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  1. Socially Extended Knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):282-298.
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  • The Epistemological Bases of the Slow Switching Argument.Mahmoud Morvarid - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):17-38.
    One of the main arguments intended to show that content externalism undermines the privileged access thesis is the ‘slow switching argument’, originally proposed by Boghossian. In this argument, it is supposed that a subject is unknowingly switched back and forth between Earth and Twin Earth: then it is claimed that, given externalism, when the subject is on Earth thinking that water is wet, he cannot know the content of his thought a priori, for he cannot, by mere reflection, rule out (...)
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  • Who Knows?Avner Baz - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):201-223.
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  • How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions.Mikkel Gerken - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):223-234.
    I discuss Lawlor’s Austinian account of knowledge ascriptions and argue that it is a brand of pragmatic encroachment. I then criticize the motivation for pragmatic encroachment theories that derives from assumptions about the functional role of knowledge ascriptions. I argue that this criticism also apply to contextualist followers of Craig. Finally, I suggest that the central lesson from reflection on the communicative functions of knowledge ascriptions is that they, upon reflection, motivate traditional invariantism.
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  • Skeptical Challenges and Knowing Actions.Stephen Hetherington - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):18-39.
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  • Why Not Believe in an Evil God? Pragmatic Encroachment and Some Implications for Philosophy of Religion.Anastasia Philippa Scrutton - 2016 - Religious Studies 52 (3):345-360.
    Pointing to broad symmetries between the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent and all-good, and the idea that God is omniscient, omnipotent but all-evil, the evil-God challenge raises the question of why theists should prefer one over the other. I respond to this challenge by drawing on a recent theory in epistemology, pragmatic encroachment, which asserts that practical considerations can alter the epistemic status of beliefs. I then explore some of the implications of my argument for how we do philosophy (...)
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  • Hill on Epistemology.Matthew McGrath - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (3):841-849.
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  • The Ethics of Belief.Berislav Marušić - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):33-43.
    The ethics of belief is concerned with the question what we should believe. According to evidentialism, one should believe something if and only if one has adequate evidence for what one believes. According to classic pragmatism, other features besides evidence, such as practical reasons, can make it the case that one should believe something. According to a new kind of pragmatism, some epistemic notions may depend on one’s practical interests, even if what one should believe is independent of one’s practical (...)
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  • Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and Epistemic Agency.Baron Reed - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):40-69.
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  • The Knowledge Rule and the Action Rule.Brian Ball - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):552-574.
    In this paper I compare Timothy Williamson's knowledge rule of assertion with Ishani Maitra and Brian Weatherson's action rule. The paper is in two parts. In the first part I present and respond to Maitra and Weatherson's master argument against the knowledge rule. I argue that while its second premise, to the effect that an action X can be the thing to do though one is in no position to know that it is, is true, its first premise is not: (...)
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  • Fallibilism, Closure, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Adam Zweber - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2745-2757.
    I argue that fallibilism, single-premise epistemic closure, and one formulation of the “knowledge-action principle” are inconsistent. I will consider a possible way to avoid this incompatibility, by advocating a pragmatic constraint on belief in general, rather than just knowledge. But I will conclude that this is not a promising option for defusing the problem. I do not argue here for any one way of resolving the inconsistency.
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  • What Liars Can Tell Us About the Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasoning.Don Fallis - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):347-367.
    If knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning, then we should be able to alter people's behavior by affecting their knowledge as well as by affecting their beliefs. Thus, as Roy Sorensen (2010) suggests, we should expect to find people telling lies that target knowledge rather than just lies that target beliefs. In this paper, however, I argue that Sorensen's discovery of “knowledge-lies” does not support the claim that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. First, I use a Bayesian (...)
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  • Are Perceptions Reached by Rational Inference? Comments on Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception.Christopher Peacocke - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (4):751-760.
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  • Conclusive Reasons, Knowledge, and Action.John A. Barker & Fred Adams - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):35-52.
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  • Knowledge and Practical Reasoning.Igor Douven - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):101-118.
    The idea that knowledge is conceptually related to practical reasoning is becoming increasingly popular. In defending this idea, philosophers have been relying on a conception of practical reasoning that drastically deviates from one which has been more traditionally advocated in analytic philosophy and which assigns no special role to knowledge. This paper argues that these philosophers have failed to give good reasons for thinking that the conception of practical reasoning they have been assuming is the right one, and that hence (...)
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  • Engel on Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1477-1486.
    I discuss Engel’s critique of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology and his related discussion of epistemic value. While I am sympathetic to Engel’s remarks on the former, I think he makes a crucial misstep when he relates this discussion to the latter topic. The goal of this paper is to offer a better articulation of the relationship between these two epistemological issues, with the ultimate goal of lending further support to Engel’s scepticism about pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. As we will see, (...)
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  • Cognitive Diversity and Epistemic Norms.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):326-342.
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