- Epistemic dimensions of gaslighting: peer-disagreement, self-trust, and epistemic injustice.Andrew D. Spear - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62:1-24.details
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Disagreement and epistemic improvement.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Mona Simion - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14641-14665.details
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Unconfirmed peers and spinelessness.Ben Sherman - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):425-444.details
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Plato's Phaedo on Disagreement and Its Role in Epistemic Improvement.Tonguc Seferoglu - 2020 - Ancient Philosophy Today 2 (1):24-44.details
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The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.details
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The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):802-831.details
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The epistemology of moral disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.details
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The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment.Richard Rowland - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):266-275.details
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Moral Error Theory Without Epistemic Error Theory: Scepticism About Second-Personal Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):547-569.details
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Disagreement and the First‐Person Perspective.Gurpreet Rattan - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):31-53.details
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A higher-order approach to disagreement.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):80-100.details
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Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12886.details
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Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12886.details
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Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - Synthese (3):1-26.details
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Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1117-1125.details
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Intellectual humility and the epistemology of disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1711-1723.details
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Inferior Disagreement.Maura Priest - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):263-283.details
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Disagreement, reliability, and resilience.John Pittard - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4389-4409.details
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The procedural epistemic value of deliberation.Fabienne Peter - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1253-1266.details
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Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.details
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Might Moral Epistemologists Be Asking The Wrong Questions?Caleb Perl - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):556-585.details
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Why Responsible Belief Is Permissible Belief.Rik Peels & Anthony Booth - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):75-88.details
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Non-rational action in the face of disagreement: an argument against (strong) non-conformism.Nikolaj Pedersen - 2016 - Synthese 195 (7):2935-2966.details
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Intuition as Philosophical Evidence.Federico Mathías Pailos - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):297-310.details
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Disagreement.Graham Oppy - 2010 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1-3):183-199.details
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A diachronic perspective on peer disagreement in veritistic social epistemology.Erik J. Olsson - 2018 - Synthese:1-19.details
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A diachronic perspective on peer disagreement in veritistic social epistemology.Erik J. Olsson - 2018 - Synthese 197 (10):4475-4493.details
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Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):51-78.details
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Disagreement, peerhood, and three paradoxes of Conciliationism.Thomas Mulligan - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):67-78.details
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Defeaters in current epistemology: introduction to the special issue.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2845-2854.details
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How to Use Cognitive Faculties You Never Knew You Had.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):251-275.details
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When is consensus knowledge based? Distinguishing shared knowledge from mere agreement.Boaz Miller - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1293-1316.details
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Everybody else is thinking it, so why can’t we?Justin P. McBrayer - 2020 - Synthese (12):1-17.details
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Caveat Auditor: Epistemic Trust and Conflicts of Interest.Justin P. McBrayer - forthcoming - Social Epistemology.details
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Moral Caution and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (2):120-141.details
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Disagreement and Epistemic Peers.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - Oxford Handbooks Online.details
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Friedman on suspended judgment.Michal Masny - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5009-5026.details
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O problema do desacordo na epistemologia contempor'nea.Juliomar Marques Silva - 2021 - Griot : Revista de Filosofia 21 (1):206-220.details
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Conciliationism and the Menace of Scepticism.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Dialogue 54 (3):469–488.details
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A Neo-Pyrrhonian Response to the Disagreeing about Disagreement Argument.Diego E. Machuca - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1663-1680.details
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Explanationist rebuttals (coherentism defended again).William G. Lycan - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):5-20.details
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Explanationism provides the best explanation of the epistemic significance of peer disagreement.Matt Lutz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1811-1828.details
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From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary.Errol Lord - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2):1-13.details
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From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary.Errol Lord - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):365-377.details
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The epistemic dimension of reasonableness.Federica Liveriero - 2015 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 41 (6):517-535.details
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That seems wrong: pedagogically defusing moral relativism and moral skepticism.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2023 - International Journal of Ethics Education 8 (2):335-349.details
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On Merely Modal Epistemic Peers: Challenging the Equal-Weight View.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):809-823.details
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Modest meta‐philosophical skepticism.Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2019 - Ratio 32 (2):93-103.details
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Reasonable doubt and disagreement.Youngjae Lee - 2017 - Legal Theory 23 (4):203-257.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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