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Global obligations, collective capacities, and ‘ought implies can’

Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1523-1538 (2020)

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The Problem of the First Belief : Group Agents and Responsibility.Onni Hirvonen - 2020 - Journal of Social Ontology 6 (1):1-20.details Attributing moral responsibility to an agent requires that the agent is a capable member of a moral community. Capable members of a moral community are often thought of as moral reasoners (or moral persons) and, thus, to attribute moral responsibility to collective agents would require showing that they are capable of moral reasoning. It is argued here that those theories that understand collective reasoning and collective moral agency in terms of collective decision-making and commitment – as is arguably the case (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
A Kantian Moral Response to Poverty.Violetta Igneski - 2023 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 26 (2):255-269.details Poverty is a global problem that is not only about material deprivation, but also a lack of agency and power. A Kantian response, with its focus on supporting the conditions of agency and empowerment, seems well suited to providing individuals with normative guidance on what their obligations are. The problem is that the guidance one finds within Kantian ethics is focused on the individual duty to aid or the duty to rescue, both of which have limited application in the context (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Abilities and Obligations: Lessons from Non-agentive Groups.Stephanie Collins - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (8):3375-3396.details Philosophers often talk as though each ability is held by exactly one agent. This paper begins by arguing that abilities can be held by groups of agents, where the group is not an agent. I provide a new argument for—and a new analysis of—non-agentive groups’ abilities. I then provide a new argument that, surprisingly, obligations are different: non-agentive groups cannot bear obligations, at least not if those groups are large-scale such as ‘humanity’ or ‘carbon emitters.’ This pair of conclusions is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Abilities and Obligations: Lessons from Non-agentive Groups.Stephanie Collins - 2022 - Erkenntnis 88 (8):3375-3396.details Philosophers often talk as though each ability is held by exactly one agent. This paper begins by arguing that abilities can be held by groups of agents, where the group is not an agent. I provide a new argument for—and a new analysis of—non-agentive groups’ abilities. I then provide a new argument that, surprisingly, obligations are different: non-agentive groups cannot bear obligations, at least not if those groups are large-scale such as ‘humanity’ or ‘carbon emitters.’ This pair of conclusions is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
Group motivation.Jessica Brown - 2022 - Noûs 56 (2):494-510.details In this paper I discuss a key issue for group moral responsibility, namely whether we can make sense of a group acting for one reason rather than another. The notion of acting for one reason rather than another is central to standard accounts of individual agency and responsibility; and also determines whether an individual is blameworthy or praiseworthy for an action. Thus if we model group responsibility on individual responsibility, we need to be able to make sense of a group (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation

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