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  1. Kant on Perceptual Content.Colin McLear - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):95-144.
    Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the ‘Content View.’ I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. Though perceptual acquaintance is controversial (...)
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  • Logical Mistakes, Logical Aliens, and the Laws of Kant’s Pure General Logic.Tyke Nunez - 2018 - Mind 128 (512):1149-1180.
    There are two ways interpreters have tended to understand the nature of the laws of Kant’s pure general logic. On the first, these laws are unconditional norms for how we ought to think, and will govern anything that counts as thinking. On the second, these laws are formal criteria for being a thought, and violating them makes a putative thought not a thought. These traditions are in tension, in so far as the first depends on the possibility of thoughts that (...)
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  • Dedekind and Cassirer on Mathematical Concept Formation†.Audrey Yap - 2017 - Philosophia Mathematica 25 (3):369-389.
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  • Mahdollisuus, välttämättömyys ja luodut ikuiset totuudet Descartesin filosofiassa.Forsman Jan - 2016 - In Ilkka Niiniluoto, Tuomas Tahko & Teemu Toppinen (eds.), Mahdollisuus. Helsinki: Philosophical Society of Finland. pp. 120-129.
    Tässä artikkelissa käsittelen Descartesin ikuisten totuuksien välttämättömyyteen liittyvää ongelmaa. Teoksessa Mietiskelyjä ensimmäisestä filosofiasta (1641–1642) Descartes nostaa esiin käsitteen ikuisista totuuksista, käyttäen esimerkkinään kolmiota. Kolmion muuttumattomaan ja ikuiseen luontoon kuuluu esimerkiksi, että sen kolme kulmaa ovat yhteenlaskettuna 180°. Se on totta kolmiosta, vaikka yhtään yksittäistä kolmiota ei olisi koskaan ollutkaan olemassa. Eräät ajattelemieni asioiden piirteet ovat siis Descartesin mukaan ajattelustani riippumattomia. Ikuisia totuuksia ovat ainakin matemaattiset ja geometriset tosiseikat sekä ristiriidan laki. Samoin Descartesin kuuluisa lause “ajattelen, siis olen” lukeutuu ikuisten totuuksien (...)
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  • The Normativity of Kant's Logical Laws.Jessica Leech - 2017 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 34 (4).
    According to received wisdom, Kant takes the laws of logic to be normative laws of thought. This has been challenged by Tolley (2006). In this paper, I defend the received wisdom, but with an important modification: Kant's logical laws are constitutive norms for thought. The laws of logic do tell us what thinking is, not because all thoughts are in conformity with logical laws, but because all thoughts are, by nature, subject to the standard of logic.
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  • John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    John Cook Wilson (1849–1915) was Wykeham Professor of Logic at New College, Oxford and the founder of ‘Oxford Realism’, a philosophical movement that flourished at Oxford during the first decades of the 20th century. Although trained as a classicist and a mathematician, his most important contribution was to the theory of knowledge, where he argued that knowledge is factive and not definable in terms of belief, and he criticized ‘hybrid’ and ‘externalist’ accounts. He also argued for direct realism in perception, (...)
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  • Wilhelm Windelband and the Problem of Relativism.Katherina Kinzel - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (1):84-107.
    This paper analyzes the shifts in Wilhelm Windelband’s ‘critical philosophy of values’ as it developed hand in hand with his understanding of relativism. The paper has two goals. On the one hand, by analyzing the role that relativism played in his philosophical project, it seeks to contribute to a better understanding of Windelband's intellectual development in the context of historicism and Neo-Kantianism. On the other hand, by highlighting Windelband’s contribution to the understanding of relativism, it sheds light on an important (...)
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  • Kant, Frege, and the Normativity of Logic: MacFarlane's Argument for Common Ground.Tyke Nunez - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (4):988-1009.
    According to what was the standard view (Poincaré; Wang, etc.), although Frege endorses, and Kant denies, the claim that arithmetic is reducible to logic, there is not a substantive disagreement between them because their conceptions of logic are too different. In his “Frege, Kant, and the logic in logicism,” John MacFarlane aims to establish that Frege and Kant do share enough of a conception of logic for this to be a substantive, adjudicable dispute. MacFarlane maintains that for both Frege and (...)
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  • Kant: Philosophy of Mind.Colin McLear - 2015 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Kant: Philosophy of Mind Immanuel Kant was one of the most important philosophers of the Enlightenment Period in Western European history. This encyclopedia article focuses on Kant’s views in the philosophy of mind, which undergird much of his epistemology and metaphysics. In particular, it focuses on metaphysical and epistemological doctrines forming the … Continue reading Kant: Philosophy of Mind →.
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  • One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Idealism in Critical Theory.Frieder Vogelmann - 2021 - Constellations 28 (3):322-336.
    Although Amy Allen’s critique of contemporary Frankfurt School critical theory has been widely discussed, her concern for an adequate conceptualization of reason’s intertwinement with power has not received the attention it deserves. The article shows that the diagnosis of a too idealistic account of reason forms the backbone of Allen’s charges against Habermas, Honneth and Forst, before it discusses her criteria for an adequate conceptualization of the intertwinement of reason and power. It demonstrates that Allen’s attempt to formulate such a (...)
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  • John Stuart Mill, Determinism, and the Problem of Induction.Elijah Millgram - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):183-199.
    Auguste Comte's doctrine of the three phases through which sciences pass (the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive) allows us to explain what John Stuart Mill was attempting in his magnum opus, the System of Logic: namely, to move the science of logic to its terminal and 'positive' stage. Both Mill's startling account of deduction and his unremarked solution to the Humean problem of induction eliminate the notions of necessity or force—in this case, the 'logical must'—characteristic of a science's metaphysical (...)
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  • Force and Objectivity: On Impact, Form, and Receptivity to Nature in Science and Art.Eli Lichtenstein - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Michigan
    Many praise science for its systematic drive to objectivity. But scientific objectivity is in fact a species of objectivity in a broader sense, which extends to aesthetic experience and broadly artistic creativity. Objectivity should be understood as outwardness, or receptivity to basic features of the world. Scientific objectivity is receptivity to basic features of the world specifically by adopting their 'point of view'. It is not a 'view from nowhere', in the sense of a globally- or universally-valid perspective. Nor is (...)
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  • Wilhelm Windelband.Katherina Kinzel - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Hermann Cohen on Kant, Sensations, and Nature in Science.Charlotte Baumann - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (4):647-674.
    The neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen is famously anti-empiricist in that he denies that sensations can make a definable contribution to knowledge. However, in the second edition of Kant’s Theory of Experience (1885), Cohen considers a proposition that contrasts with both his other work and that of his followers: a Kantian who studies scientific claims to truth—and the grounds on which they are made—cannot limit himself to studying mathematics and logical principles, but needs to also investigate underlying presuppositions about the empirical element (...)
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  • The 1860s Kant Revival and the Philosophical Society of Berlin.Lauri Kallio - 2021 - Kant E-Prints 15 (3):192-219.
    Neo-Kantianism emerged over the course of the 1860s and it occupied a leading position in the German universities from the 1870s until the First World War. Demands for getting "back to Kant" had become common since the early 1860s, and these demands were discussed in the meetings of the Philosophical Society of Berlin (Philosophische Gesellschaft zu Berlin; PGB), which was the international organization of Hegelians. In this paper I address some reactions among the PGB members to the 1860s Kant revival. (...)
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  • “Critical Philosophy Begins at the Very Point Where Logistic Leaves Off”: Cassirer's Response to Frege and Russell.Jeremy Heis - 2010 - Perspectives on Science 18 (4):383-408.
    According to Michael Friedman, Ernst Cassirer’s “outstanding contribution [to Neo-Kantianism] was to articulate, for the first time, a clear and coherent conception of formal logic within the context of the Marburg School” (Friedman 2000, p. 30). In his paper “Kant und die moderne Mathematik” (1907), Cassirer argued not only that the new relational logic of Frege1 and Russell was a major breakthrough with profound philosophical implications, but also that the logicist thesis itself was a “fact” of modern mathematics. Cassirer summarizes (...)
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  • Cassirer's Psychology of Relations: From the Psychology of Mathematics and Natural Science to the Psychology of Culture.Samantha Matherne - 2018 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 6 (3).
    In spite of Ernst Cassirer’s criticisms of psychologism throughout Substance and Function, in the final chapter he issues a demand for a “psychology of relations” that can do justice to the subjective dimensions of mathematics and natural science. Although these remarks remain somewhat promissory, the fact that this is how Cassirer chooses to conclude Substance and Function recommends it as a topic worthy of serious consideration. In this paper, I argue that in order to work out the details of Cassirer’s (...)
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  • “Physiological Kantianism” and the “Organization of the Mind”: A Reconsideration.Paolo Pecere - forthcoming - Intellectual History Review:1-22.
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  • Paul Natorp and the Emergence of Anti-Psychologism in the Nineteenth Century.Scott Edgar - 2008 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 39 (1):54-65.
    This paper examines the anti-psychologism of Paul Natorp, a Marburg School Neo-Kantian. It identifies both Natorp’s principle argument against psychologism and the views underlying the argument that give it its force. Natorp’s argument depends for its success on his view that certain scientific laws constitute the intersubjective content of knowledge. That view in turn depends on Natorp’s conception of subjectivity, so it is only against the background of his conception of subjectivity that his reasons for rejecting psychologism make sense. This (...)
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  • Psychology as a Natural Science in the Eighteenth Century.Gary Hatfield - 1994 - Revue de Synthèse 115 (3-4):375-391.
    Psychology considered as a natural science began as Aristotelian "physics" or "natural philosophy" of the soul. C. Wolff placed psychology under metaphysics, coordinate with cosmology. Scottish thinkers placed it within moral philosophy, but distinguished its "physical" laws from properly moral laws (for guiding conduct). Several Germans sought to establish an autonomous empirical psychology as a branch of natural science. British and French visual theorists developed mathematically precise theories of size and distance perception; they created instruments to test these theories and (...)
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  • Is Kant’s Ethics Metaphysically Naturalistic? Comments on Frederick Rauscher’s Naturalism and Realism in Kant’s Ethics.Konstantin Pollok - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (3):483-494.
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  • Editorial Introduction.Damian Veal - 2005 - Angelaki 10 (1):1 – 31.
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  • The Limits of Experience and Explanation: F. A. Lange and Ernst Mach on Things in Themselves.Scott Edgar - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (1):100-121.
    In the middle of the nineteenth century, advances in experimental psychology and the physiology of the sense organs inspired so-called "Back to Kant" Neo-Kantians to articulate robustly psychologistic visions of Kantian epistemology. But their accounts of the thing in itself were fraught with deep tension: they wanted to conceive of things in themselves as the causes of our sensations, while their own accounts of causal inference ruled that claim out. This paper diagnoses the source of that problem in views of (...)
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  • The Philosophy of Logic.Penelope Maddy - 2012 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (4):481-504.
    This talk surveys a range of positions on the fundamental metaphysical and epistemological questions about elementary logic, for example, as a starting point: what is the subject matter of logic—what makes its truths true? how do we come to know the truths of logic? A taxonomy is approached by beginning from well-known schools of thought in the philosophy of mathematics—Logicism, Intuitionism, Formalism, Realism—and sketching roughly corresponding views in the philosophy of logic. Kant, Mill, Frege, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Ayer, Quine, and Putnam (...)
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  • The Idea of Transcendental Analysis: Kant, Marburg Neo-Kantianism, and Strawson.Guido Kreis - 2019 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 27 (2):293-314.
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  • ‘Hypotheses, Everywhere Only Hypotheses!!’: On Some Contexts of Dilthey’s Critique of Explanatory Psychology.Uljana Feest - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 38 (1):43-62.
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  • 'Hypotheses, Everywhere Only Hypotheses!': On Some Contexts of Dilthey's Critique of Explanatory Psychology.Uljana Feest - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 38 (1):43-62.
    In 1894, Wilhelm Dilthey published an article in which he formulated a critique of what he called ‘explanatory psychology’, contrasting it with his own conception of ‘descriptive psychology’. Dilthey’s descriptive psychology, in turn, was to provide the basis for Dilthey’s specific philosophy of the human sciences (Geisteswissenschaften). In this paper, I contextualize Dilthey’s critique of explanatory psychology. I show that while this critique comes across as very broad and sweeping, he in fact had specific opponents in mind, namely, scholars who, (...)
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  • Hermann Cohen.Scott Edgar - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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