View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

14 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. added 2019-06-06
    A Kantian Defense of Self‐Ownership.Robert S. Taylor - 2004 - Journal of Political Philosophy 12 (1):65-78.
    Many scholars, including G. A. Cohen, Daniel Attas, and George Brenkert, have denied that a Kantian defense of self-ownership is possible. Kant's ostensible hostility to self-ownership can be resolved, however, upon reexamination of the Groundwork and the Metaphysics of Morals. Moreover, two novel Kantian defenses of self-ownership (narrowly construed) can be devised. The first shows that maxims of exploitation and paternalism that violate self-ownership cannot be universalized, as this leads to contradictions in conception. The second shows that physical coercion against (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  2. added 2018-09-10
    Da impossibilidade de uma relação de self-ownership: o dualismo ontológico na ilusão da auto-propriedade.Diego Ramos Mileli - 2018 - Revista Trágica: Estudos de Filosofia da Imanência 11 (2):105-126.
    O conceito de self-ownership é frequentemente utilizado nos campos da Ética e da Filosofia Política para justificar ou negar a justeza de determinadas situações, atos ou práticas. As críticas a tal conceito são predominantemente focadas em seus corolários. No presente artigo a análise se concentra sobra as condições de possibilidade da existência de uma relação de propriedade de si mesmo – auto-propriedade – procurando-se demonstrar a impossibilidade de tal relação pela ausência de multiplicidade de elementos que possam constituir um proprietário (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2018-04-03
    Animals, Slaves, and Corporations: Analyzing Legal Thinghood.Visa A. J. Kurki - 2017 - German Law Journal 18 (5):1070-1090.
    The Article analyzes the notion of legal “thinghood” in the context of the person–thing bifurcation. In legal scholarship, there are numerous assumptions pertaining to this definition that are often not spelled out. In addition, one’s chosen definition of “thing” is often simply taken to be the correct one. The Article scrutinizes these assumptions and definitions. First, a brief history of the bifurcation is offered. Second, three possible definitions of “legal thing” are examined: Things as nonpersons, things as rights and duties, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2017-01-23
    The Separateness of Persons: A Moral Basis for a Public Justification Requirement.Jason Tyndal - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (3):491-505.
    In morally grounding a public justification requirement, public reason liberals frequently invoke the idea that persons should be construed as “free and equal.” But this tells us little with regard to what it is about us that makes us free or how a claim about our status as persons can ultimately ground a requirement of public justification. In light of this worry, I argue that a public justification requirement can be grounded in a Nozick-inspired argument from the separateness of persons (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2016-01-25
    The Double Nature of DNA: Reevaluating the Common Heritage Idea.Matthieu Queloz - 2016 - Journal of Political Philosophy 24 (1):47-66.
    DNA possesses a double nature: it is both an analog chemical compound and a digital carrier of information. By distinguishing these two aspects, this paper aims to reevaluate the legally and politically influential idea that the human genome forms part of the common heritage of mankind, an idea which is thought to conflict with the practice of patenting DNA. The paper explores the lines of reasoning that lead to the common heritage idea, articulates and motivates what emerges as the most (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. added 2014-07-18
    Propriété de soi et indifférence morale du rapport à soi.Nathalie Maillard Romagnoli - 2011 - Les ateliers de l'éthique/The Ethics Forum 6 (1):4-15.
    Je m’interroge dans cet article sur les implications du principe libertarien de la pleine propriété de soi sur la question du rapport moral à soi-même. À travers le principe de la pleine propriété de soi, les libertariens défendent la liberté entière de chacun de vivre comme il l’entend, pourvu que les droits des autres soient respectés. Apparemment, ce principe n’a pas grand-chose à nous dire sur ce que nous sommes moralement autorisés à nous faire à nous-mêmes ou non. Certains libertariens, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2014-05-07
    Providing for Rights.Donald C. Hubin & Mark B. Lambeth - 1988 - Dialogue 27 (3):489-.
    Gauthier's version of the Lockean proviso (in Morals by Agreement) is inappropriate as the foundation for moral rights he takes it to be. This is so for a number of reasons. It lacks any proportionality test thus allowing arbitrarily severe harms to others to prevent trivial harms to oneself. It allows one to inflict any harm on another provided that if one did not do so, someone else would. And, by interpreting the notion of bettering or worsening one's position in (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  8. added 2013-11-04
    'Privacy, Private Property and Collective Property'.Annabelle Lever - 2012 - The Good Society 21 (1):47-60.
    This article is part of a symposium on property-owning democracy. In A Theory of Justice John Rawls argued that people in a just society would have rights to some forms of personal property, whatever the best way to organise the economy. Without being explicit about it, he also seems to have believed that protection for at least some forms of privacy are included in the Basic Liberties, to which all are entitled. Thus, Rawls assumes that people are entitled to form (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  9. added 2013-10-25
    Det vi eide førfast eiendom. Hugo Grotius og suum (What We Own Before Property: Hugo Grotius and the suum).Alejandra Mancilla - 2013 - Arr, Idéhistorisk Tiddskrift 3:3-14.
    At the basis of modern natural law theories, the concept of the suum, or what belongs to the person (in Latin, his, her, its, their own), has received little scholarly attention despite its importance both in explaining and justifying not only the genealogy of property, but also that of morality and war.1 In this paper I examine Hugo Grotius's what it is, what things it includes, what rights it gives rise to and how it is extended in the transition from (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. added 2013-10-25
    Samuel Pufendorf and the Right of Necessity.Alejandra Mancilla - 2012 - Aporia 3:47-64.
    From the end of the twelfth century until the middle of the eighteenth century, the concept of a right of necessity –i.e. the moral prerogative of an agent, given certain conditions, to use or take someone else’s property in order to get out of his plight– was common among moral and political philosophers, who took it to be a valid exception to the standard moral and legal rules. In this essay, I analyze Samuel Pufendorf’s account of such a right, founded (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2013-04-14
    Self-Ownership and the Conflation Problem.David Sobel - forthcoming - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
    Libertarian self-ownership views in the tradition of Locke, Nozick, and the left-libertarians have supposed that we enjoy very powerful deontological protections against infringing upon our property. Such a conception makes sense when we are focused on property that is very important to its owner, such as a person’s kidney. However, this stringency of our property rights is harder to credit when we consider more trivial infringements such as very mildly toxic pollution or trivial risks such having planes fly overhead. Maintaining (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. added 2013-03-05
    A Critique of Lester's Account of Liberty.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Libertarian Papers 5:45-66.
    In Escape from Leviathan, Jan Lester sets out a conception of liberty as absence of imposed cost which, he says, advances no moral claim and does not premise an assignm..
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  13. added 2009-07-28
    Self-Ownership and Transplantable Human Organs.Robert S. Taylor - 2007 - Public Affairs Quarterly 21 (1):89-107.
    Philosophers have given sustained attention to the controversial possibility of (legal) markets in transplantable human organs. Most of this discussion has focused on whether such markets would enhance or diminish autonomy, understood in either the personal sense or the Kantian moral sense. What this discussion has lacked is any consideration of the relationship between self-ownership and such markets. This paper examines the implications of the most prominent and defensible conception of self-ownership--control self-ownership (CSO)--for both market and nonmarket organ-allocation mechanisms. The (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. added 2009-07-28
    Self-Ownership and the Limits of Libertarianism.Robert S. Taylor - 2005 - Social Theory and Practice 31 (4):465-482.
    In the longstanding debate between liberals and libertarians over the morality of redistributive labor taxation, liberals such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin have consistently taken the position that such taxation is perfectly compatible with individual liberty, whereas libertarians such as Robert Nozick and Murray Rothbard have adopted the (very) contrary position that such taxation is tantamount to slavery. In this paper, I argue that the debate over redistributive labor taxation can be usefully reconstituted as a debate over the incidents (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations