- Fact-Dependent Policy Disagreements and Political Legitimacy.Klemens Kappel - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):313-331.details
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Steadfastness, deference, and permissive rationality.Jaemin Jung - 2017 - Synthese 194 (12):5093-5112.details
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Rational disagreement and scientific controversy.Alexandre Luis Junges - 2013 - Scientiae Studia 11 (3):613-635.details
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Judgments, preferences, and compromise.Peter Jones & Ian O’Flynn - 2022 - Journal of Social Philosophy 54 (1):77-93.details
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Judgments, preferences, and compromise.Peter Jones & Ian O’Flynn - 2022 - Journal of Social Philosophy 54 (1):77-93.details
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Judgments, preferences, and compromise.Peter Jones & Ian O’Flynn - 2022 - Journal of Social Philosophy 54 (1):77-93.details
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On Snobbery.Zoë A. Johnson King - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):199-215.details
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XI—Literature and Disagreement.Eileen John - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):239-260.details
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Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility.Drew Johnson - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):353-372.details
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Scientific Facts and Methods in Public Reason.Karin Jønch-Clausen & Klemens Kappel - 2016 - Res Publica 22 (2):117-133.details
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Retributivism, Justification and Credence: The Epistemic Argument Revisited.Sofia M. I. Jeppsson - 2020 - Neuroethics 14 (2):177-190.details
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Conciliationism and Moral Spinelessness.James Fritz - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):101-118.details
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Dependent philosophical majorities and the skeptical argument from disagreement.Rasmus Jaksland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-24.details
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Disagreement in metametaphysical dispute.Rasmus Jaksland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-21.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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A patchwork epistemology of disagreement?Yoaav Isaacs - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1873-1885.details
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Merging of opinions and probability kinematics.Simon M. Huttegger - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):611-648.details
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Disagreement, Dogmatism, and the Bounds of Philosophy. [REVIEW]Nick Hughes - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):591-596.details
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Relativism and Faultless Disagreement.Richard Hou & Linton Wang - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (1):203-216.details
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Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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Religious disagreements and epistemic rationality.David M. Holley - 2013 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 74 (1):33-48.details
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Is it Safe to Disagree?Jaakko Hirvelä - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):305-321.details
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Why the Fence Is the Seat of Reason When Experts Disagree.Martin Hinton - 2019 - Social Epistemology 33 (2):160-171.details
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Overcoming Disagreement Through Ordering: Building an Epistemic Hierarchy.Martin Hinton - 2018 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 55 (1):77-91.details
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Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality.David Henderson, Terry Horgan, Matjaz Potrc & Hannah Tierney - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):194-225.details
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Extremists are more confident.Nora Heinzelmann & Viet Tran - 2022 - Erkenntnis.details
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A Game-Theoretic Approach to Peer Disagreement.Remco Heesen & Pieter van der Kolk - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (6):1345-1368.details
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Reasons, Coherence, and Group Rationality.Brian Hedden - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):581-604.details
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Higher-Order Epistemic Attitudes and Intellectual Humility.Allan Hazlett - 2012 - Episteme 9 (3):205-223.details
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Entitlement and mutually recognized reasonable disagreement.Allan Hazlett - 2013 - Episteme (1):1-25.details
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Metatheories of disagreement: Introduction.Péter Hartl & Ákos Gyarmathy - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):337-347.details
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Naturalistic Moral Realism and Moral Disagreement: David Copp’s Account.Mark Hanin - 2012 - Res Publica 18 (4):283-301.details
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The epistemic significance of political disagreement.Bjørn G. Hallsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2187-2202.details
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On the ethics of algorithmic decision-making in healthcare.Thomas Grote & Philipp Berens - 2020 - Journal of Medical Ethics 46 (3):205-211.details
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The Right Side of History and Higher-Order Evidence.Adam Green - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):1-15.details
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Broad and narrow epistemic standing: its relevance to the epistemology of disagreement.Robert Gressis - forthcoming - Synthese 197:1-18.details
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Broad and narrow epistemic standing: its relevance to the epistemology of disagreement.Robert Gressis - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8289-8306.details
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Dubious pleasures.Javier González de Prado - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):217-234.details
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Expert Trespassing Testimony and the Ethics of Science Communication.Mikkel Gerken - 2018 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 49 (3):299-318.details
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The Commutativity of Evidence: A Problem for Conciliatory Views of Peer Disagreement.Georgi Gardiner - 2014 - Episteme 11 (1):83-95.details
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Toleration as the Balance Between Liberty and Security.Anna Elisabetta Galeotti & Federica Liveriero - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (2):161-179.details
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No one can serve two epistemic masters.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2389-2398.details
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Moral Responsibility, Culpable Ignorance and Suppressed Disagreement.Katherine Furman - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (5):287-299.details
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Moral Steadfastness and Meta-ethics.James Fritz & Tristram McPherson - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):43-56.details
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Interests, Disagreement and Epistemic Risk.Karyn L. Freedman - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (3):587-604.details
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The Reflective Epistemic Renegade.Bryan Frances - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):419 - 463.details
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Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus?Bryan Frances - 2020 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 10 (3-4):325-345.details
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Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors.Bryan Frances - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):1-21.details
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