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  1. The Social Fabric of Understanding: Equilibrium, Authority, and Epistemic Empathy.Christoph Jäger & Federica Isabella Malfatti - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1185-1205.
    We discuss the social-epistemic aspects of Catherine Elgin’s theory of reflective equilibrium and understanding and argue that it yields an argument for the view that a crucial social-epistemic function of epistemic authorities is to foster understanding in their communities. We explore the competences that enable epistemic authorities to fulfil this role and argue that among them is an epistemic virtue we call “epistemic empathy”.
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  • The Weaknesses of Weak Preemptionism.Rico Hauswald - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):37-55.
    According to preemptionism, a layperson should treat the fact that an epistemic authority believes p as a reason to believe p that replaces her other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to them. Many authors have found the unqualified version of preemptionism, as defended by Linda Zagzebski, too strong. At the same time, a number of them have recently advocated weakened or qualified preemptionist accounts. In this paper, I criticise these accounts. I argue that some of (...)
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  • Epistemic Deference.Rico Hauswald - forthcoming - Grazer Philosophische Studien:1-39.
    _ Source: _Page Count 39 What is the correct epistemic stance that laypeople should take vis-a-vis epistemic authorities? The author provides an answer to this question based on a critical examination of Linda Zagzebski’s _Preemption Thesis_, according to which the fact that an authority has a belief p is a reason for a layperson to believe p that replaces her other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to them. In contrast, the author argues that _epistemic deference_ (...)
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  • Epistemische Deferenz.Rico Hauswald - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (4):436-474.
    What is the correct epistemic stance that laypeople should take vis-a-vis epistemic authorities? The author provides an answer to this question based on a critical examination of Linda Zagzebski’s Preemption Thesis, according to which the fact that an authority has a belief p is a reason for a layperson to believe p that replaces her other reasons relevant to believing p and is not simply added to them. In contrast, the author argues that epistemic deference requires a layperson to perform (...)
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