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Temporal Experience

Journal of Philosophy 107 (7):333-359 (2010)

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  1. On Explaining Why Time Seems to Pass.Natalja Deng - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):367-382.
    Usually, the B-theory of time is taken to involve the claim that time does not, in reality, pass; after all, on the B-theory, nothing really becomes present and then more and more past, times do not come into existence successively, and which facts obtain does not change. For this reason, many B-theorists have recently tried to explain away one or more aspect(s) of experience that they and their opponents take to constitute an experience of time as passing. In this paper, (...)
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  • Time, Physics, and Philosophy: It’s All Relative.Sam Baron - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (1):e12466.
    This article provides a non-technical overview of the conflict between the special theory of relativity and the dynamic theories of time. The chief argument against dynamic theories of time from relativistic mechanics is presented. The space of current responses to that argument is subsequently mapped.
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  • The Dynamic Theory of Time and Time Travel to the Past.Ned Markosian - 2020 - Disputatio 12 (57):137-165.
    I argue that time travel to the past is impossible, given a certain metaphysical theory, namely, The Dynamic Theory of Time. I first spell out my particular way of capturing the difference between The Dynamic Theory of Time and its rival, The Static Theory of Time. Next I offer four different arguments for the conclusion that The Dynamic Theory is inconsistent with the possibility of time travel to the past. Then I argue that, even if I am wrong about this, (...)
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  • Explaining Temporal Qualia.Matt Farr - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-24.
    Experiences of motion and change are widely taken to have a ‘flow-like’ quality. Call this ‘temporal qualia’. Temporal qualia are commonly thought to be central to the question of whether time objectively passes: (1) passage realists take temporal passage to be necessary in order for us to have the temporal qualia we do; (2) passage antirealists typically concede that time appears to pass, as though our temporal qualia falsely represent time as passing. I reject both claims and make the case (...)
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  • Temporal Experience and the A Versus B Debate.Natalja Deng - 2017 - In Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience.
    This chapter discusses some aspects of the relation between temporal experience and the A versus B debate. To begin with, I provide an overview of the A versus B debate and, following Baron et al. (2015), distinguish between two B-theoretic responses to the A- theoretic argument from experience, veridicalism and illusionism. I then argue for veridicalism over illusionism, by examining our (putative) experiences as of presentness and as of time passing. I close with some remarks on the relation between veridicalism (...)
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  • Cognitive Metaphysics.Lieven Decock - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:1700.
    In recent years philosophers have been interested in the methodology of metaphysics. Most of these developments are related to formal work in logic or physics, often against the backdrop of the Carnap-Quine debate on ontology. Drawing on Quine’s later work, I argue that a psychological or cognitive perspective on metaphysical topics may be a valuable addition to contemporary metametaphysics. The method is illustrated by means of cognitive studies of the notions “identity,” “vagueness,” and “object” and is compared to other extant (...)
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  • On Believing That Time Does Not Flow, but Thinking That It Seems To.Kristie Miller, Alex Holcombe & Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42.
    Hoerl & McCormack posit two systems – the temporal updating system and the temporal reasoning system – and suggest that they explain an inherent contradiction in people's naïve theory of time. We suggest there is no contradiction. Something does, however, require explanation: the tension between certain sophisticated beliefs about time, and certain phenomenological states or beliefs about those phenomenological states. The temporal updating mechanism posited by H&M may contribute to this tension.
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  • Our Experience of Passage on the B-Theory.Natalja Deng - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):713-726.
    Elsewhere I have suggested that the B-theory includes a notion of passage, by virtue of including succession. Here, I provide further support for that claim by showing that uncontroversial elements of the B-theory straightforwardly ground a veridical sense of passage. First, I argue that the B-theory predicts that subjects of experience have a sense of passivity with respect to time that they do not have with respect to space, which they are right to have, even according to the B-theory. I (...)
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  • Seeing Motion and Apparent Motion.Christoph Hoerl - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (3):676-702.
    In apparent motion experiments, participants are presented with what is in fact a succession of two brief stationary stimuli at two different locations, but they report an impression of movement. Philosophers have recently debated whether apparent motion provides evidence in favour of a particular account of the nature of temporal experience. I argue that the existing discussion in this area is premised on a mistaken view of the phenomenology of apparent motion and, as a result, the space of possible philosophical (...)
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  • Dynamic perceptual completion and the dynamic snapshot view to help solve the ‘two times’ problem.Ronald P. Gruber, Ryan P. Smith & Richard A. Block - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (4):773-790.
    Perceptual completion fills the gap for discrete perception to become continuous. Similarly, dynamic perceptual completion provides an experience of dynamic continuity. Our recent discovery of the ‘happening’ element of DPC completes the total experience for dynamism in the flow of time. However, a phenomenological explanation for these experiences is essential. The Snapshot Hypotheses especially the Dynamic Snapshot View provides the most comprehensive explanation. From that understanding the ‘two times’ problem can be addressed. The static time of spacetime cosmologies has been (...)
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  • Like Giants Immersed in Time. Ontology, Phenomenology, and Marcel Proust.Maurizio Ferraris & Enrico Terrone - 2019 - Rivista di Estetica 70:92-106.
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  • I Am a Lot of Things: A Pluralistic Account of the Self.Jiri Benovsky - 2014 - Metaphysica, An International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 15 (1):113-127.
    When I say that I am a lot of things, I mean it literally and metaphysically speaking. The Self, or so I shall argue, is a plurality (notwithstanding the fact that ordinary language takes "the Self" to be a singular term – but, after all, language is only language). It is not a substance or a substratum, and it is not a collection or a bundle. The view I wish to advocate for is a kind of reductionism, in line with (...)
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  • Experiencing (in) Time.Jack Shardlow - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Warwick
    In this thesis I present a phenomenological investigation of our experience of time – of things as they fall within time – and suggest that something important goes missing in recent debates. This is the notion of a point of view. I believe that articulating the sense in which we have a point of view in time, and what this is a point of view upon, is crucial to an account of how things are for an experiencing subject. In the (...)
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  • Temporal Experience, Temporal Passage and the Cognitive Sciences.Samuel Baron, John Cusbert, Matt Farr, Maria Kon & Kristie Miller - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (8):560-571.
    Cognitive science has recently made some startling discoveries about temporal experience, and these discoveries have been drafted into philosophical service. We survey recent appeals to cognitive science in the philosophical debate over whether time objectively passes. Since this research is currently in its infancy, we identify some directions for future research.
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  • XII—Perceiving the Passing of Time.Ian Phillips - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):225-252.
    Duration distortions familiar from trauma present an apparent counterexample to what we might call the naive view of duration perception. I argue that such distortions constitute a counterexample to naiveté only on the assumption that we perceive duration absolutely. This assumption can seem mandatory if we think of the alternative, relative view as limiting our awareness to the relative durations of perceptually presented events. However, once we recognize the constant presence of a stream of non‐perceptual conscious mental activity, we can (...)
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  • Experience, Thought, and the Metaphysics of Time.Simon Prosser - 2013 - In Kasia M. Jaszczolt & Louis de Saussure (eds.), Time: Language, Cognition & Reality. Oxford University Press. pp. 1--157.
    In this chapter I argue that there can be no mental representation of objective ‘tensed’ features of reality of the kind that might be thought to occur when we experience time passing or think of times as past, present or future, whether or not such features are part of mind-independent reality. This, I hold, has important consequences for metaphysics; but (as will be most relevant to this volume) it is also likely to have important consequences for a correct semantics for (...)
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  • Experience and the Passage of Time.Bradford Skow - 2011 - Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):359-387.
    Some philosophers believe that the passage of time is a real phenomenon. And some of them find a reason to believe this when they attend to features of their conscious experience. In fact this “argument from experience” is supposed to be one of the main arguments for passage. What exactly does this argument look like? Is it any good?
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  • First Personal Modes of Presentation and the Structure of Empathy.L. A. Paul - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):189-207.
    I argue that we can understand the de se by employing the subjective mode of presentation or, if one’s ontology permits it, by defending an abundant ontology of perspectival personal properties or facts. I do this in the context of a discussion of Cappelen and Dever’s recent criticisms of the de se. Then, I discuss the distinctive role of the first personal perspective in discussions about empathy, rational deference, and self-understanding, and develop a way to frame the problem of lacking (...)
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  • Do We (Seem to) Perceive Passage?Christoph Hoerl - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):188-202.
    I examine some recent claims put forward by L. A. Paul, Barry Dainton and Simon Prosser, to the effect that perceptual experiences of movement and change involve an (apparent) experience of ‘passage’, in the sense at issue in debates about the metaphysics of time. Paul, Dainton and Prosser all argue that this supposed feature of perceptual experience – call it a phenomenology of passage – is illusory, thereby defending the view that there is no such a thing as passage, conceived (...)
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  • Time and the Domain of Consciousness.Christoph Hoerl - 2014 - Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1326:90-96.
    It is often thought that there is little that seems more obvious from experience than that time objectively passes, and that time is, in this respect, quite unlike space. Yet nothing in the physical picture of the world seems to correspond to the idea of such an objective passage of time. In this paper, I discuss some attempts to explain this apparent conflict between appearance and reality. I argue that existing attempts to explain the conflict as the result of a (...)
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  • ‘Beyond A- and B-Time’ Reconsidered.Natalja Deng - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (4):741-753.
    This article is a response to Clifford Williams’s claim that the debate between A- and B theories of time is misconceived because these theories do not differ. I provide some missing support for Williams’s claim that the B-theory includes transition, by arguing that representative B-theoretic explanations for why we experience time as passing (even though it does not) are inherently unstable. I then argue that, contra Williams, it does not follow that there is nothing at stake in the A- versus (...)
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  • The Elusive Appearance of Time.Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson - 2013 - In Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng & Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson (eds.), Johanssonian Investigations. Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday. Ontos Verlag. pp. 5--304.
    It is widely assumed that time appears to be tensed, i.e. divided into a future, present and past, and transitory, i.e. involving some kind of ‘flow’ or ‘passage’ of times or events from the future into the present and away into the distant past. In this paper I provide some reasons to doubt that time appears to be tensed and transitory, or at least that philosophers who have suggested that time appears to be that way have included in ‘appearance’ everything (...)
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  • Time.Jonathan Tallant - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):369-379.
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  • The Delusive Illusion of Passage.Emiliano Boccardi & Federico Perelda - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):387-396.
    We argue that the view that we misperceive time as passing is self-undermining.
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  • Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12).
    Debunking arguments—also known as etiological arguments, genealogical arguments, access problems, isolation objec- tions, and reliability challenges—arise in philosophical debates about a diverse range of topics, including causation, chance, color, consciousness, epistemic reasons, free will, grounding, laws of nature, logic, mathematics, modality, morality, natural kinds, ordinary objects, religion, and time. What unifies the arguments is the transition from a premise about what does or doesn't explain why we have certain mental states to a negative assessment of their epistemic status. I examine (...)
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  • Experience, Metaphysics, and Cognitive Science.L. A. Paul - 2016 - In Justin Sytsma & Wesley Buckwalter (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Wiley. pp. 419-433.
    This chapter presents an opinionated account of how to understand the contributions of experience, especially with respect to the role of cognitive science, in developing and assessing metaphysical theories of reality. I develop a methodological basis for the idea that, independently of work in experimental philosophy focused on explications of concepts, contemporary metaphysical theories with a role for experiential evidence can be fruitfully connected to empirical work in psychology, especially cognitive science. My argument is not that cognitive science should replace (...)
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  • Temporal Naturalism: Reconciling the “4Ms” and Points of View Within a Robust Liberal Naturalism.Jack Reynolds - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (1):1-21.
    In the past generation, various philosophers have been concerned with the so-called “placement problem” for naturalism. The problem has taken on the shorthand alliteration of the 4Ms, since Mind/Mentality, Meaning, Morality, and Modality/Mathematics are four important phenomena that are difficult to place within orthodox construals of naturalism, typified by physicalism and a methodological preference for ways of knowing associated with the natural sciences. In this paper I highlight the importance of temporality to this ostensibly forced choice between naturalism and the (...)
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  • Keeping Postdiction Simple.Valtteri Arstila - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 38:205-216.
    abstract Postdiction effects are phenomena in which a stimulus influences the appearance of events taking place before it. In metacontrast masking, for instance, a masking stimulus can ren- der a target stimulus shown before the mask invisible. This and other postdiction effects have been considered incompatible with a simple explanation according to which (i) our perceptual experiences are delayed for only the time it takes for a distal stimulus to reach our sensory receptors and for our neural mechanisms to process (...)
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  • Temporal Experience and Metaphysics.Graham Peebles - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (1):145-182.
    The well-known phenomenological argument draws metaphysical conclusions about time, specifically about change through time and the resulting passage or flow of time, from our temporal experience. The argument begins with the phenomenological premise that there is a class of properties which underlies our experience of time and change through time, and its conclusion is that these properties are not merely experienced but exemplified. I argue that the phenomenological argument is best served by the adoption of a representational theory of perception. (...)
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  • The Passage of Time and its Enemies: An Introduction to Time and Reality II.Emiliano Boccardi - 2017 - Manuscrito 40 (1):5-41.
    ABSTRACT This essay is a critical introduction to the second part of the special issue Time and Reality. The volume contains responses to papers appeared in the first part, as well as many original articles. The aim of this introduction is to frame these works within the general arena of the philosophy of time, highlighting a number of recurrent themes. A central theme that emerges is a difficulty in pinning down the ontological structure underlying dynamicity and passage without postulating a (...)
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  • What Experience Cannot Teach Us About Time.Akiko M. Frischhut - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):143-155.
    Does the A-theory have an intuitive advantage over the B-theory? Many A-theorists have claimed so, arguing that their theory has a much better explanation for the fact that we all experience the passage of time: we experience time as passing because time really does pass. In this paper I expose and reject the argument behind the A-theorist’s claim. I argue that all parties have conceded far too easily that there is an experience that needs explaining in the first place. For (...)
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  • The Evolutionary Origins of Tensed Language and Belief.Heather Dyke - 2011 - Biology and Philosophy 26 (3):401-418.
    I outline the debate in metaphysics between those who believe time is tensed and those who believe it is tenseless. I describe the terms in which this debate has been carried out, and the significance to it of ordinary tensed language and widespread common sense beliefs that time is tensed. I then outline a case for thinking that our intuitive beliefs about tense constitute an Adaptive Imaginary Representation (Wilson, in Biol Philos 5:37–62, 1990; Wilson, in Biol Philos 10:77–97, 1995). I (...)
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  • Presentism and the Specious Present: From Temporal Experience to Meta‐Metaphysics.Olla Solomyak - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):247-266.
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  • Theories of Apparent Motion.Valtteri Arstila - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):337-358.
    Apparent motion is an illusion in which two sequentially presented and spatially separated stimuli give rise to the experience of one moving stimulus. This phenomenon has been deployed in various philosophical arguments for and against various theories of consciousness, time consciousness and the ontology of time. Nevertheless, philosophers have continued working within a framework that does not reflect the current understanding of apparent motion. The main objectives of this paper are to expose the shortcomings of the explanations provided for apparent (...)
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  • Phenomenal Feel as Process.L. A. Paul - 2017 - Philosophical Issues 27 (1):204-222.
    Phenomenal character is the what-it's-likeness of subjective experience. I develop an ontology of phenomenal feel as process. My being in some phenomenal state R is the process of my instantiating R’s neurological correlate. The ontology explains why we have asymmetric epistemic access to phenomenal characters: the ontological ground for the subjective or first-personal stance is different from the ontological ground for the objective or third-personal stance. I end by situating my account in debates about physicalism.
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  • The Grounding Problem for Eternalism.Thorben Petersen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1819-1852.
    In this paper, I develop an argument against eternalism, which is similar to the widely discussed grounding problem for presentism. It has recently been argued by many that presentism should be rejected on grounds that its sparse ontology is not suited to underwrite the healthy dose of realism we all share about the past. My aim basically is to add a new twist to the debate, by showing that actually eternalists are no better off than their rivals. In particular, I (...)
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  • Time.Ned Markosian - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Discussions of the nature of time, and of various issues related to time, have always featured prominently in philosophy, but they have been especially important since the beginning of the 20th Century. This article contains a brief overview of some of the main topics in the philosophy of time — Fatalism; Reductionism and Platonism with respect to time; the topology of time; McTaggart's arguments; The A Theory and The B Theory; Presentism, Eternalism, and The Growing Universe Theory; time travel; and (...)
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  • The Experience and Perception of Time.Robin Le Poidevin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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