William of Ockham

Aquinas, Ockham, and Burdan all claim that a person can be numerically identical over time, despite changes in size, shape, and color. How can we reconcile this with the Indiscernibility of Identicals, the principle that numerical identity implies indiscernibility across time? Almost all contemporary metaphysicians regard the Indiscernibility of Identicals as axiomatic. But I will argue that Aquinas, Ockham, and Burdan would reject it, perhaps in favor of a principle restricted to indiscernibility at a time.

Truth is a key notion in Ockham’s philosophical reductionist program, a notion that has been the object of contrasting interpretations in scholarship. My interpretation is that, for Ockham, ‘being true’ expresses an epistemological relation, namely the one through which our mind reflects on a proposition of language, compares it with an extra-mental state of affairs, and thus ascertains their correspondence. Placing truth at a point of intersection of language with mind and reality, Ockham’s interpretation of Aristotle’s characterization of philosophy as (...) the science of truth comes to be innovative. For Ockham, philosophy is a meticulous training of interpretation of language in order to account correctly for the truth-value of propositions. (shrink)

This paper explores William Ockham's account of memory with a view to understanding its implications for his account of the nature and persistence of human beings. I show that Ockham holds a view according to which memory (i) is a type of self-knowledge and (ii) entails the existence of an enduring psychological subject. This is significant when taken in conjunction with his account of the afterlife. For, Ockham holds that during the interim state—namely, after bodily death, but prior to bodily (...) resurrection—we retain and recall our embodied experiences. This entails that the subject of our embodied psychological states can survive in a disembodied state and continue to engage in characteristic rational activities—a claim that appears to run against Ockham's own commitment to a hylomorphic conception of human beings (as essentially material). A central aim of this paper is to explore the prospects for reconciling Ockham's account of interim memory with his account of human beings. (shrink)

William of Ockham (d. 1347) is well known for his commitment to parsimony and for his so-called ‘razor’ principle. But little is known about attempts among his own contemporaries to deflect his use of the razor. In this paper, I explore one such attempt. In particular, I consider a clever challenge that Ockham’s younger contemporary, Walter Chatton (d. 1343) deploys against the razor. The challenge involves a kind of dilemma for Ockham. Depending on how Ockham responds to this dilemma, his (...) razor will, Chatton argues, either prove unacceptably dull when it comes to determining ontological commitment or prove unacceptably sharp when it comes to determining commitments entailed by certain theological doctrines. While Chatton’s objection is subtle and interesting in its own right, the broader significance of the debate between these thinkers lies in the light it sheds on medieval approaches to issues surrounding metaphysical methodology. (shrink)

Uno de los principales criterios que utiliza el método científico para establecer la pertinencia de una explicación o hipótesis competidora con respecto a un evento en la realidad física, es el principio de simplicidad o parsimonia científica. Este suele implicar la prescindencia de entidades o hipótesis consideradas innecesarias para la explicación de un fenómeno. Las raíces de este principio se suelen trazar hasta el filósofo nominalista medieval Guillermo de Ockham. En el presente trabajo, se pretende determinar el posible impacto de (...) la concepción metodológica derivada de la Navaja de Ockham en torno a la hipótesis cosmológica de los multiversos, y realizar un recorrido por la visión crítica del cosmólogo, George F. R. Ellis en la discusión sobre la validez de la hipótesis multiversal en el plano de la física contemporánea. (shrink)

The 16th and 17th centuries witnessed a philosophical shift that would help pave the way for modern science, a shift from metaphysical theories of material objects to other views embracing only the empirically-accessible parts of material things. One much-debated topic in the course of this shift was regarding prime matter. The late scholastic Jacobus Zabarella (1533-1589) arrived upon his views about prime matter via his version of the regressus method, a program for a sort of scientific reasoning. In his De (...) rebus naturalibus, Zabarella defends the position that prime matter is extended. However, it is less clear how he accounts for its extension. There is an important text where he apparently suggests that prime matter is extended in and of itself. However, there are two other texts apparently stating that matter is extended in virtue of a distinct accident in the category of quantity. I argue that a decisive reading based solely upon any particular texts is not available. Nevertheless, examining Zabarella’s writing on the topic as a whole, the trajectory of his overall argument is remarkably sympathetic to Averroes, who famously took the accidentally quantified position. Thus, from this systematic feature, the accidentally quantified reading is more reasonable. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question whether future contingents are knowable, that is, whether one can know that things will go a certain way even though it is possible that things will not go that way. First I will consider a long-established view that implies a negative answer, and draw attention to some endemic problems that affect its credibility. Then I will sketch an alternative line of thought that prompts a positive answer: future contingents are knowable, although our epistemic access of (...) them is limited in some important respects. (shrink)

This paper investigates Ockhamism from a metaphysical point of view. Its main point is that the claim that future contingents are true or false is less demanding than usually expected, as it does not require particularly contentious assumptions about the future. First it will be argued that Ockhamism is consistent with a wide range of metaphysical views. Then it will be shown that each of these views leaves room for the claim that the future is open, at least on some (...) plausible interpretations of that claim. (shrink)

There is a long history of philosophers granting a privileged epistemic status to cognition of directly present objects. In this paper, I examine three important historic accounts which provide different models of this cognitive state and its connection with its objects: that of the Stoics, who are corporealists and think that ordinary perception may have an epistemically privileged status, but who seem to struggle to accommodate non-perceptual cognizance; that of Augustine, who thinks that incorporeal objects are directly present to us (...) in ‘intellectual perception’, and that, by way of contrast, ordinary sense-perception does not have a privileged epistemic status; and that of William of Ockham, who allows for unmediated action at a distance and is fairly generous about what counts as being directly present. (shrink)

This paper attempts to demonstrate that the logical problematic of signification, has a very dangerous socio-political effect due to the ontological implication that is connected to the signification of terms in logic. It expounds the notion of signification in Formal Logic as exposed by William of Ockham. It thus, employs this notion of signification of terms, to discuss the term “Fulani”, to show the danger potent in distorting the signification of the term “Fulani” as in every conventional and connotative terms. (...) This work claims that as a result of the connection between logic and ontology, conceptualization and perception, names and reality, the distortion of terms, which are the building blocks of propositions in logic could lead to a dangerous cognition and perception of ontological realities. To this end, it posits a critique on the dangerous change in the signification of the term “Fulani”, in the conceptualization and perception of present day Nigeria people, of West Africa. A dangerous change, as this paper claims, if not speedily reconstructed and re-conceptualized, could lead to a disastrous situation in the socio-political reality of the Nigerian State. (shrink)

One version of moral error theory maintains that the central problem with morality is an ontological commitment to irreducible normativity. This paper argues that this version of error theory ultimately depends on an appeal to Ockham’s Razor, and that Ockham’s Razor should not be applied to irreducible normativity. This is because the appeal to Ockham’s Razor always contains an intractable element of epistemic circularity; and if this circularity is not vicious, we can construct a sound argument for the existence of (...) irreducibly normative truths that contains a similar kind of epistemic circularity. This argument is a version of Pascal’s Wager which I call “Parfit’s Wager,” because it is based on a passage from Derek Parfit’s On What Matters. It states that, if we believe that there are some irreducibly normative truths, we are more likely to be believing what we ought to believe compared to not believing that there are such truths, and that this indicates that we ought rationally to believe that there are such truths, justifying the ontological commitment to irreducible normativity in the process. (shrink)

The methods of intellectual history have not yet been applied to studying the invention of technology for printing texts and images ca. 1375–ca. 1450. One of the several conceptual developments in this period refl ecting the possibility of mechanical replication is a view of the relationship of eternity to durational time based on Gregory of Nyssa’s philosophy of time and William of Ockham’s. Th e article considers how changes in these ideas helped enable the conceptual possibilities of the dissemination of (...) ideas. It describes a direct connection of human perceptual knowledge to divine knowledge that enhanced the authority of printed production to transfer and reproduce the true and the good. (shrink)

In this essay, we reconsider two themes particularly discussed by the interpreters of Ockham: that of divine omnipotence and the hypothesis of the intuitive cognition of non-existent things. The purpose is to show that the hypothetical case considered by Ockham was subjected to opposite interpretations. For theological reasons, Ockham attributes not only to God but also to human beings the possibility of having acts of intuitive cognition of things that do not exist; nonetheless, he holds that it is contradictory for (...) God to give us the evident cognition of things that appear to be present when they are actually absent. Walter Chatton opposes this conclusion, arguing that no contradiction ensues from that hypothesis. Instead, he believes that it is impossible for God to give us the intuition of things that absolutely do not exist or are in no way present to us. Ockham’s arguments include some difficulties that Chatton acutely sees and discusses. In particular, Chatton calls into question Ockham’s missed distinction between the existence and the presence of the intuited thing. (shrink)

This article investigates the relation between the will and evil in Ockham’s thought. The main purpose is to show to what extent the deliberate and conscious will of evil (velle malum sub ratione mali) is possible according to Ockham’s psychological and metaethical assumptions.

Il volume ripercorre lo sviluppo del pensiero del giovane Nicola Cusano dalla frequentazione del maestro albertista Eimerico da Campo presso l’Università di Colonia (1425) e dal confronto con le posizioni filosofiche dei domenicani dello Studium coloniense, fino agli anni della maturità a Roma (1450). Il saggio illustra il contesto storico-culturale della genesi del De docta ignorantia, testo che suggella la presa di distanza di Cusano dal proprio passato universitario ma anche, al contempo, la sua insoddisfazione nei confronti dell’umanesimo diffuso in (...) Italia negli anni del Concilio di Ferrara-Firenze; e lo segue nella sua ‘caccia della Sapienza’, nell’incontro con differenti tradizioni e contesti, fino alla formulazione dell’ideale del ‘Socrate cristiano’ nell’Idiota. Il volume, riccamente documentato anche sul piano della storia delle interpretazioni e degli studi su Cusano, contribuisce a far luce sulla formazione del suo pensiero e sulle questioni che ne hanno segnato la vita. (shrink)

In his Bipartitum in morali philosophia, the Scottish philosopher William of Manderston, a pupil of John Mair, and an Ockhamist philosopher, is quoting a text of Antonin of Padua who distinguishes the factum opened to a juridical qualification from the inner belief, known by God alone. Quoting the same text, the authors of the Malleus maleficarum try hard to distinguish three distinct fields, the inner beliefs which belongs to God, the exterior acts, the facts, which are relevant for the judges, (...) and the third field, which establishes a relation between the fact and the beliefs. This third field is proper to the inquisitors. Against this ethics of imputability, Manderston, relying on Ockham’s ethics, advocates an intentionalist ethics which depends on a sharp separation between interiority and exteriority. The soteriological dimension of the question entirely belongs to the inner life, whereas the exteriority is strictly disciplinary. By his radicality, Manderston appears as a paradigm of the modern dichotomy between conscience and law, Paolo Prodi once pointed out as a cornerstone of the religious modernity. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is Ockham's stance on the question of divine concurrence---the question whether God is causally active in the causal happenings of the created world, and if so, what God's causal activity amounts to and what place that leaves for created causes. After discussing some preliminaries, I turn to presenting what I take to be Ockham's account. As I show, Ockham, at least in this issue, is rather conservative: he agrees with the majority of medieval thinkers (including (...) Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Duns Scotus, and others) that both God and created agents are causally active in the causal happenings of the world. Then I turn to some texts that may suggest otherwise; I argue that reading Ockham as either an occasionalist or a mere conservationist based on these texts originates from a misunderstanding of his main concern. I conclude with raising and briefly addressing some systematic worries regarding Ockham's account of concurrence. (shrink)

Till just few decades ago, scholars used to use the label ‘Ockhamism’ to mark a turning-point in the history of mediaeval philosophy, above all in the history of natural philosophy. That turning-point was exemplified by the once so-called ‘Buridanian school’, today known simply as ‘Parisian school of natural philosophy’, whose leading representative was for sure John Buridan. But looking carefully at some crucial points of the Picard master’s idea of ‘nature’, concerning specifically the relationship between God and secondary causes on (...) one side, and the role played by free will, both the divine and the human one, on the other side, one will find out that Buridan’s ‘Ockhamism’ is at least questionable: Scotus’ modal logic is the conceptual framework, within which he redetermines the boundaries of natural laws, but the ‘pure ockhamist’ idea of the prevalence of the will on the intellect in God’s nature is the source of an image of the world in which voluntary behaviours and natural laws are intertwined. Therefore, Buridan’s natural philosophy results as a peculiar synthesis of two of the main divergent lines of thinking of late mediaeval philosophy. (shrink)

An overview of debates in ethical theory within Christian Scholasticism in the decades after Thomas Aquinas.

On the dominant interpretation, Ockham is an externalist about mental content. This reading is founded principally on his theory of intuitive cognition. Intuitive cognition plays a foundational role in Ockham’s account of concept formation and judgment, and Ockham insists that the content of intuitive states is determined by the causal relations such states bear to their objects. The aim of this paper is to challenge the externalist interpretation by situating Ockham’s account of intuitive cognition vis-à-vis his broader account of efficient (...) causation. While there can be no doubt that intuitive states are causally individuated, I argue that, given Ockham’s broader theory of efficient causation (on which causation turns out to be an internal relation), this very fact entails that the content of such states is determined by factors internal (rather than external) to the states themselves. (shrink)

The focus of the article is the self-predication principle, according to which the/a such-and-such is such-and-such. We consider contemporary approaches (Frege, Russell, Meinong) to the self-predication principle, as well as fourteenth-century approaches (Burley, Ockham, Buridan). In crucial ways, the Ockham-Buridan view prefigures Russell’s view, and Burley’s view shows a striking resemblance to Meinong’s view. In short the Russell-Ockham-Buridan view holds: no existence, no truth. The Burley-Meinong view holds, in short: intelligibility suffices for truth. Both views approach self-predication in a uniform (...) way. We were unable to find a medieval philosopher who, like Frege, approaches self-predication in a non-uniform way. We do not want to dispute that there are also considerable differences between the contemporary and the fourteenth-century approach to self-predication. Importantly, fourteenth-century accounts of self-predication rely strongly on the identity theory of predication, and this theory is not endorsed by contemporary philosophers of language. Nevertheless, some basic tenets seem to us to be clearly shared between fourteenth-century and contemporary thinkers. (shrink)

È possibile ammettere, pensare e addirittura verificare che una cosa che sia accaduta nel passato possa non essere più accaduta in un momento presente? Ad esempio, si può, oggi, fare in modo che Roma non sia mai stata fondata? Come è possibile mutare la regolare causalità degli accadimenti di quel passato – il nostro e quello degli uomini che ci hanno preceduti – che sembra essere fondato sui vincoli di una strettissima necessità? E che dire quando questo sconvolgimento dell’ordine del (...) mondo arriva a toccare anche le possibilità logiche o le scelte di un “Divin Fattore”? D’altro canto, se ribaltiamo il discorso e ci volgiamo al futuro, sapere che qualcuno conosce in anticipo che ogni cosa avverrà o non avverrà, e come e quando, non limita forse la nostra libertà? Quale strada scegliere, allora? Abbandonare il principio di contraddizione, su cui è fondata la nostra logica, oppure lasciar cadere il predicato dell’onnipotenza e dell’onniscienza, che garantiscono a Dio di affacciarsi sulla scena del mondo contingente – quello che noi, qui e ora, vediamo e tocchiamo prima ancora di rappresentarcelo in modo astratto – cambiandolo a suo piacimento? O dovremo abbandonare il principio di un agente divino capace di sapere ogni cosa in anticipo, perché fuori dal tempo e tale da poter cambiare l’ordine nel quale siamo stati gettati? Dovremo forse limitarne la potenza a quella di un orologiaio sottomesso alle leggi che egli stesso ha creato per regolare il mondo? Oppure rinunciare alla capacità di agire diversamente da come si agisca, di dialogare con chi agisce secondo schemi e modelli di credenza radicalmente, o parzialmente diversi dai nostri, o anche solo di pensarlo e di immaginarlo possibile? Insomma, ci sono più cose in cielo e in terra o nella filosofia? Le domande si succedono l’una all’altra come le teste dell’Idra di Lerna, che ricrescevano dalla radice una volta tagliate*. Per usare un celebre modo di dire, molto usato nella filosofia italiana del secolo scorso, sembra quasi che si voglia in questo modo “mettere le brache al mondo”. La costellazione di temi e questioni che si viene così definendo è espressa filosoficamente con il termine “compatibilismo teologico” e riguarda in generale la possibilità che siano conciliabili, in modo tale che l’esistenza dell’uno non implichi la necessaria negazione dell’altro, la necessità dell’ordine del mondo, e con esso l’onnipotenza e la prescienza proprie di un soggetto divino come quello delle grandi religioni monoteiste, da una parte, e la contingenza degli accadimenti, e dunque la libertà umana di autodeterminarsi e di poter agire diversamente da come agisce, dall'altra. All’interno di una tradizione generalmente orientata a privilegiare l’aspetto etico del problema e a ragionare dunque a partire dal fondamento indiscusso del libero arbitrio, abbiamo scelto invece di affrontare le soluzioni di quegli autori che hanno individuato la chiave per affrontare il dilemma compatibilista in una prospettiva legata ad atteggiamenti di natura epistemica, come “credere”, “conoscere”, “sapere”, e percettiva, come “vedere”. (shrink)

This article analyzes the significance of the concepts “sovereignty” and “popular sovereignty” regarding the construction of modern law. Modern law isdefined in this study as a language of subjective rights (claim, liberty, power and immunity) and therefore has a nomological and authoritative character. The shift from low Middle-age to the beginning of Modernity seems to be the decisive period to understand the construction of modern law, due to the reception of Aristotle’s political writings and Roman law, aside from the rejection (...) of strong or thomist realism. In this sense, three works are analyzed: Marsilio of Padua “DefensorPacis”, William of Ockham “Breviloquium de Principatur Tyrannico” and Jean Bodin “Six Books of the Commonwealth”. The results seem to address that popular sovereignty as a foundation for legal language is in direct opposition to the acceptance of the strong concept of sovereignty, as stated by Bodin. (shrink)

It is well-known that Chatton is among the earliest and most vehement critics of Ockham’s theory of judgment, but scholars have overlooked the role Chatton’s criticisms play in shaping Ockham’s final account. In this paper, I demonstrate that Ockham’s most mature treatment of judgment not only contains revisions that resolve the problems Chatton identifies in his earlier theories, but also that these revisions ultimately bring his final account of the objects of judgment surprisingly close to Chatton’s own. Even so, I (...) argue that, at the end of the day, there remain significant differences between their respective analyses of the structure and intentionality of judicative states. (shrink)

William Ockham held that, in addition to written and spoken language, there exists a mental language, a structured representational system common to all thinking beings. Here I present and evaluate an argument found in several places across Ockham's corpus, wherein he argues that positing a mental language is necessary for the nominalist to meet certain ontological constraints imposed by Aristotle’s account of scientific demonstration.

The important impact of the French Franciscan Peter Auriol (ca. 1280-1322) upon contemporary philosophical theology at Oxford is well known and has been well documented and analyzed, at least for a narrow range of issues, particularly in epistemology. This article attempts a more systematic treatment of his effects upon Oxford debates across a broader range of subjects and over a more expansive duration of time than has been done previously. Topics discussed include grace and merit, future contingents and divine foreknowledge, (...) and the logic of the Trinity. (shrink)

Ockham holds what nowadays would be characterized as a “higher-order perception” theory of consciousness. Among the most common objections to such a theory is the charge that it gives rise to an infinite regress in higher-order states. In this paper, I examine Ockham’s various responses to the regress problem, focusing in particular on his attempts to restrict the scope of consciousness so as to avoid it. In his earlier writings, Ockham holds that we are conscious only of those states to (...) which we explicitly attend. This view, I go on to argue, is inadequate on both phenomenological and philosophical grounds. Interestingly, and perhaps for this very reason, in later works, Ockham goes on to develop an alternative explanation for his account of the limited scope of consciousness. (shrink)

This paper investigates the logic of Ockhamism, a view according to which future contingents are either true or false. Several attempts have been made to give rigorous shape to this view by defining a suitable formal semantics, but arguably none of them is fully satisfactory. The paper draws attention to some problems that beset such attempts, and suggests that these problems are different symptoms of the same initial confusion, in that they stem from the unjustified assumption that the actual course (...) of events must be represented in the semantics as a distinguished history, the Thin Red Line. (shrink)

This paper traces a rather peculiar debate between William Ockham, Walter Chatton, and Robert Holcot over whether it is possible for God to know more than he knows. Although the debate specifically addresses a theological question about divine knowledge, the central issue at stake in it is a purely philosophical question about the nature and ontological status of propositions. The theories of propositions that emerge from the discussion appear deeply puzzling, however. My aim in this paper is to show that (...) there is a way of making sense of these views (and, by implication, of much of what is puzzling about medieval theories of propositions). The key, I argue, lies in getting clear about the precise theoretical roles these thinkers assign to propositions in their accounts of propositional attitudes. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to advance our understanding of medieval approaches to consciousness by focusing on a particular but, as it seems to me, representative medieval debate. The debate in question is between William Ockham and Walter Chatton over the existence of what these two thinkers refer to as “reflexive intellective intuitive cognition”. Although framed in the technical terminology of late-medieval cognitive psychology, the basic question at issue between them is this: Does the mind (or “intellect”) cognize its (...) own states via higher-order (or “reflexive”) representational states? Their debate is representative both because it highlights the central dialectical issues and alternatives at play in medieval discussions of consciousness generally and because it showcases the two main types of approach to consciousness one finds in the later medieval period, namely, those that explain consciousness in terms of intentionality (typically, higher-order intentionality), and those that understand consciousness as a non-intentional, sui-generis mode of awareness. (shrink)

This paper argues in the first place that nominalists are right in insisting against ontological realists that semantic universality does not require commitment to universal entities. However, Ockham, in his zeal to get rid of Scotus’s universal entities, swept under the carpet the issue of universal representational content of genuinely universal symbols, conflating it with the mere indifference of the information content of non-distinctive singular representations. Buridan did come up with an abstractionist theory of the formation of genuinely universal representational (...) content to solve the resulting issues, however, the paper argues further, his solution is committed to attributing the sort of “aspectuality” to universal absolute concepts that his Ockhamist semantics denies to them. The conclusion of the paper suggests how Aquinas’s “moderate realism” can provide a consistent solution without the ontological extravaganza of ontological realists, without conflating the mere indifference of singular representation with genuine universality, and without having to deny aspectuality to our quidditative universal concepts formed by abstraction. (shrink)

This thesis provides a new analysis of early contributions to the development of the theory of absolute time—the notion that time exists independently of the presence or actions of material bodies and has no material cause. Though popularly attributed to Newton, I argue that this conception of time first appeared in medieval philosophy, as a solution to a peculiar theological problem generated by a widespread misrepresentation of Aristotle. I trace the subsequent evolution of the theory of absolute time through to (...) the seventeenth-century, and argue that Newton, if anything, retreats from a full endorsement of the doctrine. (shrink)

We lay out the fatalist’s argument, making sure to clarify which dialectical moves are available to the libertarian. We then offer a more robust presentation of Ockhamism, responding to obvious objections and teasing out the implications of the view. At this point, we discuss presentism and eternalism in more detail. We then present our argument for the claim that the libertarian cannot take Ockham’s way out of the fatalism argument unless she rejects presentism. Finally, we consider and dispense with objections (...) to our argument. In the end, it ought to be clear that the libertarian must make a choice between Ockham’s way out and presentism. (shrink)

In this paper I examine William Ockham’s theory of judgment and, in particular, his account of the nature and ontological status of its objects. Commentators, both past and present, habitually interpret Ockham as defending a kind of anti-realism about objects of judgment. My aim in this paper is two-fold. The first is to show that the traditional interpretation rests on a failure to appreciate the ways in which Ockham’s theory of judgment changes over the course of his career. The second, (...) and larger, aim is to show that careful attention to these changes in Ockham’s account (and to the motivations for them) sheds new light on broader developments in his philosophy of mind—specifically, on his views about the nature of concepts and on his account of the nature and structure of intentionality itself. (shrink)

In this paper I challenge recent externalist interpretations of Ockham’s theory of intuitive cognition. I begin by distinguishing two distinct theses that defenders of the externalist interpretation typically attribute to Ockham: a ‘direct reference thesis’, according to which intuitive cognitions are states that lack all internal, descriptive content; and a ‘causal thesis’, according to which intuitive states are wholly determined by causal connections they bear to singular objects. I then argue that neither can be plausibly credited to Ockham. In particular, (...) I claim that the causal thesis doesn’t square with Ockham’s account of supernaturally produced intuition and that the direct reference thesis sits uneasily with Ockham’s characterization of the intentional structure of intuitive states. (shrink)

This article focuses on one aspect of the late mediaeval debate over divine power, as it was discussed by Oxford philosophers Walter Chatton (d. 1343) and William Ockham (d. 1347). Chatton and Ockham would have agreed, for example, that God is ultimately responsible for the existence of the works of Pablo Picasso, but they would not agree over wheher it violates God's omnipotence to say that he cannot make something that Picasso made, for example, the painting Guernica, without using Picasso (...) himself as an intermediate cause. The context of their dispute was a larger debate regarding the ontological status of relations. This article (1) explains how these two issues, omnipotence and relations, became so interestingly tangled together, (2) tries to see which of the two men mentioned above got the better of their exchange, and finally (3) draws out some important consequences for fourteenth-century discussions of causality, occasionalism, and omnipotence. (shrink)

The quodlibetal collection sat Oxford in the are fourteenth century are discussed.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Cambridge Companion to OckhamJeffrey E. BrowerPaul Vincent Spade, editor. The Cambridge Companion to Ockham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xii + 400. Cloth, $54.95.Contemporary analytic philosophers have always been among the most enthusiastic audiences for the volumes in the Cambridge Companion series. And of all the great philosophers of the Middle Ages, perhaps none has appealed more to their sensibilities than William Ockham. It is fitting, (...) therefore, that after the publication of the Companion to Aquinas—the first volume in the series devoted to a medieval philosopher—there should appear a Companion to Ockham.The fifteen chapters comprising this volume survey the entire range of Ockham's thought and may conveniently be divided into four main parts. The first part (chaps. 2-7) deals with Ockham's most enduring legacy: his contribution to issues falling within the domain of logic, philosophy of language, and metaphysics. The second part (chaps. 8-9) is devoted to issues in epistemology and philosophy of mind/cognition. The third part (chaps. 10-13) focuses on Ockham's views in ethics, action theory, and political philosophy. And the fourth part (chaps. 14-15) considers aspects of his philosophical theology. In addition, there is also an historical chapter (chap. 1), placing Ockham's life and works in their late-medieval intellectual context, and a brief editor's introduction, including a very useful list of all Ockham's writings, together with the best (sometimes, the only) Latin editions and English translations available.The volume is well organized and beautifully conceived. Some chapters are quite difficult, and in places contain material that is likely to be unfamiliar even to specialists in medieval philosophy. But the way in which they have been organized maximizes their usefulness and accessibility to specialists and non-specialists alike. The earlier parts of the volume lay the foundation for later ones, and the individual chapters within each part are arranged so as to build on and complement one another. This is perhaps most evident in the five chapters comprising the first part. Calvin Normore's presentation ofOckham's logic (in chap. 2) nicely prepares the reader for Claude Panaccio's discussion (in chap. 3) of Ockham's theory of mental language. Panaccio's chapter, in turn, provides the framework for David Chalmer's analysis (in chap. 4) of the debate over whether [End Page 588] Ockham's mental language permits synonymous expressions. Again, these three chapters taken together provide important background for Paul Spade's treatment (in chap. 5) of Ockham's views in metaphysics, which are closely related to his logic and philosophy of language. Finally, Gyula Klima's discussion (in chap. 6) ofhow Ockham's views in semantics and ontology differ from those of his predecessors, and André Goddu's discussion (in chap. 7) of Ockham's philosophy of nature, can be fully appreciated only against the background of the preceding chapters.What is perhaps most impressive about the volume, however, is the extent to which it succeeds at providing a systematic introduction to Ockham's philosophical achievement. All the chapters are, to some extent, concerned with matters of textual analysis and interpretation. But most of them involve much more than a mere survey of Ockham's texts. For example, in each of the four main parts, there is at least one chapter that attempts to locate Ockham's views in relation to those of his predecessors or contemporaries (such as Aquinas and Scotus), with the result that we get a sense of Ockham's place in the major medieval debates to which he contributed. At the same time, the volume introduces us to some of the most lively current debates in Ockham scholarship. It does this, not merely by summarizing them, but by actually carrying them out over the course of its chapters. For example, Eleonore Stump provides a sophisticated defense (in chap. 8) of what has become a standard interpretation of Ockham's theory of intuitive and abstractive cognition. In the following chapter, however, Elizabeth Karger rejects the standard interpretation on the basis of a re-reading of certain key texts. Again, in the first part of the volume there is a running debate... (shrink)

(Warning: juvenalia from a grad student journal!). On whether Ockham's nominalism is really nominalistic and whether it faces some of the same problems as later nominalisms. -/- .

Elizabeth Karger has suggested an interpretation of Ockham's theory of the modes of common personal supposition ("TM") according to which the purpose of TM is to provide certain distinctions that Ockham will use in formulating a unified theory of immediate inference among certain kinds of sentences. Karger presents a single, powerful rule of inference that incorporates TM distinctions and that is meant to codify Ockham's theory of immediate inference. I raise an objection to Karger's rule, thereby calling into doubt the (...) interpretation of Ockham that is based on attributing that rule to him. (shrink)

William of Ockham seems to have endorsed the view (i) that a whole is its parts, (ii) that some things are such that whether they together compose a whole is contingent, and (iii) that parts are ontologically prior to the whole they compose. Ockhamist Composition as Identity is the conjunction of these three claims. It seems doubly absurd since Leibniz’s Law arguments can be run against both the conjunction of (i) and (ii) and that of (i) and (iii). In this (...) article, I appeal to recent developments in counterpart theory to block these arguments and adequately interpret the Ockhamist version of the view that composition is identity. (shrink)