Switch to: References

Citations of:

Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement

Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen

American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):193-214 (2020)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

Recent Work on Skepticism in Epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (3):257-273.details This paper critically surveys 20 years of recent work on radical skepticism. It focuses on three key issues. First, it starts by exploring how philosophers have recently challenged our understanding of radical skeptical arguments. It then unpacks and critically evaluates some influential reactions to radical skepticism: structuralism, knowledge-first epistemology, epistemological disjunctivism, and hinge epistemology. Third, it explores some novel developments of pragmatism, like pragmatic skepticism, gauges its anti-skeptical import, and reflects on the ways in which radical skeptical epistemology and ethics (...) might meet. (shrink) Download Export citation Bookmark
On Social Defeat.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):719-734.details Influential cases have been provided that seem to suggest that one can fail to have knowledge because of the social environment. If not a distinct kind of social defeater, is there a uniquely social phenomenon that defeats knowledge? My aim in this paper is to explore these questions. I shall argue that despite initial appearances to the contrary, we have no reason to accept a special class of social defeater, nor any essentially social defeat phenomenon. We can explain putative cases (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Alethic Pluralism and the Value of Truth.Filippo Ferrari - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1):1–25.details I have two objectives in this paper. The first is to investigate whether, and to what extent, truth is valuable. I do this by first isolating the value question from other normative questions. Second, I import into the debate about the nature of truth some key distinctions hailing from value theory. This will help us to clarify the sense in which truth is valuable. I then argue that there is significant variability in the value of truth in different areas of (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
What Logical Evidence Could not be.Matteo Baggio - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (5):2559–2587.details By playing a crucial role in settling open issues in the philosophical debate about logical consequence, logical evidence has become the holy grail of inquirers investigating the domain of logic. However, despite its indispensable role in this endeavor, logical evidence has retained an aura of mystery. Indeed, there seems to be a great disharmony in conceiving the correct nature and scope of logical evidence among philosophers. In this paper, I examine four widespread conceptions of logical evidence to argue that all (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Unfamiliarity in Logic? How to Unravel McSweeney’s Dilemma for Logical Realism.Matteo Baggio - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-27.details Logical realism is the metaphysical view asserting that the facts of logic exist and are mind-and-language independent. McSweeney argues that if logical realism is true, we encounter a dilemma. Either we cannot determine which of the two logically equivalent theories holds a fundamental status, or neither theory can be considered fundamental. These two conclusions together constitute what is known as the Unfamiliarity Dilemma, which poses significant challenges to our understanding of the epistemological and metaphysical features of logic. In this article, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

1