Transgenderism and Postgenderism

Irigaray's early work seeks to multiply possibilities for women's self-expression by recovering a sexual difference in which male and female are neither the same nor opposites, but irreducibly different modes of embodiment. In her more recent work, however, Irigaray has emphasized the duality of the sexes at the expense of multiplicity, enshrining the heterosexual couple as the model of sexual ethics. Alison Stone's recent revision of Irigaray supplements her account of sexual duality with a theory of bodily multiplicity derived from (...) Butler, Nietzsche, and certain German Romantics; but to the extent that Stone maintains the primacy of sexual duality, her revision fails to address the claims of multiplicity on their own terms. In this paper, I interpret a passage from Marcel Proust's novel, Sodom and Gomorrah, in order to develop an alternative theory of sexual difference in which sexual duality is affirmed in relation to a third, unsexed but sexual force which multiplies the possibilities for sexual pleasure beyond heterosexual coupling. Proust's emphasis on sexed ``parts'' rather than sexed morphologies is generative of maximally diverse combinations, all of which are equally natural and equally enhanced through artifice. (shrink)

The question of what “is” someone who is queer in a metaphysical standpoint have been hotly debated in contemporary metaphysics of gender. In my paper I will explore the view of a Phenomenological source and understanding of queerness within the umbrella of gender. Within the realm of gender we can see how queerness is a blob to which gender is both part of and a stand in for the person gender. Using Phenomenological methods based on Husserl’s foundation I can establishes (...) a base for which queerness can be clearly seen. In my paper I will address not only the difference of cis heteronormative phenomenology and the reality that queer people live. This causes a negation in a metaphysical way. The object in which the queer person lives becomes In a way how Hegel understood that if we see a gendered person in the cis reality we can say “this is a man or women” due to the way we correspond cis normative gender. This is where I will try to use Husserl’s “principle of contradiction” and Hegel’s idea of “negation” to show the fluidity of gender in which queerness encompasses. I can clearly demonstrate the “Horizon” in which the limits of cis hetero perspective of understanding of gender and queerness. But in the same thought I will further drive this idea that in a sense the split with in an ontological reality between the lives of cis hetero people and queer people. By giving definitions of what if different such a orientation and performance with the reality that queer people live with such a gender binary ontology. I will then derive some meta-language and construct a realty how communities build themselves from a mutual understanding of this queer ontology. Also real world examples of how the logic of gender effects the way that queer people operate. The counter argument I would argue against a gender nihilism that would try to attack the question that I raise that queerness is a separate state within consciousness. To which I would defended against an individual level of gender identity and understanding. To treat gender in an alienated value. But by using a strong phenomenological structure I would be able to defended by idea that queerness with in gender is a whole different ontological reality that the cis hetero reality. I will then derive some meta-language and construct a realty how communities build themselves from a mutual understanding of this queer ontology. . (shrink)

I do two things in this paper: firstly, I analyze the origins and the casting away of truscum activists and secondly, I develop a stronger metaphysical framework for what it means to be trans. I sketch a brief history of the truscum community, then I argue why mainstream trans activism’s arguments against the truscum are insufficient. Then I seek to provide a better nominalist argument, borrowing from the works of Natalie Stoljar, against the truscum’s metaphysical account of transness. That’s to (...) say I argue that transness is complex and only entails combinations of properties that may or may not overlap. In the final sections, I argue why my account of transness resolves the pragmatic and metaphysical worries of truscums; I also briefly address concerns from gender abolitionists. Written in 2023. (shrink)