Феномен пам’яті розглядається як компонент, імпліцитно присутній у процесі інформаційної комунікації. Наведено коротку типологію видів пам’яті, які утворюють референційне поле так званої семантичної пам’яті. Через підходи Ю. Лотмана та Р. Якобсона розглядаєть ся класичне уявлення про час, що тісно пов’язане з пам’яттю. Основна увага приділяється тому, як можна розглядати пам’ять у межах та за допомоги логіки. Як один зі шляхів роз в’язання цього питання пропонується застосувати інструменти часової логіки через аналіз праць видатного українського логіка Анатолія Ішмуратова. Розглянуто класифіка- ції часів (...) О. Єсперсена, Г. Райхенбаха, В. Буля. Проаналізовано суб’єктивну й об’єктивну осі орієнтації, що лежать в основі календарів, діаграм і шкал як фраґментів часу. На думку Іш му- ра това, ці інструменти — схеми, діаграми тощо — можна вважати мовами. Мож ли вість мовної об’єктивації значення визначає зв’язок логічного висновування, а отже, структуру- вання семантичних царин, якими є спогади, засобами логічної мови та відповідно до її струк- тур. Досліджуючи логічні та пізнавальні умови дії, Ішмуратов продовжував розвивати ідеї часової логіки та обґрунтовувати можливості їх застосування до пояснення психологічного сприйняття об’єктивного часу. Він будував схему семантичних зв’язків пам’яті як психоло- гічного акту, що відтворює життєвий шлях особистості; він розрізняв спогади та «псевдо- спогади», які разом впливають на переоцінку минулих подій, формують досвід особистості та її здатність конструювати альтернативи майбутнього. Особливе місце в дослідженнях Ішмуратова займає його експлікація часової тризначної логіки та застосування часових мо дальностей до аналізу так званих перехідних станів. Подальше вивчення таких підходів мог ло б допомогти раціональному осмисленню пам’яті та дати цікаві результати. (shrink)

It is often thought that consciousness has a qualitative dimension that cannot be tracked by science. Recently, however, some philosophers have argued that this worry stems not from an elusive feature of the mind, but from the special nature of the concepts used to describe conscious states. Marc Champagne draws on the neglected branch of philosophy of signs or semiotics to develop a new take on this strategy. The term “semiotics” was introduced by John Locke in the modern period – (...) its etymology is ancient Greek, and its theoretical underpinnings are medieval. Charles Sanders Peirce made major advances in semiotics, so he can act as a pipeline for these forgotten ideas. Most philosophers know Peirce as the founder of American pragmatism, but few know that he also coined the term “qualia,” which is meant to capture the intrinsic feel of an experience. Since pragmatic verification and qualia are now seen as conflicting commitments, Champagne endeavors to understand how Peirce could (or thought he could) have it both ways. The key, he suggests, is to understand how humans can insert distinctions between features that are always bound. Recent attempts to take qualities seriously have resulted in versions of panpsychism, but Champagne outlines a more plausible way to achieve this. So, while semiotics has until now been the least known branch of philosophy ending in –ics, his book shows how a better understanding of that branch can move one of the liveliest debates in philosophy forward. (shrink)

Critical studies have rightly faulted mainstream HRM for its failure to account for the meaning of being human under regimes of HRM. This article advances the field in this regard by drawing on African and broader black theological reflection on the meaning of being human, and by using visual research methods to interrogate the extent to which workplaces respect human dignity. Fifty-five (55) visual timeline interviews were conducted in a range of workplaces in the north-east of England. Data showed that (...) allowing autonomy and freedom, mediating audit regimes, contractual affirmation, and creating communities of care were the key factors whose presence created humanising workplaces and whose absence signalled dehumanising ones. This research allows a richer understanding of structures and processes that produce either humanising or dehumanising workplaces. (shrink)

Some have suggested that images can be arguments. Images can certainly bolster the acceptability of individual premises. We worry, though, that the static nature of images prevents them from ever playing a genuinely argumentative role. To show this, we call attention to a dilemma. The conclusion of a visual argument will either be explicit or implicit. If a visual argument includes its conclusion, then that conclusion must be demarcated from the premise or otherwise the argument will beg the question. If (...) a visual argument does not include its conclusion, then the premises on display must license that specific conclusion and not its opposite, in accordance with some demonstrable rationale. We show how major examples from the literature fail to escape this dilemma. Drawing inspiration from the graphical logic of C. S. Peirce, we suggest instead that images can be manipulated in a way that overcomes the dilemma. Diagrammatic reasoning can take one stepwise from an initial visual layout to a conclusion—thereby providing a principled rationale that bars opposite conclusions—and the visual inscription of this correct conclusion can come afterward in time—thereby distinguishing the conclusion from the premises. Even though this practical application of Peirce’s logical ideas to informal contexts requires that one make adjustments, we believe it points to a dynamic conception of visual argumentation that will prove more fertile in the long run. (shrink)

This paper suggests that it is largely a want of notional distinctions which fosters the “explanatory gap” that has beset the study of consciousness since T. Nagel’s revival of the topic. Modifying Ned Block’s controversial claim that we should countenance a “phenomenal-consciousness” which exists in its own right, we argue that there is a way to recuperate the intuitions he appeals to without engaging in an onerous reification of the facet in question. By renewing with the full type/token/tone trichotomy developed (...) by C. S. Peirce, we think the distinctness Block calls attention to can be seen as stemming not from any separate module lurking within the mind, but rather from our ability to prescind qualities from occurrences. (shrink)

The recent wave of data on exoplanets lends support to METI ventures (Messaging to Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence), insofar as the more exoplanets we find, the more likely it is that “exominds” await our messages. Yet, despite these astronomical advances, there are presently no well-confirmed tests against which to check the design of interstellar messages. In the meantime, the best we can do is distance ourselves from terracentric assumptions. There is no reason, for example, to assume that all inferential abilities are language-like. (...) With that in mind, I argue that logical reasoning does not have to be couched in symbolic notation. In diagrammatic reasoning, inferences are underwritten, not by rules, but by transformations of self-same qualitative signs. I use the Existential Graphs of C. S. Peirce to show this. Since diagrams are less dependent on convention and might even be generalized to cover non-visual senses, I argue that METI researchers should add some form of diagrammatic representations to their repertoire. Doing so can shed light, not just on alien minds, but on the deepest structures of reasoning itself. (shrink)

In Natural propositions (2014), Stjernfelt contends that the interpretation of a proposition or dicisign requires the joint action of two kinds of signs. A proposition must contain a sign that conveys a general quality. This function can be served by a similarity-based icon or code-based symbol. In addition, a proposition must situate or apply this general quality, so that the predication can become liable of being true or false. This function is served by an index. Stjernfelt rightly considers the co-localization (...) of these two parts to be a primitive phenomenon. Although this primitive character would seem to bar any further analysis, I endeavor to clarify the degree of proximity sufficient to enable co-localization. Siding with Pietarinen (2014), who argues that the whole issue should not be construed in metric terms, I conclude that one cannot make sense of propositional co-localization without appealing to some form of first-person perspective. (shrink)