Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. In Defence of Weak Psychological Egoism.Mark Mercer - 2001 - Erkenntnis 55 (2):217-237.
    Weak psychological egoism is the doctrine that anything an agent does intentionally, that agent does at least expecting thereby to realize one of her self-regarding ends. (Strong psychological egoism, by contrast, is the doctrine that agents act always intending thereby to realize a self-regarding end.) Though weak psychological egoism is a doctrine ultimately answerable to empirical evidence, we presently have excellent a priori reasons for accepting it and attempting to construct psychological theories that include it as an organizing principle. These (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Because I Believe It’s the Right Thing to Do.Joshua May - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):791-808.
    Our beliefs about which actions we ought to perform clearly have an effect on what we do. But so-called “Humean” theories—holding that all motivation has its source in desire—insist on connecting such beliefs with an antecedent motive. Rationalists, on the other hand, allow normative beliefs a more independent role. I argue in favor of the rationalist view in two stages. First, I show that the Humean theory rules out some of the ways we ordinarily explain actions. This shifts the burden (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • VIII—Beyond Eros: Friendship in the "Phaedrus".Frisbee C. C. Sheffield - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (2pt2):251-273.
    It is often held that Plato did not have a viable account of interpersonal love. The account of eros—roughly, desire—in the Symposium appears to fail, and, though the Lysis contains much suggestive material for an account of philia—roughly, friendship—this is an aporetic dialogue, which fails, ultimately, to provide an account of friendship. This paper argues that Plato's account of friendship is in the Phaedrus. This dialogue outlines three kinds of philia relationship, the highest of which compares favourably to the Aristotelian (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Acrasia, Human Agency and Normative Psychology.Michael Kubara - 1975 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):215 - 232.
    Is acrasia possible? Can you do wrong knowingly? Opinion divides. Each, to the other side, is a paradox monger.At issue is the most felicitous set of concepts and principles to bring to descriptions and evaluations of human action. So to speak, such a set is an outline of a script for reality to play: it provides identities and relations in which individuals and events or whatever may be cast. Deniers typically begin with a set that rules acrasia out of court, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Prudential Reasons.D. Clayton Hubin - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):63 - 81.
    Several authors, including Thomas Nagel and David Gauthier, have defended the view that reasons of self-interest (prudential reasons) are rationally binding. That is, there is always a reason, bearing on the rational advisability, based on one's self-interest and, as a result, a person may act irrationally by knowingly acting against such reasons regardless of the person's desires or values. Both Nagel and Gauthier argue from the rationally mandatory nature of prudential reasons to the conclusion that moral reasons can be rationally (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Psychological Egoism.Joshua May - 2011 - Internet Encyclopeida of Philosophy.
    Provides an overview of the theory of psychological egoism—the thesis that we are all ultimately motivated by self-interest. Philosophical arguments for and against the view are considered as well as some empirical evidence.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Egoism.Robert Shaver - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Egoism can be a descriptive or a normative position. Psychological egoism, the most famous descriptive position, claims that each person has but one ultimate aim: her own welfare. Normative forms of egoism make claims about what one ought to do, rather than describe what one does do. Ethical egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to be morally right that it maximize one's self-interest. Rational egoism claims that it is necessary and sufficient for an action to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Apriorist Self-Interest: How It Embraces Altruism and is Not Vacuous.J. C. Lester - 1997 - Journal of Social and Evolutionary Systems 20 (3):221-232.
    This essay is part of an attempt to reconcile two extreme views in economics: the (neglected) subjective, apriorist approach and the (standard) objective, scientific (i.e., falsifiable) approach. The Austrian subjective view of value, building on Carl Menger’s theory of value, was developed into a theory of economics as being entirely an a priori theory of action. This probably finds its most extreme statement in Ludwig von Mises’ Human Action (1949). In contrast, the standard economic view has developed into making falsifiable (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Nietzsche's Critique of Pure Altruism—Developing an Argument From Human, All Too Human.Guy Elgat - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (3):308-326.
    Nietzsche often appears, especially in his writings from the middle period, to endorse psychological egoism, namely the claim that all actions are motivated by, and are for the sake of, the agent’s own self-interest. I argue that Nietzsche’s position in Human, All Too Human should not be so understood. Rather, he is claiming, more weakly and more plausibly, that no action is entirely unegoistic, entirely free of egoistic motivations. Thus some actions might be motivated both by egoistic and unegoistic motives, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What Truth is There in Psychological Egoism?Charles Sayward - 2006 - Facta Philosophica 8 (1-2):145-159.
    Psychological egoism says that a purposive action is self-interested in a certain sense. The trick is to say in what sense. On the one hand, the psychological egoist wants to avoid a thesis that can be falsified by trivial examples. On the other hand, what is wanted is a thesis that lacks vacuity. The paper’s purpose is to arrive at such a thesis and show that it is a reasonable guess with empirical content.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral Psychology: Empirical Approaches.John Doris & Stephen Stich - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Moral psychology investigates human functioning in moral contexts, and asks how these results may impact debate in ethical theory. This work is necessarily interdisciplinary, drawing on both the empirical resources of the human sciences and the conceptual resources of philosophical ethics. The present article discusses several topics that illustrate this type of inquiry: thought experiments, responsibility, character, egoism v . altruism, and moral disagreement.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • From Altruistic Donation to Conditional Societal Organ Appropriation After Death.Caroline Guibet Lafaye & Henri Kreis - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):355-368.
    Since we have learned that human organs can be used to treat severe health problems, only donation has been considered for organ procurement. Among the other possibilities that can be used after a person’s death, purchase or systematic removal have been a priori rejected. However, we will show that the appeal to individual altruism have resulted in some of the aporias of the present situation. Subsequently, we will consider how systematic organ removal from deceased persons can be made acceptable in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Individual Egoism as Motivation for Human Praxis.Maria L. Lukac De Stier - 1993 - Hobbes Studies 6 (1):43-57.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Peirce's Critique of Psychological Hedonism.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2015 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 23 (2):349-367.
    Psychological hedonism is the theory that all of our actions are ultimately motivated by a desire for our own pleasure or an aversion to our own pain. Peirce offers a unique critique of PH based on a descriptive analysis of self-controlled action. This essay examines Peirce's critique and his accounts of self-controlled action and of desire.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Hobbes’s State of Nature: A Modern Bayesian Game-Theoretic Analysis.hun CHung - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (3):485--508.
    Hobbes’s own justification for the existence of governments relies on the assumption that, without a government, our lives in the state of nature would result in a state of war of every man against every man. Many contemporary scholars have tried to explain why universal war is unavoidable in Hobbes’s state of nature by utilizing modern game theory. However, most game-theoretic models that have been presented so far do not accurately capture what Hobbes deems to be the primary cause of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations