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  1. added 2020-07-08
    Review of "Truth". [REVIEW]Benjamin W. Jarvis - 2013 - Essays in Philosophy 14 (2):13.
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  2. added 2020-07-06
    Theories of Truth for Countable Languages Which Conform to Classical Logic.Seppo Heikkilä - forthcoming - Nonlinear Studies.
    Every countable language which conforms to classical logic is shown to have an extension which has a consistent definitional theory of truth. That extension has a consistent semantical theory of truth, if every sentence of the object language is valuated by its meaning either as true or as false. These theories contain both a truth predicate and a non-truth predicate. Theories are equivalent when sentences of the object lqanguage are valuated by their meanings.
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  3. added 2020-06-30
    Tarski Undefinability Theorem Terse Refutation.P. Olcott - manuscript
    Both Tarski and Gödel “prove” that provability can diverge from Truth. When we boil their claim down to its simplest possible essence it is really claiming that valid inference from true premises might not always derive a true consequence. This is obviously impossible.
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  4. added 2020-06-30
    Refuting Incompleteness and Undefinability.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    Within the (Haskell Curry) notion of a formal system we complete Tarski's formal correctness: ∀x True(x) ↔ ⊢ x and use this finally formalized notion of Truth to refute his own Undefinability Theorem (based on the Liar Paradox), the Liar Paradox, and the (Panu Raatikainen) essence of the conclusion of the 1931 Incompleteness Theorem.
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  5. added 2020-06-30
    Tarski’s Convention T: Condition Beta.John Corcoran - forthcoming - South American Journal of Logic 1 (1).
    Tarski’s Convention T—presenting his notion of adequate definition of truth (sic)—contains two conditions: alpha and beta. Alpha requires that all instances of a certain T Schema be provable. Beta requires in effect the provability of ‘every truth is a sentence’. Beta formally recognizes the fact, repeatedly emphasized by Tarski, that sentences (devoid of free variable occurrences)—as opposed to pre-sentences (having free occurrences of variables)—exhaust the range of significance of is true. In Tarski’s preferred usage, it is part of the meaning (...)
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  6. added 2020-06-30
    Two-Method Errors: Having It Both Ways.John Corcoran & Idris Samawi Hamid - forthcoming - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic.
    ►JOHN CORCORAN AND IDRIS SAMAWI HAMID, Two-method errors: having it both ways. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA E-mail: corcoran@buffalo.edu Philosophy, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523-1781 USA E-mail: ishamid@colostate.edu Where two methods produce similar results, mixing the two sometimes creates errors we call two-method errors, TMEs: in style, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, implicature, logic, or action. This lecture analyzes examples found in technical and in non-technical contexts. One can say “Abe knows whether Ben draws” in two other (...)
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  7. added 2020-06-30
    Lies, Half-Truths, and Falsehoods About Tarski’s 1933 “Liar” Antinomies.John Corcoran & Joaquin Miller - 2012 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (1):140-141.
    We discuss misinformation about “the liar antinomy” with special reference to Tarski’s 1933 truth-definition paper [1]. Lies are speech-acts, not merely sentences or propositions. Roughly, lies are statements of propositions not believed by their speakers. Speakers who state their false beliefs are often not lying. And speakers who state true propositions that they don’t believe are often lying—regardless of whether the non-belief is disbelief. Persons who state propositions on which they have no opinion are lying as much as those who (...)
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  8. added 2020-06-30
    CORCORAN REVIEWS THE 4 VOLUMES OF TARSKI's COLLECTED PAPERS.John Corcoran - 1991 - MATHEMATICAL REVIEWS 91 (I):110-114.
    CORCORAN REVIEWS THE 4 VOLUMES OF TARSKI’S COLLECTED PAPERS Alfred Tarski (1901--1983) is widely regarded as one of the two giants of twentieth-century logic and also as one of the four greatest logicians of all time (Aristotle, Frege and Gödel being the other three). Of the four, Tarski was the most prolific as a logician. The four volumes of his collected papers, which exclude most of his 19 monographs, span over 2500 pages. Aristotle's writings are comparable in volume, but most (...)
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  9. added 2020-06-27
    Defining Gödel Incompleteness Away.P. Olcott - manuscript
    We can simply define Gödel 1931 Incompleteness away by redefining the meaning of the standard definition of Incompleteness: A theory T is incomplete if and only if there is some sentence φ such that (T ⊬ φ) and (T ⊬ ¬φ). This definition construes the existence of self-contradictory expressions in a formal system as proof that this formal system is incomplete because self-contradictory expressions are neither provable nor disprovable in this formal system. Since self-contradictory expressions are neither provable nor disprovable (...)
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  10. added 2019-10-13
    Truth and Theories of Truth.Panu Raatikainen - forthcoming - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press.
    The concept of truth and competing philosophical theories on what truth amounts to have an important place in contemporary philosophy. The aim of this chapter is to give a synopsis of different theories of truth and the particular philosophical issues related to the concept of truth. The literature on this topic is vast, and we must necessarily be rather selective and very brief about complex questions of interpretation of various philosophers. The focus of the chapter is mainly on selected systematic (...)
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  11. added 2019-09-17
    La Forma della Verità. Logica e filosofia nell'opera di Alfred Tarski.Ciro De Florio - 2013 - Italy: Mimesis.
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  12. added 2019-04-19
    Eliminating Undecidability and Incompleteness in Formal Systems.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    To eliminate incompleteness, undecidability and inconsistency from formal systems we only need to convert the formal proofs to theorem consequences of symbolic logic to conform to the sound deductive inference model. -/- Within the sound deductive inference model there is a (connected sequence of valid deductions from true premises to a true conclusion) thus unlike the formal proofs of symbolic logic provability cannot diverge from truth.
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  13. added 2018-09-20
    Truth & Transcendence: Turning the Tables on the Liar Paradox.Gila Sher - 2017 - In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 281-306.
    Confronting the Liar Paradox is commonly viewed as a prerequisite for developing a theory of truth. In this paper I turn the tables on this traditional conception of the relation between the two. The theorist of truth need not constrain his search for a “material” theory of truth, i.e., a theory of the philosophical nature of truth, by committing himself to one solution or another to the Liar Paradox. If he focuses on the nature of truth (leaving issues of formal (...)
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  14. added 2017-10-17
    Horsten, Leon, The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth, MIT Press, 2011. [REVIEW]Jan Heylen - 2012 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 74 (2):377-379.
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  15. added 2017-02-27
    Ordinary Truth in Tarski and Næss.Joseph Ulatowski - 2016 - In Adrian Kuzniar & Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska (eds.), Uncovering Facts and Values. Brill. pp. 67-90.
    Alfred Tarski seems to endorse a partial conception of truth, the T-schema, which he believes might be clarified by the application of empirical methods, specifically citing the experimental results of Arne Næss (1938a). The aim of this paper is to argue that Næss’ empirical work confirmed Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, among others. In the first part, I lay out the case for believing that Tarski’s T-schema, while not the formal and generalizable Convention-T, provides a partial account of truth that (...)
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  16. added 2016-05-18
    Truth-Makers and Convention T.Jan Woleński - 2011 - Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan.
    This papers discuss the place, if any, of Convention T (the condition of material adequacy of the proper definition of truth formulated by Tarski) in the truth-makers account offered by Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith. It is argued that although Tarski’s requirement seems entirely acceptable in the frameworks of truth-makers theories for the first-sight, several doubts arise under a closer inspection. In particular, T-biconditionals have no clear meaning as sentences about truth-makers. Thus, truth-makers theory cannot be considered as (...)
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  17. added 2016-04-01
    How Tarski Defined the Undefinable.Cezary Cieśliński - 2015 - European Review 23 (01):139 - 149.
    This paper describes Tarski’s project of rehabilitating the notion of truth, previously considered dubious by many philosophers. The project was realized by providing a formal truth definition, which does not employ any problematic concept.
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  18. added 2015-09-01
    Tarskian Truth and the Two Provinces of Semantics.Ricardo Santos - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):26-37.
    In this paper, I argue that the cleavage between the theory of reference and the theory of meaning, which under the influence of Quine has dominated a large part of the philosophy of language of the last fifty years, is based on a misrepresentation of Tarski's achievement and on an overestimation of the scope and value of disquotation. In particular, I show that, if we accept Davidson's critique of disquotation, the same kind of reasons that Quine offered in opposition to (...)
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  19. added 2015-04-25
    What Is a Tarskian Definition of Truth?Manuel García-Carpintero - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (2):113 - 144.
    Since the publication of Hartry Field’s influential paper “Tarski’s Theory of Truth” there has been an ongoing discussion about the philosophical import of Tarski’s definition. Most of the arguments have aimed to play down that import, starting with that of Field himself. He interpreted Tarski as trying to provide a physicalistic reduction of semantic concepts like truth, and concluded that Tarski had partially failed. Robert Stalnaker and Scott Soames claimed then that Field should have obtained a stronger conclusion, namely that (...)
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  20. added 2014-04-02
    Putting the World Back Into Semantics.Barry Smith - 1993 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 44 (1):91-109.
    To what in reality do the logically simple sentences with empirical content correspond? Two extreme positions can be distinguished in this regard: 'Great Fact' theories, such as are defended by Davidson; and trope-theories, which see such sentences being made the simply by those events or states to which the relevant main verbs correspond. A position midway between these two extremes is defended, one according to which sentences of the given sort are made tme by what are called 'dependence structures', or (...)
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  21. added 2014-03-19
    More on Putnam and Tarski.Panu Raatikainen - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):37 - 47.
    Hilary Putnam's famous arguments criticizing Tarski's theory of truth are evaluated. It is argued that they do not succeed to undermine Tarski's approach. One of the arguments is based on the problematic idea of a false instance of T-schema. The other ignores various issues essential for Tarski's setting such as language-relativity of truth definition.
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  22. added 2014-03-15
    The Semantic Theory of Truth: Field’s Incompleteness Objection.Glen A. Hoffmann - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (2):161-170.
    According to Field’s influential incompleteness objection, Tarski’s semantic theory of truth is unsatisfactory since the definition that forms its basis is incomplete in two distinct senses: (1) it is physicalistically inadequate, and for this reason, (2) it is conceptually deficient. In this paper, I defend the semantic theory of truth against the incompleteness objection by conceding (1) but rejecting (2). After arguing that Davidson and McDowell’s reply to the incompleteness objection fails to pass muster, I argue that, within the constraints (...)
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  23. added 2013-11-23
    El problema metafísico de la verdad.Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2000 - Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofia 26 (2):351-59.
    In this paper I present what I call the 'Metaphysical Problem of Truth', which consists in explaining in virtue of what all true sentences are true, and argue that a version of the Correspondence Theory of Truth is the most plausible solution to this problem.
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  24. added 2012-12-05
    Truth, Reference, and Realism: Putnam's Challenge.Allen Porter - manuscript
    The question of truth is perhaps a perennial question of philosophy. Is truth “merely” epistemological, a function of contingent human practices and conventions, or should we adopt a stonger, metaphysical conception of truth along realist lines, understood as correspondence with objectively existing reality? In this paper I examine a famous debate in the analytic philosophy of language that hinges on the status of truth – specifically, the challenge to traditional or metaphysical realism posed by Hilary Putnam’s model-theoretic argument and the (...)
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  25. added 2012-10-14
    Formulating Deflationism.Arvid Båve - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3287-3305.
    I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely, the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, <p> is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably, Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In particular, I argue (...)
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  26. added 2012-10-14
    Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer.Arvid Båve - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.
    The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who take propositions as primary, (...)
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  27. added 2011-07-13
    Truth, Correspondence, Models, and Tarski.Panu Raatikainen - 2007 - In Approaching Truth: Essays in Honour of Ilkka Niiniluoto. London: College Press. pp. 99-112.
    In the early 20th century, scepticism was common among philosophers about the very meaningfulness of the notion of truth – and of the related notions of denotation, definition etc. (i.e., what Tarski called semantical concepts). Awareness was growing of the various logical paradoxes and anomalies arising from these concepts. In addition, more philosophical reasons were being given for this aversion.1 The atmosphere changed dramatically with Alfred Tarski’s path-breaking contribution. What Tarski did was to show that, assuming that the syntax of (...)
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  28. added 2011-07-13
    Brentano's Criticism of the Correspondence Conception of Truth and Tarski's Semantic Theory.Jan Woleński - 1989 - Topoi 8 (2):105-110.
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  29. added 2008-12-31
    Truth, Meaning, and Translation.Panu Raatikainen - 2008 - In Douglas Patterson (ed.), New essays on Tarski and philosophy. O.University Press. pp. 247.
    Philosopher’s judgements on the philosophical value of Tarski’s contributions to the theory of truth have varied. For example Karl Popper, Rudolf Carnap, and Donald Davidson have, in their different ways, celebrated Tarski’s achievements and have been enthusiastic about their philosophical relevance. Hilary Putnam, on the other hand, pronounces that “[a]s a philosophical account of truth, Tarski’s theory fails as badly as it is possible for an account to fail.” Putnam has several alleged reasons for his dissatisfaction,1 but one of them, (...)
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