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  1. The Paradox of Post‐Performance Amnesia.Barbara Gail Montero - 2019 - Wiley: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 44 (1):38-47.
    Midwest Studies In Philosophy, Volume 44, Issue 1, Page 38-47, December 2019.
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  • The Spur of the Moment: What Jazz Improvisation Tells Cognitive Science.Steve Torrance & Frank Schumann - 2019 - AI and Society 34 (2):251-268.
    Improvisation is ubiquitous in life. It deserves, we suggest, to occupy a more central role in cognitive science. In the current paper, we take the case of jazz improvisation as a rich model domain from which to explore the nature of improvisation and expertise more generally. We explore the activity of the jazz improviser against the theoretical backdrop of Dreyfus’s account of expertise as well as of enactivist and 4E accounts of cognition and action. We argue that enactivist and 4E (...)
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  • Not Being There: An Analysis of Expertise‐Induced Amnesia.Simon Høffding & Barbara Gail Montero - forthcoming - Mind and Language.
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  • What is Meta-Cognitive Skill? Kindling a Conversation Between Culadasa and Contemporary Philosophy of Psychology.Tadeusz Wieslaw Zawidzki - 2018 - Contemporary Buddhism 19 (2):476-492.
    ABSTRACTI explore affinities and tensions between Culadasa’s model of meta-cognitive skill, in his recent The Mind Illuminated, and theories of skill and meta-cognition in contemporary philosophy of psychology. I find that, while there are many assumptions that these different approaches share, for the most part, contemporary philosophy of psychology has ignored the possibility that meta-cognitive skills can be cultivated through practice, as Culadasa persuasively argues. The one exception is Joëlle Proust’s recent The Philosophy of Metacognition. This work defends a model (...)
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  • An Anscombean Perspective on Habitual Action.Annemarie Kalis & Dawa Ometto - forthcoming - Topoi.
    Much of the time, human beings seem to rely on habits. Habits are learned behaviours directly elicited by context cues, and insensitive to short-term changes in goals: therefore they are sometimes irrational. But even where habitual responses are rational, it can seem as if they are nevertheless not done for reasons. For, on a common understanding of habitual behaviour, agents’ intentions do not play any role in the coming about of such responses. This paper discusses under what conditions we can (...)
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  • Can Reason Establish the Goals of Action? Assessing Interpretations of Aristotle’s Theory of Agency.Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2017 - Discusiones Filosóficas 18 (30):35-62.
    Scholarship on Aristotle’s theory of action has recently veered toward an intellectualist position, according to which reason is in charge of setting the goals of action. This position has recently been criticized by an anti-intellectualism revival, according to which character, and not reason, sets the goals of action. I argue that neither view can sufficiently account for the complexities of Aristotle’s theory, and suggest a middle way that combines the strengths of both while avoiding their pitfalls. The key problem for (...)
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  • Remembering as a Mental Action.Santiago Arango-Munoz & Juan Pablo Bermúdez - 2018 - In Kourken Michaelian, Dorothea Debus & Denis Perrin (eds.), New Directions in the Philosophy of Memory. Routledge. pp. 75-96.
    Many philosophers consider that memory is just a passive information retention and retrieval capacity. Some information and experiences are encoded, stored, and subsequently retrieved in a passive way, without any control or intervention on the subject’s part. In this paper, we will defend an active account of memory according to which remembering is a mental action and not merely a passive mental event. According to the reconstructive account, memory is an imaginative reconstruction of past experience. A key feature of the (...)
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  • Making Sense of Akrasia.Matthew Burch - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (5):939-971.
    There are two extreme poles in the literature on akrasia. Internalists hold that it's impossible to act intentionally against your better judgment, because there's a necessary internal relation between judgment and intentional action. To the contrary, externalists maintain that we can act intentionally against our better judgment, because the will operates independently of judgment. Critics of internalism argue that it fails a realism test—most people seem to think that we can and do act intentionally against our better judgment. And critics (...)
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