- Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
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Unacknowledged Permissivism.Julia Jael Smith - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):158-183.details
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How Low Can You Go? A Defense of Believing Philosophical Theories.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Mark Walker & Sanford Goldberg (eds.), Philosophy with Attitude. OUP.details
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Conciliatory Reasoning, Self-Defeat, and Abstract Argumentation.Aleks Https://Orcidorg Knoks - 2023 - Review of Symbolic Logic 16 (3):740-787.details
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Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
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Religious Diversity and Disagreement.Matthew A. Benton - 2019 - In M. Fricker, N. J. L. L. Pedersen, D. Henderson & P. J. Graham (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology. Routledge. pp. 185-195.details
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Desacuerdos Básicos entre Pares Epistémicos.Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2018 - Ideas Y Valores 67 (168):81-99.details
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Basic disagreements among epistemic Peers.Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2018 - Ideas Y Valores 67 (168):81-99.details
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The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism.Ru Ye - 2019 - Episteme:1-20.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.details
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A Paradox About Our Epistemic Self-Conception: Are You an Über Epistemic Superior?Mark Walker - 2022 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (4):285-316.details
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Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.details
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Explaining Higher-order Defeat.Marco Tiozzo - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):453-469.details
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Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386.details
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Group disagreement: a belief aggregation perspective.Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4033-4058.details
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Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection.Robert Mark Simpson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (4):519-538.details
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A higher-order approach to disagreement.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):80-100.details
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Aesthetic Higher-Order Evidence for Subjectivists.Luis Oliveira & Chris Mag Uidhir - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):235-249.details
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Conceptual limitations, puzzlement, and epistemic dilemmas.Deigan Michael - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2771-2796.details
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Remarks on the Epistemic Interpretation of Paraconsistent Logic.Nicolás Lo Guercio & Damian Szmuc - 2018 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 22 (1):153-170.details
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The trouble with having standards.Han Li - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1225-1245.details
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How Supererogation Can Save Intrapersonal Permissivism.Han Li - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):171-186.details
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Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):342-370.details
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Norms of criminal conviction.Jennifer Lackey - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):188-209.details
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Conciliating to Avoid Moral Scepticism.Nick Küspert - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (3):279-300.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
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A Counterexample to the Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):403-409.details
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Conciliatory views, higher-order disagreements, and defeasible logic.Aleks Knoks - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
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Steadfastness, deference, and permissive rationality.Jaemin Jung - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):5093-5112.details
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Conciliationism and Moral Spinelessness.James Fritz - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):101-118.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality.David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Matjaz Potrc & Hannah Tierney - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):194-225.details
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The epistemic significance of political disagreement.Bjørn G. Hallsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2187-2202.details
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Disagreement and the division of epistemic labor.Bjørn G. Hallsson & Klemens Kappel - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2823-2847.details
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Moderate Epistemic Akrasia.Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2018 - Crítica. Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 50 (148):69-97.details
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Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Reasons.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):282-302.details
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Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1213-1223.details
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Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: from Accuracy to Akrasia.David Christensen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):397-422.details
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Akratic (epistemic) modesty.David Christensen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2191-2214.details
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Epistemic Existentialism.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - Episteme:1-16.details
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The biased nature of philosophical beliefs in the light of peer disagreement.László Bernáth & János Tőzsér - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):363-378.details
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Belief dependence: How do the numbers count?Zach Barnett - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):297-319.details
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Is Epistemic Permissivism Intuitive?Nathan Ballantyne - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):365-378.details
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Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrewsdetails
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Ethics and Epistemic Hopelessness.James Fritz - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):977–1005.details
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When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - 2019details
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