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  1. Constructing Embodied Emotion with Language: Moebius Syndrome and Face-Based Emotion Recognition Revisited.Hunter Gentry - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Some embodied theories of concepts state that concepts are represented in a sensorimotor manner, typically via simulation in sensorimotor cortices. Fred Adams (2010) has advanced an empirical argument against embodied concepts reasoning as follows. If concepts are embodied, then patients with certain sensorimotor impairments should perform worse on categorization tasks involving those concepts. Adams cites a study with Moebius Syndrome patients that shows typical categorization performance in face-based emotion recognition. Adams concludes that their typical performance shows that embodiment is false. (...)
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  • Rethinking Thinking About Thinking: Against a Pedagogical Imperative to Cultivate Metacognitive Skills.Lauren R. Alpert - 2021 - Dissertation, City College of New York (Cuny)
    In summaries of “best practices” for pedagogy, one typically encounters enthusiastic advocacy for metacognition. Some researchers assert that the body of evidence supplied by decades of education studies indicates a clear pedagogical imperative: that if one wants their students to learn well, one must implement teaching practices that cultivate students’ metacognitive skills. -/- In this dissertation, I counter that education research does not impose such a mandate upon instructors. We lack sufficient and reliable evidence from studies that use the appropriate (...)
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  • Merleau-Ponty and the transcendental problem of bodily agency.Rasmus Thybo Jensen - 2013 - In Rasmus Thybo Jensen & Dermot Moran (eds.), The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity, Contributions to Phenomenology 71. Springer. pp. 43-61.
    I argue that we find the articulation of a problem concerning bodily agency in the early works of the Merleau-Ponty which he explicates as analogous to what he explicitly calls the problem of perception. The problem of perception is the problem of seeing how we can have the object given in person through it perspectival appearances. The problem concerning bodily agency is the problem of seeing how our bodily movements can be the direct manifestation of a person’s intentions in the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Introduction to the special issue on 4E cognition.Richard Menary - 2010 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):459-463.
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  • How Radical Is Embodied Creativity? Implications of 4E Approaches for Creativity Research and Teaching.Laura H. Malinin - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:492290.
    Modern ideas of embodiment have been influential in cognitive science for the past several decades, yet there is minimal evidence of embodied cognition approaches in creativity research or pedagogical practices for teaching creativity skills. With creativity research in crisis due to conceptual, methodological, and theoretical issues, radical embodied cognitive science (RECS) may offer a framework to move the field forward. This conceptual analysis examines the current state of creativity research from the 4E (embodied, embedded, enactive, and extended) cognition and RECS (...)
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  • What’s New About Embodied Cognition?Lawrence Shapiro - 2012 - Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2).
    In the past twenty years, growing numbers of researchers have sought to steer cognitive science in a new direction. These researchers have emphasized the body’s role in cognition. Although the precise nature of this role often receives only vague description, perfectly clear is the idea that, whatever this role, the time has come for cognitive science to abandon old conceptions of the mind in favor of something new; and formerly trusted methods for its investigation must give way to novel techniques. (...)
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  • Conceptual and Biofunctional Embodiment: A Long Story on the Transience of the Enduring Mind.Asghar Iran-Nejad & Auriana B. Irannejad - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
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  • The New Mind: thinking beyond the head. [REVIEW]Riccardo Manzotti & Robert Pepperell - 2013 - AI and Society 28 (2):157-166.
    Throughout much of the modern period, the human mind has been regarded as a property of the brain and therefore something confined to the inside of the head—a view commonly known as ‘internalism’. But recent works in cognitive science, philosophy, and anthropology, as well as certain trends in the development of technology, suggest an emerging view of the mind as a process not confined to the brain but spread through the body and world—an outlook covered by a family of views (...)
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  • Biofunctional Understanding and Conceptual Control: Searching for Systematic Consensus in Systemic Cohesion.Asghar Iran-Nejad & Fareed Bordbar - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Language and embodiment—Or the cognitive benefits of abstract representations.Nikola A. Kompa - 2019 - Mind and Language 36 (1):27-47.
    Cognition, it is often heard nowadays, is embodied. My concern is with embodied accounts of language comprehension. First, the basic idea will be outlined and some of the evidence that has been put forward in their favor will be examined. Second, their empiricist heritage and their conception of abstract ideas will be discussed. Third, an objection will be raised according to which embodied accounts underestimate the cognitive functions language fulfills. The remainder of the paper will be devoted to arguing for (...)
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  • On some intracranialist dogmas in epistemology.J. Adam Carter - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):1-21.
    Research questions in mainstream epistemology often take for granted a cognitive internalist picture of the mind. Perhaps this is unsurprising given the seemingly safe presumptions that knowledge entails belief and that the kind of belief that knowledge entails supervenes exclusively on brainbound cognition. It will be argued here that the most plausible version of the entailment thesis holds just that knowledge entails dispositional belief. However, regardless of whether occurrent belief supervenes only as the cognitive internalist permits, we should reject the (...)
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  • In defence of embodied cognition: a reply to Fred Adams.Christopher Letheby - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):403-414.
    Fred Adams : 619–628, 2010) criticizes the theory of embodied cognition which holds that conceptual and linguistic thought is grounded in the brain’s perceptual and sensorimotor systems. Among other things, Adams claims that: EC is potentially committed to an implausible criterion of sentence meaningfulness; EC lacks claimed advantages over rival accounts of conceptual thought; relevant experimental data do not show constitutive, but only causal, involvement of perception in conception; and EC cannot account for the comprehension of abstract concepts. I respond (...)
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