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  1. Incommensurability in cognitive guise.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (1):29 – 43.
    Philosophers and historians of science have made the claim that successive scientific theories are incommensurable, that is, that many or all of their concepts fail to coincide. This claim has been echoed by cognitive psychologists who have applied it to the successive conceptual schemes of young children, or of children and adults. This paper examines the psychological evidence for the claim and proposes ways of reinterpreting it which do not involve imputing incommensurability. An alternative approach to understanding conceptual change is (...)
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  • Lexical Concepts as Fluctuating Structures.Alyona Budnikova - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (1):135-153.
    Lexical concepts are viewed in the article as structures consisting of interrelated facets with different structural weight. The paper suggests a way to model the graded structure of lexical concepts by assessing the weight of each constituting facet according to its relevance for defining purposes, frequency of contextual profiling and salience in derivation processes. Thus, the approach taken exploits as many linguistic points of access to the concept as possible and uses three different dimensions to range its facets. The suggested (...)
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  • Conceptual role semantics, the theory theory, and conceptual change.Ingo Brigandt - 2004 - In Proceedings First Joint Conference of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology and the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Barcelona, Spain. Murcia: Universidad de Murcia. pp. 30-34.
    The purpose of the paper is twofold. I first outline a philosophical theory of concepts based on conceptual role semantics. This approach is explicitly intended as a framework for the study and explanation of conceptual change in science. Then I point to the close similarities between this philosophical framework and the theory theory of concepts, suggesting that a convergence between psychological and philosophical approaches to concepts is possible. An underlying theme is to stress that using a non-atomist account of concepts (...)
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  • A Theory of Conceptual Advance: Explaining Conceptual Change in Evolutionary, Molecular, and Evolutionary Developmental Biology.Ingo Brigandt - 2006 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    The theory of concepts advanced in the dissertation aims at accounting for a) how a concept makes successful practice possible, and b) how a scientific concept can be subject to rational change in the course of history. Traditional accounts in the philosophy of science have usually studied concepts in terms only of their reference; their concern is to establish a stability of reference in order to address the incommensurability problem. My discussion, in contrast, suggests that each scientific concept consists of (...)
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  • Are There Any Situated Cognition Concepts of Memory Functioning as Investigative Kinds in the Sciences of Memory?Ruth Hibbert - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Kent
    This thesis will address the question of whether there are any situated cognition concepts of memory functioning as investigative kinds in the sciences of memory. Situated cognition is an umbrella term, subsuming extended, embedded, embodied, enacted and distributed cognition. I will be looking closely at case studies of investigations into memory where such concepts seem prima facie most likely to be found in order to establish a) whether the researchers in question are in fact employing such concepts, and b) whether (...)
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