Switch to: References

Citations of:

Scientific realism with a Humean face

In Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. London: pp. 75-95 (2011)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Having Science in View: General Philosophy of Science and its Significance.Stathis Psillos - 2016 - In Paul Humphreys (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press USA.
    The relatively recent trend seems to be to move away from General Philosophy of Science and towards the philosophies of the individual sciences and to relocate whatever content GPoS is supposed to have to the philosophies of the sciences. I argue that scepticism or pessimism about the prospects of GPoS is unwarranted. I also argue that there can be no philosophies of the various sciences without GPoS. Defending these two claims is the main target of this chapter. I will show, (...)
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Lee Hardy, Nature’s Suit. Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy of the Physical Sciences: Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013 (Series in Continental Thought, Vol. 45). ISBN 978-0-8214-2066-9, 272 pp. US-$ 34.95 (pbk). [REVIEW]Harald A. Wiltsche - 2015 - Husserl Studies 31 (2):175-182.
    The debate about scientific realism has occupied center stage in philosophy of science since its very inception. The main question is whether or not scientific theories are true descriptions of the world. Or, to give the question a slightly different spin: What grounds do we have for believing in the reality of the unobservable entities postulated by contemporary science ? Although the main arena of this debate is analytic philosophy, it is clear that these questions are no less important for (...)
    Export citation  
  • What is General Philosophy of Science?Stathis Psillos - 2012 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43 (1):93-103.
    The very idea of a general philosophy of science relies on the assumption that there is this thing called science —as opposed to the various individual sciences. In this programmatic piece I make a case for the claim that general philosophy of science is the philosophy of science in general or science as such. Part of my narrative makes use of history, for two reasons. First, general philosophy of science is itself characterised by an intellectual tradition which aimed to develop (...)
    Export citation  
    Bookmark   13 citations