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  1. added 2019-01-23
    Explaining Free Will.Michael Elstob - 2018 - Chesham, UK: C. M. Elstob. Printed and distributed by Amazon.
    A new approach using independence indeterminism, a novel naturalistic metaphysics for an open creative universe. -/- The problem of free will - what exactly it is, whether it is required for us to be morally responsible for our actions, and whether any natural being can possibly possess it - has remained unresolved for over 2000 years. -/- Now, starting from the very widely held belief that most change takes place in a way that is independent of how most other change (...)
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  2. added 2018-06-12
    Changing Our Minds: Democritus on What is Up to Us.Monte Johnson - 2014 - In Pierre Destrée, R. Salles & Marco Antonio De Zingano (eds.), Up to Us: Studies on Causality and Responsibility in Ancient Philosophy. Sankt Augustin: Academia Verlag. pp. 1-18.
    I develop a positive interpretation of Democritus' theory of agency and responsibility, building on previous studies that have already gone far in demonstrating his innovativeness and importance to the history and philosophy of these concepts. The interpretation will be defended by a synthesis of several familiar ethical fragments and maxims presented in the framework of an ancient problem that, unlike the problem of free will and determinism, Democritus almost certainly did confront: the problem of the causes of human goodness and (...)
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  3. added 2018-03-16
    A Deterministic Model of the Free Will Phenomenon.Mark Hadley - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 8 (1):1-19.
    The abstract concept of indeterministic free will is distinguished from the phenomenon of free will. Evidence for the abstract concept is examined and critically compared with various designs of automata. It is concluded that there is no evidence to support the abstract concept of indeterministic free will, it is inconceivable that a test could be constructed to distinguish an indeterministic agent from a complicated automaton. Testing the free will of an alien visitor is introduced to separate prejudices about who has (...)
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  4. added 2018-02-16
    Hard-Incompatibilist Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - In Gregg D. Caruso & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    As philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism continue to gain traction, we are likely to see a fundamental shift in the way people think about free will and moral responsibility. Such shifts raise important practical and existential concerns: What if we came to disbelieve in free will? What would this mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as human beings? Would it cause nihilism and despair as some (...)
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  5. added 2017-12-29
    On Flew’s Compatibilism and His Objections to Theistic Libertarianism.Hakan Gundogdu - 2015 - Kaygı Uludağ University Faculty of Arts and Sciences Journal of Philosophy 25:115-142.
    Flew strongly defends a compatibilist thesis in the free will debate before going on to totally object to theistic libertarianism. His objections basically rely on his compatibilism embracing the notion of agent causation, which is not very common in compatibilist theses. Since he is a strong proponent of ordinary language philosophy, he also holds that linguistic analyses can certainly solve the free will problem as well as many other problems of philosophy. In doing so, he first uses the paradigm cases (...)
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  6. added 2017-09-18
    Free Will, Agent Causation, and “Disappearing Agents”.Randolph Clarke - 2017 - Noûs.
    A growing number of philosophers now hold that agent causation is required for agency, or free will, or moral responsibility. To clarify what is at issue, this paper begins with a distinction between agent causation that is ontologically fundamental and agent causation that is reducible to or realized in causation by events or states. It is widely accepted that agency presents us with the latter; the view in question claims a need for the former. The paper then examines a “disappearing (...)
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  7. added 2017-07-29
    Aquinas on Free Will and Intellectual Determinism.Tobias Hoffmann & Cyrille Michon - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.
    From the early reception of Thomas Aquinas up to the present, many have interpreted his theory of liberum arbitrium to imply intellectual determinism: we do not control our choices, because we do not control the practical judgments that cause our choices. In this paper we argue instead that he rejects determinism in general and intellectual determinism in particular, which would effectively destroy liberum arbitrium as he conceives of it. We clarify that for Aquinas moral responsibility presupposes liberum arbitrium and thus (...)
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  8. added 2017-04-17
    Descartes on Free Will and Moral Possibility.Brian Embry - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:380-398.
    An early modern scholastic conception of moral possibility helps make sense of Descartes's own perplexing use of that concept and solves the exegetical puzzles surrounding Descartes's conflicting remarks about free will.
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  9. added 2016-12-08
    Mind-Body problemets olösbarhet frigör viljan.Jan Scheffel - manuscript
    Mind-body problemet analyseras i ett reduktionistiskt perspektiv. Genom att kombinera emergensbegreppet med algoritmisk informationsteori visas i ett tankeexperiment att ett starkt epistemiskt emergent system kan konstrueras utifrån en relativt enkel, ickelinjär process. En jämförelse med hjärnans avsevärt mer komplexa neurala nätverk visar att även medvetandet kan karakteriseras som starkt epistemiskt emergent. Därmed är reduktionistisk förståelse av medvetandet inte möjlig; mind-body problemet har alltså inte en reduktionistisk lösning. Medvetandets ontologiskt emergenta karaktär kan därefter konstateras utifrån en kombinatorisk analys; det är därmed (...)
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  10. added 2016-12-08
    Reasons, Causes, and Chance-Incompatibilism.Markus Schlosser - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):335–347.
    Libertarianism appears to be incoherent, because free will appears to be incompatible with indeterminism. In support of this claim, van Inwagen offered an argument that is now known as the “rollback argument”. In a recent reply, Lara Buchak has argued that the underlying thought experiment fails to support the first of two key premises. On her view, this points to an unexplored alternative in the free will debate, which she calls “chance-incompatibilism”. I will argue that the rollback thought experiment does (...)
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  11. added 2016-10-13
    Molinism and Theological Compatibilism.Christoph Jäger - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):71-92.
    In a series of recent papers John Martin Fischer argues that the Molinist solution to the problem of reconciling divine omniscience with human freedom does not offer such a solution at all. Instead, he maintains, Molina simply presupposes theological compatibilism. However, Fischer construes the problem in terms of sempiternalist omniscience, whereas classical Molinism adopts atemporalism. I argue that, moreover, an atemporalist reformulation of Fischer’s argument designed to show that Molinism is not even consistent is unsuccessful as well, since it employs (...)
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  12. added 2016-07-31
    Freedom and Thought.Michael Bourke - 2016 - Modern Horizons:1-22.
    Despite recent neuroscientific research purporting to reveal that free will is an illusion, this paper will argue that agency is an inescapable feature of rationality and thought. My aim will not be to address the methodology or interpretation of such research, which I will only mention in passing. Rather, I will examine a collection of basic concepts which are presupposed by thought, and propose that these concepts are interrelated in ways that makes them both basic and irreducibly complex. The collection (...)
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  13. added 2016-06-01
    What If Every Subconscious Brain Module is Really an Independent Consciousness?Robert Vermeulen - manuscript
    What if subconscious brain processes are actually independent consciousnesses, each resembling an independent advisor whispering advice to the main consciousness, or “I”? This multi-consciousness model would support free will, as our choices are informed by other consciousnesses, not the subconscious. Each independent consciousness allows a movable perspective through its rich representation of the world and constantly seeks harmony and resonance between its internal concepts, other consciousnesses, external reality, and the genetic worm hole to the evolutionary past.
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  14. added 2016-05-05
    Evolution Beyond Determinism - on Dennett's Compatibilism and the Too Timeless Free Will Debate.Maria Brincker - 2015 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 3 (1):39-74.
    Most of the free will debate operates under the assumption that classic determinism and indeterminism are the only metaphysical options available. Through an analysis of Dennett’s view of free will as gradually evolving this article attempts to point to emergentist, interactivist and temporal metaphysical options, which have been left largely unexplored by contemporary theorists. Whereas, Dennett himself holds that “the kind of free will worth wanting” is compatible with classic determinism, I propose that his models of determinism fit poorly with (...)
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  15. added 2015-09-26
    Kane is Not Able: A Reply to Vicens' 'Self-Forming Actions and Conflicts of Intention'.Gregg Caruso - 2015 - Southwest Philosophy Review 31 (2):21-26.
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  16. added 2015-08-29
    The Idea of Will.M. M. Dorenbosch - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 6 (7):449-472.
    This article presents a new conceptual view on the conscious will. This new concept approaches our will from the perspective of the requirements of our neural-muscular system and not from our anthropocentric perspective. This approach not only repositions the will at the core of behavior control, it also integrates the studies of Libet and Wegner, which seem to support the opposite. The will does not return as an instrument we use to steer, but rather as part of the way we (...)
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  17. added 2015-08-26
    Responses.Helen Steward - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (6):681-706.
    As the author of A Metaphysics for Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), I respond to each of the preceding eight papers in this Special Issue.
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  18. added 2015-03-21
    The Embodied and Social Dimensions of Free Will: The Value of Phenomenology.Andreas Elpidorou - 2015 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 6 (2):23-24.
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  19. added 2015-01-16
    On Free Will and on the Nature of Philosophy.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 2015 - Iyyun 64:89-96.
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  20. added 2014-11-20
    Man as Trinity of Body, Spirit, and Soul.Marcoen J. T. F. Cabbolet - manuscript
    Although there are several monistic and dualistic approaches to the mind-body problem on the basis of classical or quantum mechanics, thus far no consensus exists about a solution. Recently, the Elementary Process Theory (EPT) has been developed: this corresponds with a fundamentally new disciplinary matrix for the study of physical reality. The purpose of the present research was to investigate the mind-body problem within this newly developed disciplinary matrix. The main finding is that the idea of a duality of body (...)
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  21. added 2014-08-04
    Review of Heidi M. Ravven, The Self Beyond Itself: An Alternative History of Ethics, the New Brain Sciences, and the Myth of Free Will. [REVIEW]Fritz J. McDonald - 2014 - Neuroethics 7 (2):251-252.
    The Self Beyond Itself is a defense of an incompatibilist, hard determinist view of free will. Free will is here defined in a very strong sense, as the existence of actions that do not result from any causes other than the agent herself. The question of how to define free will, especially whether it consists in the ability to do otherwise, and what the ability to do otherwise amounts to, is not given much consideration in this book.Ravven frames her work (...)
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  22. added 2014-06-24
    Die Erschaffung der Realität.Claus Janew - 1998 - Dresden, Germany: Sumari-Verlag.
    The main argument in this book is the undeniable openness of every system to the unknown. And the fundamental question goes: What does this openness produce? We are a part of the infinite universe and an incorporation of its wholeness. Both for us means an individualized reality, through which the universe expresses itself and on the other hand through which it is built up with. It also means our necessity, importance and indestructibility for the sum of its incorporations. Most connections (...)
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  23. added 2014-06-23
    A Case Against the Contemporary Taxonomy of Views on the Metaphysics of Freedom. Berkeley's Account of Free Will and Agency.Daniele Bertini - 2011 - Dialegesthai.
    My paper provides a preliminary work towards a theory of freedom and agency which I name "Theory of Procedural Agency (TPA)". Since TPA relies on intuitions which can not be settled into the metaphysical framework of contemporary approaches to freedom and agency, I focus on some reasons which explain why these intuitions should be preferred to the competing ones. My strategy is to argue for my view defending an embryonal version of TPA, that is Berkeley's considerations on free will, agency (...)
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  24. added 2014-06-04
    Dialogue on Alternating Consciousness: From Perception to Infinities and Back to Free Will.Claus Janew - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 5 (4):351-391.
    Can we trace back consciousness, reality, awareness, and free will to a single basic structure without giving up any of them? Can the universe exist in both real and individual ways without being composed of both? This dialogue founds consciousness and freedom of choice on the basis of a new reality concept that also includes the infinite as far as we understand it. Just the simplest distinction contains consciousness. It is not static, but a constant alternation of perspectives. From its (...)
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  25. added 2014-03-20
    Anticipatory Consciousness, Libet's Veto and a Close-Enough Theory of Free Will.Azim F. Shariff & Jordan B. Peterson - 2005 - In Ralph D. Ellis & Natika Newton (eds.), Consciousness & Emotion: Agency, Conscious Choice, and Selective Perception. John Benjamins.
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  26. added 2014-03-06
    What Should a Powers-Based Theory of Free Will Be About?Ruth Groff - manuscript
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  27. added 2014-01-27
    Hegel sobre la posibilidad ontológica del libre albedrío y su realización efectiva en el Sistema del Derecho.Hector Ferreiro - 2013 - In Silvia del Luján Di Sanza & Diana María López (eds.), El vuelo del búho: Estudios sobre filosofía del idealismo. Buenos Aires: Prometeo. pp. 153-170.
    El concepto de libertad suele identificarse con el de la capacidad de elección, es decir, con el libre albedrío. La doctrina de la libertad queda con esto básicamente reducida a la discusión de la cuestión de si en un mundo que se presenta como un entramado de procesos causales al infinito el hombre es capaz de causar algo por sí mismo, esto es, en otros términos, de si el acto de elección puede ser un acontecimiento independiente de aquel entramado, en (...)
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  28. added 2014-01-26
    La tercera antinomia de la razón pura su crítica y resolución en el Sistema de Hegel.Hector Ferreiro - 2009 - In Diana López (ed.), Experiencia y límite. Kant Kolloquium (1804-2004). Santa Fe: Ediciones de la Universidad Nacional del Litoral. pp. 195-207.
    Bajo la forma de la tercera antinomia de la razón pura, Kant asume y reformula la tradicional contraposición entre necesidad natural y libertad humana: si el universo de las cosas sensibles está exhaustivamente regido por la causalidad, no hay lugar allí para la libertad humana entendida como auto-determinación. Kant intenta evitar este corolario sustentando la posibilidad de la libertad a nivel de la cosa en sí. Hegel critica la esterilidad de esta solución y propone en su lugar una particular concepción (...)
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  29. added 2013-06-15
    Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will.Benjamin Vilhauer - 2008 - In Pablo Muchnik (ed.), Incompatibilism and Ontological Priority in Kant's Theory of Free Will.
    This paper concerns the role of the transcendental distinction between agents qua phenomena and qua noumena in Kant's theory of free will. It argues (1) that Kant's incompatibilism can be accommodated if one accepts the "ontological" interpretation of this distinction (i.e. the view that agents qua noumena are ontologically prior to agents qua phenomena), and (2) that Kant's incompatibilism cannot be accommodated by the "two-aspect" interpretation, whose defining feature is the rejection of the ontological priority of agents qua noumena. The (...)
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  30. added 2013-05-02
    Defining Free Will Away. [REVIEW]Eddy Nahmias - 2012 - The Philosophers Magazine 58 (3):110-114.
    A critical review of Sam Harris' Free Will (2012).
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  31. added 2013-04-24
    Free Will Agnosticism.Stephen Kearns - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):235-252.
    I argue that no one knows whether there is free will.
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  32. added 2013-02-28
    A Superação Hegeliana Do Dualismo Entre Determinismo E Liberdade.Hector Ferreiro - 2012 - In Konrad Utz, Agemir Bavaresco & Paulo R. Konzen (eds.), Sujeito e Liberdade: Investigações a Partir do Idealismo Alemão. Porto Alegre: ediPUCRS. pp. 129-143.
    Kant explicitou, talvez com maior clareza que qualquer outro filósofo antes do que ele, a essência do conflito que implica a relação da causalidade natural e a causalidade livre. Hegel assevera que com o dualismo fenômeno-coisa em si Kant deixa intacta como tal a incompatibilidade entre as noções de causalidade natural e causalidade livre, já que, conserva sua contraposição mesma para simplesmente localizá-la na estrutura do sujeito. Hegel aspira precisamente a fechar o ciclo da metafísica dualista que definiu a filosofia (...)
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  33. added 2012-11-25
    Allowing for Every Contingency.Raam Gokhale - manuscript
    A Dialogue on Determinism, Contingency and Free Will.
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  34. added 2012-10-26
    Stoic Conceptions of Freedom and Their Relation to Ethics.Susanne Bobzien - 1997 - Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 41 (S68):71-89.
    ABSTRACT: In contemporary discussions of freedom in Stoic philosophy we often encounter the following assumptions: (i) the Stoics discussed the problem of free will and determinis; (ii) since in Stoic philosophy freedom of the will is in the end just an illusion, the Stoics took the freedom of the sage as a substitute for it and as the only true freedom; (iii) in the c. 500 years of live Stoic philosophical debate, the Stoics were largely concerned with the same philosophical (...)
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  35. added 2012-07-18
    A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought (Review).Susanne Bobzien - 2012 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (2):292-293.
    Much of chapters 2 to 6 is in agreement with publications from the last twenty years (including those of the reviewer); so for example Frede’s points that neither Aristotle nor the Stoics had a notion of free-will; that in Epictetus (for the first time) the notions of freedom and will were combined; that an indeterminist notion of free-will occurs first in Alexander. The achievement of these chapters lies in the way Frede carefully joins them together and uses them as a (...)
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  36. added 2011-12-12
    Free Will Free Choice Under Constraints.Chaohui Zhuang - manuscript
    The problem of Free Will is an important topic in religion, philosophy and neuroscience. We will introduce a new model of free will: free choice under constraints. Under outer and inner constraints, human still have the ability of free choice. Outer constrains include physical rules, environment and so on. Inner constrains include customs, desires, habits, preferences and so on. Given a specific context, human have the ability of deciding Yes/No on a specific preference. The free choices are caused, but not (...)
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  37. added 2011-01-25
    Afterword to The Philosophy of Aristotle.Susanne Bobzien (ed.) - 2011 - Signet.
    ABSTRACT: This is a little piece directed at the newcomer to Aristotle, making some general remarks about reading Aristotle at the beginning and end, with sandwiched in between, a brief and much simplified discussion of some common misunderstandings of Aristotle's philosophy, concerning spontaneity, causal indeterminism, freedom-to-do-otherwise, free choice, agent causation, logical determinism, teleological determinism, artistic creativity and freedom (eleutheria).
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  38. added 2010-07-13
    Free Will, 2nd Ed.Gary Watson - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
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  39. added 2010-02-24
    How Consciousness Creates Reality.Claus Janew - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (6):838-867.
    We will begin with seemingly simple interactions in our daily lives, examine how they originate on a deeper level, come to understand the essentials of consciousness, and finally recognize that we create our reality in its entirety. In the course of this quest, we will uncover little-heeded paths to accessing our subconscious, other individuals, and that which can be understood by the term "God". And the solution to the classical problem of free will constitutes the gist of the concepts is (...)
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  40. added 2010-02-24
    Omnipresent Consciousness and Free Will.Claus Janew - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (6):868-876.
    This article is not an attempt to explain consciousness in terms basically of quantum physics or neuro-biology. Instead I should like to place the term "Consciousness" on a broader footing. I shall therefore proceed from everyday reality, precisely where we experience ourselves as conscious beings. I shall use the term in such a general way as to resolve the question whether only a human being enjoys consciousness, or even a thermostat. Whilst the difference is considerable, it is not fundamental. Every (...)
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  41. added 2009-09-23
    All the Freedom You Can Want: The Purported Collapse of the Problem of Free Will.Edward C. Lyons - 2007 - St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary 22 (1):101-164.
    Reflections on free choice and determinism constitute a recurring, if rarified, sphere of legal reasoning. Controversy, of course, swirls around the perennially vexing question of the propriety of punishing human persons for conduct that they are unable to avoid. Drawing upon conditions similar, if not identical, to those traditionally associated with attribution of moral fault, persons subject to such necessitating causal constraints generally are not considered responsible in the requisite sense for their conduct; and, thus, they are not held culpable (...)
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