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Hyperintensionality and Normativity

Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag (2019)

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  1. Deontic Logic.Paul McNamara - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Hyperintensionality.Francesco Berto & Daniel Nolan - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    An overview of hyperintensionality is provided. Hyperintensional languages have expressions with meanings that are more fine-grained than necessary equivalence. That is, the expressions may necessarily co-apply and yet be distinct in meaning. Adequately accounting for theories cast in hyperintensional languages is important in the philosophy of language; the philosophy of mind; metaphysics; and elsewhere. This entry presents a number of areas in which hyperintensionality is important; a range of approaches to theorising about hyperintensional matters; and a range of debates that (...)
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  • Forms and Norms of Indecision in Argumentation Theory.Daniela Schuster - 2021 - Deontic Logic and Normative Systems, 15th International Conference, DEON 2020/2021.
    One main goal of argumentation theory is to evaluate arguments and to determine whether they should be accepted or rejected. When there is no clear answer, a third option, being undecided, has to be taken into account. Indecision is often not considered explicitly, but rather taken to be a collection of all unclear or troubling cases. However, current philosophy makes a strong point for taking indecision itself to be a proper object of consideration. This paper aims at revealing parallels between (...)
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  • Moral Principles: Hedged, Contributory, Mixed.Aleks Knoks - 2021 - In Deontic Logic and Normative Systems 2020/21.
    It's natural to think that the principles expressed by the statements "Promises ought to be kept" and "We ought to help those in need" are defeasible. But how are we to make sense of this defeasibility? On one proposal, moral principles have hedges or built-in unless clauses specifying the conditions under which the principle doesn't apply. On another, such principles are contributory and, thus, do not specify which actions ought to be carried out, but only what counts in favor or (...)
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  • Axiomatizing Norms Across Time and the 'Paradox of the Court'.Daniela Glavaničová & Matteo Pascucci - 2021 - In Fenrong Liu, Alessandra Marra, Paul Portner & Frederik Van de Putte (eds.), DEON 2020/2021. College Publications. pp. 201-218.
    In normative reasoning one typically refers to intervals of time across which norms are intended to hold, as well as to alternative possibilities representing hypothetical developments of a given scenario. Thus, deontic modalities are naturally intertwined with temporal and metaphysical ones. Furthermore, contemporary debates in philosophy suggest that a proper understanding of fundamental ethical principles, such as the Ought-Implies-Can thesis, requires a simultaneous analysis of these three families of concepts. In the present article we propose a general formal framework which (...)
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  • A Hyperintensional Logical Framework for Deontic Reasons.Federico L. G. Faroldi & Tudor Protopopescu - 2019 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 27 (4):411-433.
    In this paper we argue that normative reasons are hyperintensional and put forward a formal account of this thesis. That reasons are hyperintensional means that a reason for a proposition does not imply that it is also a reason for a logically equivalent proposition. In the first part we consider three arguments for the hyperintensionality of reasons: an argument from the nature of reasons, an argument from substitutivity and an argument from explanatory power. In the second part we describe a (...)
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