This article discusses the status of necessity in an ontology that acknowledges only contingent events and objects, focusing particularly on the relationship between thought and necessity in an ontological framework where thought is seen as a contingent occurrence with a contingent structure. To this end, I closely analyse Deleuze’s criticisms of the Kantian transcendental project and his reworking of the Kantian notion of time and discuss Michael Ardoline's recent work on the relationship between difference and necessity. I make two main (...) claims. The first is that the pure form of time or difference is a transcendental condition for all events and entities (speculative temporalism). The second is that the future is ruled by radical consistency and has the potential to radically transform and destroy everything (enhanced Humeanism). I bring these two facets of Deleuze’s metaphysics of time to address the initial issue of the relationship between necessity and thought. Consequently, I argue that thinking can produce well-grounded necessities, but these well-grounded necessities remain ontologically precarious, as the conditions that sustain them are always subject to potential disruption and destruction in the future. (shrink)