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Universals

Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):5-32 (1993)

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  1. Intensional Entities.George Bealer - 1998 - In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 803-7.
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  • Modal Predicates.Andrea Iacona - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Logic 2:44-69.
    Despite the wide acceptance of standard modal logic, there has always been a temptation to think that ordinary modal discourse may be correctly analyzed and adequately represented in terms of predicates rather than in terms of operators. The aim of the formal model outlined in this paper is to capture what I take to be the only plausible sense in which ‘possible’ and ‘necessary’ can be treated as predicates. The model is built by enriching the language of standard modal logic (...)
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  • A New Framework for Conceptualism.John Bengson, Enrico Grube & Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):167 - 189.
    Conceptualism is the thesis that, for any perceptual experience E, (i) E has a Fregean proposition as its content and (ii) a subject of E must possess a concept for each item represented by E. We advance a framework within which conceptualism may be defended against its most serious objections (e.g., Richard Heck's argument from nonveridical experience). The framework is of independent interest for the philosophy of mind and epistemology given its implications for debates regarding transparency, relationalism and representationalism, demonstrative (...)
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  • Propositional Contingentism.Peter Fritz - 2016 - Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (1):123-142.
    According to propositional contingentism, it is contingent what propositions there are. This paper presents two ways of modeling contingency in what propositions there are using two classes of possible worlds models. The two classes of models are shown to be equivalent as models of contingency in what propositions there are, although they differ as to which other aspects of reality they represent. These constructions are based on recent work by Robert Stalnaker; the aim of this paper is to explain, expand, (...)
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  • Propositions, Structure and Representation.Thomas Hodgson - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3pt3):339-349.
    Neo-Russellian theories of structured propositions face challenges to do with both representation and structure which are sometimes called the problem of unity and the Benacerraf problem. In §i, I set out the problems and Jeffrey King's solution, which I take to be the best of its type, as well as an unfortunate consequence for that solution. In §§ii–iii, I diagnose what is going wrong with this line of thought. If I am right, it follows that the Benacerraf problem cannot be (...)
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  • Second-Order Necessitism.José Tomás Alvarado Marambio - 2017 - Eidos: Revista de Filosofía de la Universidad Del Norte 26:268-301.
    Resumen En una serie de escritos Timothy Williamson ha argumentado a favor del necesitismo, esto es, la tesis de que es necesario que todo exista necesariamente. Este trabajo discute el necesitismo de segundo orden, esto es, la tesis de que es necesario que toda propiedad exista necesariamente, considerando líneas de argumentación semejantes a las desplegadas en primer orden. Se examinan tres de estos argumentos: el carácter necesario de ser una propiedad, la aparición de las propiedades en proposiciones, y los compromisos (...)
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  • Presentism and Ontological Commitment.Theodore Sider - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (7):325-347.
    Presentism is the doctrine that only the present is real. Since ordinary talk and thought are full of quantification over non-present objects, presentists are in a familiar predicament: in their unreflective moments they apparently commit themselves to far more than their ontological scruples allow. A familiar response is to begin a project of paraphrase. Truths appearing to quantify over problematic entities are shown, on analysis, to not involve quantification over those entities after all. But I think that we might be (...)
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  • Propositional or Non-Propositional Attitudes?Sean Crawford - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):179-210.
    Propositionalism is the view that intentional attitudes, such as belief, are relations to propositions. Propositionalists argue that propositionalism follows from the intuitive validity of certain kinds of inferences involving attitude reports. Jubien (2001) argues powerfully against propositions and sketches some interesting positive proposals, based on Russell’s multiple relation theory of judgment, about how to accommodate “propositional phenomena” without appeal to propositions. This paper argues that none of Jubien’s proposals succeeds in accommodating an important range of propositional phenomena, such as the (...)
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  • Metaphysical Explanation and the Philosophy of Mathematics: Reflections on Jerrold Katz's Realistic Rationalism.Robert Kraut - 2001 - Philosophia Mathematica 9 (2):154-183.
    Mathematical practice prompts theories about aprioricity, necessity, abstracta, and non-causal epistemic connections. But it is not clear what to count as the data: mathematical necessity or the appearance of mathematical necessity, abstractness or apparent abstractness, a prioricity or apparent aprioricity. Nor is it clear whether traditional metaphysical theories provide explanation or idle redescription. This paper suggests that abstract objects, rather than doing explanatory work, provide codifications of the data to be explained. It also suggests that traditional rivals—conceptualism, nominalism, realism—engage different (...)
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  • Universals.Chad Carmichael - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):373-389.
    In this paper, I argue that there are universals. I begin (Sect. 1) by proposing a sufficient condition for a thing’s being a universal. I then argue (Sect. 2) that some truths exist necessarily. Finally, I argue (Sects. 3 and 4) that these truths are structured entities having constituents that meet the proposed sufficient condition for being universals.
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  • Deep Platonism.Chad Carmichael - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):307-328.
    According to the traditional bundle theory, particulars are bundles of compresent universals. I think we should reject the bundle theory for a variety of reasons. But I will argue for the thesis at the core of the bundle theory: that all the facts about particulars are grounded in facts about universals. I begin by showing how to meet the main objection to this thesis (which is also the main objection to the bundle theory): that it is inconsistent with the possibility (...)
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  • The Concrete Modal Realist Challenge to Platonism.Matthew McGrath - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):587 – 610.
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  • Fórmulas Barcan de segundo orden Y universales trascendentes.José Tomás Alvarado Marambio - 2013 - Ideas Y Valores 62 (152):111-131.
    Se ha destacado recientemente que la Fórmula de Barcan y la Conversa de la Fórmula de Barcan para lógica modal cuantificacional de orden superior parecen válidas. Si se interpreta que los cuantificadores tienen como rango propiedades, la validez de y de orden superior parece implicar la existencia de universales trascendentes, esto es, universales que no requieren estar instanciados para existir en un mundo posible. Este trabajo discute esta línea de argumentación. En primer lugar, se sostiene que la semántica en la (...)
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  • Putting Reasons First: A Defense of Normative Non-Naturalism.Andrew T. Forcehimes - unknown
    Against non-analytic naturalism and quietist realism, I defend a robust form of non-naturalism. The argument proceeds as follows: In the face of extensional underdetermination, quietist realism cannot non-question-beggingly respond to alternative accounts that offer formally identical but substantively different interpretations of what reasons are. They face what we might call the reasons appropriation problem. In light of this problem, quietists ought to abandon their view in favor of robust realism. By permitting substantive metaphysical claims we can then argue, based on (...)
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  • On the Mind Dependence of Truth.Diego Marconi - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):301 - 318.
    The claim that truth is mind dependent has some initial plausibility only if truth bearers are taken to be mind dependent entities such as beliefs or statements. Even on that assumption, however, the claim is not uncontroversial. If it is spelled out as the thesis that “in a world devoid of mind nothing would be true”, then everything depends on how the phrase ‘true in world w’ is interpreted. If ‘A is true in w’ is interpreted as ‘A is true (...)
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  • The Expressing Relation.Andrea Iacona - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (3):235–260.
    The paper deals with the question of what it is for a sentence to express a proposition. In the first part of the paper I argue that a certain notion of proposition widely adopted in contemporary philosophy is more theoretically loaded than is commonly assumed. The fact is that some properties are typically assigned to propositions, but no support for the claim that there are things with those properties can be found in the “evidence” from ordinary language. My point is (...)
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  • Presentism and the Grounding Objection.Thomas M. Crisp - 2007 - Noûs 41 (1):90–109.
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  • ‘That’-Clauses and Non-Nominal Quantification.Tobias Rosefeldt - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (3):301 - 333.
    This paper argues that ‘that’-clauses are not singular terms (without denying that their semantical values are propositions). In its first part, three arguments are presented to support the thesis, two of which are defended against recent criticism. The two good arguments are based on the observation that substitution of ‘the proposition that p’ for ‘that p’ may result in ungrammaticality. The second part of the paper is devoted to a refutation of the main argument for the claim that ‘that’-clauses are (...)
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  • The Expressing Relation.Andrea Iacona - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (3):235-260.
    The paper deals with the question of what it is for a sentence to express a proposition. In the first part of the paper I argue that a certain notion of proposition widely adopted in contemporary philosophy is more theoretically loaded than is commonly assumed. The fact is that some properties are typically assigned to propositions, but no support for the claim that there are things with those properties can be found in the “evidence” from ordinary language. My point is (...)
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  • Strong And Weak Possibility.Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (2):191-217.
    The thesis of existentialism holds that if a proposition p exists and predicates something of an object a, then in any world where a does not exist, p does not exist either. If “possibly, p” entails “in some possible world, the proposition that p exists and is true,” then existentialism is prima facie incompatible with the truth of claims like “possibly, the Eiffel Tower does not exist.” In order to avoid this claim, a distinction between two kinds of world-indexed truth (...)
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  • On the Ignorance, Knowledge, and Nature of Propositions.Pierre Le Morvan - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3647-3662.
    Deploying distinctions between ignorance of \ and ignorance that \ , and between knowledge of \ and knowledge that \ , I address a question that has hitherto received little attention, namely: what is it to have knowledge of propositions? I then provide a taxonomy of ontological conceptions of the nature of propositions, and explore several of their interesting epistemological implications.
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