Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Can Subjectivism Account for Degrees of Wellbeing?Willem van der Deijl & Huub Brouwer - forthcoming - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-22.
    Wellbeing describes how good life is for the person living it. Wellbeing comes in degrees. Subjective theories of wellbeing maintain that for objects or states of affairs to benefit us, we need to have a positive attitude towards these objects or states of affairs: the Resonance Constraint. In this article, we investigate to what extent subjectivism can plausibly account for degrees of wellbeing. There is a vast literature on whether preference-satisfaction theory – one particular subjective theory – can account for (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Can happiness measures be calibrated?Mats Ingelström & Willem van der Deijl - forthcoming - Synthese:1-28.
    Measures of happiness are increasingly being used throughout the social sciences. While these measures have attracted numerous types of criticisms, a crucial aspect of these measures has been left largely unexplored—their calibration. Using Eran Tal’s recently developed notion of calibration we argue first that the prospect of continued calibration of happiness measures is crucial for the science of happiness, and second, that continued calibration of happiness measures faces a particular problem—The Two Unknowns Problem. The Two Unknowns Problem relies on the (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Nomadic Concepts, Variable Choice, and the Social Sciences.Catherine Greene - 2020 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 50 (1):3-22.
    The observation that concepts used by social scientists are often problematic is not new; they have been described as Ballung concepts, cluster concepts, essentially contested, and reflexive; however, the need to work with these concepts remains. This article addresses the problem of variable choice in the social sciences by exploring and extending Woodward’s recommendations. This article demonstrates why Woodward’s criteria are difficult to apply in the social sciences and proposes an alternative, but complementary, framework for assessing variables.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Well-Being Coherentism.Gil Hersch - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Philosophers of well-being have tended to adopt a foundationalist approach to the question of theory and measurement, according to which theories are conceptually prior to measures. By contrast, social scientists have tended to adopt operationalist commitments, according to which they develop and refine well-being measures independently of any philosophical foundation. Unfortunately, neither approach helps us overcome the problem of coordinating between how we characterize wellbeing and how we measure it. Instead, we should adopt a coherentist approach to well-being science.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Sustainable Development and Well-Being: A Philosophical Challenge.Mollie Painter-Morland, Geert Demuijnck & Sara Ornati - 2017 - Journal of Business Ethics 146 (2):295-311.
    This paper aims at gaining a better understanding of the inherent paradoxes within sustainability discourses by investigating its basic assumptions. Drawing on a study of the metaphoric references operative in moral language, we reveal the predominance of the ‘well-being = wealth’ construct, which may explain the dominance of the ‘business case’ cognitive frame in sustainability discourses. We incorporate economic well-being variables within a philosophical model of becoming well :221–231, 2005), highlighting the way in which these variables consistently articulate a combination (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Happiness.Dan Haybron - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    There are roughly two philosophical literatures on “happiness,” each corresponding to a different sense of the term. One uses ‘happiness’ as a value term, roughly synonymous with well-being or flourishing. The other body of work uses the word as a purely descriptive psychological term, akin to ‘depression’ or ‘tranquility’. An important project in the philosophy of happiness is simply getting clear on what various writers are talking about: what are the important meanings of the term and how do they connect? (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations