Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Cooperative activity, shared intention, and exploitation.Olle Blomberg & Erik Malmqvist - 2024 - Ethics 134 (3):387-401.
    Jules Salomone-Sehr argues that an activity is cooperative if and only if, roughly, it consists of several participants’ actions that are (i) coordinated for a common purpose (ii) in ways that do not undermine any participant’s agency. He argues that guidance by shared intention is neither necessary nor sufficient for cooperation. Thereby, he claims to “topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory." In response, we argue that Salomone-Sehr’s account captures another notion of cooperation than the sociopsychological notion shared agency theory (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)Two Dimensions of Responsibility: Quality and Competence of Will.Taylor Madigan - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-14.
    Pure quality of will theories claim that ‘the ultimate object’ of our responsibility responses (i.e., praise and blame) is the quality of our will. Any such theory is false—or so I argue. There is a second dimension of (moral) responsibility, independent of quality of will, that our responsibility responses track and take as their object—namely, how adroitly we are able to translate our will into action; I call this competence of will. I offer a conjectural explanation of the two dimensions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Shared Agency and Mutual Obligations: A Pluralist Account.Jules Salomone - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):1120-1140.
    Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants’ resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher and lower degrees of involvement. Obligations to do one's bit might provide our (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Conditional Intentions and Shared Agency.Matthew Rachar - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):271-288.
    Shared agency is a distinctive kind of sociality that involves interdependent planning, practical reasoning, and action between participants. Philosophical reflection suggests that agents engage in this form of sociality when a special structure of interrelated psychological attitudes exists between them, a set of attitudes that constitutes a collective intention. I defend a new way to understand collective intention as a combination of individual conditional intentions. Revising an initial statement of the conditional intention account in response to several challenges leads to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Collective Intentions.Matthew Rachar & Jules Salomone - 2017 - In Mortimer Sellers & Stephan Kirste (eds.), Encyclopedia of the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Springer.
    This entry surveys main accounts of collective intentions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • How to be minimalist about shared agency.Jules Salomone-Sehr - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):155-178.
    What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared Intention Thesis, i.e., the claim that shared agency necessarily involves shared intentions. This article dissents from this orthodoxy and offers a minimalist account of shared agency—one where parties to shared activities need not form rich webs of interrelated psychological states. My account has two main components: a conceptual analysis of shared agency in terms of the notion of plan, and an explanation of undertheorized agency‐sharing mechanisms. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • (1 other version)Two Dimensions of Responsibility: Quality and Competence of Will.Taylor Madigan - 2024 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 10 (2):281-294.
    Pure quality of will theories claim that ‘the ultimate object’ of our responsibility responses (i.e., praise and blame) is the quality of our will. Any such theory is false—or so I argue. There is a second dimension of (moral) responsibility, independent of quality of will, that our responsibility responses track and take as their object—namely, how adroitly we are able to translate our will into action; I call this competence of will. I offer a conjectural explanation of the two dimensions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark