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How Basic Are Basic Actions?

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78:195 - 213 (1978)

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Is Analytical Action Theory Reductionist?Ian Carter - 1991 - Analyse & Kritik 13 (1):61-66.details Steven Lukes and Alasdair MacIntyre have accused analytical action theory of being motivated by reductionist aims and of ignoring the fact that what is distinctively human about actions is their essentially social character. These reductionist aims are said to ‘subvert’ the search for the distinctively human. Enterprises that have particularly come under fire (and which Lukes recommends ‘abandoning’) are the search for ‘basic’ actions and attempts to solve problems regarding the ‘individuation’ of actions. Lukes and MacIntyre are mistaken however, both (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Choosing your poison and the time of a killing.Auke J. K. Pols - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):719-733.details The problem of the time of a killing is often cited as providing grounds for rejecting the action identification thesis favoured by Anscombe and Davidson. In this paper I make three claims. First, I claim that this problem is a threat to the action identification thesis because of two assumptions the thesis makes: since the thesis takes actions to be a kind of doings, it has to assume that agents’ doings last as long as their actions and vice versa. Second, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Let me go and try.Kirk Ludwig - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (3):340-358.details This paper argues for a deflationary account of trying on which ‘x tried to ϕ’ abbreviates ‘x did something with the intention of ϕ-ing’, where ‘did something’ is treated as a schematic verb. On this account, tryings are not a distinctive sort of episode present in some or all cases of acting. ‘x tried to ϕ’ simply relates some doing of x’s to a further aim x had, which may or may not have been achieved. Consequently, the analysis of ‘x (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
The Discovery of Nonsense.Irving Thalberg - 1981 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):293-312.details Download Export citation Bookmark
Quand Vouloir, c'est Faire [How to Do Things with Wants].Olivier Massin - 2014 - In R. Clot-Goudard (Dir.), L'Explication de L'Action. Analyses Contemporaines, Recherches Sur la Philosophie Et le Langage N°30, Paris, Vrin 30.details This paper defends the action-theory of the Will, according to which willing G is doing F (F≠G) in order to make G happen. In a nutshell, willing something is doing something else in order to bring about what we want. -/- I argue that only the action-theory can reconcile two essential features of the Will. (i) its EFFECTIVITY: willing is closer to acting than desiring. (ii) its FALLIBILITY: one might want something in vain. The action-theory of the will explains EFFECTIVITY (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
Sculpting the space of actions. Explaining human action by integrating intentions and mechanisms.Machiel Keestra - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Amsterdamdetails How can we explain the intentional nature of an expert’s actions, performed without immediate and conscious control, relying instead on automatic cognitive processes? How can we account for the differences and similarities with a novice’s performance of the same actions? Can a naturalist explanation of intentional expert action be in line with a philosophical concept of intentional action? Answering these and related questions in a positive sense, this dissertation develops a three-step argument. Part I considers different methods of explanations in (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations

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