- The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.details
|
|
Inquiry, Questions, and Actions.Benoit Guilielmo - forthcoming - Dialogue.details
|
|
When warrant transmits and when it doesn’t: towards a general framework.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2481-2503.details
|
|
.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2023 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.Timothy Bowen - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
|
|
A representationalist reading of Kantian intuitions.Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2169-2191.details
|
|
Non-Ideal Decision Theory.Sven Neth - 2023 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeleydetails
|
|
Epistemic modals and credal disagreement.Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):987-1011.details
|
|
Disagreement and Intellectual Scepticism.Andrew Rotondo - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):251-271.details
|
|
Endorsement and assertion.Will Fleisher - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):363-384.details
|
|
Essential Laws. On Ideal Objects and their Properties in Early Phenomenology.Guillaume Fréchette - 2015 - In Bruno Leclercq, Sébastien Richard & Denis Seron (eds.), Objects and Pseudo-Objects Ontological Deserts and Jungles from Brentano to Carnap. Boston: de Gruyter. pp. 143-166.details
|
|
Knowledge-First Evidentialism and the Dilemmas of Self-Impact.Paul Silva Jr & Eyal Tal - 2021 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge.details
|
|
Perceptual Justification: Factive Reasons and Fallible Virtues.Christoph9 Kelp & Harmen8 Ghijsen - 2015 - In Chienkuo Mi, Michael Slote & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue. New York: Routledge.details
|
|
The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
How We Choose Our Beliefs.Gregory Salmieri & Benjamin Bayer - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):41–53.details
|
|
Meaning and Emotion: The Extended Gricean Model and What Emotional Signs Mean.Constant Bonard - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Geneva and University of Antwerpdetails
|
|
Quine's Epistemic Norms in Practice: Undogmatic Empiricism.Michael Shepanski - 2023 - London: Bloomsbury Academic.details
|
|
Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Probability and nonclassical logic.Robert Williams - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Realism and Objectivity.Billy Dunaway - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 135-150.details
|
|
Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.Timothy Bowen - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Perspectival Skeptical Theism.Jonathan Curtis Rutledge - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (2):244-264.details
|
|
El escepticismo williamsoniano sobre la utilidad epistémica de la distinción a priori/a posteriori.Emilio Méndez Pinto - 2023 - Dissertation, National Autonomous University of Mexicodetails
|
|
Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Handbooks. pp. 120-133.details
|
|
Evidence and Inductive Inference.Nevin Climenhaga - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 435-449.details
|
|
Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 176-194.details
|
|
Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-41.details
|
|
Not So Phenomenal!John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (1):1-43.details
|
|
A Modal Logic and Hyperintensional Semantics for Gödelian Intuition.Timothy Bowen - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Introduction to the Routledge Handbook of Propositions.Adam Russell Murray & Chris Tillman - 2022 - In Chris Tillman & Adam Murray (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Propositions. Routledge.details
|
|
Evidentialism.Giada Fratantonio - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
|
|
Fixed Points in the Hyperintensional Epistemic $\mu$-Calculus and the KK Principle.Timothy Bowen - manuscriptdetails
|
|
What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.details
|
|
CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON: Horizons of Possibility and Meaning.Steven James Bartlett - 2021 - Salem, USA: Studies in Theory and Behavior.details
|
|
Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.details
|
|
Curiosity was Framed.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.details
|
|
The No-No Paradox Is a Paradox.Roy T. Cook - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):467-482.details
|
|
Perceiving events.Matthew Soteriou - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):223-241.details
|
|
Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.details
|
|
Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.details
|
|
How can belief be akratic?Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13925-13948.details
|
|
Consciousness and Knowledge.Berit Brogaard & Elijah Chudnoff - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Externalism Explained.Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Practical Knowledge and Luminosity.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1237-1267.details
|
|
Intentional action first.Yair Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.details
|
|
Action as a form of temporal unity: on Anscombe’s Intention.Douglas Lavin - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):609-629.details
|
|
Prospects for evidentialism.Bob Beddor - 2019 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.details
|
|
Limits of Optimization.Cesare Carissimo & Marcin Korecki - 2024 - Minds and Machines 34 (1):117-137.details
|
|
Whither Evidentialist Reliabilism?Juan Comesaña - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag. pp. 307-25.details
|
|