Judging the warrant of conspiracy theories can be difficult, and often we rely upon what the experts tell us when it comes to assessing whether particular conspiracy theories ought to be believed. However, whereas there are recognised experts in the sciences, I argue that only are is no such associated expertise when it comes to the things we call `conspiracy theories,' but that the conspiracy theorist has good reason to be suspicious of the role of expert endorsements when it comes (...) to conspiracy theories and their rivals. The kind of expertise, then, we might associate with conspiracy theories is largely improvised—in that it lacks institutional features—and, I argue, ideally the product of a community of inquiry. (shrink)

Drawing on the relevant alternatives framework and Mary Kate McGowan’s work on conversational scorekeeping, I argue that usage of the term ‘conspiracy theory’ in ordinary language and public discourse typically entails the performance of what I call a dismissive conversational exercitive, a kind of speech act that functions to exclude certain propositions from (or prevent their inclusion in) the set of alternatives considered relevant in a given conversational context. While it can be legitimate to perform dismissive conversational exercitives, excluding alternatives (...) that deserve to be taken seriously can be highly problematic for a variety of reasons. For one, it can give rise to what I call the problem of premature conclusions when subjects illegitimately dismiss certain propositions as irrelevant and, as a result, prematurely take certain conclusions or claims to be warranted. Depending on the kind of conclusion or claim, the problem can come in different variants, three of which I shall examine in more detail: the problem of premature knowledge claims, the problem of premature causal claims, and the problem of premature generic generalizations. (shrink)

Academic discussions concerning what to do about conspiracy theories often focus on whether or not to debunk them. Less often discussed are the methods, audiences and effectiveness of debunking eff...

Conspiracy theories and conspiracy theorists have been accused of a great many sins, but are the conspiracy theories conspiracy theorists believe epistemically problematic? Well, according to some recent work, yes, they are. Yet a number of other philosophers like Brian L. Keeley, Charles Pigden, Kurtis Hagen, Lee Basham, and the like have argued ‘No!’ I will argue that there are features of certain conspiracy theories which license suspicion of such theories. I will also argue that these features only license a (...) limited suspicion of these conspiracy theories, and thus we need to be careful about generalising from such suspicions to a view of the warrant of conspiracy theories more generally. To understand why, we need to get to the bottom of what exactly makes us suspicious of certain conspiracy theories, and how being suspicious of a conspiracy theory does not always tell us anything about how likely the theory in question is to be false. (shrink)

This paper aims to provide clear guidelines for researchers studying conspiracy theory belief. It examines the meta-linguistic question about how we should conceptualize 'conspiracy theory' and its relationship to the evaluative question of how we should evaluate beliefs in conspiracy theories, addressing normative issues surrounding the meaning, use, and conceptualization of ‘conspiracy theory’, as well as how these issues might impact how researchers study conspiracy theories or beliefs in them It argues that four norms, the Empirical Accuracy Norm, the Linguistic (...) Norm, the Social Norm, and the Academic Fecundity Norm, underlie debates about how we should conceptualize or define ‘conspiracy theory’. We zoom in on the linguistic norm, as it has been treated as more fundamental than the other norms. We then scrutinize the argument that normative conceptualizations prematurely settle the question of how conspiracy theories and belief in them should be evaluated, and argue that it fails. Subsequently, we turn to the risks normative conceptualizations pose when it comes to certain assumptions and biases in the study of conspiracy theory belief. Finally, we explore where this leaves us regarding the meta-linguistic and evaluative questions, and formulate seven guidelines for studying conspiracy theory belief, whether it be theoretical, historical, or empirical. (shrink)

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Volume 52, Issue 4, Page 235-257, July 2022. Charles Pigden’s 1995 article “Popper Revisited, or What is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories?” stimulated what is today a fertile sub-field of philosophical enquiry into conspiracy theories. In his article, Pigden identifies Karl Popper as the originator of the philosophical argument that it is naïve to believe in any conspiracy theory. But Popper was not criticizing belief in conspiracy theories at all, as Pigden defined them or as they (...) have usually come to be understood since about the 1960s. Pigden has therefore fundamentally and anachronistically misinterpreted Popper. The object of Popper’s criticism was, rather, the inadequate approach to social science that is limited to the discovery of human intentions, including conspiracies, in particular the will of Great Men. Popper’s critique of the conspiracy theory of society was correct and should be rehabilitated. Pigden is correct only insofar as he concludes that we should not dismiss conspiracy theories without critical evaluation, a proposition with which Popper would likely have wholeheartedly agreed. (shrink)

Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Volume 52, Issue 4, Page 235-257, July 2022. Charles Pigden’s 1995 article “Popper Revisited, or What is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories?” stimulated what is today a fertile sub-field of philosophical enquiry into conspiracy theories. In his article, Pigden identifies Karl Popper as the originator of the philosophical argument that it is naïve to believe in any conspiracy theory. But Popper was not criticizing belief in conspiracy theories at all, as Pigden defined them or as they (...) have usually come to be understood since about the 1960s. Pigden has therefore fundamentally and anachronistically misinterpreted Popper. The object of Popper’s criticism was, rather, the inadequate approach to social science that is limited to the discovery of human intentions, including conspiracies, in particular the will of Great Men. Popper’s critique of the conspiracy theory of society was correct and should be rehabilitated. Pigden is correct only insofar as he concludes that we should not dismiss conspiracy theories without critical evaluation, a proposition with which Popper would likely have wholeheartedly agreed. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates how the UK’s Advertising Standards Authority governs advertising ethics with and on behalf of its members and stakeholders. Drawing on an archive of 310 non-commercial adjudication reports, we highlight the substantive norms and procedural mechanisms through which the ASA governs advertising complaints alleging offence and/or harm. Substantively, the ASA precludes potential normative transgressions by publishing, disseminating, consulting upon, and updating detailed codes of advertising conduct. Procedurally, the ASA adjudicates between allegations and justifications of offence and harm on (...) a received complaint-by-complaint basis, often upon consequentialist grounds. Such consequentialism, we claim, has the effect of normalizing power imbalances between the ASA’s members, on the one hand, and wider stakeholders, on the other hand. The paper argues that, in the context of UK advertising, what Michel Foucault called the right ‘to be or not to be governed like that’ is enjoyed by relatively few subjects. Having demonstrated how UK advertising practices are governed, the paper closes with suggestions as to how they might be governed otherwise. (shrink)