Switch to: References

Citations of:

Confucianism and African Philosophy

In Toyin Falola & Adeshina Afolayan (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 207-222 (2017)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Symposium: Are Certain Knowledge Frameworks More Congenial to the Aims of Cross-Cultural Philosophy?Leigh Jenco, Steve Fuller, David H. Kim, Thaddeus Metz & Miljana Milojevic - 2017 - Journal of World Philosophies 2 (2):99-107.
    In “Global Knowledge Frameworks and the Tasks of Cross-Cultural Philosophy,” Leigh Jenco searches for the conception of knowledge that best justifies the judgment that one can learn from non-local traditions of philosophy. Jenco considers four conceptions of knowledge, namely, in catchwords, the esoteric, Enlightenment, hermeneutic, and self- transformative conceptions of knowledge, and she defends the latter as more plausible than the former three. In this critical discussion of Jenco’s article, I provide reason to doubt the self-transformative conception, and also advance (...)
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Confucian Harmony from an African Perspective.Thaddeus Metz - 2016 - African and Asian Studies 15 (1):1-22.
    Chenyang Li’s new book, The Philosophy of Confucian Harmony, has been heralded as the first book-length exposition of the concept of harmony in the approximately 3,000 year old Confucian tradition. It provides a systematic analysis of Confucian harmony and defence of its relevance for contemporary moral and political thought. In this philosophical discussion of Li’s book, I expound its central claims, contextualize them relative to other salient work in English-speaking Confucian thought, and critically reflect on them in light of a (...)
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Making Sense of Survivor’s Guilt: How to Justify It with an African Ethic.Thaddeus Metz - 2019 - In George Hull (ed.), Debating African Philosophy: Perspectives on Identity, Decolonial Ethics and Comparative Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 149-163.
    The default position in Western ethics is that survivor’s guilt is either irrational or not rational, i.e., that while survivor’s guilt might be understandable, it is not justified in the sense of there being good reason for a person to exhibit it. From a widely held perspective, for example, one ought to feel guilty only for having done wrong, and in a culpable way, which, by hypothesis, a mere survivor has not done. Typical is the following: ‘Strictly speaking, survivor guilt (...)
    Export citation