such a non-classificatory kind of introspection primitive introspection. Our main goal is to show that, although not sufficient, primitive introspection (...)
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  11. Bodily Self-Knowledge as a Special Form of Perception.Hao Tang - 2022 - Disputatio 11 (20).
    We enjoy immediate knowledge of our own limbs and bodies. I argue that this knowledge, which is also called proprioception, is a special form of perception, special in that it is, unlike perception by the external senses, at the same time also a form of genuine self-knowledge. The argument has two parts. Negatively, I argue against the view, held by G. E. M. Anscombe and strengthened by John McDowell, that this knowledge, bodily self-knowledge, is non-perceptual. This involves, inter alia, rescuing (...)
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  12. The importance of self‐knowledge for free action.Joseph Gurrola - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    Much has been made about the ways that implicit biases and other apparently unreflective attitudes can affect our actions and judgments in ways that negatively affect our ability to do right. What has been discussed less is that these attitudes negatively affect our freedom. In this paper, I argue that implicit biases pose a problem for free will. My analysis focuses on the compatibilist notion of free will according to which acting freely consists in acting in accordance with our reflectively (...)
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  13. On Noticing Transparent States: A Compatibilist Approach to Transparency.Arnaud Dewalque - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.
    According to the transparency thesis, some conscious states are transparent or "diaphanous". This thesis is often believed to be incompatible with an inner-awareness account of phenomenal consciousness. In this article, I reject this incompatibility. Instead, I defend a compatibilist approach to transparency. To date, most attempts to do so require a rejection of strong transparency in favor of weak transparency. In this view, transparent states can be attended to by attending (in the right way) to the presented world: that is, (...)
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  14. Transparent Self-Knowledge of Attitudes and Emotions: A Davidsonian Attempt.Ning Fan - 2021 - International Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):275-284.
    In Authority and Estrangement, Richard Moran provides a fascinating account of how we know what we believe that he calls the “transparency account.” This account relies on the transparency relation between the question of whether we believe that p and the question of whether p is true. That is, we can consider the former by considering the grounds for the latter. But Moran’s account has been criticized by David Finkelstein, who argues that it fails to explain how we know our (...)
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  15. Prisoners of Prophecy: Freedom and Foreknowledge in the Dune Series.William Peden - 2022 - In Dune and Philosophy: Mind, Monads and Muad’Dib.
    In the Dune Series, Frank Herbert explores the idea of prophecy. To be prescient seems to be empowered, but is this true? Can knowing the future trap us? Does knowledge of the future constrict our sense of being free agents? -/- These questions have also been explored by decision theorists and philosophers of action. Thus, this chapter provides an introduction to these fields aimed at fans of the Dune series. -/- I explain the Prisoner's Dilemma and how foreknowledge can trap (...)
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  16. On Being Internally the Same.Anil Gomes & Matthew Parrott - 2021 - In Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Internalism and externalism disagree about whether agents who are internally the same can differ in their mental states. But what is it for two agents to be internally the same? Standard formulations take agents to be internally the same in virtue of some metaphysical fact, for example, that they share intrinsic physical properties. Our aim in this chapter is to argue that such formulations should be rejected. We provide the outlines of an alternative formulation on which agents are internally the (...)
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  17. On the Ecological Self. Possibilities and Failures of Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Others.Roberta Guccinelli - 2019 - In L. Aguiar de Sousa and A. Falcato (ed.), Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity and Values. Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle Upon Tyne, Regno Unito: pp. 84-98.
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  18. Tragic Flaws.Nathan Ballantyne - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):20-40.
    In many tragic plays, the protagonist is brought down by a disaster that is a consequence of the protagonist's own error, his or her hamartia, the tragic flaw. Tragic flaws are disconcerting to the audience because they are not known or fully recognized by the protagonist—at least not until it is too late. In this essay, I take tragic flaws to be unreliable belief-forming dispositions that are unrecognized by us in some sense. I describe some different types of flaws and (...)
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  19. Solving the self-illness ambiguity: the case for construction over discovery.Sofia M. I. Jeppsson - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (3):294-313.
    Psychiatric patients sometimes ask where to draw the line between who they are – their selves – and their mental illness. This problem is referred to as the self-illness ambiguity in the literature; it has been argued that solving said ambiguity is a crucial part of psychiatric treatment. I distinguish a Realist Solution from a Constructivist one. The former requires finding a supposedly pre-existing border, in the psychiatric patient’s mental life, between that which belongs to the self and that which (...)
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  20. La racionalidad como virtud de la agencia. [REVIEW]Josep E. Corbi - 2019 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 38:163-174.
    En *Racionalidad, acción y opacidad*, Fernando Broncano nos invita a poner en cuestión una ima- gen de la racionalidad y de la agencia que se sitúa en el centro de la cultura filosófica contemporánea. Es una imagen que nace con la modernidad y ocupa un lugar tan nuclear en nuestra cultura que se sostiene más allá de cualquier evidencia que podamos aportar en su contra. La tarea que emprende *Racionalidad, acción y opacidad* es subrayar los puntos ciegos de esa imagen, (...)
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  21. On the Ecological Self. Possibilities and Failures of Self-Knowledge and Knowledge of Others.Roberta Guccinelli - 2019 - In Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity and Values. Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle Upon Tyne, Regno Unito: pp. 84-98.
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  22. On Knowing and Seeing: Groundwork for a New Empiricism[REVIEW]Mira Magdalena Sickinger - 2021 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 98 (4):495–502.
    This is a discussion note on Michael Ayers’ Knowing and Seeing. Groundwork for a New Empiricism.
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  23. Historical Knowledge as Self-Understanding in the Films of Whit Stillman.Timothy Yenter - 2022 - Film and Philosophy 26:69-84.
    Whit Stillman’s films depict characters attempting to gain relevant knowledge of their historical situation so that they can shape their lives. Through an analysis of scenes from each of Stillman’s films, this essay demonstrates that historical knowledge is presented as a kind of self-understanding in the films. That historical knowledge is useful for gaining control over one’s future as well as for properly evaluating one’s life reveals a philosophically interesting approach to self-knowledge. Stillman’s complex approach of layering contexts further suggests (...)
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  24. Intention and self knowledge: Wittgenstein's bequeathal A first draft.Les Jones - manuscript
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  25. Extending Introspection.Lukas Schwengerer - 2021 - In Robert William Clowes, Klaus Gärtner & Inês Hipólito (eds.), The Mind-Technology Problem - Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artifacts. Springer. pp. 231-251.
    Clark and Chalmers propose that the mind extends further than skin and skull. If they are right, then we should expect this to have some effect on our way of knowing our own mental states. If the content of my notebook can be part of my belief system, then looking at the notebook seems to be a way to get to know my own beliefs. However, it is at least not obvious whether self-ascribing a belief by looking at my notebook (...)
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  26. Fernández on Transparency: Is the Bypass Procedure Compatible with Changes in Belief-Formation?Martin Francisco Fricke - 2020 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):25-40.
    According to Fernández, we self-attribute beliefs on the basis of their grounds, “bypassing” the beliefs to be attributed. My paper argues that this procedure runs into normative and metaphysical problems if certain changes in the subject’s ways of forming beliefs occur. If the change is accidental, the problem is normative: self-attributing the resulting belief by way of Bypass cannot be justified. The metaphysical problem is that it is unclear how the procedure can reflect any change in belief-formation at all, given (...)
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  27. ¿BEL o Bypass? Dos teorías de la transparencia del autoconocimiento.Martin Francisco Fricke - 2020 - Tópicos. Revista de Filosofía 59:11-50.
    Alex Byrne and Jordi Fernández propose two different versions of a transparency theory of self-knowledge. According to Byrne, we self-attribute beliefs by an inference from what we take to be facts about the world (following a rule he calls BEL). According to Fernández, we self-attribute the belief that p on the basis of a prior mental state, a state which constitutes our grounds for the belief that p (thereby realizing a procedure he calls Bypass). In this paper, I present the (...)
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  28. A Role for Conscious Accessibility in Skilled Action.Chiara Brozzo - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):683-697.
    Skilled sportsmen or musicians—more generally, skilled agents—often fill us with awe with the way they perform their actions. One question we may ask ourselves is whether they intended to perform some awe-inspiring aspects of their actions. This question becomes all the more pressing as it often turns out that these agents were not conscious of some of those aspects at the time of performance. As I shall argue, there are reasons for suspecting lack of conscious access to an aspect of (...)
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  29. Narrative, Second-person Experience, and Self-perception: A Reason it is Good to Conceive of One's Life Narratively.Grace Hibshman - 2022 - The Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3):615-627.
    It is widely held that it is good to conceive of one's life narratively, but why this is the case has not been well established. I argue that conceiving of one's life narratively can contribute to one's flourishing by mediating to oneself a second-person experience of oneself, furnishing one with valuable second-personal productive distance from oneself and as a result self-understanding. Drawing on Eleonore Stump's theory that narratives re-present to their audiences the second-person experiences they depict, I argue that conceiving (...)
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  30. The value of privileged access.Jared Peterson - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):365-378.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  31. Teaching drunk: Work, the online economy, and uncertainty in action.Max F. Kramer - 2021 - Philosophy 96 (3):387-408.
    (Runner-up, Royal Institute of Philosophy 2020 Philosophy Essay Prize) Technological developments have led to the digitization of certain sectors of the economy, and this has many authors looking ahead to the prospects of a post-work society. While it is valuable to theorize about this possibility, it is also important to take note of the present state of work. For better or worse, it is what we are currently stuck with, and as the COVID-19 pandemic has ensured, much of that work (...)
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  32. Alienation or regress: on the non-inferential character of agential knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1757-1768.
    A central debate in philosophy of action concerns whether agential knowledge, the knowledge agents characteristically have of their own actions, is inferential. While inferentialists like Sarah Paul hold that it is inferential, others like Lucy O’Brien and Kieran Setiya argue that it is not. In this paper, I offer a novel argument for the view that agential knowledge is non-inferential, by posing a dilemma for inferentialists: on the first horn, inferentialism is committed to holding that agents have only alienated knowledge (...)
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  33. Self, Sense and Autonomy.Matthew Ian Harding - manuscript
    This study advances a refutation of Physicalism. It demonstrates that it cannot, coherently, be maintained. An alternative approach based on Husserl’s ‘transcendental ego’ is developed. This is an account where the physical world is constituted by a freely acting self from a phenomenology that is ontologically neutral. By doing so, the, so-called, ‘hard problem’ of consciousness is dissolved. It will be shown that the self is compelled to attribute moral and aesthetic value to the world that it has constituted. The (...)
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  34. The Self, Self-knowledge, and a Flattened Path to Self-improvement.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    This essay explores the connection between theories of the self and theories of self-knowledge, arguing (a) that empirical results strongly support a certain negative thesis about the self, a thesis about what the self isn’t, and (b) that a more promising account of the self makes available unorthodox – but likely apt – ways of characterizing self-knowledge. Regarding (a), I argue that the human self does not appear at a personal level the autonomous (or quasi-autonomous) status of which might provide (...)
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  35. Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.
    In this paper I aim to illuminate the significance of thought insertion for debates about the first-person concept. My starting point is the often-voiced contention that thought insertion might challenge the thesis that introspection-based self-ascriptions of psychological properties are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person concept. In the first part of the paper I explain what a thought insertion-based counterexample to this immunity thesis should be like. I then argue that various thought insertion-involving scenarios do not give (...)
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  36. Personal Identity and Self-Interpretation & Natural Right and Natural Emotions.Gabor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Toth (eds.) - 2020 - Budapest: Eötvös University Press.
    Collection of papers presented at the 2nd and 3rd Budapest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy.
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  37. Skill and Sensitivity to Reasons.Joshua Shepherd - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (3):669-681.
    In this paper I explore the relationship between skill and sensitivity to reasons for action. I want to know to what degree we can explain the fact that the skilled agent is very good at performing a cluster of actions within some domain in terms of the fact that the skilled agent has a refined sensitivity to the reasons for action common to the cluster. The picture is a little bit complex. While skill can be partially explained by sensitivity to (...)
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  38. The "Ten-Percent Brain Myth" guided with the Fundamentals of Jaina's Theory of Knowledge.Megha Arora - 2020 - International Journal of Psychosocial Rehabilitation 24 (08):5977-5982.
    Great religions to pragmatic capacities sporadically abound in the stories of supernatural phenomena which subsumes telepathy, clairvoyance and precognition. However, unfortunately treated as the topics of spiritualism, witchcraft and edification, not the materials of Scientific Enquiry. Whatsoever, have been deciphered about these queer speculations, the most prevalent sole concept is : namely, that there can be senseexperiences from the realm which is not accessible to human brain and sense organs. Possessor of these senses which are not currently accessible to average (...)
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  39. Warum ich weiß, dass ich kein Zombie bin.Thomas Grundmann - 2005 - In Albert Newen & Gottfried Vosgerau (eds.), Den eigenen Geist kennen. Paderborn: mentis. pp. 135-149.
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  40. Self-Referential Memory and Mental Time Travel.Jordi Fernández - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):283-300.
    Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology. One way to capture what is distinctive about it is by using the notion of mental time travel: When we remember some fact episodically, we mentally travel to the moment at which we experienced it in the past. This way of distinguishing episodic memory from semantic memory calls for an explanation of what the experience of mental time travel is. In this paper, I suggest that a certain view about the content of memories can (...)
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  41. Skeptical doubting and mindful self-reflection.Guido Melchior - 2013 - In Mind, Language and Action. Papers of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium. pp. 274-276.
    The skeptic argues that we cannot have any external world knowledge because we cannot know that we are not brains in a vat. The intuitive appeal of this skeptical argument is essentially based on the comprehensibility of the process of skeptical doubting, where we focus our attention on our experiences and experience-based beliefs and raise questions about the sources of these experiences. I propose that skeptical doubting is an instance of a mental attitude that contemporary psychology characterizes as mindfulness. I (...)
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  42. The Narrative Coherence Standard and Child Patients' Capacity to Consent.Gah-Kai Leung - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 11 (1):40-42.
    Aryeh Goldberg compellingly argues for a Narrative Coherence Standard (NCS) to bolster existing methods of assessing patients' mental capacity. But his account fails to distinguish between the cognitive abilities of children and adults; consequently, worries may be raised about the scope of the NCS, in particular when we consider child patients. In this article, I argue the NCS cannot plausibly apply to children. Since children's self-conception does not arrive fully formed — but rather is a product of both incomplete cognitive (...)
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  43. Memory: A Self-Referential Account.Jordi Fernández - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
    This book offers a philosophical account of memory. Memory is remarkably interesting from a philosophical point of view. Our memories interact with mental states of other types in a characteristic way. They also have some associated feelings that other mental states lack. Our memories are special in terms of their representational capacity too, since we can have memories of objective events, and we can have memories of our own past experiences. Finally, our memories are epistemically special, in that beliefs formed (...)
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  44. The functional character of memory.Jordi Fernandez - 2018 - In Dorothea Debus Kourken Michaelian (ed.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. London: pp. 52-72.
    The purpose of this chapter is to determine what is to remember something, as opposed to imagining it, perceiving it, or introspecting it. What does it take for a mental state to qualify as remembering, or having a memory of, something? The main issue to be addressed is therefore a metaphysical one. It is the issue of determining which features those mental states which qualify as memories typically enjoy, and those states which do not qualify as such typically lack. In (...)
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  45. Intentional objects of memory.Jordi Fernandez - 2017 - In Sven Bernecker & Kourken Michaelian (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory. London, UK: pp. 88-100.
    Memories are mental states with a number of interesting features. One of those features seems to be their having an intentional object. After all, we commonly say that memories are about things, and that a subject represents the world in a certain way by virtue of remembering something. It is unclear, however, what sorts of entities constitute the intentional objects of memory. In particular, it is not clear whether those are mind-independent entities in the world or whether they are mental (...)
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  46. Self-knowledge Of Beliefs Is Possible?Robson Barcelos - 2017 - FRONTISTÉS: Revista de Eletrônica Do Curso de Filosofia FAPAS 11 (20):1-7.
    This article is about self-knowledge on one's own mental states. Considering human as rational beings, this study aims to problematize the position of subject in process of self-knowledge, as well as to realize the state of knowledge about self-knowledge. In this way, Richard Moran constitutes the method of transparency about the knowledge of one's own mental states. Such a method receives some criticism from the philosopher Quassim Cassam and the philosopher Brie-Gertler. In the same extent, both authors problematize some characteristics (...)
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  47. Self-Knowledge and the possible moral consequences.Robson Barcelos - 2019 - Pólemos 8 (15):274-291.
    We are subject with consciousness. For this we have to have self-consciousness so that consciousness can exist. In this way, there is the possibility of self-knowledge of one's own mental states. Thus, the article aims at investigating the possibility of self-knowledge of one's own mental states, their applicability and consequences in relation to Kantian moral theory. Therefore, it reflects on how self-knowledge of one's own mental states and the characteristics of Kantian moral theory occur. Finally, there is the possibility of (...)
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  48. The Agential Point of View.Ben Sorgiovanni - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):549-572.
    Agentialist accounts of self-knowledge seek to do justice to the connection between our identities as rational agents and our capacity to know our own minds. There are two strategies that agentialists have employed in developing their position: substantive and non-substantive. My aim is to explicate and defend one particular example of the non-substantive strategy, namely, that proposed by Tyler Burge. In particular, my concern is to defend Burge's claim that critical reasoning requires a relation of normative directness between reviewing and (...)
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  49. In Defence of Bare Attention: A Phenomenological Interpretation of Mindfulness.J. Puc - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6):170-190.
    'Mindfulness' is arguably the most important concept to have transplanted from Buddhist thought to contemporary Western psychology. However, whilst mindfulness was already an ambiguous term in the original context, specified more by a set of practices than by a clear definition, its cross-cultural transmission has blurred its content even further. In this paper, I assess the recent criticism of the widespread definition of mindfulness as non-elaborative, purely receptive 'bare attention'. According to the critics of bare attention, what can be characterized (...)
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  50. The Self Shows Up in Experience.Matt Duncan - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):299-318.
    I can be aware of myself, and thereby come to know things about myself, in a variety of different ways. But is there some special way in which I—and only I—can learn about myself? Can I become aware of myself by introspecting? Do I somehow show up in my own conscious experiences? David Hume and most contemporary philosophers say no. They deny that the self shows up in experience. However, in this paper I appeal to research on schizophrenia—on thought insertion, (...)
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