Este artículo problematiza la forma en la que el feminismo ha interpretado al escepticismo como una amenaza para su proyecto epistemológico, ético y político, y plantea que, a pesar de dicha interpretación, el escepticismo es inherente a la filosofía feminista y un aliado útil para su proyecto. El problema ha estado en cómo el feminismo ha reducido su comprensión del escepticismo a una versión cartesiana extrema y ha pasado por alto otras corrientes de la tradición —como la de David Hume— (...) que podrían ser fructíferas para promover una actitud crítica y emancipatoria. Muestra así como una alianza entre una comprensión moderada del escepticismo y el feminismo puede brindar las herramientas necesarias para cuestionar formas de dominación patriarcal y poner en marcha investigaciones que combatan la opresión de género. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with identifying and accounting for cases where the epistemic standard is raised inappropriately. The first section is concerned with identifying a notion of a variable epistemic standard that is neutral regarding a range of theoretical issues. The second section argues that the possibility the epistemic standard could be raised in some epistemic inappropriate way warrants further investigation. The third section outlines and provides a partial explanation of such a case: one in which a climate change denier (...) attempts to raise the epistemic standard in order to shut down inquiry. (shrink)

We consider the complex interactions between rape culture and epistemology. A central case study is the consideration of a deferential attitude about the epistemology of sexual assault testimony. According to the deferential attitude, individuals and institutions should decline to act on allegations of sexual assault unless and until they are proven in a formal setting, i.e., a criminal court. We attack this deference from several angles, including the pervasiveness of rape culture in the criminal justice system, the epistemology of testimony (...) and norms connecting knowledge and action, the harms of tacit idealizations away from important contextual factors, and a contextualist semantics for 'knows' ascriptions. (shrink)