In the Sociology of Emotion and Affect Studies, affects are usually regarded as an aspect of human beings alone, or of impersonal or collective atmospheres. However, feelings and emotions are only specific cases of affectivity that require subjective inner selves, while the concept of ‘atmospheres’ fails to explain the singularity of each individual case. This article develops a theory of social affect that does not reduce affect to either personal feelings or collective emotions. First, I use a Spinozist understanding of (...) the ‘body’ to conceptualize the receptivity and mutual constitution of bodies, to show how affects do not ‘belong’ to anybody; they are not solely attributable either to the human or to any kind of body alone, but emerge in situations of the encounter and interaction. Next I build upon Jean-Marie Guyau’s concept of transmissions to show how we can theorize affect as an emerging transmission between and among bodies. Finally, I demonstrate how we now have a complete conceptual frame for theorizing affect in relation to all bodies in any given social scene, the grand composition of which I call affectif. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung: Seit Langem sieht die Welt sich wieder einer globalen pandemischen Bedrohung ausgesetzt, die nicht nur wissenschaftlich, wirtschaftlich, politisch und gesellschaftlich, sondern auch künstlerisch zu bewältigen versucht wird. Dabei dominieren vor allem zwei visuelle Phänomene die Bildwelten der journalistischen und sozialen Medien: das Bild der Maske und das Bild des Virus selbst. Beide Bilder sind insbesondere in der Verbindung mit epi- und pandemischer Erfahrung bereits hoch aufgeladen. Die Sichtbarkeit der Maske und die Sichtbarmachung des Virus verweisen auf ihre komplexen historischen (...) Dimensionen und rufen philosophisch-ethische Fragen auf. Durch eine Gegenüberstellung von künstlerischen Zeugnissen historischer und gegenwärtiger Seuchenerfahrung werden im vorliegenden Beitrag historisch tradierte Muster von narrativen und visuellen Seuchendarstellungen, die auch den gegenwärtigen Pandemiediskurs bestimmen, herausgearbeitet und kritisch hinterfragt. Dabei wird gefragt, wie Kunst und Literatur zu einer rhetorischen und metaphorischen Deeskalation aktueller und zukünftiger pandemischer Krisendiskurse beitragen und damit auch eine der Ästhetik inhärente Ethik aufzeigen können. (shrink)

My paper sets out to compare neuroaesthetics and transcendental philosophy, concerning the perception of schemes of imitation in aesthetic experience. The argument is structured in four steps: first, I will introduce the function of schemes in mirror-neuron-based processes and in general in the embodiment theory of Mark Johnson and George Lakoff; second, I will consider some analogical relations between a transcendental approach and neuroaesthetics concerning semantics; third, starting with the statement that one open question in neuroaesthetics is how creativity emerges, (...) I would like to propose a transcendental account about sensible schemes as a possible foundation of creativity. I will conclude my paper with some examples from visual arts and aesthetic practices in general. (shrink)

In contemporary human and social sciences, it has become almost a commonplace to attribute to objects and artefacts the features of personhood and subjectivity. In the last decades, significant attempts have been made, in different disciplines, to show how things and material realities have the power to act upon the world and to transform human cognition as well as social processes. In order to describe the transformative power of things, scholars have then recurred to the semantic sphere of action and (...) will, to stop seeing agency anthropocentrically as a solely human property, by recognizing to inanimate entities, if not intention and desire, at least the role of social «agents» or «actors». By focusing on the recourse to the notion of «agency», I will single out some of the internal tensions that still inhabit this scientific trend, and, by drawing on the notion of «performativity», introduced by J.L. Austin and developed by Judith Butler, I will suggest a way to develop further the entanglement between material culture and the construction of identity. (shrink)

What distinguishes humans form animals? Acknowledging that humans are part of nature, that can process psychologically their affective-vital reactions to nature, and thus be held responsible for cultural processes, is the result of art historical, cultural-philosophical and life science research over the past two centuries. This line of argumentation led to the consideration that there must also be a connection between affective-psychological reactions and formal, a-historical mechanisms that are usually used by the arts. However, influenced by classical aesthetic theory, no (...) connection to culturally relevant communication processes has been established. It is the concern of the following scientific-historical study to establish this possible connection between the three in retrospect of research from the mid-19th century to the Hamburg circle around the art historian Aby Warburg, the philosopher Ernst Cassirer and the developmental psychologist Heinz Werner in the 1920s and the emergence of embodiment theories in the second half of the 20th century. (shrink)

Images share a common feature with all phenomena of imagination, since they make us aware of what is not present or what is fictional and not existent at all. From this perspective, the philosophical approach of Kendall Lewis Walton—born in 1939 and active since the 1960s at the University of Michigan—is perhaps one of the most notable contributions to image theory. Walton is an authoritative figure within the tradition of analytical aesthetics. His contributions have had a considerable influence on a (...) broad range of topics, such as the role of categories in the understanding of the arts (Walton, “Categories of Art”. Philosophical Review, 79(3): 334–367, 1970), the ambiguous nature of emotions in the experience of fictional stories (Walton, “Fearing Fictions”. The Journal of Philosophy, 75(1): 5–25, 1978), the transparency of photographic images compared to other depictions (Walton, “Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism”. Noûs, 18(1): 67–72, 1984) and, above all, the development of a general theory of fiction as imaginative activity. His 1990 book Mimesis as Make-believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts collects and re-elaborates articles Walton published on the subject since the 1970s. Though he does not attempt to give a definitive answer for what imagination is, Walton thoroughly investigates its role in all cases of representational works, describing depictions as a specific case of “make-believe” activity: images, in short, are specific props of a visual and perceptual “make-believe” game. (shrink)