- Recent work on the proof paradox.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12667.details
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Rehabilitating Statistical Evidence.Lewis Ross - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):3-23.details
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Rational requirements for suspended judgment.Luis Rosa - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):385-406.details
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Profiling, Neutrality, and Social Equality.Lewis Ross - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (4):808-824.details
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Legal proof and statistical conjunctions.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2021-2041.details
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Justice in epistemic gaps: The ‘proof paradox’ revisited.Lewis Ross - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):315-333.details
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Criminal Proof: Fixed or Flexible?Lewis Ross - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly (4):1-23.details
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Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control.Blake Roeber - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):415-431.details
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Suspending belief in credal accounts.Andrew del Rio - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):3-25.details
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Normative certitude for expressivists.Michael Ridge - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3325-3347.details
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Belief, blame, and inquiry: a defense of doxastic wronging.Z. Quanbeck - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (10-11):2955-2975.details
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No Reasons to Believe the False.Javier González De Prado Salas - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):703-722.details
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No Reasons to Believe the False.Javier González Prado - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):703-722.details
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What does decision theory have to do with wanting?Milo Phillips-Brown - 2021 - Mind 130 (518):413-437.details
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II—Pluralism about Belief States.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):187-204.details
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Updating as Communication.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):225-248.details
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Belief in a Fallen World.Robert Pasnau - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):531-559.details
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Reasoning Simplifying Attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):722-735.details
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An Epistemic Puzzle About Knowledge and Rational Credence.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2019 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 32 (3-4):195-206.details
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Requirements of intention in light of belief.Carlos Núñez - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2471-2492.details
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Must Good Reasoning Satisfy Cumulative Transitivity?Shyam Nair - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):123-146.details
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Privacy rights and ‘naked’ statistical evidence.Lauritz Aastrup Munch - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3777-3795.details
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Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.details
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Full Belief and Loose Speech.Sarah Moss - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):255-291.details
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Knowledge, Individualised Evidence and Luck.Dario Mortini - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3791-3815.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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A new puzzle about belief and credence.Andrew Moon - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.details
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Moral Caution and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (2):120-141.details
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Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
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Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility.Alex Madva - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):53-78.details
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Belief: What is it Good for?John MacFarlane - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-18.details
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Implicature and non-local pragmatic encroachment.Dustin Locke - 2017 - Synthese 194 (2).details
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#MeToo & the role of Outright Belief.Alexandra Lloyd - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):181-197.details
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An Epistemic Objection to Racial Profiling.Alexandra Lloyd - forthcoming - Tandf: Social Epistemology:1-9.details
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Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.details
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Justification, knowledge, and normality.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1593-1609.details
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Eleven angry men.Clayton Littlejohn - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):227-239.details
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The independence of (in)coherence.Wooram Lee - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6563-6584.details
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On the Arbitrariness Objection to the Threshold View.Matthew Lee - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (1):143-158.details
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Just Probabilities.Chad Lee-Stronach - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Will I get a job? Contextualism, belief, and faith.Samuel Lebens - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5769-5790.details
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On the Harmony between Epistemology and Pistology.Samuel Lebens - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):29-35.details
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Why Is Proof the Only Way to Acquire Mathematical Knowledge?Marc Lange - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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Standards and values.Matthew Kotzen - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):167-187.details
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Diachronic trends in the topic distributions of formal epistemology abstracts.David Kinney - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-34.details
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Credence as doxastic tendency.Dominik Kauss - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4495-4518.details
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Algorithms and the Individual in Criminal Law.Renée Jorgensen - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):1-17.details
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Dependent philosophical majorities and the skeptical argument from disagreement.Rasmus Jaksland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-24.details
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Why Credences Are Not Beliefs.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):360-370.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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