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Mental Causation and Free Will after Libet and Soon: Reclaiming Conscious Agency

In Alexander Batthyany & Avshalom Elitzur (eds.), Irreducibly Conscious. Selected Papers on Consciousness. Winter (2009)

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  1. Strong Libertarian Free Will and Libet's Intentions.Daniel von Wachter - manuscript
    While other philosophers have pointed out that Libet's experiment is compatible with compatibilist free will and also with weak libertarian free will, this article argues that it is even compatible with strong libertarian free will (SLF), \ie a person's ability to initiate causal processes. Contrary to what Libet suggested, the actions in the experiment were motivated by urges. It is in accordance with SLF that the urges had preceding unconcious causes. Furthermore, Libet's observation that vetoing is possible confirmes SLF.
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  • Remaking responsibility: complexity and scattered causes in human agency.Joshua Fost & Coventry Angela - 2013 - In Tangjia Wang (ed.), Proceedings of the 1st International Conference of Philosophy: Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow. Global Science and Technology Forum. pp. 91-101.
    Contrary to intuitions that human beings are free to think and act with “buck-stopping” freedom, philosophers since Holbach and Hume have argued that universal causation makes free will nonsensical. Contemporary neuroscience has strengthened their case and begun to reveal subtle and counterintuitive mechanisms in the processes of conscious agency. Although some fear that determinism undermines moral responsibility, the opposite is true: free will, if it existed, would undermine coherent systems of justice. Moreover, deterministic views of human choice clarify the conditions (...)
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