Epistemic externalism is a view about what it takes for a belief to be epistemically justified or to be an item of knowledge. Externalism has grown considerably in popularity over the past few decades and this development has spilled over into the philosophy of religion, where we find externalist theories of justification and knowledge being employed to make the case for the positive epistemic status of religious beliefs. In §1, I offer an overview of epistemic externalism and its rival, internalism. (...) In §2, I outline some of the most significant applications of externalism to the philosophy of religion. In §3, I consider whether externalist theories are really required to secure various desiderata that externalist religious epistemologists take to be important. In §4, I explore an objection according to which the facts of religious diversity indicate that religious beliefs do not meet externalist requirements for justification or knowledge. Finally, in §5, I consider a worry about whether externalist accounts can really be used to evaluate the epistemic standing of religious beliefs. (shrink)

This paper presents and examines the argument from divine hiddenness as an evidential argument. It argues that a key thought that motivates the argument, namely, that it's surprising that God's existence is not more obvious, does not alone secure the conclusion that divine hiddenness is evidence against God. The evidential problem of divine hiddenness is illustrated using Bayesian models.

Launonen and Mullins argue that if Classical Theism is true, human cognition is likely not theism-tracking, at least, given what we know from cognitive science of religion. In this essay, we develop a model for how classical theists can make sense of the findings from cognitive science, without abandoning their Classical Theist commitments. We also provide an argument for how our model aligns well with the Christian doctrine of general revelation.