- Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Self-Experience.Darryl Mathieson - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.details
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A Minimalist Threshold for Epistemically Irrational Beliefs.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What is Belief? Oxford University Press.details
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Expressivism about delusion attribution.Sam Wilkinson - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (2):59-77.details
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Too much or too little? Disorders of agency on a spectrum.Valentina Petrolini - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (2):5-12.details
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Debunking Doxastic Transparency.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A3)5-24.details
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Delusions and Dispositionalism about Belief.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628.details
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For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not.Dan Zahavi & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of mind and phenomenology. New York: Routledge. pp. 36-53.details
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Jaspers' Dilemma: The Psychopathological Challenge to Subjectivity Theories of Consciousness.Alexandre Billon & Uriah Kriegel - 2015 - In R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 29-54.details
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Understanding Delusions: Evidence, Reason, and Experience.Chenwei Nie - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Warwickdetails
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Delusional Inference.Ryan McKay - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (3):330-355.details
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Delusion.Lisa Bortolotti - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.details
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How can belief be akratic?Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13925-13948.details
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Concepts, Belief, and Perception.Alex Byrne - 2020 - In Christoph Demmerling & Dirk Schroder (eds.), Concepts in Thought, Action, and Emotion: New Essays. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Rationality and its contexts.Timothy Lane - 2016 - In Timothy Joseph Lane & Tzu-Wei Hung (eds.), Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. London, U.K.: Elsevier Academic Press. pp. 3-13.details
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Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory.Bart Streumer - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge.details
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The Bite of Rights in Paternalism.Norbert Paulo - 2015 - In Thomas Schramme (ed.), New Perspectives on Paternalism and Health Care. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
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Psychopathy: Morally Incapacitated Persons.Heidi Maibom - 2017 - In Thomas Schramme & Steven Edwards (eds.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Medicine. Springer. pp. 1109-1129.details
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¿Son los delirios creencias irracionales?Flor Cely - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (S3):119-135.details
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Self-deception.Eric Funkhouser - 2019 - New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs, by Lisa Bortolotti.Daniel Williams - 2021 - Mind 132 (526):549-558.details
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Egocentric and Encyclopedic Doxastic States in Delusions of Misidentification.Sam Wilkinson - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):219-234.details
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A Mental Files Approach to Delusional Misidentification.Sam Wilkinson - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):389-404.details
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Common-sense functionalism and the extended mind.Jack Wadham - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):136-151.details
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The phenomenology of hypo- and hyperreality in psychopathology.Zeno Van Duppen - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):423-441.details
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Delusions and Not-Quite-Beliefs.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):29-37.details
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Is Having Contradictory Beliefs Possible? Discussion and Critique of Arguments for the Psychological Principle of Non-Contradiction.Maciej Tarnowski - 2020 - Studia Semiotyczne—English Supplement 31:91-126.details
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Czy posiadanie sprzecznych przekonań jest możliwe? Omówienie i krytyka argumentów za psychologiczną zasadą niesprzeczności.Maciej Tarnowski - 2019 - Studia Semiotyczne 33 (2):323-353.details
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Is There a Right to Hold a Delusion? Delusions as a Challenge for Human Rights Discussion.Mari Stenlund - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):829-843.details
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Forum Internum Revisited: Considering the Absolute Core of Freedom of Belief and Opinion in Terms of Negative Liberty, Authenticity, and Capability.Mari Stenlund & Pamela Slotte - 2018 - Human Rights Review 19 (4):425-446.details
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A Patchier Picture Still: Biases, Beliefs and Overlap on the Inferential Continuum.Sophie Stammers - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1829-1850.details
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Beliefs and biases.Shannon Spaulding - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7575-7594.details
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The mental lives of zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.details
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Delusions and madmen: against rationality constraints on belief.Declan Smithies, Preston Lennon & Richard Samuels - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-30.details
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Can Anosognosia for Hemiplegia be Explained as Motivated Self-Deception?Andrew C. Sims - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2):337-353.details
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Mad Belief?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):13-17.details
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No excuses for moral realism.Hanno Sauer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):553-578.details
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Social epistemological conception of delusion.Alessandro Salice & Kengo Miyazono - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1831-1851.details
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On the nature, pathology, and etiology of delusions: comments on Miyazono’s delusions and beliefs.Eisuke Sakakibara - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):1-8.details
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Irrationality and Pathology of Beliefs.Eisuke Sakakibara - 2016 - Neuroethics 9 (2):147-157.details
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Imagined and delusional pain.Jennifer Radden - 2021 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 12 (2):151-166.details
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Aiming at the truth and aiming at success.Lubomira Radoilska - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):111-126.details
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Can Dispositionalism About Belief Vindicate Doxasticism About Delusion?José Eduardo Porcher - 2015 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 19 (3):379-404.details
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Between scientific and empathetic understanding: The case of auditory verbal hallucination.Shivam Patel - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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The Empirical Case against Infallibilism.T. Parent - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):223-242.details
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Delusional Predictions and Explanations.Matthew Parrott - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):325-353.details
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The clinical significance of anomalous experience in the explanation of monothematic delusions.Paul Noordhof & Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10277-10309.details
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The Causal Role Argument against Doxasticism about Delusions.Kengo Miyazono & Lisa Bortolotti - 2014 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (3):30-50.details
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Précis of Delusions and Beliefs: A Philosophical Inquiry.Kengo Miyazono - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):1-5.details
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