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  1. Religious Experience Without Belief? Toward an Imaginative Account of Religious Engagement.Amber Griffioen - 2016 - In Thomas Hardtke, Ulrich Schmiedel & Tobias Tan (eds.), Religious Experience Revisited: Expressing the Inexpressible? Leiden, Netherlands: pp. 73-88.
    It is commonly supposed that a certain kind of belief is necessary for religious experience. Yet it is not clear that this must be so. In this article, I defend the possibility that a subject could have a genuine emotional religious experience without thereby necessarily believing that the purported object of her experience corresponds to reality and/or is the cause of her experience. Imaginative engagement, I argue, may evoke emotional religious experiences that may be said to be both genuine and (...)
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  2. Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW]Godehard Brüntrup - 2004 - International Philosophical Quarterly 44 (3):452-453.
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  3. Negative Feelings of Gratitude.Tony Manela - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (1):129-140.
    Philosophers generally agree that gratitude, the called-for response to benevolence, includes positive feelings. In this paper, I argue against this view. The grateful beneficiary will have certain feelings, but in some contexts, those feelings will be profoundly negative. Philosophers overlook this fact because they tend to consider only cases of gratitude in which the benefactor’s sacrifice is minimal, and in which the benefactor fares well after performing an act of benevolence. When we consider cases in which a benefactor suffers severely, (...)
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  4. Meinong on Aesthetic Objects and the Knowledge-Value of Emotions.Venanzio Raspa - 2013 - Humana.Mente. Journal of Philosophical Studies 25:211-234.
    In this paper I trace a theoretical path along Meinong’s works, by means of which the notion of aesthetic object as well as the changes this notion undergoes along Meinong’s output will be highlighted. Focusing especially on "Über emotionale Präsentation", I examine, on the one hand, the cognitive function of emotions, on the other hand, the objects apprehended by aesthetic emotions, i.e. aesthetic objects. These are ideal objects of higher order, which have, even though not primarily, the capacity to attract (...)
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  5. Varieties of Envy.Sara Protasi - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):535-549.
    In this paper I present a novel taxonomy of envy, according to which there are four kinds of envy: emulative, inert, aggressive and spiteful envy. An inquiry into the varieties of envy is valuable not only to understand it as a psychological phenomenon, but also to shed light on the nature of its alleged viciousness. The first section introduces the intuition that there is more than one kind of envy, together with the anecdotal and linguistic evidence that supports it. The (...)
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  6. The Preoccupation and Crisis of Analytic Philosophy.Michael Losonsky - 2014 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 10 (1):5-20.
    I propose to reconsider Gilbert Ryle’s thesis in 1956 in his introduction to The Revolution of Philosophy that “the story of twentieth-century philosophy is very largely the story of this notion of sense or meaning” and, as he writes elsewhere, the “preoccupation with the theory of meaning is the occupational disease of twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon and Austrian philoso- phy.” Ryle maintains that this preoccupation demar- cates analytic philosophy from its predecessors and that it gave philosophy a set of academic credentials as (...)
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  7. Of Life That Resists.Basil Vassilicos - 2015 - Philosophy Today 59 (2):207-225.
    For Michel Henry, the Cartesian notion of “videre videor” (“I seem to see”) provides the clearest schema of the type of self-affection in which life is experienced, and through which one can provide a properly phenomenological conception of life. It is above all in Henry’s exemplification of the ‘videor’ in terms of affective experience (in undergoing a passion, feeling pain) that one is able to pin down his two principle arguments concerning the nature of this self-affection. The one, regarding the (...)
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  8. Furcht Und Angst.Andreas Dorschel - 2012 - In Dietmar Goltschnigg (ed.), Angst. Lähmender Stillstand und Motor des Fortschritts. Stauffenburg. pp. 49-54.
    Is fear a ‘deficient mode’ of anxiety? This claim made by Martin Heidegger in ‘Being and Time’ (1927) depends on an analysis of intentionality. Emotions take objects: to love, to hate, to fear is to love, to hate, to fear someone or something. Yet anxiety, Heidegger maintains (‘Being and Time’ § 40), is about “nothing” (“nichts”) rather than “something” (“etwas”). Heidegger then turns lack of knowledge or understanding of what one’s anxiety is about into a revelation of “Nothing” (“Die Angst (...)
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  9. Looking Into Meta-Emotions.Christoph Jäger & Eva Bänninger-Huber - 2015 - Synthese 192 (3):787-811.
    There are many psychic mechanisms by which people engage with their selves. We argue that an important yet hitherto neglected one is self-appraisal via meta-emotions. We discuss the intentional structure of meta-emotions and explore the phenomenology of a variety of examples. We then present a pilot study providing preliminary evidence that some facial displays may indicate the presence of meta-emotions. We conclude by arguing that meta-emotions have an important role to play in higher-order theories of psychic harmony.
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  10. Sensory Substitution and Non-Sensory Feelings.David Suarez, Diana Acosta Navas, Umut Baysan & Kevin Connolly - forthcoming - In Fiona Macpherson (ed.), Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Oxford University Press.
    One of the central limitations of sensory substitution devices (SSDs) is their inability to reproduce the non-sensory feelings that are normally associated with visual experiences, especially hedonic and aesthetic responses. This limitation is sometimes reported to cause SSD users frustration. To make matters worse, it is unclear that improvements in acuity, bandwidth, or training will resolve the issue. Yet, if SSDs are to actually reproduce visual experience in its fullness, it seems that the reproduction of non-sensory feelings will be of (...)
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  11. Emotions and Wellbeing.Christine Tappolet & Mauro Rossi - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):461-474.
    In this paper, we consider the question of whether there exists an essential relation between emotions and wellbeing. We distinguish three ways in which emotions and wellbeing might be essentially related: constitutive, causal, and epistemic. We argue that, while there is some room for holding that emotions are constitutive ingredients of an individual’s wellbeing, all the attempts to characterise the causal and epistemic relations in an essentialist way are vulnerable to some important objections. We conclude that the causal and epistemic (...)
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  12. Review Essay: Frankfurt, “The Reasons of Love”. [REVIEW]Alan Soble - 2005 - Essays in Philosophy 6 (1):30.
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  13. Background Emotions, Proximity and Distributed Emotion Regulation.Somogy Varga & Joel Krueger - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):271-292.
    In this paper, we draw on developmental findings to provide a nuanced understanding of background emotions, particularly those in depression. We demonstrate how they reflect our basic proximity (feeling of interpersonal connectedness) to others and defend both a phenomenological and a functional claim. First, we substantiate a conjecture by Fonagy & Target (International Journal of Psychoanalysis 88(4):917–937, 2007) that an important phenomenological aspect of depression is the experiential recreation of the infantile loss of proximity to significant others. Second, we argue (...)
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  14. An Affective Approach to Moral Motivation.Christine Clavien - 2010 - Journal of Cognitive Science 11 (2):129-160.
    Over the last few years, there has been a surge of work in a new field called “moral psychology”, which uses experimental methods to test the psychological processes underlying human moral activity. In this paper, I shall follow this line of approach with the aim of working out a model of how people form value judgements and how they are motivated to act morally. I call this model an “affective picture”: ‘picture’ because it remains strictly at the descriptive level and (...)
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  15. From Thumos to Emotion and Feeling. Some Observations on the Passivity and Activity of Affectivity.Robert Zaborowski - 2010 - History and Philosophy of Psychology 12 (1):1–25.
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  16. Qing (情) and Emotion in Early Chinese Thought.Brian Bruya - 2003 - In Keli Fang (ed.), Chinese Philosophy and the Trends of the 21st Century Civilization. Commercial Press.
    In a 1967 article, A. C. Graham made the claim that 情 qing should never be translated as "emotions" in rendering early Chinese texts into English. Over time, sophisticated translators and interpreters have taken this advice to heart, and qing has come to be interpreted as "the facts" or "what is genuine in one." In these English terms all sense of interrelationality is gone, leaving us with a wooden, objective stasis. But we also know, again partly through the work of (...)
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  17. Four Theories of Inversion in Art and Music.John Dilworth - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):1-19.
    Issues about the nature and ontology of works of art play a central part in contemporary aesthetics. But such issues are complicated by the fact that there seem to be two fundamentally different kinds of artworks. First, a visual artwork such as a picture or drawing seems to be closely identified with a particular physical object, in that even an exact copy of it does not count as being genuinely the same work of art. Nelson Goodman describes such works as (...)
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  18. Love, Hate and Emotion.C. H. Whiteley - 1979 - Philosophy 54 (208):235.
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  19. Against Basic Emotions, and Toward a Comprehensive Theory.Marc A. Cohen - 2005 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 26 (4):229-254.
    According to recent literature in philosophy and psychology, there is a set of basic emotions that were preserved over the course of evolution because they serve adaptive functions. However, the empirical evidence fails to support the claim that there are basic emotions because it fails to show that emotions can be identified with specific functions. Moreover, work on basic emotions lacks the conceptual space to take emotional experience into account and so fails to amount to an adequate theory of emotion: (...)
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  20. Possible Girls.Neil Sinhababu - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):254–260.
    I argue that if David Lewis’ modal realism is true, modal realists from different possible worlds can fall in love with each other. I offer a method for uniquely picking out possible people who are in love with us and not with our counterparts. Impossible lovers and trans-world love letters are considered. Anticipating objections, I argue that we can stand in the right kinds of relations to merely possible people to be in love with them and that ending a trans-world (...)
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  21. The Foundation of Phenomenological Ethics: Intentional Feelings.Wei Zhang - 2009 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 4 (1):130-142.
    E. Husserl’s reflections in Logical Investigations on “intentional feelings” and “non-intentional feelings” are significant in both his later ethical explorations and M. Scheler’s thought on ethics. Through the incorporation of the views of Husserl and Scheler, we find that the phenomenology of the intentional feeling-acts is not only the foundation of the non-formal ethics of values in Scheler’s phenomenology, but also at least the constitutive foundation of the ethics of Husserl’s first orientation.
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Classifying Emotions
  1. Is Boredom One or Many? A Functional Solution to the Problem of Heterogeneity.Andreas Elpidorou - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
    Despite great progress in our theoretical and empirical investigations of boredom, a basic issue regarding boredom remains unresolved: it is still unclear whether the construct of boredom is a unitary one or not. By surveying the relevant literature on boredom and arousal, the paper makes a case for the unity of the construct of boredom. It argues, first, that extant empirical findings do not support the heterogeneity of boredom, and, second, that a theoretically motivated and empirically grounded model of boredom (...)
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  2. A Paper On Recalcitrant Emotions.Alex Grzankowski - manuscript
    In discussions of the metaphysics and normativity of the emotions, it is commonplace to wheel out examples of (for instance) people who know that rollercoasters aren’t dangerous but who fear them anyway. Such cases are well known to have been troubling for Cognitivists who hold the emotions are (at least in part) judgements or beliefs. But more recently, the very theories that emerged from the failure of Cognitivism (Perceptual theories and other Neo-Cognitivist approaches) have been argued to face trouble as (...)
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  3. Cognitive Emotion and the Law.Harold Anthony Lloyd - 2016 - Law and Psychology Review 41.
    Many wrongly believe that emotion plays little or no role in legal reasoning. Unfortunately, Langdell and his “scientific” case method encourage this error. A careful review of analysis in the real world, however, belies this common belief. Emotion can be cognitive, and cognition can be emotional. Additionally, modern neuroscience underscores the “co-dependence” of reason and emotion. Thus, even if law were a certain science of appellate cases (which it is not), emotion could not be torn from such “science.” -/- As (...)
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  4. Are Emotions Psychological Constructions?Charlie Kurth - 2018 - Philosophy of Science.
    According to psychological constructivism, emotions result from projecting folk emotion concepts onto felt affective episodes (e.g., Barrett 2017, LeDoux 2015, Russell 2004). Moreover, while constructivists acknowledge there’s a biological dimension to emotion, they deny that emotions are (or involve) affect programs. So they also deny that emotions are natural kinds. However, the essential role constructivism gives to felt experience and folk concepts leads to an account that’s extensionally inadequate and functionally inaccurate. Moreover, biologically-oriented proposals that reject these commitments are not (...)
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  5. Modeling Semantic Emotion Space Using a 3D Hypercube-Projection: An Innovative Analytical Approach for the Psychology of Emotions.Radek Trnka, Alek Lačev, Karel Balcar, Martin Kuška & Peter Tavel - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    The widely accepted two-dimensional circumplex model of emotions posits that most instances of human emotional experience can be understood within the two general dimensions of valence and activation. Currently, this model is facing some criticism, because complex emotions in particular are hard to define within only these two general dimensions. The present theory-driven study introduces an innovative analytical approach working in a way other than the conventional, two-dimensional paradigm. The main goal was to map and project semantic emotion space in (...)
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  6. On the Definition of Jealousy and Other Emotions in Anarchy, State and Utopia.Terence Rajivan Edward - 2017 - Philosophical Pathways (209):1-3.
    This paper responds to an ingenious footnote from Robert Nozick’s book Anarchy, State and Utopia. Using a table of four possible situations, Nozick defines what it is to be jealous, envious, begrudging, spiteful and competitive. I deny a claim that Nozick makes for his table, a claim needed for these definitions. I also point out that Nozick fails to capture what he has in mind by jealousy.
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  7. The Difference Between Emotion and Affect.Tom Cochrane - forthcoming - Physics of Life Reviews.
    In this brief comment on a target article by Koelsch et al., I argue that emotions are more sensitive to context than other affective states.
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  8. Review of Elena Pulcini, Invidia. La passione triste. [REVIEW]Marco Solinas - 2012 - Iride: Filosofia e Discussione Pubblica (65):200-201.
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  9. Kant's Taxonomy of the Emotions.Kelly D. Sorensen - 2002 - Kantian Review 6:109-128.
    If there is to be any progress in the debate about what sort of positive moral status Kant can give the emotions, we need a taxonomy of the terms Kant uses for these concepts. It used to be thought that Kant had little room for emotions in his ethics. In the past three decades, Marcia Baron, Paul Guyer, Barbara Herman, Nancy Sherman, Allen Wood and others have argued otherwise. Contrary to what a cursory reading of the Groundwork may indicate, Kant (...)
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  10. Love as a Moral Emotion.J. David Velleman - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):338-374.
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  11. Classifying Emotion: A Developmental Account.Alexandra Zinck & Albert Newen - 2008 - Synthese 161 (1):1 - 25.
    The aim of this paper is to propose a systematic classification of emotions which can also characterize their nature. The first challenge we address is the submission of clear criteria for a theory of emotions that determine which mental phenomena are emotions and which are not. We suggest that emotions as a subclass of mental states are determined by their functional roles. The second and main challenge is the presentation of a classification and theory of emotions that can account for (...)
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Moods
  1. The Intentional Structure of Moods.Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    Moods are sometimes claimed to constitute an exception to the rule that mental phenomena are intentional (in the sense of representing something). In reaction, some philosophers have argued that moods are in fact intentional, but exhibit a special and unusual kind of intentionality: they represent the world as a whole, or everything indiscriminately, rather than some more specific object(s). In this paper, I present a problem for extant versions of this idea, then propose a revision that solves the problem but (...)
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  2. The Intentionality and Intelligibility of Moods.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):118-135.
    This article offers an account of moods as distinctive kinds of personal level affective-evaluative states, which are both intentional and rationally intelligible in specific ways. The account contrasts with those who claim moods are non-intentional, and so also arational. Section 1 provides a conception of intentionality and distinguishes moods, as occurrent experiential states, from other states in the affective domain. Section 2 argues moods target the subject’s total environment presented in a specific evaluative light through felt valenced attitudes (the Mood-Intentionality (...)
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  3. Moods Are Not Colored Lenses: Perceptualism and the Phenomenology of Moods.Francisco Gallegos - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1497-1513.
    Being in a mood—such as an anxious, irritable, depressed, tranquil, or cheerful mood—tends to alter the way we react emotionally to the particular objects we encounter. But how, exactly, do moods alter the way we experience particular objects? Perceptualism, a popular approach to understanding affective experiences, holds that moods function like "colored lenses," altering the way we perceive the evaluative properties of the objects we encounter. In this essay, I offer a phenomenological analysis of the experience of being in a (...)
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  4. Not in the Mood for Intentionalism.Davide Bordini - 2017 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 41 (1):60-81.
    According to intentionalism, the phenomenal character of experience is one and the same as the intentional content of experience. This view has a problem with moods (anxiety, depression, elation, irritation, gloominess, grumpiness, etc.). Mood experiences certainly have phenomenal character, but do not exhibit directedness, i.e., do not appear intentional. Standardly, intentionalists have re-described moods’ undirectedness in terms of directedness towards everything or the whole world (e.g., Crane, 1998; Seager, 1999). This move offers the intentionalist a way out, but is quite (...)
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  5. Emotions: Philosophical Issues About.Julien Deonna, Christine Tappolet & Fabrice Teroni - 2015 - WIREs Cognitive Science 1:193-207.
    We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then (...)
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  6. Intentionalism About Moods.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.
    According to intentionalism, phenomenal properties are identical to, supervenient on, or determined by representational properties. Intentionalism faces a special challenge when it comes to accounting for the phenomenal character of moods. First, it seems that no intentionalist treatment of moods can capture their apparently undirected phenomenology. Second, it seems that even if we can come up with a viable intentionalist account of moods, we would not be able to motivate it in some of the same kinds of ways that intentionalism (...)
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  7. The Case Against Representationalism About Moods.Amy Kind - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind.
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  8. Pure Intentionalism About Moods and Emotions.Angela Mendelovici - 2013 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge. pp. 135-157.
    Moods and emotions are sometimes thought to be counterexamples to intentionalism, the view that a mental state's phenomenal features are exhausted by its representational features. The problem is that moods and emotions are accompanied by phenomenal experiences that do not seem to be adequately accounted for by any of their plausibly represented contents. This paper develops and defends an intentionalist view of the phenomenal character of moods and emotions on which emotions and some moods represent intentional objects as having sui (...)
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Emotions and Feelings
  1. Hunger for Being Born Completely. Plasticity and Desire.Guido Cusinato - 2017 - Philosophical News 14:65-77.
    The main claim of this article is that the plasticity of the human formation process does not consist in receiving passively an already-given shape, like hot wax stamped by a seal. Rather, it creates ever new shapes and makes a person overcome her own self-referential horizon. Furthermore, I argue that this formation process is directed by desire, meant as “hunger for being born completely” (Zambrano). The human being comes into the world without being born completely, and it is precisely such (...)
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  2. Precis of The Emotional Mind (2018).Tom Cochrane - manuscript
    This is a precis of The Emotional Mind (2018, Cambridge University Press), summarising the key claims of the book chapter by chapter. It covers the theories of mental content (valent representation), pleasure and pain, emotions, emotional bodily feelings, social emotions, the relationship between reason and emotion, the model of character, and the general model of mental architecture presented in the book.
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  3. The World According to Suffering.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - In Michael S. Brady, David Bain & Jennifer Corns (eds.), The Philosophy of Suffering. London: Routledge.
    On the face of it, suffering from the loss of a loved one and suffering from intense pain are very different things. What makes them both experiences of suffering? I argue it’s neither their unpleasantness nor the fact that we desire not to have such experiences. Rather, what we suffer from negatively transforms the way our situation as a whole appears to us. To cash this out, I introduce the notion of negative affective construal, which involves practically perceiving our situation (...)
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  4. The Intentionality and Intelligibility of Moods.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):118-135.
    This article offers an account of moods as distinctive kinds of personal level affective-evaluative states, which are both intentional and rationally intelligible in specific ways. The account contrasts with those who claim moods are non-intentional, and so also arational. Section 1 provides a conception of intentionality and distinguishes moods, as occurrent experiential states, from other states in the affective domain. Section 2 argues moods target the subject’s total environment presented in a specific evaluative light through felt valenced attitudes (the Mood-Intentionality (...)
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  5. Cognitive Emotion and the Law.Harold Anthony Lloyd - 2016 - Law and Psychology Review 41.
    Many wrongly believe that emotion plays little or no role in legal reasoning. Unfortunately, Langdell and his “scientific” case method encourage this error. A careful review of analysis in the real world, however, belies this common belief. Emotion can be cognitive, and cognition can be emotional. Additionally, modern neuroscience underscores the “co-dependence” of reason and emotion. Thus, even if law were a certain science of appellate cases (which it is not), emotion could not be torn from such “science.” -/- As (...)
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  6. Editorial: Affectivity Beyond the Skin.Giovanna Colombetti, Joel Krueger & Tom Roberts - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9:1-2.
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  7. Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action.Declan Smithies & Jeremy Weiss - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (1):27-54.
    What is the role of affective experience in explaining how our desires provide us with reasons for action? When we desire that p, we are thereby disposed to feel attracted to the prospect that p, or to feel averse to the prospect that not-p. In this paper, we argue that affective experiences – including feelings of attraction and aversion – provide us with reasons for action in virtue of their phenomenal character. Moreover, we argue that desires provide us with reasons (...)
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  8. The Good of Boredom.Andreas Elpidorou - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):323-351.
    I argue that the state of boredom (i.e., the transitory and non-pathological experience of boredom) should be understood to be a regulatory psychological state that has the capacity to promote our well-being by contributing to personal growth and to the construction (or reconstruction) of a meaningful life.
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  9. Merleau-Ponty.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In Thomas Szanto & Hilge Landweer (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Emotions. Routledge.
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  10. Musical Scaffolding and the Pleasure of Sad Music: Comment on “An Integrative Review of the Enjoyment of Sadness Associated with Music".Joel Krueger - forthcoming - Physics of Life Reviews.
    Why is listening to sad music pleasurable? Eerola et al. convincingly argue that we should adopt an integrative framework — encompassing biological, psycho-social, and cultural levels of explanation — to answer this question. I agree. The authors have done a great service in providing the outline of such an integrative account. But in their otherwise rich discussion of the psycho-social level of engagements with sad music, they say little about the phenomenology of such experiences — including features that may help (...)
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