Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism.Oscar Seminar - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):149-155.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • A Thirder and an Everettian: A Reply to Lewis's 'Quantum Sleeping Beauty'.David Papineau & Víctor Durà-Vilà - 2009 - Analysis 69 (1):78-86.
    Since the publication of Elga's seminal paper in 2000, the Sleeping Beauty paradox has been the source of much discussion, particularly in this journal. Over the past few decades the Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics 1 has also been much debated. There is an interesting connection between the way these two topics raise issues about subjective probability assignments.This connection is often alluded to, but as far as we know Peter J. Lewis's ‘Quantum Sleeping Beauty’ is the first attempt to examine (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • A Two-Sided Ontological Solution to the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Franceschi Paul - unknown
    I describe in this paper an ontological solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin with describing the Entanglement urn experiment. I restate first the Sleeping Beauty problem from a wider perspective than the usual opposition between halfers and thirders. I also argue that the Sleeping Beauty experiment is best modelled with the Entanglement urn. I draw then the consequences of considering that some balls in the Entanglement urn have ontologically different properties form normal ones. In this context, considering a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Generalized Sleeping Beauty Problem: A Challenge for Thirders.R. White - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):114-119.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Unravelling the Tangled Web: Continuity, Internalism, Non-Uniqueness and Self-Locating Beliefs.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2010 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 86.
    A number of cases involving self-locating beliefs have been discussed in the Bayesian literature. I suggest that many of these cases, such as the sleeping beauty case, are entangled with issues that are independent of self-locating beliefs per se. In light of this, I propose a division of labor: we should address each of these issues separately before we try to provide a comprehensive account of belief updating. By way of example, I sketch some ways of extending Bayesianism in order (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  • Self-Location is No Problem for Conditionalization.Darren Bradley - 2011 - Synthese 182 (3):393-411.
    How do temporal and eternal beliefs interact? I argue that acquiring a temporal belief should have no effect on eternal beliefs for an important range of cases. Thus, I oppose the popular view that new norms of belief change must be introduced for cases where the only change is the passing of time. I defend this position from the purported counter-examples of the Prisoner and Sleeping Beauty. I distinguish two importantly different ways in which temporal beliefs can be acquired and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   26 citations  
  • When Betting Odds and Credences Come Apart: More Worries for Dutch Book Arguments.Darren Bradley & Hannes Leitgeb - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):119-127.
    If an agent believes that the probability of E being true is 1/2, should she accept a bet on E at even odds or better? Yes, but only given certain conditions. This paper is about what those conditions are. In particular, we think that there is a condition that has been overlooked so far in the literature. We discovered it in response to a paper by Hitchcock (2004) in which he argues for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • Sleeping Beauty and De Nunc Updating.Namjoong Kim - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts
    About a decade ago, Adam Elga introduced philosophers to an intriguing puzzle. In it, Sleeping Beauty, a perfectly rational agent, undergoes an experiment in which she becomes ignorant of what time it is. This situation is puzzling for two reasons: First, because there are two equally plausible views about how she will change her degree of belief given her situation and, second, because the traditional rules for updating degrees of belief don't seem to apply to this case. In this dissertation, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Inertia, Optimism and Beauty.Patrick Hawley - 2013 - Noûs 47 (1):85-103.
    The best arguments for the 1/3 answer to the Sleeping Beauty problem all require that when Beauty awakes on Monday she should be uncertain what day it is. I argue that this claim should be rejected, thereby clearing the way to accept the 1/2 solution.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Horgan on Sleeping Beauty.Joel Pust - 2008 - Synthese 160 (1):97 - 101.
    With the notable exception of David Lewis, most of those writing on the Sleeping Beauty problem have argued that 1/3 is the correct answer. Terence Horgan has provided the clearest account of why, contrary to Lewis, Beauty has evidence against the proposition that the coin comes up heads when she awakens on Monday. In this paper, I argue that Horgan’s proposal fails because it neglects important facts about epistemic probability.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • The End of Sleeping Beauty’s Nightmare.Berry Groisman - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):409-416.
    The way a rational agent changes her belief in certain propositions/hypotheses in the light of new evidence lies at the heart of Bayesian inference. The basic natural assumption, as summarized in van Fraassen's Reflection Principle, would be that in the absence of new evidence the belief should not change. Yet, there are examples that are claimed to violate this assumption. The apparent paradox presented by such examples, if not settled, would demonstrate the inconsistency and/or incompleteness of the Bayesian approach, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Sleeping Beauty Awakened: New Odds at the Dawn of the New Day.T. Horgan - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):10-21.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism.The Oscar Seminar - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):149–155.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Sleeping Beauty in Flatland.Paul Franceschi - unknown
    I present a solution to the Sleeping Beauty problem. I begin with the consensual emerald case and describe then a set of relevant urn analogies and situations. These latter experiments make it easier to diagnose the flaw in the thirder's line of reasoning. I discuss in detail the root cause of the flaw in the argument for 1/3 which is an erroneous assimilation with a repeated experiment. Lastly, I discuss an informative variant of the original Sleeping Beauty experiment that casts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Logical Analysis of Monty Hall and Sleeping Beauty.Allen L. Mann & Ville Aarnio - 2018 - Studia Logica 106 (6):1123-1162.
    Hintikka and Sandu’s independence-friendly logic is a conservative extension of first-order logic that allows one to consider semantic games with imperfect information. In the present article, we first show how several variants of the Monty Hall problem can be modeled as semantic games for IF sentences. In the process, we extend IF logic to include semantic games with chance moves and dub this extension stochastic IF logic. Finally, we use stochastic IF logic to analyze the Sleeping Beauty problem, leading to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Generalized Sleeping Beauty Problem: A Challenge for Thirders.Roger White - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):114–119.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Sleeping Beauty Awakened: New Odds at the Dawn of the New Day.Terry Horgan - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):10–21.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations