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  1. The Elusive Experience of Agency.Robert E. Briscoe - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):262-267.
    I here present some doubts about whether Mandik’s (2010) proposed intermediacy and recurrence constraints are necessary and sufficient for agentive experience. I also argue that in order to vindicate the conclusion that agentive experience is an exclusively perceptual phenomenon (Prinz, 2007), it is not enough to show that the predictions produced by forward models of planned motor actions are conveyed by mock sensory signals. Rather, it must also be shown that the outputs of “comparator” mechanisms that compare these predictions against (...)
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  • Toward a Unified View of Cognitive Control.Dario D. Salvucci & Niels A. Taatgen - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):227-230.
    Allen Newell (1973) once observed that psychology researchers were playing “twenty questions with nature,” carving up human cognition into hundreds of individual phenomena but shying away from the difficult task of integrating these phenomena with unifying theories. We argue that research on cognitive control has followed a similar path, and that the best approach toward unifying theories of cognitive control is that proposed by Newell, namely developing theories in computational cognitive architectures. Threaded cognition, a recent theory developed within the ACT-R (...)
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  • Is Music Conscious? The Argument From Motion, and Other Considerations.Kevin O'Regan - 2017 - Psychomusicology: Music, Mind, and Brain 27 (4):327-333.
    Music is often described in anthropomorphic terms. This paper suggests that if we think about music in certain ways we could think of it as conscious. Motional characteristics give music the impression of being alive, but musical motion is conventionally taken as metaphorical. The first part of this paper argues that metaphor may not be the exclusive means of understanding musical motion – there could also be literal ways. Discussing kinds of consciousness, particularly “access consciousness” (Block 1995), the second part (...)
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  • Just Doing What I Do: On the Awareness of Fluent Agency.James M. Dow - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (1):155-177.
    Hubert Dreyfus has argued that cases of absorbed bodily coping show that there is no room for self-awareness in flow experiences of experts. In this paper, I argue against Dreyfus’ maxim of vanishing self-awareness by suggesting that awareness of agency is present in expert bodily action. First, I discuss the phenomenon of absorbed bodily coping by discussing flow experiences involved in expert bodily action: merging into the flow; immersion in the flow; emergence out of flow. I argue against the claim (...)
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  • Control of Perception Should Be Operationalized as a Fundamental Property of the Nervous System.Warren Mansell - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):257-261.
    This commentary proposes that “cognitive control” is neither componential nor emergent, but a fundamental feature of behavior. The term “control” requires an operational definition. This is best provided by the negative feedback loop that utilizes behavior to control perception; it does not control behavior per se. In order to model complex cognitive control, Perceptual Control Theory proposes that loops are organized into a dissociable hierarchical network (PCT; Powers, Clark, & McFarland, 1960; Powers, 1973a, 2008). In this way, behavior is dynamically (...)
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  • Processes Versus Representations: Cognitive Control as Emergent, Yet Componential.Eddy J. Davelaar - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):247-252.
    In this commentary, I focus on the difference between processes and representations and how this distinction relates to the question of what is controlled. Despite some views that task switching is a prototypical control process, the analysis concludes that task switching depends on the task goal representation and that control processes are there to prevent goal representations from disintegrating. Over time, these processes become obsolete, leaving behind a representation that automatically controls task performance. The distinction between processes and representations relates (...)
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  • Agentive Awareness is Not Sensory Awareness.Myrto I. Mylopoulos - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):761-780.
    In this paper, I argue that the conscious awareness one has of oneself as acting, i.e., agentive awareness, is not a type of sensory awareness. After providing some set up in Sect. 1, I move on in Sect. 2 to sketch a profile of sensory agentive experiences as representational states with sensory qualities by which we come to be aware of ourselves as performing actions. In Sect. 3, I critique two leading arguments in favor of positing such sensory experiences: the (...)
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  • Why Reject a Sensory Imagery Theory of Control Consciousness?Myrto I. Mylopoulos - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):268-272.
    Mandik (2010) defends a motor theory of control consciousness according to which nonsensory states, like motor commands, directly contribute to the awareness we have of ourselves as being in control of our actions. Along the way, he argues that his theory is to be preferred over Prinz’s (2007) sensory imagery theory, which denies that nonsensory states play any direct role in the generation of control consciousness. I argue that Mandik’s criticisms of Prinz’s theory fall short, but that nonetheless there are (...)
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