- Grading in Groups.Michael Morreau - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (2):323-352.details
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Doxastic divergence and the problem of comparability. Pragmatism defended further.Anne Https://Orcidorg Meylan - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):199-216.details
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A Moorean View of the Value of Lives.Kris McDaniel - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):23-46.details
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On Parfit’s Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle.Michal Masny - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):114-139.details
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Do epistemic reasons bear on the ought simpliciter?Susanne Mantel - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):214-227.details
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The balance and weight of reasons.Nicholas Makins - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):592-606.details
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Incommensurability, slight pains and God.Morgan Luck - 2014 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 75 (2):79-85.details
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Kant on the motive of (imperfect) duty.Jennifer Ryan Lockhart - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (6):569-603.details
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Belief and rational indeterminacy.Nick Leonard - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13523-13542.details
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Imprecise Credences and Acceptance.Benjamin Lennertz - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
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Deontological Decision Theory and Agent-Centered Options.Seth Lazar - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):579-609.details
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Anton's Game: Deontological Decision Theory for an Iterated Decision Problem.Seth Lazar - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (1):88-109.details
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Parity and the Resolution of Value Conflicts in Design.Atay Https://Orcidorg Kozlovski - 2022 - Science and Engineering Ethics 28 (2):1-18.details
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Bare-Difference Methodology and a Problematic Separability Principle.Zak A. Kopeikin - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (4):553-570.details
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Moorean pluralism as a solution to the incommensurability problem.Justin Klocksiem - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):335 – 49.details
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In Defense of the Trichotomy Thesis.Justin Klocksiem - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (3):317-327.details
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Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity.Michael Klenk - 2021 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 13 (2).details
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On the Ranking of Teams.Stephen Kershnar & James Delaney - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):567-579.details
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Weak Superiority, Imprecise Equality and the Repugnant Conclusion.Karsten Klint Jensen - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (3):294-315.details
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Maximization, Incomparability, and Managerial Choice.Nien-hê Hsieh - 2007 - Business Ethics Quarterly 17 (3):497-513.details
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Is incomparability a problem for anyone?Nien-hê Hsieh - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):65-80.details
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Is Incomparability a Problem for Anyone?Nien-hê Hsieh - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (1):65-80.details
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Too many cooks.Alex Horne - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-22.details
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The Authority Account of Prudential Options.Keith Horton - 2015 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):17-35.details
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The limited impact of indeterminacy for healthcare rationing: how indeterminacy problems show the need for a hybrid theory, but nothing more.Anders Herlitz - 2016 - Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (1):22-25.details
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Toward a Hybrid Theory of How to Allocate Health-related Resources.Anders Herlitz - 2023 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 48 (4):373-383.details
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Social Choice, Nondeterminacy, and Public Reasoning.Anders Herlitz & Karim Sadek - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (3):377-401.details
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Spectrum Arguments, Parity and Persistency.Anders Herlitz - 2020 - Theoria 86 (4):463-481.details
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Putting costs and benefits of ordeals together.Anders Herlitz - 2021 - Economics and Philosophy 37 (1):37-49.details
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Nondeterminacy, Two-Step Models, and Justified Choice.Anders Herlitz - 2018 - Ethics 129 (2):284-308.details
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Nondeterminacy, cycles and rational choice.Anders Herlitz - 2020 - Analysis 80 (3):443-449.details
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Microlevel Prioritizations and Incommensurability.Anders Herlitz - 2018 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 27 (1):75-86.details
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Classifying comparability problems in a way that matters.Anders Herlitz & Henrik Andersson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-19.details
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Dimensions of Value.Brian Hedden & Daniel Muñoz - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Consequentialism and Collective Action.Brian Hedden - 2020 - Ethics 130 (4):530-554.details
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Take the sugar.Caspar Hare - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):237-247.details
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Perfectly balanced interests.Caspar Hare - 2009 - Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):165-176.details
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Rational Choice and the Transitivity of Betterness.Toby Handfield - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3):584-604.details
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Incommensurability and vagueness in spectrum arguments: options for saving transitivity of betterness.Toby Handfield & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2373-2387.details
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The Impotence of the Value Pump.John Halstead - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (2):195-216.details
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Value-Preference Symmetry and Fitting-Attitude Accounts of Value Relations.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):476-491.details
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The Possibility of Undistinguishedness.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):609-613.details
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Money Pumps, Incompleteness, and Indeterminacy.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):60-72.details
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Indeterminacy and the Small-Improvement Argument.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2013 - Utilitas 25 (4):433-445.details
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Conflicting reasons in the small-improvement argument.Johan E. Gustafsson & Nicolas Espinoza - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):754-763.details
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An Extended Framework for Preference Relations.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (3):360-367.details
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The Numbers Count.Peter A. Graham - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):129-134.details
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Whom Should We Enhance? The Problem of Altering Potential.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2013 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4):731-753.details
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Whom Should We Enhance? The Problem of Altering Potential.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (6):731-753.details
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How (and How Not) to Defend Lesser-Evil Options.Kerah Gordon-Solmon - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 20 (3-4):211-232.details
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