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  1. Problemas interpretativos de la definición estoica de representación cognitiva.Christian Pineda - 2024 - Nova Tellus 42 (1):63-91.
    Abstract: This paper aims to establish the problems of the Stoic concept of cognitive representation (καταληπτική φαντασία). So I intend to reconstruct the scholarly debate on this definition. For it, I state the debate around its two most conflictive terms: the participle ὑπάρχον and the preposition ἀπό. By analyzing the Stoic fragments in which these terms appear, I explore both textual and philosophical arguments in order to find the different senses of both. By doing so, my aim is highlighting the (...)
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  2. Misprinted Representations in Stoicism.Christian Pineda - 2023 - Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 56 (2):325-351.
    This paper deals with the Stoic concept of misprinted representation (φαντασία παρατυπωτική), which has received little attention compared to other concepts of Stoic epistemology and philosophy of mind. I aim at showing that a better understanding of this concept is important for grasping some elements of the Stoic account of mental representations that have been ignored or misunderstood in modern Stoic scholarship. First, by clarifying the status of the misprinted representation as a genuine representation, we can understand what it means (...)
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  3. Affekt und Wille. Senecas Ethik und ihre handlungspsychologische Fundierung.Stefan Röttig - 2022 - Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter.
    In the 89th letter to Lucilius Seneca divides philosophy into three parts, namely ethics, physics, and logic. As philosophy in general he also divides its ethical parts into three parts: the first one has to do with value judgments, the second with impulses, and the third with actions. But instead of characterizing each of these parts and giving an overview of their contents he rather describes an ideal action: first, one makes a correct value judgment, then, one initiates a regulated (...)
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  4. The Stoic Appeal to Expertise: Platonic Echoes in the Reply to Indistinguishability.Simon Shogry - 2021 - Apeiron 54 (2):129-159.
    One Stoic response to the skeptical indistinguishability argument is that it fails to account for expertise: the Stoics allow that while two similar objects create indistinguishable appearances in the amateur, this is not true of the expert, whose appearances succeed in discriminating the pair. This paper re-examines the motivations for this Stoic response, and argues that it reveals the Stoic claim that, in generating a kataleptic appearance, the perceiver’s mind is active, insofar as it applies concepts matching the perceptual stimulus. (...)
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  5. Demonstration and the Indemonstrability of the Stoic Indemonstrables.Susanne Bobzien - 2020 - Phronesis 65 (3):355-378.
    Since Mates’ seminal Stoic Logic there has been uncertainty and debate about how to treat the term anapodeiktos when used of Stoic syllogisms. This paper argues that the customary translation of anapodeiktos by ‘indemonstrable’ is accurate, and it explains why this is so. At the heart of the explanation is an argument that, contrary to what is commonly assumed, indemonstrability is rooted in the generic account of the Stoic epistemic notion of demonstration. Some minor insights into Stoic logic ensue.
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  6. What do our impressions say? The Stoic theory of perceptual content and belief formation.Simon Shogry - 2019 - Apeiron 52 (1):29-63.
    Here I propose an interpretation of the ancient Stoic psychological theory on which (i) the concepts that an adult human possesses affect the content of the perceptual impressions (φαντασίαι αἰσθητικαί) she forms, and (ii) the content of such impressions is exhausted by an ‘assertible’ (ἀξίωμα) of suitable complexity. What leads the Stoics to accept (i) and (ii), I argue, is their theory of assent and belief formation, which requires that the perceptual impression communicate information suitable to serve as the content (...)
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  7. Creating a Mind Fit for Truth.Simon Shogry - 2018 - Ancient Philosophy 38 (2):357-381.
    This paper offers a new defense of the externalist interpretation of the kataleptic impression. My strategy is to situate the kataleptic impression within the larger context of the Stoic account of expertise. I argue that, given mastery in recognizing the limitations of her own state of mind, the subject can restrict her assent to kataleptic impressions, even if they are phenomenologically indistinguishable from those which are not kataleptic.
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  8. Rational Impressions and the Stoic Philosophy of Mind.Vanessa de Harven - 2017 - In John Sisko (ed.), in History of Philosophy of Mind: Pre-Socratics to Augustine. Acumen Publishing. pp. 215-35.
    This paper seeks to elucidate the distinctive nature of the rational impression on its own terms, asking precisely what it means for the Stoics to define logikē phantasia as an impression whose content is expressible in language. I argue first that impression, generically, is direct and reflexive awareness of the world, the way animals get information about their surroundings. Then, that the rational impression, specifically, is inherently conceptual, inferential, and linguistic, i.e. thick with propositional content, the way humans receive incoming (...)
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  9. The legend of the justified true belief analysis.Julien Dutant - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.
    There is a traditional conception of knowledge but it is not the Justified True Belief analysis Gettier attacked. On the traditional view, knowledge consists in having a belief that bears a discernible mark of truth. A mark of truth is a truth-entailing property: a property that only true beliefs can have. It is discernible if one can always tell that a belief has it, that is, a sufficiently attentive subject believes that a belief has it if and only if it (...)
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  10. The Stoic Account of Apprehension.Tamer Nawar - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-21.
    This paper examines the Stoic account of apprehension (κατάληψις) (a cognitive achievement similar to how we typically view knowledge). Following a seminal article by Michael Frede (1983), it is widely thought that the Stoics maintained a purely externalist causal account of apprehension wherein one may apprehend only if one stands in an appropriate causal relation to the object apprehended. An important but unanswered challenge to this view has been offered by David Sedley (2002) who offers reasons to suppose that the (...)
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  11. From Skepticism to Paralysis.Suzanne Obdrzalek - 2012 - Ancient Philosophy 32 (2):369-392.
    This paper analyzes the apraxia argument in Cicero’s Academica. It proposes that the argument assumes two modes: the evidential mode maintains that skepticism is false, while the pragmatic claims that it is disadvantageous. The paper then develops a tension between the two modes, and concludes by exploring some differences between ancient and contemporary skepticism.
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  12. Socrates in the Stoa.Eric Brown - 2005 - In Sara Ahbel‐Rappe & Rachana Kamtekar (eds.), A Companion to Socrates. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 275-284.
    I show how the familiar Stoic paradoxes were developed by reflecting on Socrates.
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  13. Reasonable Impressions in Stoicism.Tad Brennan - 1996 - Phronesis 41 (3):318-334.
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