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Hard, Harder, Hardest.Katalin Balog - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 265-289.details
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Artificial consciousness: from impossibility to multiplicity.Chuanfei Chin - 2017 - In Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017. Berlin: Springer. pp. 3-18.details
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How Philosophy of Mind Can Shape the Future.Susan Schneider & Pete Mandik - 2018 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge. pp. 303-319.details
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Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs: How Peircean Semiotics Combines Phenomenal Qualia and Practical Effects.Marc Champagne - 2018 - Cham: Springer.details
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Misrepresenting consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.details
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Preface.Raphael van Riel & Albert Newen - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):5-8.details
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The mental lives of zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.details
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Can a Corporation be Worthy of Moral Consideration?Kenneth Silver - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 159 (1):253-265.details
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Outscoping and Discourse Threat.Theodore Sider - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (4):413-426.details
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The Vegetative State and the Science of Consciousness.Nicholas Shea & Tim Bayne - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (3):459-484.details
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If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1697-1721.details
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There is an epistemic problem in animal consciousness research.Aida Roige - 2023 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1.details
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Panpsychism, intuitions, and the great chain of being.Luke Roelofs & Jed Buchanan - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2991-3017.details
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The philosophical issue in machine consciousness.Piotr Boltuc - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):155-176.details
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Blockheads! Essays on Ned Block’s Philosophy of Mind and Consciousness, eds Adam Pautz and Daniel Stoljar.Ian Phillips - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):639-650.details
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Why do qualia and the mind seem nonphysical?José M. Musacchio - 2005 - Synthese 147 (3):425-460.details
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A naturalist-phenomenal realist response to Block's harder problem.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):163-204.details
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The Problem of Consciousness: Easy, Hard or Tricky?Tom McClelland - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):17-30.details
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Conscious experience, reduction and identity: many explanatory gaps, one solution.Liam P. Dempsey - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (2):225-245.details
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Taking type-b materialism seriously.Janet Levin - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (4):402-425.details
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Cognitive Phenomenology: In Defense of Recombination.Preston Lennon - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Metaphysics of Quantity and the Limit of Phenomenal Concepts.Derek Lam - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (3):1-20.details
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Physical realization.Robert Kirk - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):148-156.details
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Physicalism and strict implication.Robert Kirk - 2006 - Synthese 151 (3):523-536.details
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Can happiness measures be calibrated?Mats Ingelström & Willem van der Deijl - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5719-5746.details
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The search for neural correlates of consciousness.Jakob Hohwy - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):461–474.details
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Mind–brain identity and evidential insulation.Jakob Hohwy - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):377-395.details
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Could robots be phenomenally conscious?Frank Hofmann - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):1-12.details
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Could robots be phenomenally conscious?Frank Hofmann - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3):579-590.details
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Emotions, feelings and intentionality.Peter Goldie - 2002 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):235-254.details
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What Mary’s Aboutness Is About.Martina Fürst - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):63-74.details
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Sensuous Experience, Phenomenal Presence, and Perceptual Availability.Christopher Frey - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (2):237-254.details
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Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Erhan Demircioglu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.details
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The Problem of Other (Group) Minds.Orli Dahan - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (3):1099-1112.details
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Color, qualia, and attention : a non-standard interpretation.Austen Clark - 2010 - In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. MIT Press. pp. 203.details
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Explaining the Qualitative Dimension of Consciousness: Prescission Instead of Reification.Marc Champagne - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (1):145-183.details
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Valence and Value.Peter Carruthers - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):658-680.details
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On central cognition.Peter Carruthers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):143-162.details
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Quantum computation and the untenability of a “No fundamental mentality” constraint on physicalism.Christopher Devlin Brown - 2022 - Synthese 201 (1):1-18.details
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Wittgenstein and Qualia.Ned Block - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):73-115.details
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Analyzing the etiological functions of consciousness.Dylan Black - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (1):191-216.details
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Materialism and the Moral Status of Animals.Jonathan Birch - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):795-815.details
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Papineau on the vagueness of phenomenal concepts.Michael V. Antony - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):475-483.details
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Are our concepts CONSCIOUS STATE and CONSCIOUS CREATURE vague?Michael V. Antony - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):239 - 263.details
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Strong Neurophilosophy and the Matter of Bat Consciousness: A case study.Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):57-76.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John P. Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Zombies.Robert Kirk - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Inverted qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Obvious Argument for the Inconceivability of Zombies.Drew McDermott - manuscriptdetails
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